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SUBURBS IN BLACK AND WHITE:  
RACE, JOBS & POVERTY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY LONG ISLAND 
By 
 Tim Keogh  
Advisor: Professor Judith Stein 
 
“Suburbs in Black and White” examines how economic development shaped African 
American suburbanization on Long Island, New York from 1920 through 1980.  After 1940, the 
fortunes of Long Island’s growing black population shifted from widespread poverty to upward 
social mobility, though by the 1960s, a divide emerged between the rising black middle class and 
black working poor, and distinctly ‘black’ suburbs emerged with problems familiar to postwar 
inner cities.  While urban racial inequality is often framed in terms of housing segregation and 
the city/suburb divide, census and labor market data reveal that structural economic change 
across the New York metropolitan region produced the racial gap and intra-racial class divide, 
regardless of urban or suburban residence.  Long Island’s economy experienced the national 
labor market ‘twist’ after World War II, as job opportunities expanded for skilled workers and 
contracted for the unskilled.  By the 1970s, deindustrialization reached the suburbs, leading to 
further job loss and strained suburban tax systems.  African Americans disproportionately 
suffered from the transition, and their economic plight shaped the outcomes of local housing 
segregation.  Nonetheless, the ideology of suburban ‘affluence’ and the dualism of black city 
versus white suburb dominated public policy in the 1960s and 1970s, obscuring the shared plight 
of postwar African American urban and suburban residents.  By viewing the postwar suburbs 
from the perspective of the suburban labor market, this dissertation integrates the urban fringe 
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me work through many of my ideas, and he offered some of the most useful comments on my 
drafts.  I hope I can repay him for the hours he devoted to my dissertation.  Peter-Christian 
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In 1951, real estate developer Taca Home Builders unveiled four-room, fully heated 
suburban homes in Wyandanch, a hamlet thirty-five miles east of Manhattan in Suffolk County, 
New York.  Priced at $7,290 and eligible for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing 
Administration, the homes were competitive with Levittown, the quintessential postwar 
American suburb, only six miles away.1  Though similar, the two communities were competing 
for different customers: the Levitt brothers refused to sell to non-whites, while Taca made its 
product available to anyone, “to give people of all races and creeds an opportunity of owning 
their own home.”2  This was an implicit message to aspiring black homebuyers who were denied 
government-insured housing elsewhere on Long Island.  Taca’s ‘Carver Park’(named in honor of 
black scientist George Washington Carver) was one of several housing tracts in Wyandanch 
catering to black homeowners, attracted to the hamlet for the same reasons whites liked 
Levittown: single-family homes, good schools, ‘country living,’ and well-paying jobs in nearby 
industries.3   
Wyandanch was a ‘black’ Levittown, a result of federal housing policy that restricted 
mortgage subsidies to racially ‘homogenous’ suburbs, creating distinct ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
suburban neighborhoods in the postwar period.4  For whites though, Levittown was merely one 
																																																						
1“Complete Homes from $4,990,” Amsterdam News, December 3, 1949; “Non-Racial Dwellings Opened at 
Wyandanch,” New York Times, March 11, 1951; Levitt homes generally sold for $6,990 to $9,500 depending on the 
model in the initial years after development.  See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of 
the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 236. 
2 “Real Estate News,” Nassau Review-Star, June 20, 1952, 18. 
3 “New Homes Built for Minorities,” Amsterdam News, May 5, 1956. 
4 Andrew Wiese, Places of Their Own: African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 140; John Kimble, “Insuring Inequality: The Role of the Federal Housing 





subdivision among hundreds of choices reserved for white homebuyers.  By comparison, there 
were few Wyandanches for black homeowners, which was one of five Suffolk County 
neighborhoods that housed nearly two-thirds of the entire county’s African American 
population.5  The acute demand for black suburban housing allowed builders to forgo amenities 
expected for white communities.  Harlem transplants Mozelle and Sullivan Hart quickly learned 
this after they purchased an $8,000 home in Wyandanch in 1957, complete with a failing heater, 
a yard lacking topsoil, and an unpaved street out front.  In contrast, Levittown homeowners 
enjoyed fresh asphalt, new appliances, and carefully manicured lawns, all part of Levitt’s careful 
community planning and efforts to entice buyers.6  This was true across Long Island’s black 
suburban developments, which were hastily constructed, sometimes built without proper runoff, 
lacked playgrounds, and in a few instances, existed near environmental hazards.7   
Despite the disadvantages, black suburbanites formed ‘places of their own.’8  The Hart 
family of Wyandanch eventually fixed the heater, grew a proper suburban front lawn, and put a 
second floor on the house, the same improvements white Levittowners made.  They remarked 
that buying a home in Wyandanch was “moving into paradise,” the same sentiments hundreds of 
Levittowners aired about their postwar suburb.9  Their neighbors formed civic associations, 
fretted about taxes, joined the school board, and attended local government meetings, 
unremarkable activities emulated across suburbia.  Wyandanch and its sister communities were 
																																																						
 
5 Cavaioli, Frank J. “Ethnic Population Patterns on Long Island.” in Ethnicity in Suburbia: The Long Island 
Experience, Salvatore J. LaGumina, ed., (Salvatore J. LaGumina: 1980), 16. 
6 D.J. Hill, “In a Separate Suburbia Proud but Often Powerless, Wyandanch Residents Try to Stabilize Their 
Community,” Newsday, September 23, 1990. 
7 Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature & the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century 
America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 54, 65. 
8 I am borrowing Andrew Wiese’s phrase for black suburbs. See Wiese, 7-9. 
9 D.J. Hill, “In a Separate Suburbia Proud but Often Powerless, Wyandanch Residents Try to Stabilize Their 




referred to as little ‘Harlems,’ symbols of racial progress in spite of segregation and emblematic 
of postwar black upward mobility.  Though denied entry to Levittown, African Americans 
nonetheless made their own equivalents by the early 1960s, diversifying ‘white’ suburbia.   
If Wyandanch was the ‘black’ equivalent of Levittown, their histories diverged after 
1960.  During the 1960s, median family income in Wyandanch trailed twelve percent behind 
Levittown and fifteen percent behind other communities in Suffolk County.  By 1970, 
Levittown’s poverty rate stood at three percent, while seventeen percent of families lived in 
poverty in Wyandanch’s most populous census tract, and just under a tenth of the entire county’s 
welfare cases resided within the black suburb’s borders.10  Though most of Wyandanch’s homes 
were built after 1945, over a fifth of its housing stock was deemed ‘deteriorated or dilapidated.’ 
Part of this was due to shoddy construction, but multiple families moved into cellars and hastily-
dormered second floors in single-family homes.  Overcrowding degraded the community’s 
residential housing stock, strained local public services, and added children to schools without a 
concomitant increase in property tax contributions.11  While early critics warned that the Levitts 
were building a suburban ‘slum,’ by the 1970s Levittowners delighted in mocking these 
predictions as property values soared, homeowners added garages, pools, or patios to their 
houses, and the children of first-generation Levittowners became homeowners in Levittown.12 In 
																																																						
10 Wyandanch’s largest census tract, 1225, was the only census tract within the contiguous borders of ‘Wyandanch’ 
in both 1960 and 1970.  See Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, US Census ’70: Volume 6: Income 
(Hauppauge, New York: Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1972), pp. 7, 45, 77-88; Nassau County Planning 
Commission, Nassau County, New York Data Book (Mineola, New York: Nassau County Planning Commission, 
June 1966), X-4; Nassau County Planning Commission, Nassau County, New York Data Book (Carle Place, New 
York: Nassau County Planning Commission, June 1974), 152; U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and 
Housing: Census Tracts, Part 14: New York, NY Standard Metropolitan Area (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), P-
684; Robert Koubek, Wyandanch: A Case Study of Political Impotence in a Black Suburban Ghetto (M.A. Thesis, 
Queens College, 1971), 29. 
11 New York State Urban Development Corporation, New York State Urban Development Corporation Annual 
Report 1973 (New York: Urban Development Corp, 1974), 53; “Portraits of a Housing Crisis,” Newsday, November 
12, 1972, 11. 
12 “What’s a Levittown? It’s Good Housing,” Newsday, July 9, 1971, 18A; “A Plan to Keep Levittown Unchanged,” 




contrast, Wyandanch’s plight undermined its symbolism of racial progress, and a homeowner 
admitted that “the main concern of middle class people in Wyandanch is to get the hell out of 
here.”13   
Wyandanch’s conditions also produced distinct political battles.  While all suburbanites 
bickered over property taxes, zoning codes, and school quality, local conflicts in Wyandanch 
revolved around the black poor.  Black homeowners chafed under ballooning school budgets to 
accommodate the district’s high proportion of low-income students, and they demanded the 
dissolution of Wyandanch’s school district in 1968, so that surrounding white suburban districts 
should share the burden of educating the hamlet’s poor population. Their effort failed, and the 
district implemented austerity, drawing the ire of low-income parents.14  In 1970, local clergy 
and anti-poverty activists contracted with Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s new public housing 
agency, the Urban Development Corporation, to build a public housing complex in the suburb.  
The low-income project threatened the middle class status of the suburb, and black homeowners, 
uniting with whites of neighboring hamlets, defeated the project.15  Frustrations even spilled into 
the streets.  For three nights in August 1967, youths threw Molotov cocktails into a gas station, 
stores, and two homes, lit cars on fire and ignited the high school’s auditorium.  They hurled 
rocks and bottles at police and firefighters sent to calm the neighborhood and isolate the 
flames.16   
By the 1980s, Levittowners looked forward to their fortieth anniversary of Levitt’s 
postwar achievement, while Wyandanch was unrecognizable from its early past.  A growing 
																																																						
13 Quoted in Koubek, 38. 
14“NAACP Bids State Act on Wyandanch,” Newsday, January 6, 1968, 5; Koubek, 38, 78-82. 
15 “The Wyandanch Housing Fight,” Newsday, Jul 26, 1973, 4. 
16 “School, 3 Stores set Afire on LI,” Newsday, August 2, 1967, 1l; “11 Fires Plague Wyandanch,” Newsday, August 
3, 1967, 3; “Violence Strikes L.I. Village Again,” New York Times, August 3, 1967, 18; “Dennison Vows 




population of drug users and prostitutes moved into derelict houses.  Homeless individuals and 
addicts met in the “living room” and “Pork Chop Hill,” two wooded areas near the hamlet’s main 
thoroughfare.  In winter months, the residents of these woods kept warm with barrel fires, but 
periodic police raids forced them into other parts of the community.  Police battled the 
neighborhood’s drug problems, including a high-profile arrest and conviction of a 10-year-old 
who sold crack on Straight Path, the hamlet’s main thoroughfare, in 1989.  The major battles 
over schools and housing persisted, though community activism now included campaigns to 
condemn vacant stores and ‘crack houses,’ reduce community addiction, and decrease gun 
violence.17  Daria Cooper, who had lived in Wyandanch since the 1950s, remarked that “the 
community has not survived as intact as it was when I grew up here."18  Ethel Ryan Bond, who 
returned for her high school reunion, lamented the changes as well.  In the 1960s, "it was a 
country town…when I drive through Wyandanch now, it hurts me. It's not Wyandanch 
anymore."19 
Levittown was symbolic of postwar suburbia, but the same cannot be said of Wyandanch. 
The Pulitzer-winning journalist Les Payne described it as a hamlet “left to the sociologists, the 
welfare case workers, the building-resurrection men…it is in the suburbs” he remarked tartly, 
“but not of the suburbs.”20  The history of Wyandanch indeed parallels that of the nation’s inner-
city neighborhoods, not the leafy-green enclaves along the urban fringe.  Why such a divergent 
trajectory?  Segregation looms large as an explanation, concentrating poverty and forcing nearly 
																																																						
17D.J. Hill, “In a Separate Suburbia Proud but Often Powerless, Wyandanch Residents Try to Stabilize Their 
Community,” Newsday September, 23, 1990; “Wyandanch Aims to Take Back Streets from Pushers and 
Prostitutes,” New York Times, August 22, 1993; “Wyandanch Seeks U.S. Help in Fighting Crime,” New York Times, 
October 7, 1993, B7; “Family Court Judge Finds 10-Year-Old Did Sell Crack,” New York Times, February 2, 1989. 
18  “Wyandanch Aims to Take Back Streets from Pushers and Prostitutes,” New York Times, August 22, 1993. 
19 D.J. Hill, “In a Separate Suburbia Proud but Often Powerless, Wyandanch Residents Try to Stabilize Their 
Community,” Newsday September, 23, 1990. 





all African Americans, save the wealthy few, into the neighborhoods with poor black residents. 
This occurred in suburbs and cities alike.  Though middle class African Americans could exert 
their status economically, they were nonetheless geographically tied to the minority poor, and the 
trajectory of black neighborhoods were shaped by both groups.21 On Long Island, residential 
segregation mixed with the region’s balkanized government system, where the tax base rested on 
small communities of homeowners.  Public revenues were generated from local residents, 
leaving black suburban schools in places like Wyandanch, where the poor and middle class 
shared the burden of supporting schools, starved of necessary funding.   
If segregation concentrated African Americans in city and suburb, it nonetheless had 
distinct consequences in each space.  Urban minorities were relegated to cities with declining tax 
bases, disappearing job opportunities, and a vanishing middle class.  In the suburbs, segregation 
deprived black residents of broader tax revenues, not proximity to suburban jobs or middle class 
neighbors. A Wyandanch resident could walk or drive to major industrial centers, and Long 
Island’s largest concentration of manufacturing firms was only five miles west.  The hamlet 
never lost its middle class constituency. Segregation explains the concentration of minority poor, 
not the existence of the suburban poor themselves, who, except for local housing and related 
school divisions, lived in a space of plentiful opportunity.  Understanding Wyandanch’s distinct 
																																																						
21 William Julius Wilson contends that a black middle class served as an integral ‘social buffer’ in 
socioeconomically diverse black neighborhoods, since they could support vital community institutions during 
prolonged bouts of unemployment and economic contraction.  When the black middle class suburbanized, poverty 
concentration and social dislocation from norms of employment and community institutions intensified.  See 
William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 56-57; But as other scholars have illustrated, segregation still placed 
middle class residents within poor neighborhoods even if middle class residents left the poorest inner city 
neighborhoods.  See Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril Among the Black Middle Class 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Bruce D. Haynes, Red Lines, Black Spaces: The Politics of Race and 
Space in a Black Middle-Class Suburb (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Karyn R. Lacy, Blue-Chip Black 
Race, Class, and Status in the New Black Middle Class (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), chapter 1; 
Steven Gregory, Black Corona Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban Community (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 




suburban history through the lens of housing segregation has limited analytical utility, especially 
because it is reflective of a larger reality, that Wyandanch residents, and black Long Islanders in 
the aggregate, were poorer than whites.   Black family incomes trailed whites on Long Island, 
and more importantly, while the overall poverty rate was much lower on Long Island than New 
York City, the black poverty rate change little between city and suburb.  As of 1970, sixteen 
percent of Long Island’s black families lived below the poverty line, only four percentage points 
below that of the metropolitan area (19.9 percent).22   
Why African Americans did not enjoy the same upward mobility as whites who moved to 
the suburbs is the subject of this study.  The answer lies in the broad history of Long Island’s 
mid-century suburbanization, which I contend was a process of both job and housing 
decentralization.  Long Island emerged as the nation’s most affluent suburb after World War II 
thanks to strong government intervention, in housing, via mortgage subsidies and infrastructure 
projects, and in the labor market, through federal support of the region’s aerospace 
manufacturers.  The two were inseparable, and both made Levittown possible.  Each worked 
against black poor suburbanites and neighborhoods like Wyandanch.  Aerospace firms were the 
largest employers on Long Island and enabled working class New Yorkers to become suburban 
homeowners, though the industry employed few African Americans.  Long Island’s broader 
economy meanwhile favored white-collar and skilled technical employment.  While a 
burgeoning black middle class benefitted from this labor market, unskilled African Americans 
were at a disadvantage, lacking the rising educational standards necessary to obtain Long 
Island’s jobs.  The black poor could move to the suburbs, but the barriers to becoming a stable 
suburbanite were rooted in the job market.  Housing segregation compounded labor market 
																																																						
22 1970 Census of Population and Housing, P-601, P-603, P-863, P-865; Long Island’s overall poverty rate was 




inequality, reflected in black suburbs like Wyandanch, where the rising middle class shared 
suburban blocks and schools with the poor, who were unable to utilize the suburban labor market 
for upward mobility.   
The dominant view of suburbia, embodied in Levittown, obscured these truths.  The 
suburbs were the spatial antithesis to the city, not only in terms of aesthetics or income, but job 
opportunities in the postwar period.  When policymakers approached the ‘suburban’ poor during 
the War on Poverty, they believed the “pockets of poverty amidst plenty” could easily be 
absorbed into the suburban mainstream.  In the wake of the riots, the suburbs likewise became 
the solution to the nation’s inner-city problems, and housing segregation between city and suburb 
was the barrier.  Neither perspective accounted for the employment chasm nor the shift from 
industry to services that accelerated in both city and suburb in the 1960s and 1970s.  As 
policymakers searched in vain for suburban jobs that could absorb the poor, or battled suburban 
homeowners to build public housing in their hamlets, the problems within black suburbs 
compounded.  Suburban rioting, joblessness, decrepit housing, rising property taxes, and 
stagnant wages fit uneasily into the established spatial framework that dominated the views and 
policies of government officials, policymakers, activists, and suburbanites themselves.  The 
consequence was impoverished policy tools to combat the problems in places like Wyandanch.  
 Fifty years since, the story of the postwar black suburbs like Wyandanch remains untold 
for largely the same reason.  Scholars continue to narrate the postwar period as one of a spatial 
divide, between largely white beneficiaries of suburbanization versus the minority victims of 
segregation. This stems from the vast social science literature demonstrating the broad 




racial employment and educational disparities, higher rates of crime, and various other ills.23 
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton’s oft-cited book, American Apartheid, synthesizes decades 
of this research, testing nineteen distinct indices to prove segregation "systematically undermines 
the social and economic well-being of blacks in the United States."24 Housing, as these studies 
make clear, undermined the victories of the civil rights movement and continues to subvert 
progress toward racial equality.  In addition, these scholars have contributed to a new conception 
of poverty, “not only in individual terms but also in terms of how it is distributed across space 
and across communities.”25  Historians for their part investigate the origins of modern housing 
segregation, its historical implications, and failed attempts to alter segregated housing patterns in 
the postwar period, linking housing segregation to the major political and social developments of 
the mid to late twentieth century, from civil rights and conservatism to new racial identities.  
While formal Jim Crow fell in the South, a “New American Dilemma” emerged, “the fusion of 
class segregation and racial discrimination embodied in the urban-suburban divide.”26   
Kenneth Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier established the framework for understanding the 
historical origins of the urban/suburban divide.  Jackson argues that New Deal policies 
subsidized white suburban development while containing low-income minority populations in 
																																																						
23 Work on the consequences of housing segregation include John F. Kain, “Housing Segregation, Negro 
Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 82, no. 2 (May, 1968): 175-
197; Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial 
Inequality (New York: Routledge, 1995); Michael A. Stoll, “Job Sprawl, Spatial Mismatch, and Black Employment 
Disadvantage,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 25, no. 4 (Fall, 2006): 827-854; Camille Z. Charles, 
Gniesha Dinwiddie, and Douglas S. Massey, “The Continuing Consequences of Segregation: Family Stress and 
College Academic Performance,” Social Science Quarterly 85, no. 5 (December 2004): 1353-1373; John Yinger, 
Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1995), chapter 8; Patrick Sharkey, Stuck in Place: Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress 
Toward Racial Equality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
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urban public housing projects, whose “result, if not intent…was to segregate the races, to 
concentrate the disadvantaged in inner cities, and to reinforce the image of suburbia as a place of 
refuge from the problems of race, crime, and poverty.”27 Policy created disparate cities and 
suburbs, and Jackson’s work has influenced an entire generation of scholars.  Historians have 
since added local government authorities, real estate developers and agents, white suburban 
activists, political coalitions, and changing racial ideologies to Jackson’s account, all of which 
formed, sustained, and rationalized the racial and socioeconomic divide between cities and 
suburbs.  They also use this framework to answer some of the most important questions of the 
late twentieth century.  This includes the civil rights movement, which failed to break down 
housing segregation in the face of strong political, legal, and social opposition.28  The late 
twentieth century political evolution of the “New” Right and neo-liberal Democrats is likewise 
interpreted as an outgrowth of housing segregation.  Robert Self, Matthew Lassiter, and Lily 
Geismer all claim that middle-class white suburban homeowners, the beneficiaries of 
segregation, formed a ‘suburban’ political consensus that defended the spatial advantages they 
received from suburban living, including lower taxes, a cleaner environment, and quality 
schools, at the expense of those denied housing opportunities.  Suburban jurisdictions produced a 
‘narrow’ view of social responsibility, absolving suburbanites of the plight of inner cities as they 
thwarted integration and redistributive fiscal strategies, perpetuating racial inequality and the 
city/suburb divide.29  Finally, racial ideologies were redrawn along spatial lines in the mid-
																																																						
27 Jackson, 219. 
28 Charles M. Lamb, Housing Segregation in Suburban America Since 1960: Presidential and Judicial Politics 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Christopher Bonastia, Knocking on the Door: The Federal 
Government's Attempt to Desegregate the Suburbs (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
29 All three historians analyze a suburban political consensus they argue was pivotal to metropolitan inequality in the 
postwar period.  Robert Self argues that the structural formation of fragmented suburbs limited the social 
responsibility of its white beneficiaries to their “spatially bounded communities.”  See Robert O. Self, American 
Babylon: Race and the Postwar Struggle for Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 289-290, 333;  




twentieth century.  David M.P. Freund argues that federal housing policy and local zoning law 
fostered a new racial ideology tied to property rather than biological notions of race.  This 
ideology shaped white views of racial integration’s effects on property values, taxes, and crime, 
in turn forming a powerful rationale to enforce segregation.30   
These historians situate the city/suburban divide at the center of postwar American 
culture and politics.  In their telling, housing segregation provided middle-class whites a spatial 
privilege that they socially and politically exploited to hoard public resources within their 
borders and shield themselves from the poverty, unemployment, fiscal challenges, and minority 
concentrations within America’s cities.31  In a period of capital flight, this spatial order is seen as 
the major impediment to just and incorporative social and economic policies.  The most fleshed 
out accounts along these lines are found in Thomas Sugrue’s Origins of the Urban Crisis and 
Robert Self’s American Babylon, both of which understand deindustrialization, the limits of 
racial progress, and liberal/conservative political ideologies in spatial terms.  The Origins of the 
Urban Crisis is a split history, describing the causes and consequences of deindustrialization for 
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Detroit and its residents, while also analyzing white resistance to integration.  While the former 
affected blacks disproportionately, it fell on all unskilled. Housing exclusion, however, put a 
ceiling on black social mobility, concentrated Detroit’s poverty, and left the suburbs safe from 
the ‘urban crisis’ isolated in the increasingly black Detroit.  White anti-integration activism also 
informed their racial identities and an increasingly ‘illiberal’ political persuasion.32  Robert Self’s 
American Babylon similarly collapses the economy into a spatial narrative, linking housing 
segregation to the decentralization of industry outside Oakland’s city limits, a process that kept 
taxes low, employment high, and the suburbs reserved for white homeowners, starving the 
minority-dominated inner city of jobs and public funding.  This was the outcome of local politics 
as much as state policy, between anti-tax, anti-integration suburbanites and black activists 
demanding redistribution and reinvestment for the city of Oakland and its poor, minority 
residents. 33  In The Origins of the Urban Crisis, the suburbs protect themselves from a decline 
concentrated within urban borders.  In American Babylon, the postwar political economy is a 
spatial battle that white homeowners won after passing the Proposition 13 tax cap.   
These studies rely on the sharp white/black, city/suburb divide.  In contrast, the most 
resent historiographical shift, dubbed the ‘new suburban history,’ explicitly challenges these 
inherited constructs, asking scholars to understand suburbs, like cities, as diverse regions.  In the 
process, historians have uncovered working class suburbs, black suburban ‘pioneers,’ Mexican-
American colonias, and suburbs varied in character and function.34  ‘New’ suburban historians 
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nonetheless agree that segregation was central to racial and class inequality.  Andrew Wiese’s 
national history of twentieth century black suburbanization exemplifies this.  Wiese recognizes 
the existence of working class suburbs and regional differences in the suburban experience, but 
the struggles pivot around space.  After 1945, the greatest threat to black working class suburbs 
was urban renewal, what he interprets as ‘racial cleansing,’ projects to erase their neighborhoods 
out of existence to make way for white housing developments.  While the working class confront 
urban renewal, postwar black middle class homebuyers faced housing apartheid, in turn 
challenging or working around the segregated market to form ‘places of their own.’35  Though 
the ‘new suburban history’ has been criticized by Matthew Lassiter and Christopher Niedt for re-
affirming middle-class racial homogeneity and the urban/suburban divide, even these scholars 
argue exclusionary suburbanization was pivotal to postwar problems.36  They want historians to 
go beyond city versus suburb to reveal the “persistent patterns of racial and class segregation at 
the neighborhood level.”37 
Collectively, these scholars have uncovered the importance of residential segregation to 
America’s intransigent racial and class inequality.  In so doing, they have overturned popular 
myths, including the assumption that racial housing patterns are the consequence of individual 
choice and the belief that ‘de jure’ segregation was peculiar to the South.  They have also proven 
that segregation was (and continues to be) a structural, ideological, and political construct, not 
merely an expression of racism.  This is a tremendous achievement, and there is still work to be 
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done.38  But whether framing inequality as a divide between city and suburb or specific 
neighborhoods, the premise remains the same: space was, and remains, the mainspring of 
inequality and postwar urban decline.  This places the suburbs outside the problems of poverty, 
joblessness, and stagnant wages that plagued Americans across metropolitan regions.  The spatial 
focus obscures the role of the suburban labor market in driving inequality and ignores the history 
of the postwar suburban economy and suburban poverty, developments that share commonalities 
with postwar American cities.  Though segregation is part of Wyandanch’s history, it is not the 
whole story. 
Understanding the suburban economy demands a new approach, and “Suburbs in Black 
and White” draws on a framework that views suburbanization as a process involving the 
decentralization of jobs and people. Geographers Robert Lewis, Richard Walker, and Richard 
Harris contend twentieth-century suburbanization was the “simultaneous march of industry and 
cities outward,” that housing was “joined at the hip by industry locating to the urban fringe.” The 
process occurred in a variety of ways, producing suburbs varied in function, socioeconomic 
makeup, density, and race, places that defy any neat city/suburb dichotomy.  While they analyze 
pre-World War II suburbs, their conclusions apply to the postwar era as well.39  During and after 
World War II, defense spending in particular favored industrial jobs outward along the urban 
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fringe, pulling residents toward the suburbs.  Scholars have documented its influence on 
suburbanization, both in terms of infrastructure development and its direct and indirect 
employment effects.40  Cold War spending, a major glue cementing labor, state, and business in 
the ‘Great Compression,’ made postwar suburbs like Long Island possible.   
Understanding suburbs as job sites in the postwar period re-orients the problem of racial 
inequality away from segregation and toward a more complex confluence of factors, which 
certainly includes racism, but also considers labor market change, employment policy, and “de-
industrialization.”  Segregation has been endemic on Long Island, dividing suburbs racially into 
the twenty-first century. In 2002, David Rusk concluded that Long Island was “the most 
segregated suburb for black residents,” and a Census Report found it to be the tenth most racially 
separate metropolitan region.  This began after World War II, and persists despite federal, state, 
and county legislation to integrate Nassau and Suffolk counties.41  But black suburbs were 
nonetheless close to the region’s major employment centers, and residential segregation did not 
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exclude them from these jobs.  Figuring out why they were unable to enjoy these opportunities 
on equal terms with whites is key to understanding the postwar racial divide in the north.  In 
addition, the focus on segregation limits how we can account for change in black communities, 
because the consequences of segregation for black Long Islanders shifted over time, inextricably 
linked to their broader fortunes in the postwar economy.  Both progress and decline occurred 
within these segregated communities.42  Lastly, the suburban economic perspective permits us to 
include the suburbs into a shared story with cities, because urban and suburban neighborhoods 
faced similar social ills as each were tied to labor markets shedding unskilled work.  Therefore, 
the response of the federal government to unemployment and poverty are central to the suburban 
history. And how civil rights activists, working class homeowners, and local government 
officials grappled with suburban economic change is as important as traditional suburban 
concerns of housing, schools, or taxes.  This perspective does not eliminate the role of racism, 
but integrates the suburban poor and blue-collar worker, black or white, into a larger postwar 
narrative about the national economy.   
Approaching black postwar suburbs from an economic perspective addresses several 
historiographical fields.  The few existing histories of suburban civil rights activism emphasize 
the fight for equal housing and schools, not struggles for employment.  They favor a class-
homogenous framing, a black middle class challenging white suburban homeowners and the 
exclusionary suburban political structure.43  Even Andrew Wiese’s Places of their Own, which 
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recognizes the importance of job opportunity to working class black suburbanization prior to 
1945, cuts the poor out of his narrative after World War II.  Middle-class actors and their 
concerns dominate the story, namely housing, fair government treatment, and education.44 On 
Long Island, black suburbanites were not divorced from the broader fight for jobs, and racism 
was just as evident among their employers. Recognizing the fight for jobs reveals the class 
tensions between the black middle class and poor in the suburbs.  If the former demanded open 
housing and equal schooling, the latter struggled for remunerative jobs to survive in high-cost 
suburban communities.45  This is particularly relevant to aerospace manufacturing, the primary 
suburban industry.  Scholars examine the changing dynamics of the industry after 1945, such as 
the geographic swing towards the Sunbelt and the shift from conventional armaments to high-
tech weaponry. The racial dynamics of the postwar defense industry also remains unexplored, as 
does the racial consequences of changes within aerospace in the 1950s and 1960s.46  
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Understanding how defense aerospace, the second largest industrial employer in the nation, 
affected blacks, unskilled workers, and the suburban political economy over the long term is 
central to understanding the developments of suburban racial inequality.   
Any history of the postwar poor must grapple with the War on Poverty.  While historians 
study the program’s implementation and the grassroots contribution to its direction and outcome, 
generally the subject has been pursued in urban, rural, or national contexts.47  The ‘suburban’ 
war on poverty is not part of the story.  This is unfortunate because the suburbs epitomized the 
“paradox of poverty amid prosperity,” and were thus, by this rationale, the place where the 
Johnson administration’s solution of job training and economic growth was most likely to 
succeed.  I will explore the validity of this assumption. A suburban angle likewise complicates 
the grassroots narrative that emphasizes tension between local War on Poverty programs, 
especially Community Action Programs, and local government.  Community action did not 
always figure so heavily into local politics, nor did federal programs necessarily produce such 
conflict.  This dissertation thus offers a new lens to understand the War on Poverty, in a region 
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that largely accepted the project, even producing their own local programs that mirrored federal 
attempts, all in the hopes that Long Island’s widespread affluence could absorb the poor who 
were trained to enter the private market for jobs. 
The spatial framework that dominates urban histories also neglects postwar suburban 
poverty.  As Matthew Lassiter and Christopher Niedt note in a recent historiographical critique, 
suburban scholarship recognizes pre-World War II suburban socioeconomic diversity and the 
rise of suburban poverty in recent years, but the middle-class suburban ‘norm’ remains the 
primary interpretation of the postwar period.48  Contemporary work on suburban poverty, which 
has outpaced urban poverty growth since 1990 to become the most popular residence for the 
nation’s poor, reveals suburbia’s underbelly of job loss, economic decline, public service 
distress, and rising crime, markers historically associated with cities.49 This has a longer history 
that flows from the early twentieth century to the twenty-first, and this dissertation bridges the 
gap between research on suburban poverty in different periods, and by doing so challenges a 
myth that is central to the spatial interpretation of postwar history and racial inequality.   
While jobs, suburban poverty, and suburban policy remain under-studied, integration 
remains a perennial subject for urban historians.  Scholars focus on the late 1960s and early 
1970s as the pivotal moment when housing integration reached the national agenda and failed.  
Historians blame HUD, state agencies, homeowner opposition, lack of political will, narrowly 
interpreted court decisions, and weak legislation for this ‘lost goal’ of the civil rights 
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movement.50  Few, however, question the logic of these integration schemes, unlike 
contemporaries, who found much to criticize.51  As a consequence, scholars accept and implicitly 
support what political scientist David Imbroscio calls the ‘mobility paradigm,’ a thread of policy 
proposals to move people “through metropolitan space as a means of addressing urban social 
problems.”52 This approach has come under withering attack recently from geographers and 
social scientists, who argue that the benefits of spatial integration are an expression of liberal 
ideology, not empirical evidence.53  This critique has emerged in the context of current efforts to 
integrate cities and suburbs, but one can easily apply this perspective to earlier attempts at urban 
and suburban integration, as this dissertation will.   
Extrapolating broad conclusions from the experience of the black poor in this one 
postwar suburban region is admittedly problematic.  After all, African Americans were only 4.7 
percent of Long Island’s total residents in 1970, and the black poor were but a fraction of this 
population, less than 22,000 residents of 2.5 million according to the official census designation 
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of ‘poverty.’54 One might feel we can write this group off as an anomaly, a people who slipped 
through the cracks of an otherwise exclusive zone of prosperity.  But the fact that they existed, 
formed communities, and fought for full participation in postwar suburbia, including suburban 
jobs, warrants attention.  And the larger questions of why they existed, and why their spatial 
proximity to jobs didn’t translate into upward mobility, provides insight into the causes of racial 
inequality after World War II.  Black poverty has been an important question in the twentieth 
century, though often cast in spatial terms.  By looking at the black suburban poor, we can see 
that similar forces produced urban and suburban poverty: discrimination in employment, state 
failure to create jobs, increasing educational requirements in the labor market, and wage 
inequality.  In a broader sense, the black poor confronted a reality that growing numbers of 
suburbanites faced toward the end of the last century and now must reckon with in the new 
millennium: a lack of good employment. Blacks garnered disproportionate attention in suburbia 
because poverty was disproportionately black, a ‘paradox amidst plenty,’ but further 
investigation into why they existed reveals a great deal about the limitations of the postwar 
‘Golden Age,’ not just in racial terms, but in the large failure to secure full employment, a goal 
now seemingly lost altogether.   
Investigating this history requires defining both ‘Long Island,’ and the even trickier word 
‘suburb,’ loaded with social and political meaning.  Kenneth Jackson defined ‘suburb’ as a 
residential space for affluent and middle class homeowners who live “far from their 
workplaces.”55  The definition has been complicated since.  Kevin Kruse and Tom Sugrue see it 
as a “political” space, where municipal boundaries between city and suburb create two 
																																																						
54 Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, U.S. Census '70: Volume 2:  Race (Hauppauge, New York: Nassau-
Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1972), 3; 1970 Census of Population and Housing, P-863-P-865. 




competing and separate entities.56  Economies rarely have such neat boundaries, however, and 
this dissertation uses Robert Bruegmann’s metaphor of a solar system to explain the relationship 
between city, suburb, and rural settlement.  All are celestial bodies, intimately connected in 
varying degrees through gravity, their bonds shift with time and orbit.57  Long Island relied on 
New York City’s broader economy as well as federal military spending and mortgage subsidies, 
and dependence on each fluctuated over time.  Throughout the dissertation, I shall refer to Long 
Island as a suburb and a ‘bi-county region’ within the New York ‘metropolitan area.’  I 
recognize such identifications are vague, but here ‘bi-county’ refers to Nassau and Suffolk, the 
two counties that make up ‘Long Island,’ distinct from New York City’s two boroughs, Queens 
and Brooklyn, which are also on the geographic Island.  All of these counties and boroughs are 
part of the larger New York metropolitan area, considered to be New York City and the 
surrounding seventeen county ‘suburbs’ that sprawl across three states.  
The dissertation is organized into six chapters that overlap chronologically.  While 
chapter one ends in 1945, chapters two through six converge in the 1960s, a crucial turning point 
in Long Island’s history.  The first two chapters situate black Long Islanders within the region’s 
changing job market, framing the story as one of jobs and housing forming simultaneously.  
Chapter one begins at the turn of the twentieth century, when Long Island was the main source of 
New York City’s perishable produce. Farms competed with developers, who eyed the Island’s 
expansive plains and lush harbors as a bedroom for Gotham’s middle class and elite.  European 
immigrants and southern black migrants became the region’s pre-World War II working class, 
																																																						
56 Sugrue and Kruse, 5. 
57 Robert Bruegmann, Sprawl A Compact History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 94; Bruegmann 
borrows the term from geographer Peirce Lewis, and argues that it is a more useful metaphor than the standard 
geographic models used that neatly divide cities and suburbs in ways that never exist in reality.  See Peirce Lewis, 
“The Galactic Metropolis,” 23-50, in Beyond the Urban Fringe: Land Use Issues in Non-Metropolitan America, ed. 




and their jobs in agriculture, domestic service, and construction were primarily low-wage.  
Housing reflected this reality, and low-income ethnic and racial enclaves emerged in parallel to 
their inner-city counterparts.  The Second World War completely transformed Long Island’s 
employment landscape, as military spending turned the region’s craft-oriented aviation industry 
into a mass employer, dragging Long Island out of the Depression as over 100,000 Long 
Islanders, both black and white, entered factories and benefitted from rapidly rising wages and 
full employment.   
Chapter two picks up after 1945, explaining Long Island’s explosive growth through 
1965 and the fortunes of African Americans in this job climate.  Military spending continued (a 
full-employment policy in outcome, if not intent), along with commuter incomes, supporting 
retail, service, and local government employment, all of which made mass homeownership 
possible. African Americans were not equal participants in these developments.  A rising black 
middle class used well-paying jobs to buy homes, but a disproportionately poor black population 
competed for low-paying work in what remained of Long Island’s domestic and farm jobs, or 
among its non-defense factories.  Despite prosperity and growth, racism and structural changes 
limited social mobility for Long Island’s black working class and poor, undermining the benefits 
of suburban residence.   
Chapter three investigates the community consequences of this class divide within Long 
Island’s black population.  The rising black middle class either challenged entrenched housing 
segregation to integrate white neighborhoods or thrived in black ‘Levittowns.’ They formed the 
basis of a suburban civil rights movement in the process, concerned with fair housing, public 
service equity, and school integration.  The black poor meanwhile faced dwindling housing 




affordable enclaves.  While rising incomes permitted the middle class to challenge racist housing 
policy and practice, poverty undermined those gains, as segregation set off developments that 
forced the black poor into black middle class communities.  Such concentration strained local 
public services and set off intense political battles over the future of black hamlets, ones that put 
suburb against suburb, and within these communities, middle class homeowner against low-
income tenant. 
These local conflicts occurred during major economic transformations in the 1960s, 
particularly within the region’s most important job sector, aerospace, the focus of the fourth 
chapter.  Defense manufacturing accounted for twenty-two percent of Long Island’s non-
agricultural jobs in 1954, and military firms were consistently the region’s largest employers.  
After World War II though, the sector employed few African Americans.58  Firms hired along 
gender and racial lines, and the federal government did little to enforce black employment. Civil 
rights activists looking to improve black job prospects targeted the industry, and with renewed 
federal commitment to fair employment in the 1960s, minority hiring was possible.  But the 
industry itself was shifting from mass-producing planes to experimental weapons and spacecraft, 
favoring skilled technicians over blue-collar assembly line workers.  In addition, the controversy 
surrounding the ‘military-industrial complex’ pushed Defense Secretary Robert Strange 
McNamara to streamline defense spending, which shut down Long Island’s largest employer in 
1965, shifted contracts South and West, and generally produced fewer jobs by the late 1960s.  
																																																						
58 Over seventy percent of all manufacturing jobs were defense related.  30% of Long Island’s non-agricultural 
workforce were employed in manufacturing overall.  See W.N. Leonard, "The Trend of Defense Contracts," in 
Nassau-Suffolk Business Conditions, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1954): 11, Box 1, Hofstra College Center for the Study of 
Business and Community Research Records, Long Island Studies Institute, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New 
York; Harold L. Wattel, “Economic Growth and Unemployment,” in Long Island Business 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1958): 7, 
Box 1, Hofstra College Center for the Study of Business and Community Research Records, Long Island Studies 




Fair employment could guarantee minority hiring by 1970, but it was in an industry that no 
longer employed unskilled blue-collar workers.   
 Chapters five and six address the efforts of policymakers to grapple with these suburban 
economic challenges.  Chapter five covers Long Island’s War on Poverty, both the federally-
funded programs and locally developed initiatives in the spirit of Johnson’s domestic project 
between 1964 and 1970.  The assumption that America’s economic institutions were sound was 
rhetorically resonant on Long Island, which by any statistical measure of poverty or 
employment, enjoyed ‘affluence.’  Local policymakers and anti-poverty activists embraced the 
program’s supply-side efforts, from transportation initiatives to job training.  The chapter 
outlines how the initial enthusiasm for eradicating Long Island’s minor poverty program turned 
into deep criticism of the War on Poverty’s flawed logic and assumptions by 1968.  The War on 
Poverty’s failure made Long Island’s unskilled jobs deficit apparent, a problem Nassau County 
government looked to solve by guaranteeing every county resident a job by 1969.   
 Despite the economic troubles of the late 1960s, the belief in suburban prosperity 
continued to inform policy, particularly when compared with the ‘urban crisis’ wracking 
America’s inner cities.  Chapter six deals with this emerging spatial interpretation of America’s 
urban problems, contrasting it with the shared economic reality of job loss, the labor market 
chasm, and inflation in city and suburb in the 1970s.  Federal, state, and county housing agencies 
wanted to break down segregation and build low-income suburban housing. Their goals were 
expansive, and they wanted to improve employment outcomes among the urban poor and assure 
the suburbs offer their ‘fair share’ of jobs and suburban tax revenues.  This was premised on the 
belief of suburban prosperity, but the communities targeted for low-income housing, including 




Island’s regressive property tax system that increasingly burdened their communities.  Their 
suburban location nonetheless made them ideal for housing projects according to public 
agencies, which set off intense battles between suburbanites over who should take their ‘fair 
share’ of the poor, a heavy burden for suburbs with low-income populations themselves. The 
theory of the spatial divide, that ‘suburbs’ were affluent at the expense of ‘cities,’ confronted a 
more complex reality of structural changes plaguing workers in both cities and suburbs alike in 
the 1960s and 1970s.   
Overall, black suburbs like Wyandanch were of the suburbs precisely because the suburbs 
were embedded within the nation’s economy during and after World War II.  This meant that 
major economic questions, including full employment policy, racial job discrimination, the 
growing job market divide, and poverty were suburban as well as urban questions.  The fact that 
policymakers neglected these realities in favor of a ‘spatial’ interpretation that pit ‘poor’ city 
versus ‘affluent’ suburb produced an impoverished set of policy solutions to deal with job loss, 
racial inequality, and poverty.  Unfortunately, this interpretation and these policy solutions 
remain dominant.  This dissertation goes beyond this paradigm, because suburban residence was 
not a shelter from the broader spout of deindustrialization and declining opportunity affecting the 
northeast, mid-west, and older urban centers of the South and West.  This was truer of black 





The Future Detroit of the East 
 
Hubert Goode and his family made their way from Raleigh, North Carolina to Long 
Island in 1917.  Lorenzo B. Smull, a successful real estate developer in the Gold Coast hamlet of 
Port Washington, hired the Goodes as servants on his estate.  Smull wired money to the Goode 
family to travel north, which involved three trains between Baltimore and Port Washington.  
Upon arrival, the family lived upstairs in the Smull estate, and Hubert’s parents cooked, cleaned 
the house, tended the yard, and raised the Smull children.  Hubert, then a young boy, had duties 
on the estate as well, from raking the leaves to helping around the house.1  The Goodes were 
among the thousands of African American families who migrated from the South and settled in 
northern and western suburbs during the Great Migration.  As many as one in six southern black 
migrants between World War I and World War II moved directly to the suburbs in search of 
freedom and employment opportunities, skipping urban centers entirely.2  Unlike central city 
migrants, they pinned their hopes on a suburban labor market shaped by the immense wealth 
emanating from America’s industrial cities to the bedrooms and farms along the urban fringe.   
In Long Island’s case, New York City’s insatiable demand for food kept truck farmers 
busy, while Gotham’s burgeoning population sought vacation spots on the Island’s seashore, 
suburban housing along its railroad lines, and estate property or private recreational playgrounds.  
All of this required an army of workers to construct single-family homes, manage estate gardens, 
launder clothes, chauffeur, rear children, and pick produce.  A suburban ‘working class’ filled 
																																																						
1 Oral history transcript of interview with Hubert Goode on March 17, 1981, p. 1-7, African American Heritage Oral 
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these positions, a mixture of immigrants from Europe, native whites, and southern African 
Americans.  As Long Island’s service and agricultural workers, they toiled in an economy 
sharply divided between those who labored in the suburbs and those who resided in the suburbs 
but labored elsewhere.  The consumption habits of the latter determined the fortunes of the 
suburban working class, and little mobility existed between the two.  Low incomes and status 
within Long Island’s labor market constrained working class housing choice, and poor housing 
conditions developed mirroring that of America’s urban ‘ghettos.’  As African Americans came 
to dominate the region’s working class by the 1930s, race permeated the discourse of poverty 
and its community consequences.  Skin color, the migrant origins of southern black laborers, and 
their poverty coalesced to form Long Island’s variant of the “negro problem.”   
 The was the layout of early twentieth century Long Island: a working class catering to 
the needs of middle class homeowners, truck farmers, and the consumer needs of an industrial 
elite.  World War II dramatically altered this reality.  The aircraft industry became the dominant 
employer in the region, and Long Island became less dependent on the incomes of commuters 
from the five boroughs, instead drawn into the orbit of federal defense contract.  The new 
industry likewise uncoupled Long Island’s working class from its dependence on the wealth of 
landowning farmers, suburban homeowners, and estate-owners.  The defense industry 
compressed the labor market, forging a new suburbia and a new kind of suburbanite on Long 
Island:  the industrial, working-class suburbanite, their incomes derived from federal contracts, 
strong unions, and acute demand for their labor.  Over the course of the war, Long Island’s black 
workforce joined the industrial working class thanks to this unquenchable demand as well as 
anti-discrimination enforcement at the local, state, and federal levels.  By 1945, the old economy 




landscape of Long Island, the dynamics of its labor market and the lives of its residents, both 
black and white.  
 
The ‘Gold Coast’ and the Sub-urban Economy 
 In 1898, Long Island’s contemporary form took shape when New York City annexed the 
Island’s urban center, Brooklyn, along with the western third of Queens County to form the 
borough of Queens.  The remainder of eastern Queens became Nassau County on January 1, 
1899, and this new county, along with Suffolk County to its east formed the re-defined Long 
Island.3  While Long Islanders celebrated their resistance to Gotham’s encroachment as a victory 
for ‘home rule’ and local government, New York’s land grab signified the growing influence of 
the urban center, a process that began prior to annexation and accelerated afterwards.4  Long 
Island remained politically independent from City Hall, but was nonetheless increasingly 
dependent on New York City’s economy. This dependence developed in four ways.  Nassau and 
Suffolk county farmers profited from perishable food demand formerly satisfied within city 
limits but pushed out by residential and industrial development.  Long Island’s accessible natural 
beauty, from its sandy beaches on its south shore to the quiet harbors and hills on its north shore, 
led New Yorkers to vacation, relocate permanently, and in the case of New York’s wealthiest, 
construct exclusive residential and recreational spaces.  All of this produced new labor sectors to 
meet the needs of Long Island’s farmers, vacationers, homeowners, and social elite. 
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As the Midwest came to dominate grain production and upstate New York exported dairy 
products, Long Island’s farmers exploited New York City’s perishable food demand.  
Strawberries, cauliflower, cabbage, cucumbers, peas, Brussels sprouts, and above all, potato 
production increased in Nassau and Suffolk Counties.  Even as farm acreage declined amidst 
suburbanization in Nassau County (agricultural land in Nassau County dropped from over 
90,000 acres in 1875 to 23,000 acres in 1930), farmers managed to double potato production  
from 1900-1920 to 1.8 million bushels, largely thanks to fertilizers, new machinery, and 
innovative growing techniques.5  Further east in Suffolk, potato production topped fourteen 
million bushels per year in the 1940s. Beyond farm produce, farmers also tapped into New 
York’s exotic food demand, including the ‘Peking Duck,’ a new specialty item introduced to the 
region in 1873 that turned Long Island into the nation’s premier duck producing region. Whether 
raising ducks or growing fruit, farmers could only rely on their own labor and new machinery for 
a portion of their production.  Picking ripe strawberries, bagging potatoes, and slaughtering 
ducks required manual laborers, and Long Island’s farmers depended on a seasonal workforce to 
ready their goods for market.6 
Produce travelled west along the Long Island Railroad to feed New York’s population; 
New Yorkers travelled east to enjoy Long Island’s natural beauty.  Prior to the 1880s, scant 
infrastructure limited access to the south shore’s beaches, though after railroad companies 
opened Coney Island, Brighton Beach, and Manhattan Beach in Brooklyn to resort development, 
speculation turned eastward.  Austin Corbin, who had linked New Yorkers to Coney Island 
through his New York and Manhattan Beach railway, bought the Long Island Railroad in 1880, 
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and transformed the railroad into a carrier of vacationers to the “greatest watering place in the 
world.”7  Corbin encouraged vacation development stretching from the Rockaways in Queens to 
Montauk on Long Island’s east end.8  The popularity of these destinations only grew with the 
advent of the automobile, inspiring Robert Moses to develop a series of public parks with 
beaches, ponds, woodlands, and golf courses, all connected via ‘parkways’ to New York City’s 
green-starved residents.  By 1928, Moses had secured nearly ten thousand acres and designed 
fourteen parks on the Island.9  These resort destinations swelled with employment over the 
summer months, necessitating an army of waiters, maids, cooks, landscapers, and maintenance 
workers. 
Long Island’s recreational attractions and infrastructure encouraged permanent 
settlement, and no group had a greater influence on the region’s development than the nation’s 
social elite, who colonized both its shores from the 1880s until the outbreak of World War II.  
Long Island was the perfect location to emulate European aristocratic ‘country’ living and leisure 
while remaining tied to the “Capitol of Capital.”10  Nearly 1,000 French chateaus, English 
castles, and Italian villas were constructed across the two counties, over forty percent of which 
were built between 1900 and 1918.  By 1937, the region housed fourteen of the nation’s twenty-
five wealthiest families.  On the South shore, running from the eastern border of Nassau County 
out to Montauk, sat the estates of financier August Belmont, sugar refiner Henry Have Meyer, 
and railroad manager William K. Vanderbilt.  On Long Island’s North Shore, over six hundred 
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estates stretched from the Queens border into Suffolk County in nearly uninterrupted sequence, 
all at least fifty acres large.  Collectively known as the ‘Gold Coast,’ powerful families such as 
the Morgans, Hearsts, Sages, Astors, Woolworths, Guggenheims, Fricks, Goulds, and Fords 
settled within the area.  The elite mingled at seventy-one private clubs, participating in every 
conceivable social activity, from dinner parties to fox hunts.  Beyond the estates themselves were 
thousands of acres reserved for trotting courses, horse racing tracks, golf, tennis courts, hunting 
grounds, polo fields, and a private highway for America’s first major automobile races.11  
The estates and private clubs formed an ‘estate economy,’ a collection of complex tasks 
to maintain the physical estate structures along with the daily and seasonal rituals of elite life.  
Even a modest country house required a workforce of ten to twenty employees to care for the 
grounds, bedrooms, food, and children, not to mention periodic employment of masons, florists, 
and construction workers.  The largest estates employed between 250 and 400 people.  Chicago 
department store heir Marshall Fields’ two thousand acre ‘Caumsett’ estate employed over four 
hundred to operate the dairy farm, stables, cottages, athletic facilities, power plant, yacht dock, 
and several houses.  The enterprise was so large that the estate had its own business office to 
organize the daily work routines and approve contracts for new building projects, transportation 
of workers, and other duties.  While most estates were not as complex as Caumsett, all relied on 
a stable workforce within their grounds as well as services that operated along the fringes of their 
property.12   
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Behind the ostentatious migration of the nation’s wealthy was a larger influx of middle 
class New Yorkers spilling out of the five boroughs in search of single-family homes.  Middle 
class housing appeared sporadically in the nineteenth century, and railroad suburbs blossomed in 
western Nassau County, including Lynbrook, Lawrence, Woodmere, Hewlett, Rockville Centre, 
Garden City, and Freeport.13  In the twentieth century, the population surge eastward through 
Queens and into Nassau County accelerated.  From 1920-1930, Long Island’s population nearly 
doubled to over 464,000, making Nassau County the fastest growing county in the nation.14  
Commuters in search of residential suburbs bought up tracts near railroad lines, feeding into a 
speculative boom in property and housing construction, all of which benefitted a blue-collar 
labor force who built the homes, roads, sidewalks, and stores in these suburbs.  Once built, the 
homeowners made use of service workers on a smaller scale, relying on a single live-in servant 
or visiting maids and nannies, along with laundresses, chauffeurs, gardeners, and masons.15 
 
The Suburban Working Class  
 The farms, estates, resorts, and middle-class suburbs produced a labor market in the 
building trades, road and public works construction, domestic service, and agricultural work, 
constituting over half of the jobs Long Island residents held in 1930 and the majority of jobs 
available in the region.  A diverse population filled these jobs.  Whites, some descended from 
Long Island’s early English and Dutch settlers, found opportunity within this new economy, as 
did the small black population of 5,000, but the massive increase in labor demand attracted 
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foreign-born immigrants along with southern black migrants.  The foreign-born migration to 
Long Island coincided with the general population growth from 1900-1940, as both tripled 
during the period.  Germans, Poles, Irish, and Italian immigrants dominated the immigration 
influx, as Table 1.1 indicates.  German immigrants tended to be middle class homeowners 
themselves, but Irish, Polish and Italian immigrants toiled as laborers on the estates, farms, and 
construction projects across Long Island.16  African Americans trailed European immigration in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century, though the black migration outpaced foreign born 
immigration after 1920, and southern African Americans became the largest non-native group on 
Long Island by the outbreak of World War II.  
Broader developments, including the momentum of the Great Migration and declining 
immigration, partly account for the increasing presence of African Americans within Long 
Island’s labor market, but local factors influenced the growing reliance on black labor as well.  In 
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Table 1.1: Foreign-born and African American Population Growth, 1910-1940 
 1910 1920 1930 1940 
Ireland 7,326 7,002 8,954 8,669 
Poland  6,416 9,188 9,093 
Italy 5,684 6,988 13,316 14,994 
Germany 8,232 7,866 17,616 18,145 
African-American 5,088 5,850 13,462 21,927 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Thirteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1910: Statistics for New 
York. Containing Statistics of Population, Agriculture, Manufactures, and Mining for the State, Counties, Cities, 
and Other Divisions (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1913), 230, 236; U.S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the 
United States, 1920 - State Compendium, New York. Statistics of Population, Occupations, Agriculture, 
Manufactures, and Mines and Quarries for the State, Counties, and Cities (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1923), 38, 
41, 53; U.S. Census Bureau, 1930 Census of the United States: Volume III, Part 2: Montana-Wyoming, section 
II - New Hampshire-New York (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1932), 270, 272, 298; U.S. Census Bureau, 1940 
Census of Population, Volume II: Characteristics of the Population, Part 5: New York-Oregon (Washington 




the first two decades of the twentieth century, a racial hierarchy existed within Long Island’s 
service economy.  The wealthiest estate owners, like utility executive John E. Aldred, hired only 
the most experienced servants from the British Isles.17  Most were less restrictive, hiring both 
immigrants and blacks but dividing their workforce by color. Clarence Phillips, a former yacht 
club cook recalled that “gardening wasn’t so great for blacks because…they had the Italians and 
Pollocks [sic] that did a lot of gardening around here…in fact, they never heard tell of no black 
gardeners.”18  African Americans rarely lived on the estates, instead working at the periphery of 
the estate economy.  No black workers lived on the Guggenheim estate, and as Alec Sucilsky, a 
Polish immigrant and Guggenheim employee recalled, the only ‘colored help’ was “around the 
horses…they didn’t live on the estate.”19  If black workers benefitted from the estate economy, it 
was through contract work.  Black Port Washington resident Marjorie Biddle remembered that 
all of her neighbors “took in laundry…just for private people cause all these rich people had 
initials on their napkins and things.”20   
This racial divide receded in the 1920s and 1930s, encouraging a black migration.  
Contrary to the common perception of the ‘Roaring Twenties’ as the height of estate society, 
Long Island’s estate economy waned during the decade as operating costs rose, taxes increased, 
and opportunities to profit from the real estate boom encouraged estate owners to sell land.21  For 
those that remained, cutting costs proved necessary.  Rather than import famed landscapers from 
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19 Oral history transcript of interview with Alec Sucilsky on  January 13, 1984, p. 13, Gold Coast Estate Workers 
Oral History Collection, PWLHC. 
20 Oral history transcript of interview with Marjorie Biddle and Florence Longworth Biddle on  January, 1981, p. 23, 
African American Heritage Oral History Collection, PWLHC. 
21 Sobin, 50-51; A prime example of subdivision tendencies was the property of former publishing magnate, Frank 
Munsey, which upon his death was converted into several residential communities that formed the incorporated 
village of Munsey Park by 1930.  See Philip A. Atiyeh, “A Twentieth Century History of Munsey Park,” 




Calabria or servants from the British Isles, estate owners increasingly turned to black labor, and 
shifted from live-in to live-out domestic service.22  The growth of the domestic service industry 
for middle class homeowners further encouraged black migration as a low-wage labor source.  
Amidst the Depression, a continued influx of black workers into the North further depressed 
wages, and black workers became the “preferred” workforce among the middle class and 
wealthy.23   
A structured migration system aided the growth of black labor on Long Island.  
Recruitment began unofficially, as one domestic worker would inform friends and families 
across the eastern seaboard of job opportunities.  John Blount, who moved to Long Island in 
1907, recalled that his second cousin negotiated with an estate worker to hire his mother and 
sisters.24  Employment agencies eventually organized recruitment, especially as the less personal 
live-out domestic system became popular, where homeowners and estate owners hired servants 
by the day but did not provide housing accommodations.  Agencies contracted with employers in 
search of help, and then sent money or drove directly to the South to pick up groups of service 
workers ready for the trip north.  If new recruits could not afford to pay the agency, they worked 
off their debts.25  These agencies were often little more than enterprising domestic servants with 
connections to prospective migrants down south.  Freeport resident Louise Simpson remembers 
how there was “this particular family who was sort of like a personnel person for employment.  
She would go to where she came from in Carolina and bring people up.”26  Former domestic 
Harvey Sinkar-Herring was one such person.  She opened her own domestic servant recruitment 
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agency, offering not only passage north, but temporary housing and training classes, charging the 
employers hiring fees and room and board.27  A similar process emerged for recruiting cheap 
construction labor.  Contractors in road and housing construction went south in search of ‘green’ 
workers to maintain a pliant, low-wage workforce.28  
Long Island’s farmers likewise relied on migrants from the South, tapping into a broader 
agricultural labor stream flowing along a 1,200-mile network from New England to Florida.  
Since the turn of the century, truck farmers utilized temporary laborers during harvest and 
planting seasons.  These laborers came from a variety of sources, but as Cindy Hahamovitch 
finds, a structure emerged tying black southerners to a year-round harvest rhythm during the long 
agricultural depression of the 1920s and 1930s.29  Crew leaders, often migrant laborers 
themselves, contracted with growers on Long Island and then recruited individual laborers from 
the south by the truckload.30  Like domestic service agencies, the crew leader offered credit to 
cover transportation and food costs, and since housing was often provided on site in makeshift 
camps at the farm, food and other living expenses were removed from wages during the extent of 
the stay.  Most migrants were black men, moving with their crews or joining new ones to make 
incomes across the eastern seaboard.31 
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Once on Long Island, African American workers joined the Italian, Polish, Irish, and 
other white workers in competition for service and agricultural jobs as estate owners and farmers 
“grazed in a savannah of cheap labor.”32  The most stable and well-paying opportunities (relative 
to other sectors) could be found in year-round domestic service.  Women predominated, leading 
to a black gender imbalance in Nassau County.  Women were fifty-five percent of the county’s 
black population in 1930, reaching almost sixty percent by 1940.33  Young single women made 
the trek along with married women who left their families in search of higher pay up north, “a 
highly gendered process of suburbanization” as Andrew Wiese’s states.34  Wages and working 
conditions varied depending on the local labor supply, the benevolence of the employer, and the 
stability of the specific job.  Domestics labored around twelve hours per day, and depending on 
their specific duties, could work anywhere from five to seven days per week.  Daily wages 
ranged from three to five dollars on the estates in the 1920s ($40-65 in 2012), to just forty dollars 
a month during the Depression for live-out domestic service (about $660 in 2012).35   
Precarity awaited those working in construction, on resorts, along the fringes of the estate 
economy, and in the fields.  Jobs in these sectors offered seasonal or part-time employment, and 
workers cobbled together a living by navigating between them.  The estate economy’s ever-
changing tasks forced laborers to learn a variety of service skills.  Thomas Longsworth, living in 
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Port Washington, a Gold Coast town, was a chauffeur, butler, chimneysweeper, and when 
needed, maintenance man.36  Workers in the seasonal industries, which included resorts, housing 
construction, country clubs, and agricultural labor, moved between each as demand changed.  
Rebecca Hobson Nash, whose family travelled from Virginia to Riverhead on Long Island’s east 
end in 1926, cut potatoes during the spring, harvested the spuds in the summer, and shifted to 
house work during the winter months.37  And just as migrant farmers travelled up and down the 
east coast to work for as little as two dollars a day harvesting produce, Long Island residents 
likewise travelled across the Island following the booms and busts of local employment.  
Clarence Phillips, after working as a cook, janitor, and eventually gardener in the Gold Coast, 
recalled that once “gardenin’ had all come to an end and there was nothin’ for me to do.” He then 
went to work making “3c a bushel for picked potatoes…workin’ on a farm down in the eastern 
end of the Island, on Sound Avenue” in Mattituck, some seventy miles away.38   
This instability affected men’s fortunes in particular, who had fewer stable opportunities 
in the suburban economy. If married, they relied on their wives for stable income that they 
supplemented as prospects appeared.39  Ironically, the Depression offered unprecedented stability 
for laborers through public work relief.  Public jobs programs, first administered under Governor 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA) in 1931 and 
continued through the alphabet soup of federally administered programs, employed thousands.  
Statistical records, while scarce, indicate that Long Island’s working class relied on public 
programs for their livelihoods.  A 1933 survey of families receiving work relief in Nassau 
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County reveals that nearly eighty percent of the county’s relief workers were either skilled 
tradesmen or unskilled laborers, a third were foreign-born, and seven percent were black, greater 
than their proportion of the population (less than three percent).  A Civil Works Administration 
survey in 1934 found that Italian and Polish was spoken among over forty percent of all workers 
in unskilled positions.40  The programs funded long-term building projects (at least relative to the 
short-term work in the suburban economy), including Robert Moses’ state parkway network, 
local public roads and schools, and a county-wide urban sewage system in Nassau.41  African 
Americans in particular found security in these work relief programs, and in 1933, almost thirty 
percent of Nassau County’s black male population were employed on public relief.42  As African 
American domestic Beatrice Nixon recalled, “in Glen Cove, nearly everybody was on the WPA.  
That’s the only work they could get.”  Her husband, after years of working sporadically in the 
estate economy, took WPA jobs “as long as the Depression lasted, until he could go out and get a 
job like he wanna, of his own.”43  Nixon stated that workers in Glen Cove thought of “their WPA 
work as jobs no different from private employment except that they seem safer and more lasting 
than private employment.”44 
Long Island’s unskilled laborers could move across the various sectors of the mixed 
service and agricultural economy, or exploit the stability of Depression-era relief, but the 
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structure of the economy presented little vertical mobility.  The skills obtained through service 
labor could be transferred into small businesses.  Ethel Saulter remembers that her father, a 
migrant from Margaretsville, North Carolina, opened a taxi service for train commuters in 
Manhasset.45  Others started garbage removal businesses, grocery stores, or delicatessens.46  
Such self-employed African Americans numbered less than five hundred, or four percent of the 
total black labor force in 1940, and even those workers were tied to the broader service 
economy.47  The foundation of Long Island’s wealth was imported from New York City, save 
the agriculture sector that required large landholdings and access to capital.  Long Island’s 
southern black population served as a source of cheap labor to clean the homes of middle class 
residents, tend to the gardens of the wealthy, harvest farmer’s potatoes, and wait on vacationers 
at seaside resorts.   While spared the grueling industrial work migrants in the North’s urban 
centers endured, Long Island’s black workers entered a precarious and constrained labor market 
of low-wage opportunity, a market they shared with immigrants and the rest of the suburban 
working class. 
 
‘The Negro Problem’ 
 Long Island’s low-paying and unstable labor market shaped the living conditions of the 
region’s working class.  Despite the proliferation of single-family housing across the region, less 
than sixty percent of Long Islanders owned homes as of 1940.  Immigrant communities did form 
the kinds of working class suburbs that Becky Nicola ides found in Los Angeles, where 
																																																						
45 Oral history transcript of interview with Ethel Saulter on January 9, 1981, p. 1-5, African American Heritage Oral 
History Collection, PWLHC. 
46 Lynda Rose Day, Making a Way to Freedom: A History of African Americans on Long Island (Interlaken, N.Y.: 
Empire State Books, 1997), 84-85; Oral history transcript of interview with Gerald Biddle December, 1980, p. 5, 
African American Heritage Oral History Collection, PWLHC. 




homeownership served as a safety net against economic insecurity.48  For example, real estate 
speculator Giovanni Campagnoli encouraged Italian immigrants, many from Manhattan’s Lower 
East Side and the ‘Belmont’ section of the Bronx, to purchase homes in Copiague, a small 
hamlet in Suffolk County.  He named the streets after famous Italians, and home-owning Italians 
built a “singular Italian village” sandwiched between the resort community of Amityville and the 
middle class village of Lindenhurst.49 Communities such as these were rare, though more 
common among immigrants than African Americans, as only sixteen percent of Nassau’s and 
thirty-three percent of Suffolk’s black population owned their own homes.50  Real estate 
developer Louis Fife developed a black homesteader community in Gordon Heights in Suffolk 
County in 1927 where actors, vacationers, and local workers lived and grew produce for 
consumption as well as truck farming purposes.  Gordon Heights was the exception, and most 
black residents moved into rental units in urbanized villages within reach of the estate economy, 
or across the unincorporated expanse of the Island in strategic locations tied to multiple sectors 
of the labor market.51  In Suffolk County, black residents straddled the agricultural and resort 
economies, like in North Amityville, a hamlet just north of the waterfront village of Amityville, 
where southern blacks could work on nearby potato fields as well as the hotels and restaurants 
dotting the Great South Bay.52  In Nassau County, incorporated villages like Hempstead, Glen 
Cove, Freeport, and Rockville Centre were hubs for domestics and laborers working in the 
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surrounding middle class suburban and wealthy estate economy.  Early settlers set in motion 
family and community-based chain migrations, and in places like Freeport and Rockville Centre, 
the majority of black residents originated from just a few counties in North and South Carolina.53  
These population numbers were only what Census takers captured at the moment they surveyed 
the area, and in reality, the black presence was higher during peak employment season.  In 
Hempstead and Rockville Centre, social workers estimated around a quarter of African 
American’s were a ‘floating population’ of single women or family members, temporarily 
staying as jobs opened and then leaving.54    
 Within these villages, black residents faced a constrained housing market, limited to the 
least desirable housing because of their low incomes, dependence on local employment, 
widespread use of racial covenants, and careful deployment of land-use regulation that protected 
middle class residences.55  Economic segregation trumped racial segregation, as black residents 
shared housing with foreign-born immigrants in similar conditions.  Freeport, Inwood (part of 
the ‘Five-Towns’ area in southwestern Nassau County), and Glen Cove all had mixed Italian, 
black, and sometimes Polish sections, though social workers in these communities noted that 
earlier migration among foreign-born whites and their slightly higher economic positions led to 
higher homeownership rates among Italian and Polish immigrants compared to black residents.56  
Work largely determined housing location, and given transportation difficulties, long hours, and 
family ties, Long Island’s rental markets were islands all to themselves, and rent ranged widely 
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from one village to the next.  Average monthly rents in the Bennington Park section of Freeport, 
a domestic service settlement south of the LIRR in the village’s east end, averaged between 
eighteen to twenty dollars per month.57 Six miles north, monthly rents in the village of 
Hempstead fluctuated from twenty-seven to thirty-seven dollars, a significant proportion of a 
domestic worker’s forty dollar average monthly wage.58 
 Limited mobility within and between villages, low incomes, and a growing population 
produced conditions ripe for exploitation.  As African Americans continued to migrate into the 
region in the 1930s as foreign-born immigration stagnated, property owners took advantage of 
their poverty and dependence on local jobs, turning every possible inhabitable structure into rent-
producing property.  In Inwood, former Italian homeowners in the swampy ‘Frog Hollow’ 
neighborhood rented their housing to incoming black tenants, flipping the community from 
Italian to black dominated.59  In the Banks Avenue section of Rockville Centre, property owners 
converted former barns, morgues, cellars, and storefronts into dwelling spaces.  In Oyster Bay 
village, twenty families shared the charred remains of a partially burnt down blacksmith’s 
shop.60  Vacancies in these sections remained low, and since wages from individuals or even 
intermittent dual earners barely covered monthly rents, multiple families holed up in rooms to 
make ends meet.  Cots converted kitchens into makeshift bedrooms while outhouses became the 
restrooms for forty or more people.  Tenants and property owners exploited seasonal demands 
for housing, taking in ‘roomers’ who had migrated from the south in search of short-term 
employment.61  All of this rapidly deteriorated already unsafe housing conditions, generating 
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suburban ‘slums’ parallel to their urban counterparts.  A 1934 housing survey of the Bennington 
Park section in Freeport revealed that of 213 dwellings, only fifty-five were connected to the 
village sewer system and only forty-two had gas stoves.  Storefronts were converted to makeshift 
housing, as Figure 1.1 shows, and residents of these ‘flats’ had to draw water from a hydrant near 
the privy, relying on the coal kitchen stove for heat.62  Bennington Park’s conditions were found 
across the “Harlem Belts” in the incorporated villages of Nassau and western Suffolk counties, in 
the “Battery” section of Oyster Bay village, “the Hill” in Hempstead, “Banks Avenue” in 
Rockville Centre, and “Long Branch Road” in Glen Cove.  In these districts, families survived 
without insulation or water during the winter and sewage overflowed into wells, threatening the 
health of those who used it.63   
 
Figure 1.1.  “Bennington Park.” Backyard of 132-138 E. Sunrise 
Highway, in the Bennington Park section of Freeport circa 1950. 
Courtesy of Freeport Historical Society. 
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Black housing conditions were the physical markers of Long Island’s ‘negro problem,’ a 
growing concern about the region’s poverty that coincided with black southerner’s increased 
presence on the Island.  Their skin color, higher levels of poverty, and migrant status became 
intertwined with the debate over poverty and the housing conditions poverty bred.   Prior to the 
1930s, local activism treated African Americans and foreign-born immigrants similarly.  Long 
Island’s wealthy elites funded settlement houses in Long Island villages to assist the destitute and 
offer training in the trades and ‘domestic arts.’  Philanthropist Margaret Sage endowed the 
Margaret Sage Industrial School in 1907 in the Inwood/Lawrence area of southwestern Nassau 
County, which served both the local Italian and black population.  In Glen Cove, estate owners 
funded two settlement houses, the Orchard House in the heavily Italian ‘orchard’ section of the 
city, and the Lincoln House for black Glen Cove residents, both of which offered domestic 
training courses, athletic programs, and social activities.64  Continued black migration amidst the 
Depression led to an intensifying focus on the African American poor and their status as 
‘migrants’ in particular.   
Welfare was the most contentious issue. New forms of welfare emerged to soften the 
blow of unemployment and poverty during the decade, and as the poorest Long Islanders, blacks 
and foreign-born Italian immigrants received home relief in greater proportion than their 
population.65  In the hamlet of Inwood, a social work survey determined that Italians and African 
Americans were forty percent of all relief cases in 1937.  Taxpayers decried the increasing costs 
and alleged ‘abuse’ of the system, though their vitriol was targeted toward black recipients rather 
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than foreign born whites.  This occurred for three basic reasons.  Firstly, racist assumptions about 
black irresponsibility pervaded discussions of welfare, although Italian immigrants were not 
immune to such assumptions.  Second, unlike foreign-born whites, African Americans became a 
larger proportion of recipients over the course of the 1930s.  Data from the Family Service 
Association of the Five Towns, a private welfare agency in southwestern Nassau County, found 
that their minority caseload nearly doubled in proportion over two years.  Finally, this increasing 
proportion were southern migrants directly from the south.  Of eighty-seven applicants to the 
Family Service Association, seventy-four were from southern states.66   
Migrants on the welfare rolls during the Depression was hardly surprising.  Welfare 
checks filled the gaps in seasonal employment and was a better alternative to returning south 
where prospects were even more desperate.  For a small proportion, relief was also an attractive 
alternative to declining wages in domestic work.67  Such behavior, even from a small minority of 
African Americans, shaped the views of black poverty.  Welfare investigators expressed their 
anger when receiving applications for relief before the applicant had found adequate housing, 
sharing stories of clients who were “completely satisfied once they get on relief, and often refuse 
to accept private employment for fear of being taken off relief.”68  Community members adopted 
similar views.  In Inwood, a local police officer believed that despite the jobs available, a “low 
type of black…far under Harlem” were moving to Nassau specifically for relief.  Glen Cove’s 
Chamber of Commerce president believed his city had the largest welfare cost per capita in the 
country, a problem emanating from “the colored group” who relied on “public relief” unlike 
‘homeowning’ Polish and Italian immigrants.  Others in the city agreed, and a social worker 
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report found that the “white community has actually come to resent the presence of the colored 
population…the feeling seems to be that when employment relations ceased, responsibility 
ceased and it is up to the foreign and colored elements to shift for themselves rather than become 
a burden of the community.”69   
Welfare, though a rational response to unstable income and a bulwark against destitution 
among Long Island’s poor black population, was understood as the motivation for the southern 
migration and the cause of deplorable housing conditions.  These assumptions, when combined 
with the financial implications of an increased relief load, resulted in new policies designed to 
curb the ‘abuses.’  Nassau’s Department of Public Welfare, already in the business of monitoring 
relief cases as of 1935, added a ‘settlement’ auxiliary branch to their department in 1938 with the 
sole purpose of verifying a recipient’s county residency.  If a resident did not live in Nassau for 
at least a year prior to receiving public assistance, the Department could “return” them to their 
original residence.  Such a policy was incredibly time-consuming, difficult, and largely 
ineffective (from 1938 to 1940, the branch deported sixty-six people), though it exemplified the 
belief that the poor were abusing the state’s benevolence and that the county’s problems 
originated from outside rather than within the dynamics of the region.70  The consequences of 
such a policy were devastating for the few families targeted by the welfare department.  In 1936, 
an African American widow, referred to as “Mrs. X” in the welfare department report, moved 
from South Carolina in search of domestic work, leaving her five children behind with her 
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brother in the South.  When her brother could no longer afford to care for the children and sent 
them north, Mrs. X quit her sleep-in domestic job to care for them.  The county paid her rent for 
two years until 1938, when the welfare department demanded she return to South Carolina.  She 
refused, and planned to forgo relief for a year to establish legal residence in the County.  Her two 
sons worked irregularly over the next year, though the family fell behind on rent, gas, and 
electricity bills, seeking relief again in 1939.  When the department determined that “neither 
Mrs. X. nor her two oldest sons were making a real effort to become independent of public 
relief,” they again ordered she return to South Carolina.  After a court action, the Deputy Sheriff 
took Mrs. X and four of her children to South Carolina, separated from her family and Long 
Island’s job opportunities.71   
African Americans’ ‘migrant’ status likewise informed the debates over housing 
conditions in Long Island’s ‘Harlem belts.’  As overcrowding further deteriorated the low-rent 
housing stock in Nassau’s incorporated villages, concern grew over the consequences of such an 
environment, especially as potential breeding grounds for disease and crime.  As a housing 
activist warned fellow middle class residents, “the woman in that house who lives here under 
those conditions, engaged by you and by myself or by anyone else as a domestic, could carry 
typhoid fever into your own home.”72  Tensions emerged between those who wanted to improve 
village housing stock and those who feared such improvements would induce further 
immigration.  Those in favor of eliminating the worst conditions looked to stronger housing code 
regulation.  In Rockville Centre, the building department forced landlords to renovate or face 
condemnation, though condemnation pushed tenants into the remaining housing or compelled 
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them to find housing in other village black districts, exacerbating the conditions elsewhere.73  
Improving housing stock, while helpful to existing residents, was viewed as an inducement to 
further migration.74  In Glen Cove, residents hoped to “discourage colored families from coming 
to Glen Cove by continuing the poor housing conditions.”75  The fear that housing 
improvements, which increased public costs for sewage, clean water, or housing itself, would 
only worsen conditions by encouraging further settlement stifled any movement toward large-
scale housing renovation during the 1930s, despite unprecedented efforts in cities across the 
country and new streams of federal funding. 
The belief that housing or welfare was the primary motivator for Long Island’s black 
settlement and the cause of Long Island’s ‘negro problem’ misunderstood their role as the 
region’s source of cheap labor and the living conditions their low-incomes produced.  When 
Perry Gangloff of the New York School of Social Work surveyed the city of Glen Cove in 1937, 
he found a community blaming the lack of industry, poor transportation, and the presence of 
foreign groups for the city’s high unemployment and income inequality, but as Gangloff 
recognized, Glen Cove had “lost sight of their own growth and its relation to the present 
situation,” that those very ‘problems’ sprouted from the city’s growth itself, an economy 
dependent the “existence of wealthy suburban estates.”76  As a city tied to the Woolworth, Pratt, 
and Morgan estates, among others, improving housing conditions and alleviating poverty 
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“Death in one hand and prosperity in the other”77 
Long Island’s dependent service economy languished during the Depression.  Tied to the 
wealth generated in New York, the fortunes of the wealthy and middle class in the city 
determined that of Long Island.  The building boom ended after 1929, while elites constructed 
only eighty estates in the 1930s.  At the Depression’s nadir in early 1933, nearly a fifth of Nassau 
County’s population applied for emergency relief.78  New Deal projects, while supporting 
thousands of unemployed Long Islanders, supplemented the foundation of residential suburbia, 
completing the state parkway network as envisioned by Robert Moses, designing a public golf 
course at Bethpage State Park, and improving local public amenities.79  All of the projects 
buttressed the stagnant suburban economy, but growth did not return until 1940, and the recovery 
was not based upon the fortunes of Gotham but rather from the region’s aircraft industry, a 
relatively small segment of the elite recreational economy prior to 1940 that transformed the 
nature of the Long Island economy by the end of the war, revolutionizing the region’s labor 
market, the spatial layout of the Island, and its relationship to the metropolitan region.       
The origins of Long Island’s aircraft industry are closely tied to the origins of aviation 
itself.  While North Carolina, Ohio, and even Connecticut compete over aviation birth rights, 
Long Island can claim most of the seminal flight accomplishments prior to 1930 thanks to the 
disposable wealth of the nation’s upper class flowing through the region.80 Early aircraft was a 
novelty, dominated by wealthy sportsmen, adventurers, and entrepreneurs.  Wealthy interest in 
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aviation coalesced with the ample land available in Nassau County, and early aviators carved 
seven airfields out of the Hempstead Plains, holding internationally recognized tournaments and 
supporting major breakthroughs in flight.  From Long Island’s airfields, Earle Ovington made 
the first airmail flight, Lieutenants John Macready and Oakley Kelly began the first 
transcontinental flight to San Diego, and Charles Lindbergh took off for Paris.  The area’s early 
dominance made it the center of America’s small military aircraft efforts during World War I, 
and the “Lindbergh Boom” in 1927 birthed a commercial market.  Sales jumped from twenty-
one to seventy-one million dollars in two years, and Long Island’s social elite established the 
Aviation Country Club in 1929, complete with tennis courts, swimming pool, and a landing 
field.81   
Long Island’s early aviation industry, while world-renowned, remained on the periphery 
of Long Island’s economy through the 1930s, an outgrowth of the region’s proximity to New 
York’s wealth rather than a distinct industry.  For one, aircraft employed few people.  In 1930, 
Nassau County had only 4,000 manufacturing workers in any industry.  Aviation was a ‘craft 
industry’ done in ‘job shops’ with a small number of skilled workers rather than an assembly 
line.  These men (all men prior to World War II), designed handmade tools and parts drawn from 
their own expertise, and often built a ‘lot’ of parts for an order, moving from one component to 
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another.  New York City supplied the craft workers, including Polish, German, and Italian 
immigrants with backgrounds in Old-World metal and woodworking trades.82  The craft-based 
nature of early aircraft limited both entry into the job market as well as the need for large 
numbers of employees, and given low demand in the 1910s and 1920s, aircraft remained a small 
part of Long Island’s economy despite its strong geographic and popular presence.   
The industry’s close relationship with the US military transformed its role in the region.  
The Depression destroyed the nascent consumer market, and private production remained 
stagnant through the 1930s.  The manufacturers who survived wedded themselves to military 
contracts.  Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, founded in 1929 by six men in a garage 
in Baldwin, worked closely with the Navy, moving to a 120-acre site in Bethpage by 1936.83  In 
neighboring Farmingdale on the Nassau/Suffolk border, Russian expatriate Alexander de 
Seversky founded the Seversky Aircraft Corporation in 1931, developing record-breaking 
military aircraft like the P-35 for the Army Air Corps in his 250,000 square foot factory.  While 
Seversky was ousted in 1938 and the company was reorganized into the Republic Aircraft 
Corporation, his early relationship with the Army was pivotal to the company’s survival.84  Other 
firms, including the Sperry Gyroscope Company of Brooklyn and Fairchild’s Ranger Aircraft 
Engineering Corporation in Farmingdale, powered through the Depression as instrument and 
engine developers for military aircraft.85  Despite such growth, their impact on the area’s labor 
																																																						
82 Tom Lilley, Tom. “Conversion to Wartime Production Techniques,” The History of the Aircraft Industry: An 
Anthology. G.R. Simonson, ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968), 135-136; Richard Thruelsen, The Grumman 
Story (New York: Praeger, 1976), 21; Stephen Raymond Patnode, “Labor’s Love Lost: The Influence of Gender, 
Race, and Class on the Workplace in Postwar America.” (PhD diss., Stony Brook University, 2008), 19. 
83 Thruelson, 17-91; Freudenthal, 93; John W. Thomas, “Financing long Island’s Aircraft Industry, 1928-1938,” in 
The Development of the Aerospace Industry on Long Island; Financial and Related Aspects, Volume II, eds. William 
K. Kaiser, Charles E. Stonier (Hempstead NY: Hofstra University Yearbook of Business, Series 5, Volume 4, 1968), 
48-50. 
84 Joshua Stoff, The Thunder Factory: An Illustrated History of the Republic Aviation Corporation (Osceola, WI: 
Motorbooks International, 1990), 12-33; Thomas, 51-52; Rossano, 72-3. 




market remained small.  Grumman’s employment remained below five hundred workers until 
1937, never climbing above 1,000 until 1940. Republic likewise remained below 1,000 
employees.86   
Global hostilities changed this.  Military-related exports to Europe and Latin America 
grew in the late 1930s, and the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 pushed the War Department to 
strengthen the nation’s air defense.  In March 1940, FDR requested 50,000 planes a year from 
American manufacturers.  By the end of that year, legislation was in place to streamline the 
contract process, assist in the development of defense facilities, and produce a government-
private industry partnership popularly known as the ‘military-industrial complex’ in the postwar 
period.87  Long Island’s aircraft manufacturers benefitted from this partnership, and the region 
became the nation’s sixth largest recipient of military contracts by 1945.88  Republic’s 
relationship with the Army thrived as the company produced the first single-engine single-seat 
pursuit aircraft, the P-47 Thunderbolt, building 15,683 P-47’s during the war as the second 
largest producer for the Army Air Corps.89  Grumman built thousands of F4F Wildcats, F6F 
Hellcats, and TBF-1 Avengers for the Navy, and the company became known as the “Iron 
Works” for their planes’ ability to survive battles and return pilots to safety.  Around these 
airframe producers (firms that built and assembled airplanes) emerged a network of 
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subcontractors making instruments, flight equipment, and engines, including Sperry, the Ranger 
Engines division, and Liberty Aircraft Corporation.   
This high level of production, supported through military spending, revolutionized the 
region’s economy and geographic layout.  The factories transitioned from the craft-based, 
innovation-oriented ‘job shop’ to an assembly line mass production system, necessitating long, 
slender single-story buildings covering thousands of acres. They also necessitated thousands of 
trained factory workers to design, manufacture, and assemble the more than 100,000 parts 
required to make an airplane.  These massive needs transformed Long Island into an industrial 
suburb, joining what Sarah Jo Peterson calls “the latest eruption in a decades-long process of 
suburban diversification” across the nation during World War II, as new industrial nodes 
sprouted along the nation’s outlying urban fringe.90  Defense-related industrialization 
reconfigured cities, built towns from farmland, and aided the regional growth of the South and 
West. 91  In Long Island’s case, defense-related industrialization pivoted the region away from its 
subservient position to New York City.  Long Island’s residential suburban service economy no 
longer dominated the labor market as industry moved to the center of its job growth and source 
of income, making the bi-county region a center rivaling the nation’s largest manufacturing 
cities.  Industry also provided Long Island’s working class with unprecedented opportunities for 
jobs, housing, and services, transforming their lives.  
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 When aircraft demand took off in 1940, Republic, Grumman, and their subcontractors all 
scrambled for workers.  Republic’s staff climbed from a few hundred to 1,500, with an additional 
8,000 in training.  Grumman’s jumped to over 6,000 by 1941, and the company continued hiring 
around 1,000 workers per month.  At their peaks, Republic’s employment rolls were over 24,000 
and Grumman’s more than 25,000 in 1943.  Scientific instruments, the largest parts 
manufacturing sector for aircraft production, went from non-existent to employing over 10,000 
by 1943.  Overall, more than 100,000 people were part of defense-related aviation manufacturing 
on Long Island at the war’s peak, about forty percent of the 1940 labor force.  They built 
everything from stabilizers and bomb sight equipment to the planes themselves, part of the 
production front for the most advanced air power in the world.92  In other parts of the nation, 
filling suburban factory positions involved massive migration and coordination between housing 
agencies, private builders, and local government to meet the needs of these workers in these new 
communities.93  On Long Island, the existing population provided a ready workforce, and the 
challenge was transforming these service and agricultural laborers into industrial workers. 
Despite Long Island’s proximity to the nation’s largest city, defense manufacturers 
overwhelmingly relied on local labor.  A Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) survey of 
Republic Aircraft employees in 1940 determined that almost eighty percent lived in Nassau and 
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Suffolk counties, with the remainder commuting from Queens and Brooklyn.94  Local workers 
were preferred for several reasons.  Transportation from New York City, especially to the 
Nassau/Suffolk border, was limited and difficult, unless one had access to a car and the parkway 
system along the city’s perimeter.  When Grumman and Republic began tapping the city for 
workers during labor shortages in 1943, they had to coordinate with the Long Island Railroad to 
operate special trains to their plants.95  Both companies also operated multiple shifts over twenty 
and twenty-four-hour periods during the war, and waited on irregular shipments of materials to 
their plants, all requiring a workforce ready for abrupt schedule changes.96  Lastly, the state 
defined the limits of the local labor market.   The Navy coordinated with Grumman to limit 
employment to “bona fide residents of Nassau and Suffolk counties” in 1941 to counter fears of 
subversive groups in defense plants.97  Numerous agencies, eventually centralized under the War 
Manpower Commission (WMC) in April 1942, tried to stabilize the intense labor mobility 
occurring during the war, regulating the transfer of workers to areas of production. The WMC’s 
local committees calculated labor supply and production demands across the nation, restricting 
contracts to firms with adequate labor supplies.  The WMC collaborated with Long Island’s 
aircraft companies and effectively closed off the labor market, given the fact Long Island’s labor 
supply could meet production demands.  With United States Employment Service (USES) 
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offices in Hempstead, Rockville Centre, and Patchogue (among others), firms exhausted local 
supplies of men and women, and Long Island remained relatively closed off, a labor market all to 
itself.98 
With only a small manufacturing employment base available on the Island (less than 
3,500 registrants with the NYS department of Labor were classified as “general industrial 
workers”), the government and private firms established island-wide training programs to turn 
farmers, fishermen, housewives, domestic servants, general laborers and high school students 
into riveters, welders, and sheet metal workers. In 1940 and 1941, the government and aircraft 
firms utilized ten high schools and four aviation training centers across Nassau and western 
Suffolk counties.  The government restructured its Works Progress Administration and National 
Youth Administration programs to train the unemployed for defense, preparing over 16,000 
future employees in 1941 alone.  Republic and Grumman augmented public programs with their 
own private schools.  Republic established the “Faust” School in Jericho with a one million 
dollar grant in 1941, while Grumman trained and re-trained its employees in local high schools 
through night classes and apprenticeship programs on the job, a system they continued into the 
postwar period.99    
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Long Island’s service economy all but collapsed as laborers left the estates, farms, and 
resorts to fill the job openings and training programs in the defense industry.  Estate worker John 
Gregory recalled that World War II ended the dependency on estate work, and “when Grumman 
and different factories opened up, a lot of these men went. The younger fellows were drawn into 
services….and the others went to Grumman and what not.”100  Farm laborers like Joseph 
Mancuso of Bethpage no longer depended on intermittent wage work that “paid practically 
nothing” and instead got a job at subcontractor Kirkham Engineering, where “work was steady.”  
Adeline Fischer, whose family barely eked out a living during the Depression, recalled that war 
work pulled her father off welfare and seasonal agricultural labor. It was “the best time of our 
life because he had a steady paycheck and we had food on the table.”101  All over Long Island, 
former construction workers, butchers, potato farmers, fishermen, and bakers became industrial 
blue-collar workers, and the “only thing they had in common was that they were Long 
Islanders.”102  The divide inherent to Long Island’s residential suburban economy dissipated as 
these industrial workers entered a labor market that offered competitive wages.  They were the 
beneficiaries of what Robert Margo and Claudia Goldin call the “Great Compression,” the 
narrowing of the wage gap between the bottom and top twenty percent, between skilled and 
unskilled workers, and the educated and un-educated during World War II, a process especially 
apparent in the former ‘Gold Coast.’103    
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Black workers pinned their hopes on the defense industry’s transformative potential as 
well, though their aspirations were dashed as racial barriers barred black workers, along with 
white ethnics, from industrial employment at the outset of the defense buildup in 1940.  Before 
Pearl Harbor, Grumman refused to hire any German or Italian born Americans, while Ranger 
Engines required citizenship papers dated before 1932.  Proof of American birth proved 
problematic for blacks as well, since many had come from areas of the South where births went 
unrecorded.  Republic, the largest employer in December 1940, required all of its employees to 
be “white, full citizens, aged less than fifty.”  For white ethnic workers though, the barriers 
quickly faded as employers and the government relaxed citizenship requirements during the war, 
and defense firms quickly absorbed them during labor shortages in 1941 and 1942.104  Long 
Island’s employers did not relax their restrictions on black workers, following general trends 
across the country that denied blacks jobs in the defense industry.  Black activists challenged 
these racial restrictions as early as 1940, forcing state governments and the Executive Branch to 
pass the most significant civil rights legislation since Reconstruction.105  New York City’s 
NAACP, Urban League, black labor groups raised awareness to the problem within the state, 
pushing state congressmen and eventually Governor Herbert Lehman to establish the Committee 
on Discrimination in Employment (COD) as part of the New York State Council of Defense in 
March 1941.106  Devoted to integrating the defense industry because “discrimination of any kind 
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is un-American, indefensible, and…dangerous to our democracy at this time,” the committee 
coordinated with the broader defense council to gather statistics, negotiate with employers to 
adopt non-discriminatory practices, and concurrently launch an anti-discrimination educational 
campaign.  Executive Order 8802, Franklin Roosevelt’s response to A. Philip Randolph’s threat 
of mass protest in Washington, established a similar bureau at the federal level, the Fair 
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC).  The FEPC accepted individual complaints of 
discrimination and could investigate the alleged claims, basically launching a publicity campaign 
in order to compel a firm to comply.  FDR expanded the FEPC’s powers in 1943 under 
Executive Order 9346, requiring all contracts to carry a non-discrimination clause.107   
On one hand, these committees, at both the state and Federal level, were as “toothless,” 
as historians claim.  The FEPC remained chronically underfunded, underpowered, and unwilling 
to threaten war production to integrate firms.  Of some 8,000 claims nationwide, only a third 
were resolved in some form.  As Kevin Kruse and Stephen Tuck argue, the FEPC was “thin on 
substance,” representing little more than a symbolic origin to any federal civil rights commitment 
in the twentieth century.  New York’s COD also had little power to enforce anti-discrimination, 
and mostly launched publicity campaigns or number-gathering initiatives.108  Regardless of the 
apparent limitations, the effectiveness of these committees ultimately rested on local 
cooperation, as Joseph Abel argues.  The FEPC was most effective in the North and among firms 
with sympathetic management or in desperate need of workers.  Once the FEPC was integrated 
into the Office of Production Management in 1942 and then the War Manpower Commission in 
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1943, those bureau’s regional offices were responsible for enforcement.  Local black workers 
discovered that on Long Island, government officials were committed to integrating firms, 
especially as firms faced worker shortages, and as a result, aspiring black workers were able to 
join the defense industry on Long Island.109  
The black struggle to join Long Island’s war economy began during the defense buildup 
in 1940.  After Republic Aviation announced a fivefold plant expansion on September 9th, New 
York Urban League Industrial Secretary Charles Collier Jr. visited the plant to inform the 
company of available black aviation mechanics from the Manhattan High School of Aviation 
Trades.  At the time, there was only one African American chauffeur among the company’s 
2,400 workers.  Republic’s public relations director, William L. Wilson, dismissed the effort to 
employ more black workers, stating that he could do little “because of objections from white 
workers in the plant if Negroes were employed” which would “interfere with efficient production 
on defense orders.”110  Republic’s attitude galvanized black activists across the metropolitan 
area, and members from New York City’s Urban League, the Catholic Interracial Council, the 
Committee for Employment Opportunities for Negroes, and the National Conference of 
Christians and Jews united in an ad-hoc committee to launch a massive publicity campaign 
against the metropolitan area’s intransigent firms.111  By January 1941, the committee contacted 
President Roosevelt and Governor Lehman to raise awareness, and by the end of the month, 
State Lieutenant Governor Charles Poletti launched a full-scale investigation, condemning 
Republic, Brewster, and Grumman for their refusal to hire qualified black employees from the 
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Manhattan school.112  In May, Republic agreed to train one black resident of Patchogue, Long 
Island, “an experiment…in this one instance” that if successful, would provide avenues for other 
minority employees.  By August, all three companies committed to “liberal hiring policies” and 
promised to “give job and training opportunities to every qualified Negro in Nassau and Suffolk 
counties.”113 
Long Island’s firms did little to fulfill their promise.  When the local division of the 
Office of Production Management (OPM) (responsible for coordinating the nation’s economy 
and for the FEPC’s implementation early in the war) received a letter from William Hendricks, 
an experienced black electrical engineer who was refused a job at Republic, the labor division of 
the OPM investigated.  OPM field employment assistant Edward Lawson reported that “frankly, 
I’m beginning to think that Republic is stalling along” after discovering the company still had 
only a single black employee in a laborer position.  Lawson wrote to Republic public relations 
director William L. Wilson, and the company gave Hendricks a job in the tool and die 
department.  By November 1, 1941, Hendricks was officially on the payroll as a toolmaker, the 
first black employee on the production line at Republic.114 While securely employed by the end 
of the year, the environment at Republic remained hostile to blacks, and within a year, Hendricks 
faced serious threats to his job.  He felt “treated with an aire [sic] of suspicion because it was 
unusual for a black to be seen here,” and felt discriminated by “a superior who possibly was 
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afraid that I might aspire for his job.”  He managed a number of employees but was unable to 
keep them from “shooting oil from pressure cans, throwing towels knotted up at one another and 
tying cups of water to whirling machines.”  Hendricks tried to reprimand them, but those he 
spoke to were quickly removed from his charge until he led only a single employee.  When he 
asked his sectional supervisor about the situation, the supervisor replied that “no matter how 
qualified a colored man was, still white men did not want to take the work from him.”115 
Hendricks returned to Edward Lawson in 1942, now working for the local office of War 
Manpower Commission in charge of FEPC implementation.  Hendricks filed another complaint, 
and outright hostility ensued at work.  Supervisors advised him to leave the company, fellow 
workers believed he was a government spy (admittedly, he had been writing letters to 
government officials about inefficiency at the workplace, blaming “German” elements at 
Republic) and pranksters removed the screws and bolts from his chair so “when I sat down, the 
chair fell apart and I found myself on the floor.”   Despite his excellent record on the job, the 
company transferred him to the methods engineering department (a sector devoted to 
experimental manufacturing), and was so eager to remove him altogether that they willingly 
wrote a letter of reference for him and claimed he was “unhappy on the job.”116 While admittedly 
uneasy at work, Hendricks did not want to leave the company, asking the WMC once again for 
assistance.  Edward Lawson tried to negotiate with the company, but Republic claimed that a 
hate-strike would ensue among white workers and that “the management” would not hire more 
blacks unless Hendricks was ousted.  Lawson responded that if management could not control 
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their employees, “the Army representatives of the War Manpower Commission would see to it 
that no serious stoppage of work occurred because of the refusal of individuals to work with a 
Negro.”  Lawson went further:  “any employee who refuses to continue normal work because of 
his personal prejudices will be considered disloyal to the Government and not only will be 
subject to immediate dismissal, but may be prevented from obtaining employment in other 
industrial establishments engaged in war production.”117  Republic conceded, giving Hendricks a 
senior operation sheet writer position in the methods engineering department.  
It took nearly a year and outright threats to secure a job for a single, well-qualified black 
worker.  While undoubtedly a major victory for officials assigned to prying open the industry, 
this did not guarantee opportunities in defense work for the masses of African Americans in the 
metropolitan region.  In a region with few trained industrial workers, access to training programs 
was the key to entry into the aircraft industry, and this proved the most formidable obstacle to 
integrating Long Island’s defense workforce.  Aside from the immense unpaid time investment 
for the unskilled (three-hour night classes on weekdays took nearly half a year to complete), it 
was in training schools where birth certificates were checked, literacy tested, and physical exams 
administered.  Training schools were the major regulators of the workforce, and firms could stall 
integration while still promising to hire on a non-racial basis by simply limiting access to 
training programs, a widespread form of “training discrimination” as Joseph Abel argues in his 
study of the Texas aircraft industry.118   
Defense firms limited access to training programs in two ways.  First, to assert control 
over the training regimen, they refused to recognize training from unacceptable programs.  The 
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National Youth Administration (NYA) centers on Long Island, which had converted to defense 
training after 1940, were celebrated for training black men and women for war work.119  
Nonetheless, this public form of training was deemed inadequate, and NYA graduates like Sarah 
Tibbs, a black resident of Amityville, were denied employment at all the major companies.120  
Aside from limiting acceptable training programs, firms also used schools to screen potential 
employees.  Migrant domestic Myrtle Lebby of Inwood was refused a position at an aviation 
school in Lynbrook for having recently held a job in Washington DC, and therefore did not meet 
local residency requirements.  Arthur Lindsay of Freeport was likewise dropped from a school in 
Freeport after a “confidential investigation of his residence, associates, and habits” deemed him 
unfit to work for the company, despite stellar records at the school and good rapport with his 
teacher.121  The Freeport National Defense School’s 425 enrollees in June 1942 had no blacks at 
all, rejecting a dozen black applicants the month prior who were below the school’s 
requirements.122  African Americans rejected from these schools turned to government agencies 
to rectify the situation.  New York State’s COD responded to complaints over the Freeport 
school’s anti-black stance in 1942, forcing the school to re-enroll two of the twelve rejected 
applicants and continuously monitoring the school through July when they accepted nineteen 
																																																						
119 Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-40 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 207-208; 
Polenberg, 79-82; Brooklyn Urban League Industrial Development, ““Moving Toward an Equitable Distribution of 
Negroes in War Production,” June-August 1942, p. 9, Box 7, folder 404, War Council Papers. 
120 Edward Lawson, “Lawson’s Report – Republic Aviation Corporation, Farmingdale, Long Island,” September 28, 
1942, p. 2, Box 48, folder “Republic Aviation,” Case Files 1941-1946, FEPC; John Beecher and James Fleming, 
“Employment Practices at Brewster, Republic, Grumman, and Otis Elevator” September 28, 1942, p. 2, Box 44, 
folder “Grumman Aeronautical Corporation,” Case Files 1941-1946, FEPC;  Letter Miss Sarah Cotter Tibbs to 
FEPC, December 5, 1943, Box 25, folder “Grumman Aircraft Corp., 2-BR-407,” Case Files 1941-1946, FEPC. 
121 Letter from Edward Lawson to Myrtle Lebby, August 31, 1943, Box 25, folder 2-BR-146, Case Files 1941-1946, 
FEPC; “Field Visit Report,” March 8, 1944, Box 25, folder “Grumman Aircraft Training, 2-BR-370,” Case Files 
1941-1946, FEPC; Letter from Arthur Lindsay to President Roosevelt, October 30, 1943, Box 25, folder “Grumman 
Aircraft Training, 2-BR-370,” Case Files 1941-1946, FEPC; Letter from Edward Lawson to Paul Gilbert, Dec. 8, 
1943, Box 25, folder “Grumman Aircraft Training, 2-BR-370,” Case Files 1941-1946, FEPC. 
122 New York State War Council, Committee on Discrimination in Employment, “Monthly Report,” August 1942, p. 




black students.  In 1943, the COD launched hearings, conferences, and a full-scale investigation 
to guarantee equal access to the schools.  By June 1943, the COD, in cooperation with the FEPC, 
restricted the firms’ ability to select trainees at schools, requiring standardized non-racial 
admissions criteria for entrance that were assessed any enrollee alleged discrimination.123 
After nearly two years, workers and government officials managed to pry open the 
industry to black employment, a struggle that coalesced with the growing labor shortage after 
1942.  Republic’s minority employment increased from two employees in October 1941 to 105 
by September 1942, with over half working in skilled or semi-skilled positions.  While still only 
one percent of the firm’s entire workforce, black workers were making headway in the company.  
Grumman likewise improved their hiring policies, from fifteen non-white employees in October 
1941 (with only five laboring on the assembly line) to fifty the next year, with twenty five in 
training (though this only represented a quarter of a percent of the total workforce).124  After 
1942, those numbers would grow as Long Island’s labor market dried up.  In December 1942, 
the WMC considered Suffolk County “pretty well drained of applicants,” and by the next year, 
firms canvassed over radio, in newspapers, and door-to-door.  They accepted part-time 
employees, cut the process of hiring aliens down to two weeks, encouraged women to apply, and 
even went as far as accepting trainees from New York City, although more often they relaxed 
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residency requirements for people moving to Long Island in order to qualify for the local 
schools.125  With racial barriers broken and immense manpower needs, the FEPC and the COD 
became referral organizations, solving the labor shortage while also getting blacks hired.  When 
five black women from Amityville did not receive calls for jobs after completing training, the 
FEPC alerted Republic of the situation, who found these women jobs as they opened.  Likewise, 
when Mrs. Laurona Hunter was refused a position at Republic in 1943, the FEPC negotiated a 
non-factory position for her since the company was not hiring for the assembly line.126  
Upholding anti-discrimination took a back seat to filling jobs.  After a year of fighting to keep 
William Hendricks employed at Republic Aviation, the FEPC supported his termination in 
September 1943, citing the fact that other blacks were now employed in the tool room and 280 
were in the plant overall.  Hendrick’s previous defender, WMC officer Edward Lawson, believed 
Hendricks suffered from a “very pronounced persecution complex.”127   
Over the course of the war, the proportion of African Americans workers in Long 
Island’s defense industry grew.  From 1942 to 1943, the black proportion jumped from just under 
one percent (0.9%) to 3.1 percent, or over 1,500 employees within the seven largest aircraft 
firms.  While relatively small number, when measured against the 1940 black population, the 
seven largest aircraft producers employed over ten percent (10.4 percent) of all African 
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American adults, close to the twelve percent of all adult whites working in the industry.  By 
1944, that white-black difference narrowed to 9.3 percent of all adult blacks compared to ten 
percent of all whites as total aircraft employment dropped eighteen percent.  Given the walls 
around Long Island’s labor market, this was a significant achievement.  The numbers in 
scientific instruments, a field closely tied to aircraft production, followed a similar trajectory.  In 
November 1942, only 130 non-whites worked in the entire sector, or 1.6 percent of the total 
labor force.  By November 1944, that number jumped to 4.3 percent of the workforce.128 
 Racial integration and black mobility within companies varied by firm and sector, as 
Table 1.2 illustrates.  Fairchild’s Ranger Engine division in Farmingdale, the most intransigent of 
aircraft parts firms, severely limited the mobility of its paltry forty-one black employees.  When 
WMC officials visited the plant, the employment manager informed them that their applications 
had removed any references to race or religion, though direct conversations with black 
employees revealed that race determined an employee’s occupational status.  Employee Sylvia 
Morris reported that she was the first black women to work on machines at the plant, and black 
men were relegated to the porter department.  A male employee confirmed this, stating that 
despite his five-month training in preparation for the assembly line, he was told “that the only 
job for Negroes in the plant were those of porters or washers.”  Another male employee admitted 
to operating a burring machine but remained at a washer’s pay-rate.  Promotions were not based 
on qualifications or training accolades, but made in an ad-hoc manner, overwhelmingly favoring 
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whites.129 Ranger was the exception on Long Island, as once workers and corporate heads 
generally accepted blacks on the factory floor, they entered into the broad corporate ladder.  Of 
107 black employees at Republic in September 1943, fifty-seven percent were categorized as 
skilled or semi-skilled, compared to a quarter working in the non-manufacturing positions.   
Sperry Gyroscope Company, the most progressive of the metropolitan area’s firms, managed to 
employ almost two-thirds of its black workforce in its Lake Success plant in the skilled or semi-
skilled categories, and only four of the 717 black employees worked in non-production 
positions.130   
Ultimately, prospective black employees compelled government officials to enforce anti-
discrimination employment law and require the region’s defense factories to train and hire on a 
non-racial basis.  African Americans benefitted from this early struggle as labor shortages 
became acute.  By 1943, blacks were participants in the industry and government-driven 
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Table 1.2: Black Employment Levels in Selected Firms, 1944 
 Black Employees Total Employees Percent of Total 
Employees (%) 
Grumman 900* 24,000* 3.8 
Liberty Aircraft 124 2,249 5.5 
Republic Aviation 375 11,417 3.3 
Ranger Engines 41 2,074 2.0 
* Estimate 
Source: “Final Deposition Report” March 9, 1944, Box 25, folder 2-BR-369, Case Files 1941-1946, FEPC; 
“Compliance Report,” Oct. 25, 1944, Box 27, folder 2-BR-409, Case Files 1941-1946, FEPC; “Final Deposition 
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transformation of Long Island’s workforce that severed both black and white dependence on the 
employment patterns of farms, resorts, middle class homes, and wealthy estates.  With access to 
better paying and more secure jobs, African Americans on Long Island could enjoy the fruits of 
the ‘Great Compression,’ as the area’s working class became industrialized, entering into 
massive factories with others like themselves, and benefitting from the upward mobility wartime 
work provided.   
 
The Future Detroit of the East  
Defense industrialization created a brand new world of work and homes for thousands of 
black and white Long Islanders, placing the manufacturing production worker, rather than the 
middle class commuter or estate owner, at the center.  The black and white laborers who left the 
farms and estates for defense factories entered a working environment distinct from the 
residential and agricultural suburban workplace.  While most factories employed less than a 
hundred workers, the majority of defense laborers worked for the big three firms:  Republic, 
Grumman, and Sperry.   Here they walked into hundred acre single-story plants, labored above, 
below, and alongside hundreds of other workers as they assembled fighter-bombers, aircraft 
engines, or on a smaller scale, various scientific instruments.  Sperry’s Lake Success Plant 
exemplified this new work environment.  Elmer Sperry founded the Sperry Gyroscope Company 
in 1910 to design and produce navigational technologies, the most prominent being the 
gyroscope, a device to measure orientation in ships and planes.  By World War II, the company 
had expanded into various military technologies requiring new factories and a workforce of over 




Long Island along the Queens/Nassau border in Great Neck and Lake Success.131  The plant in 
Lake Success was built largely in what was then the “country,” requiring an automobile or access 
to the limited private bus transportation available.  On a tour of this plant, one FEPC official 
commented that “the space covered stretches out beyond the limit of vision and the tour around 
the various departments took about two hours and even then I did not see all of them.”  The 
scientific instruments moved along a belt as the various pieces were assembled, and cellophane 
covered the instrument as it travelled through the assembly line to prevent dust particles from 
clogging the device.  Usually one worker utilized a machine, though most were capable of 
working two or three different kinds of machines to prevent boredom and broaden skills.  
Women and African Americans worked alongside white men in nearly every sector of the very 
hot, noisy, and dirty factory (save the electronics production department, which was air 
conditioned and clean), and non-whites were almost sixteen percent of the total workforce in 
early 1945.132   
 The shop floor was merely one place workers of all genders and colors would mingle 
together.  At Sperry, cafeterias fed employees, a plant hospital provided complete physical care, 
and at lunchtime, “negro and white workers were playing games together” including horseshoes 
and volleyball.  This was common practice throughout Long Island’s defense firms.  At Republic 
Aviation, dance parties were popular among both black and white laborers, while Grumman was 
the most well-known for its paternalistic environment for war workers.  The company 
maintained an ‘open-door’ management policy so that employees were welcome to air any 
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grievance or issue directly to the company’s top managers, and they paid the fourth highest 
wages in the nation, not including a bonus system to increase production across the plant (which 
other firms in the area emulated).  The company also maintained a forty-acre farm, three 
nurseries for employee children, and a number of sports programs for both men and women, 
including over one hundred softball teams.  Grummanites, rather than viewing this as an empty 
corporate gesture, openly embraced Grumman’s paternalist policies, and a kind of family culture 
developed between workers and the employer that continued into the postwar period.133 
The war transformed the lives of thousands outside the defense workforce as well.  
Domestics found work in the USO, servicing military personnel at Mitchel Field (and the 
surrounding bases, including Santini), a key supply base for US defenses in the North Atlantic 
and home to the Air Defense Command.  While estate workers like James Baxter jokingly 
referred to Mitchel Field as “the white officer’s country club” between the wars because wealthy 
military officers kept horses and played polo (requiring black service workers to care for their 
horses), the war broadened the activities taking place at the base, and employment opportunities 
abounded.  Irma Brasier left her domestic service job at the Garden City Country Club in 1943, 
working as a USO senior hostess along with her mother for the duration of the organization’s 
initial existence to 1947.134 Further east, Mason General Hospital in Brentwood opened to handle 
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soldier’s psychological issues, while Camp Upton expanded from its army training origins to 
include a hospital, separation center, and a host of new buildings, and both required hundreds of 
construction workers, office personnel, mess attendants, and general service workers.135  
Demand for food meanwhile afforded agricultural laborers an unprecedented degree of stability.  
With a rise in potato planting, black farmworkers had plenty of work, and the WMC opened a 
number of agricultural labor supply centers to house and coordinate work schedules for some 
652 indigenous, southern, and foreign laborers, supplementing their intermittent agricultural 
employment with non-agricultural war-related work.  Even with a continued influx of southern 
blacks, the Department of Agriculture had to import 450 Jamaican workers to harvest produce 
across two-hundred farms on Long Island from 1943-1945.136   
Long Islanders also encountered a new spatial layout catering to the needs of 
manufacturing production workers.  Real estate developer Frederick Leeston-Smith, who bought 
up a 300-acre plot of land to build 1,200 homes adjacent to the growing Grumman plant in 1940, 
foresaw that the Island was “fast becoming a great center of aircraft and allied industries…the 
future Detroit of the east.”  He imagined the farmland giving way to homes for industrial 
workers, and secured Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages to make the homes 
affordable.  Bankers, retail store owners, and above all builders anticipated the building boom 
and “buying power of our people” unleashed by the high wages of defense work as early as 
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1940.  In a region that had built much of its prosperity on housing construction prior to the 
Depression, a new housing boom directly related to industry would lift the two counties out of 
the decade-long construction slump.137 
On one hand, workers did have access to new housing opportunities as they flocked to 
communities immediately surrounding factories.  Farmingdale, a village resting between 
Republic Aviation and Grumman, became completely overrun with workers trying to secure 
even temporary housing.  A survey noted that “most of the houses are rented even before they 
have been vacated” and homeowners capitalized on the limited housing stock, charging 
exorbitant rents “even for the shabbiest dwellings.”  Workers even resorted to renting “defense 
trailers” in lieu of actual housing.  Only seventeen percent of surveyed Republic employees 
owned their own homes, while nearly half rented an apartment, house, or slept in room & board 
accommodations.  Demand for housing was high, especially because “increased earnings of the 
workers have spurred their desire for better housing facilities.”138  The U.S. Housing Authority 
appropriated one million dollars for defense housing at the outset of the war, and dozens of real 
estate developers capitalized on housing demand as well.139  Aside from Leeston-Smith’s 
housing tracts in Bethpage, several housing developments appeared early in the war.  In 
Farmingdale village, South Park Homes, East Park Homes, Nakomis Park, and Republic Homes 
all catered to defense workers with FHA mortgages, and many were “sold faster than they are 
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being built.”  In the New Hyde Park/Lake Success area, one hundred and thirty homes were 
erected after Sperry opened its factory in 1942.  Developers even built luxury homes to 
accommodate “executives, engineers, architects, and the better paid workers,” including 
Alexander Edelman’s 500 shorefront homes in Lindenhurst village along the Great South Bay, “a 
mecca for yachting, fishing, and duck shooting.”140 
Aside from these projects though, Long Island would not have the kind of boomtown 
development like Willow Run outside Detroit or the burgeoning defense areas of the South and 
West during the war.  While factories blossomed across the region’s landscape, the housing 
boom would follow the war, not coincide with it.  Housing construction from 1940-1944 
declined sixty-four percent from the 1930s and was seventy-one percent lower than the 
immediate postwar period (1945-1950), the birth-pangs of the postwar suburban boom.141  
Government restrictions played a pivotal role.  Aside from widespread rationing of building 
materials, construction itself became highly regulated during the war.  The National Housing 
Agency (NHA) limited government housing loans to properties within war areas with actual 
housing shortages, and the NHA found no housing problems on Long Island. Since the majority 
of workers lived in Nassau and Suffolk Counties anyway, the government encouraged bus 
services, increased use of railroads, and car-pools or temporary tenancies as alternatives to new 
housing.142   
																																																						
140 “To Erect Homes out of Town,” New York Sun, November 28, 1941; “Many New Homes in this Area,” New York 
Sun, August 22, 1941; “Rush Work on Homes for Aircraft Workers,” Untitled Newspaper, Aug 3, 1941,  folder 
“Republic – Newspaper Clippings,” CAM; United States Employment Service of the War Manpower Commission, 
“Labor Market Reports: New York City, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester Counties,” Vo. 2, no. 11, December 1942, p. 
41, Box 6, folder 271, War Council Papers; “Edelman Firm Buys 1,500 Lots on Long Island,” New York Herald 
Tribune, May 4, 1941, folder “Republic – Newspaper Clippings,” CAM. 
141 U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Housing: 1950. Volume I, General Characteristics. Part 4, Michigan-New York 
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1953), Table 20. 
142 “NHA Begins Converting Old N.Y. Homes for Defense Workers in Busy Centers,” New York Times, January 17, 
1943; War Manpower Commission, “Labor Market Development Report,” Vol. 4, no. 4, June/July 1944, p. 24, Box 




Rather than a housing boom occurring near burgeoning factories, a factory boom 
happened in the ample but dispersed settlements across the bi-county region, a pattern that would 
expand in the postwar period as firms decentralized aspects of production to draw in pockets of 
workers from local neighborhoods.   Grumman opened five auxiliary plants in 1942, stretching 
from Port Washington on the North Shore to Amityville on the South shore, allowing local 
employees to walk to work.143  Jake Swirbul saw the advantages not only in bringing in new 
workers, but also as a means to expand manufacturing space without limiting production.144  
Republic and Sperry likewise opened multiple plants in Oyster Bay, Great Neck, and Lake 
Success.  Subcontractors remained even more decentralized, operating anywhere from former 
airfields in Valley Stream on the Queens/Nassau border to Greenport on the North Fork of 
eastern Long Island.  So unlike the military bases of the South or the massive industrial Willow 
Run Bomber plant twenty-five miles outside of Detroit, housing and factories did not emerge 
simultaneously or in the same magnitude on Long Island, though the transformation was no less 
significant.  In Nassau and western Suffolk counties, industrialization came to the suburbs, 
transforming suburbia’s purpose from agricultural, commuter, and estate economies to that of 
manufacturing mass-production.  Industry pulled workers off farms or out of upper and middle 
class homes and into the more stable world of defense manufacturing as well as the multiplier 
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Wartime’s broad-based prosperity was short-lived, a result of unprecedented war needs 
rather than any sustained civilian demand that consumer industries could look forward to.  As the 
material demand declined in 1944, workers were left with uncertainty.  The next year, wartime 
spending dried up, and in regions transformed during the war, economist Paul Samuelson’s 
warnings of a returning depression rang true:  the military cancelled over 18,000 contracts, and 
fifty of the nation’s sixty-six airframe plants ceased to produce aircraft.145  Republic Aviation 
ordered a ten-day shutdown in 1945, and by December, employment dropped to 3,700.  Sperry’s 
workforce meanwhile shrank from 30,000 to 5,000.146  Grumman took a different approach, 
dismissing everyone over a loudspeaker announcement, and only notifying certain employees to 
report for work the next week.147  The emergency of war turned these small companies into giant 
enterprises, but peacetime could not sustain their size. Each tried converting to leaner civilian 
production.  Republic attempted to convert its XF-12 Rainbow military transport to commercial 
uses, though both American and Pan-American Airlines cancelled purchases, while Republic’s 
small-scale commercial amphibian (the RC-3 “Seabee”) proved costly and undercapitalized. The 
company managed to sell only twenty Rainbows, and the RC-3 was a $6.5 million dollar loss.148  
Republic consequently let 3,200 workers go in 1947 after increasing its workforce to 8,000.  
Grumman had some success, producing a number of small-scale commercial aircraft (most 
notably the G-73 Mallard), while also branching out into aluminum canoes and truck bodies, but 
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Grumman’s diversification never comprised more than five percent of their total sales, which had 
dropped from $236.8 million in 1945 to $24.2 million two years later, requiring a new round of 
2,000 layoffs.149   
Long Island’s airframe manufacturers competed for dwindling military funds, which 
continued to comprise nearly eighty percent of all aircraft orders nationwide in the immediate 
postwar period.150  For the industry’s employees, the mobility war work provided proved 
fleeting.  Women were overwhelmingly let go in what Stephen Patnode refers to as a postwar 
transition to “neo-traditional” gender roles in the workplace, removing women from the shop-
floor and restricting female jobs to low-level white collar work.   As former Grummanite 
Catherine O’Regan remembered, “after the war was over… they removed all of the females from 
the shop… [the] next day they were all replaced by men.”151  For Long Island’s blacks, the 
question was not so much about ‘last hired, first fired’ that unionists, civil rights activists, and 
industrialists on the national level debated during the transition to peace, but what to do after an 
entire industry collapsed, a problem they shared with their white co-workers.  James Baxter 
returned to estate work after losing his job at Grumman, securing stable employment again in 
1956 as a groundskeeper for the public school system in Great Neck.  Irma Brasier likewise 
returned to the service sector after her stint for the USO, sewing dresses from home, and doing 
day work or laundry.152   
Within a little over two decades, black Long Islanders had moved from the fringes of the 
low-wage suburban service market to participation in industrial suburbia.  This was largely the 
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result of the exceptional economic boom of war that drove an entire national economy to devote 
its manpower and resources to develop thousands of planes, millions of tanks, and billions of 
ammunition rounds.  These African Americans were part of the broader Great Migration flanked 
by the two World Wars, exploiting better-paying and liberating industrial work.  Black migrants 
to Long Island did not come to the area for industrial jobs however; they were swept up into the 
wholesale transformation of the region, and this was thanks to local efforts as much as national 
trends.  The state played a pivotal role, structuring the local labor market and defending their 
work rights.  Local activists likewise pushed firms to employ all of Long Island’s manpower, 
regardless of background or skin color.  Through the combined forces of state intervention and 
activist interest in black employment, opportunity emerged.  Ultimately, these efforts were all for 
temporary work in a wartime emergency, and there was little evidence that either the defense 
industry or equal opportunity would be sustained for existing African Americans or new black 
migrants after World War II.  Like the nation as a whole, Long Islanders feared a return to the 
old prewar economy. Blacks, too, feared that the war years were aberrant and wondered about 





Progress and Poverty 
 
In 1951, National Geographic magazine published an article of writer-photographer and 
explorer Howell Walker’s most recent excursion.  It was not to remote Australian territories or 
obscure Quebec farms, but instead a drive from the East River to Montauk, to observe an island 
where the “only monotonous thing about it is the constant change.”  Emerging from the newly-
constructed Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, Walker made his way east, stopping to interview locals 
and observe Long Island in flux.  The detour included Levittown, and Walker snapped photos of 
the new model homes, the lines of anxious homebuyers, and veterans filling out applications for 
low-cost loans.1  Walker’s photographs, along with the pictures and stories in Time, The New 
York Times, and elsewhere cemented Levittown and Long Island as the quintessential postwar 
suburb, emblematic of America’s prosperity and social mobility after 1945.2  And though the 
myth that surrounds Levittown attributes its popularity to the baby boom, returning veterans, and 
Americans’ proclivities toward homeownership, Walker recognized a major factor in Levittown 
and Long Island’s popularity: “along with the popular eastward migration goes industry.  Home 
seekers want space for their families, business needs space for its plants.  The general trend is a 
healthy one; transplanted factories find available labor in the grown suburbs, and residents find 
jobs close to home.”3 
Though Walker neglected the structural factors undergirding postwar suburbanization, 
historians have filled in the gap, showing the role of federal housing subsidies and highway 
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construction in fostering postwar sprawl.  Unlike Walker, historians still overlook the importance 
of jobs to postwar suburbanization, and if suburban industry is mentioned, it is in the context of 
tax revenues and the urban/suburban divide, not as central to suburbanization itself.4  On Long 
Island, jobs and housing grew together, both thanks to federal agencies: the FHA spent $601 per 
Nassau County resident from 1934 to 1960, while defense spending per capita in Nassau County 
amounted to $596 in 1960 alone.5  Defense dollars buttressed a robust labor market in blue-collar 
jobs and services, supporting an estimated 600,000 of 1.3 million Nassau County residents in 
1960.6  Defense-related manufacturing also fostered the infrastructure and construction capacity 
to attract other industries, while the population boom led to new jobs in finance, retail, and 
various services.  In all, job growth was a critical factor in Long Island’s 400 percent population 
increase from 1945 to 1960, especially for the thousands of upwardly mobile working class 
Americans who took advantage of new employment opportunities to purchase homes on the 
Island and become members of the postwar ‘middle class.’  
 Whether one could access these jobs determined their ability to enjoy Long Island’s 
postwar consumer bounty; the labor market was critical to social mobility.  This was as true for 
the region’s burgeoning black population as anyone else.  While housing segregation was 
endemic across Long Island, residential discrimination did not forbid aspiring black suburbanites 
from moving to the bi-county region, nor did it push pre-war black residents off Long Island.  On 
one hand, a rising black ‘middle class’ procured jobs that financed homeownership, at least one 
car, a washer machine, and a TV.  They sat in traffic on their daily commutes, fretted over taxes, 
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spent weekends tending to lawns, and entertained guests in their living rooms, all like the 
average white suburbanite.7  Families like the Blackmans, who owned a 50 x 100 lot in the 
Nassau County hamlet of New Cassel, typified this black middle class.  Carl Blackman was an 
engineering supervisor who drove to his defense-related instrument job in Suffolk, while his wife 
Lorraine taught pre-kindergarten in nearby Westbury.  Together, they earned $20,000 a year, 
well above the Nassau County median family income.8  But for every success story like the 
Blackmans, there was a family like the Jacksons.  Bessie and her husband moved from Harlem to 
the very same neighborhood of New Cassel in 1966 after years of saving and job hunting.  Her 
husband Logan got a trucking job on Long Island, and Bessie hoped to leave the workforce to 
care for the kids.  Unfortunately, Logan contracted tuberculosis and was admitted to a 
sanatorium.  Bessie tried to apply for welfare, but was denied because they were homeowners. 
She then returned to the workforce as a domestic servant, a job sectors commensurate with her 
skills and work experience.  Each morning she rode a bus to an employment agency in 
downtown Hempstead and then another bus to her job site.  The kids helped one another get to 
school, and returned home long before her.9   
As Newsday, Long Island’s suburban daily newspaper recognized in 1966, “there is the 
middle class Negro who has made it and the poor Negro who has not.”10  While the Blackmans’ 
trajectory was only possible in Long Island’s robust postwar economy, the Jacksons and the 
thousands of others who labored in homes, on farms, or waited for work on street corners were 
what Peter Bacon Hales insightfully calls “ghostly images” in suburbia,  “of a different time and 
place, a different land and landscape.”  Almost half of Long Island’s black population in the 
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postwar period did not obtain the kinds of jobs that enabled upward mobility in the postwar 
period, and instead labored in occupations resembling the pre-war world of work: inconsistent, 
low-wage, and lacking benefits.  Though living within a region of unprecedented opportunity, 
they were seemingly untouched by the prosperity around them.  “These negroes were not actors 
in the Levittown drama,” as Hales put it.11 
While a tiny proportion of Long Island’s population, the region’s disproportionately 
black poor nonetheless complicate the spatial narrative of postwar urban history, one that places 
housing segregation at the center of racial inequality.  In the most popular metropolitan histories, 
the suburban economy is prosperous, but segregation limited African American access to these 
jobs.  The postwar suburb, while racially divided, is above all class homogeneous.12 On Long 
Island, the black poor lived in the suburbs, though residence within a prosperous region did not 
translate into upward mobility, and the central problem was the structure of the economy itself, 
in terms of the jobs it produced for the unskilled and the ways racism pervaded the labor market.  
Their existence illustrates the limits of Long Island’s postwar growth and the postwar economy, 
which unlike World War II, favored the educated and skilled; those lacking either or both 
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Jobs and Housing 
In 1958, social workers at Adelphi University interviewed industrial workers living on 
Long Island, the ‘M’ family being among the dozen of blue-collar interviewees.  Mr. ‘M’, his 
wife and two sons were originally New York City residents with ‘limited assets,’ but when Mr. 
‘M’ secured a job at Republic Aviation in 1951 during the Korean War boom, the family 
relocated to Long Island.  They rented for two years, saving Mr. M’s high wages to purchase a 
$9,600 single-family home, completing their transition into the postwar middle class.  The story 
was typical on Long Island and significant for two reasons.  First, it illustrates the importance of 
industry to suburbanization, including postwar suburbanization.  As geographers Richard Walker 
and Robert Lewis argue, “residential areas…have always been joined at the hip by industry 
locating to the urban fringe.”13 Long Island’s postwar suburbanization was both an industrial and 
residential process occurring simultaneously, as Table 2.1 illustrates.  Job growth actually 
outpaced the population increase from 1935-1954, and manufacturing led the charge, laying 
down the foundation for the postwar residential boom.  The ‘M’ family story is also significant 
because they were a working class family who took advantage of industrial growth in the 
suburbs to become homeowners and members of the postwar ‘middle class,’ using geographic 
mobility for upward social mobility.  Though not all suburban migrants moved to the urban 
fringe for jobs, recent research has indicated that job decentralization influenced residential 
suburbanization after World War II, i.e. people followed jobs to the suburbs.14  And needless to 
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say, working class suburbanites were more likely to relocate for jobs, particularly on Long 
Island, where relatively high-wage industries could be used as the stepping-stone to suburban 
homeownership.  Unlike pre-war working class migrants, working class families moving to Long 
Island were no longer relegated to the low-wage job opportunities of the estate and agricultural 
economy.  Instead, the postwar working class benefitted from a decentralized landscape of 
industry and services for a broad population of blue-collar workers, engineers, small 
businessmen, and a growing army of retailers, government employees, wholesalers, and other 
service workers.  The ‘crabgrass frontier’ was indeed a new space, for both jobs and homes. 
At the center of Long Island’s postwar industrial growth were the defense-oriented 
aircraft producers.  World War II laid the foundation for industrial suburbia, but the Cold War 
sustained it.  The industry’s postwar uncertainty in 1945 dissipated as the Cold War precipitated 
a gradual military expansion that lasted into the 1980s.  Long Island became part of what Ann 
Markusen describes as the ‘gunbelt,’ the defense-induced industrial shift to loosely developed 
areas stretching from the suburbs of Boston down the Atlantic coastline to Florida, across the 
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Table 2.1:  Nassau-Suffolk Population vs. Manufacturing, Wholesale, and Retail 
Employment, 1935 and 1954 
 1935 1954 Change (%) 
Population 530,000* 1,346,414 154 
Manufacturing 6,979 110,737 1,487 
Wholesale 2,159 10,978 409 
Retail 18,741 71,211 280 
Total 24,879 192,926 592 
* Estimate 
Source: Source:  Harold L. Wattel, “Economic Growth and Unemployment,” in Long Island Business 5, no. 1 (Jan. 
1958): 7, Box 1, Hofstra College Center for the Study of Business and Community Research Records, Long Island 




Deep South, and up the West Coast in the postwar period.15  Cold War spending favored 
airpower, and Republic, Grumman and their subcontractors benefitted in two ways.  During 
conventional ‘hot wars’ like Korea and Vietnam, airframe firms manufactured jet aircraft.   In 
the broader arms race, Long Island’s defense-oriented firms sustained their businesses with 
experimental weaponry contracts during the guided missiles boom in the wake of the Soviet A-
bomb detonation, and later the space boom following the launch of Sputnik.16  Electronics firms 
became prominent during the guided missiles boom, and Long Island’s electronic manufacturers, 
including American Bosch Arma and Sperry Gyroscope, joined Grumman and Republic in 
missile production.17  The ‘space’ boom of the 1960s then pumped billions of dollars into what 
was now the ‘aerospace’ industry, and Grumman secured the Apollo Lunar Module contract 
from NASA in 1962, constructing twelve modules.18   
The presence of these large defense contractors influenced the physical layout and the 
labor market of Long Island’s postwar economy.  The contracts flowing to these large firms 
attracted subcontractors engaged in war production to the region, accelerating a process of 
industrial ‘decentralization’ in the New York metropolitan area occurring since the turn of the 
century.19  While New York’s consumer electronics industry migrated to the Midwest, firms 
developing un-standardized electronics (namely military goods) stayed in the tristate area, and 
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Long Island employed almost a fifth of the nation’s military electronics workers in the 1950s.20  
New firms accounted for some of this growth, though a 1956 survey of Long Island industry 
found that three quarters of bi-county firms emigrated from New York City.21  Electronics, along 
with the large aerospace producers, were the most visible industrial growth sectors in the bi-
county region, making up two-thirds of all Long Island’s exports from as well as eighty-eight 
percent of all export-oriented manufacturing.22   
Defense manufacturing, which required huge flexible factories, encouraged an industrial 
real estate market that attracted other industrial firms to the region, part of the broader industrial 
decentralization taking place nation-wide.  Developers designed ‘industrial parks’ to 
accommodate this shift, single story factories built in a zoned area for industry with setback 
requirements and parking, usually near major transportation nodes.  The ‘industrial park’ offered 
firms versatile workspaces.  Managers utilized the floor-space to adapt ‘assembly stations’ to 
new products and automation techniques, and could use large plots of land for plant expansion if 
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necessary.23  Developer Abraham Shames is credited to have built the first industrial park in the 
northeast, a “community of commerce” in Westbury, Long Island in 1956.  By 1965, more than 
sixty-eight industrial parks went up on Long Island, buttressing a twenty-two percent growth in 
industrial firms.24  These parks attracted urban factories in search of space, as three separate 
surveys revealed spatial needs were the primary factor in a firm’s relocation to Long Island.25  
The publishing industry, which had been slowly leaving the city since 1910 when Doubleday 
Publishers opened their “Country Life Press” facility in Garden City, grew to include some 290 
establishments with over 9,400 employees by 1964.26  Plastics manufacturers, from kitchenware 
to Christmas decorations, also established facilities in Nassau and Suffolk.  Aurora Plastics 
Corporation, makers of Batman, Superman, and Captain America hobby kits, moved from a 
4,000 square foot plant in Brooklyn to a flexible facility in West Hempstead in 1954 where they 
immediately added 148,000 square feet of floor space.27 Long Island even received some of the 
massive decentralization of the city’s apparel industry in the postwar period, taking advantage of 
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flexible plants and a cheap female labor pool.  Apparel accounted for seven percent of all 
manufacturing jobs in 1962.28  
The aviation and aerospace industry was as influential to the labor market as it was Long 
Island’s physical industrial landscape.  First, defense production, which included electronics 
manufacturers, metal fabricators, and chemical factories (among others), dominated 
manufacturing employment in the region despite industrial diversification, accounting for half of 
all industrial jobs in 1963.29  Secondly, the aerospace industry paid high wages.  Unions 
organized Long Island’s firms after World War II and successfully negotiated wages above 
regional and national industrial earnings. The International Association of Machinists (IAM) 
won recognition among Republic Aviation’s workforce in 1950, and by the end of the Korean 
War in 1953, Republic’s workers earned the nation’s highest hourly industrial wages: $1.45 for 
laborers and $2.45 for skilled workers.  The International Union of Electronic and Electrical 
Workers (IUE) organized a number of electronics manufacturers, including Sperry and American 
Bosch Arma. By 1955, around eighty percent of defense workers were unionized on Long Island.  
Grumman remained the only non-unionized major plant, though they maintained high wages and 
generous benefits as a bulwark against labor organizing.30  75,000 aircraft and aerospace 
workers, making on average $103.37 per week in 1956, raised the wages of electrical machinery, 
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fabricated metal, and other defense-related manufacturers, not to mention the effects these wages 
had on the service sector, which had to compete with the defense industry for workers.31  More 
broadly, federal defense spending in the region had multiplier effects on the entire Long Island 
economy.  Several surveys determined that wages in the defense sector supported between one 
and a half to two persons in related retail, service, and construction.32   
 Thanks to factory expansion and relocation, manufacturing employment in Nassau 
County grew three percent from 1950-1960, triple the national average.  By the end of the 
decade, boosters bragged that more people worked in Long Island industry than “in the industries 
of eighteen of our states.”33 And the relatively high-paying industrial jobs accounted for the 
region’s rising affluence despite its rapid population growth, as Nassau became the most affluent 
American county with 100,000 or more people in 1960, while Suffolk’s median income climbed 
from below the New York State average to seventh highest in the state.34  This broad-based 
wealth contributed to the massive housing boom after World War II, when over half of the 
region’s homes were built, nearly ninety percent of which were single-family housing.35  While 
federal housing subsidies were important factors in expanding homeownership, it was well-
paying job opportunities that enabled millions of upwardly mobile Americans to afford monthly 
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mortgage payments and insurance.  New York City commuters were still forty percent of 
Nassau’s and fifteen percent of Suffolk’s workers as of 1960.36  But for Long Island’s working 
class, Nassau and Suffolk’s budding high-wage industrial sector sustained homeownership, and 
defense manufacturing in particular encouraged suburban migration.37  Sperry conducted a 
survey in 1962, and while their largest facility sat on the Nassau/Queens border, only twelve 
percent of their employees lived in the boroughs.  New Hyde Park, the neighboring suburb of 
Sperry’s Lake Success plant, had the highest concentration of families with employees (718 
families), and nearly 2,484 employee families had moved east to Suffolk County since 1949.38  
Republic likewise determined that of 12,681 employees in 1962, only nine percent commuted 
from the boroughs, while over half (6,884) of workers lived in the immediate surrounding towns 
of Oyster Bay, Hempstead, and Babylon.39  Finally, eighty percent of Grumman’s workforce 
hailed from Long Island during the 1960s.40   
Among Long Island’s postwar suburban housing tracts, the proportion of industrial 
workers grew over the course of the 1950s, in step with suburban industrialization.  Levittown, 
America’s quintessential postwar suburb, exemplified this trend.  Abraham Levitt and his sons 
William and Alfred applied assembly-line construction techniques to construct 17,447 homes on 
seven square miles of former potato fields and undeveloped land on the Hempstead/Oyster Bay 
town border. 41  When the first homes entered the market in 1947, over two-thirds of the original 
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veteran and white-collar homebuyers worked in the five boroughs.  Fourteen years later, the 
proportion of commuters fell to thirty-six percent, as did the number of white collar workers, 
whose dominance dropped from over three-fourths to only half by 1961.  As sociologist William 
S. Dobriner argued, by 1960 Levittown was “no longer so clearly middle class… [it] has drifted 
down from middle to working class.” 42  With over 1,000 aircraft workers in Levittown in 1960, 
the quintessential postwar suburb was the realization of the American dream because of its ideal 
location in an emerging industrial landscape. 
The jobs-housing link worked both ways, as the sheer population growth laid a 
foundation for a dynamic service sector, the final pillar to Long Island’s postwar prosperity.  
Plant relocation and expansion, along with new housing and improvements (necessary for the 
unfinished second floors of Long Island’s cheaply built Cape Cods), buttressed construction, 
which remained a relatively stable source of jobs for around nine percent of Long Island’s labor 
force from 1952-1965.  Burgeoning suburban communities also necessitated a growing army of 
sanitation workers, public works employees, police officers, teachers, and other civil servants.  
From 1952-1965, government employment more than doubled.  The retail sector, restricted to a 
few railroad suburb downtowns prior to 1940, exploded after the war.  Urban retailers followed 
their customers, initiating a process of commercial decentralization similar to that of industry.  
Macy’s moved into a 300,000 square foot anchor store in the newly constructed Roosevelt Field 
shopping ‘mall’ in 1956, part of a complex that became one of the largest in the nation.  Malls 
and their step-brother, the strip-mall, proliferated across Long Island, making the region the 
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fourth largest retail market in the country by 1964.  In that same year, retail employment became 
the largest single employment sector on Long Island, exceeding manufacturing by 24,000 jobs.43 
Within twenty years, a transformed urban space developed on the outskirts of America’s 
largest city.  Cold War state spending and strong labor unions, along with state-subsidized 
housing, highways, and commercial development supported broad-based upward mobility for 
working class Americans.  These national developments coalesced with decisions of real estate 
developers, manufacturers, and commercial firms, who collectively pulled workers to factories 
and homes in the suburbs, as Robert Self argues.44 While commuters still relied on Manhattan 
and downtown Brooklyn for work, the region shed its dependence on Gotham, drawn instead 
into the orbit of the federal government and its stimulus to housing construction and aerospace 
manufacturing.  Workers likewise shed their dependence on older, less equitable forms of work, 
entering into unionized industrial or rapidly expanding service jobs.  Opportunity on Long Island 
was now predicated upon access to the region’s mass employment opportunity.   
 
The Old Economy 
  The estate economy was already stagnant by the 1930s, and Long Island’s farms had 
been competing with residential speculation since the turn of the century.  But with the explosion 
of housing, factories, and malls across Long Island after 1945, the estate era was officially over, 
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though both farmers and estate owners maximized Long Island’s transformation from the ‘social 
capital of the world’ into a ‘bedroom for the masses.’45  The costs of maintaining estates rose 
precipitously, as taxes to support urban infrastructure fell heavily on large property owners.  In 
addition, the general shift away from Long Island’s elite status lowered the prestige of 100-acre 
manses.  Some shed their estates for as little as a quarter of the original purchasing cost, while a 
few, including the widow of Marshall Fields III, transferred their properties to local and state 
government for parkland.  Others did well in the subdivision boom. JP Morgan Jr. sold the 
family estate to developers who built some 100 homes on the site.46  The hamlet of Great Neck, 
once a Gold Coast locale for industrialists, bankers, actors, and writers (including F. Scott 
Fitzgerald), blossomed into a thriving suburban community, and ninety-five percent of the 
estates were subdivided into one to two acre plots for 40,000 residents.47   
 Long Island’s farmers also exploited the opportunity to profit from suburbanization.  
Budding housing tracts and the concomitant demand for urban services raised tax rates and 
assessments, while a golden nematode outbreak temporarily devastated potato yields.  Luckily, 
these farmers were sitting on rapidly appreciating property, and many (including the fifty-five 
farmers who sold their farms to the Levitts) let their land ‘idle’ for speculative purposes.  Nassau 
County’s 32,000 acres of farmland in 1945 dwindled to 5,565 acres by 1964.48  Remaining farms 
in Nassau and western Suffolk now served a suburban population who wanted Halloween 
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pumpkins or fresh produce during summer.  In contrast, eastern Suffolk County farmers thrived 
after World War II, exploiting new disease resistant crop-strains, fertilizers, equipment, and 
pesticides.  Suffolk County became the nation’s third largest potato producer in 1954 with 
43,000 acres devoted to the tuber.   Cauliflower was the second most popular crop, and Suffolk 
farmers were innovators in its mass production, growing over two million crates per year.49  
Suffolk also continued to be the nation’s premier duck producer.  Wartime rationing expanded 
the demand for ducks in the 1940s, a development that extended after the war as ducks competed 
with chickens and turkeys for America’s favorite dinner bird.  The Hollis Warner Duck farm, the 
largest duck producer in the world, sat on 250 acres along the mouth of the Peconic River in 
Riverhead, producing 500,000 ducks per year.  The operation employed the latest technological 
advancements and organizing techniques available, including electric incubators, devoted wheat 
fields, and two miles of cart tracks to feed thousands of ducks.  Warner’s farm employed 150 
workers alone, not including the freezers and transportation network necessary to reach the 
national market.  In all, seventy Suffolk duck farms reached peak production of 7.5 million ducks 
in the late 1950s, thriving amidst postwar suburbanization.  Where Nassau and western Suffolk 
County developed into an urban agglomeration of homes, factories, and retail centers, eastern 
Suffolk was a sparse cluster of commercial farming and small housing tracts.50  
 In sum, while industrial suburbia largely engulfed Long Island’s prewar metropolitan-
dependent economy, elements of the old economy endured, some in new ways.  As of 1952, 
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16,000 Long Islanders still worked in agriculture, along with 5,000 migrants.51  Though 
indigenous agricultural laborers rapidly declined, farmers continued to exploit migrants.  Estates 
only disappeared slowly; the live-in system continued in what remained of the ‘Gold Coast.’52 
Across the rest of Long Island, domestic service adapted to postwar suburbia.  Rather than large 
staffs working on estates, single servants complimented the new postwar household, full of 
labor-saving home devices and a housewife-oriented domestic culture.  Household workers 
might work part-time and take on a multitude of tasks, from childcare to cleaning and cooking.  
They were less likely to reside in individual homes, instead piecing together incomes from 
multiple employers.53  Thirty-six domestic employment agencies operated in Nassau County 
alone after the war, linking domestics to employers through advertising gimmicks, including free 
item giveaways with a contract.  A network of chauffeurs and laundry services supported 
domestics who now had to travel across the hundreds of single-family housing tracts spread 
across Long Island.54  Though all these sectors were dwarfed by opportunities in industry and 
services after 1945, they remained an option in the postwar labor market, one though with lower 
pay, no job security, and few if any benefits.  As was true in the pre-war period, these jobs did 
not enable upward mobility.  
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The New Suburbanites 
The new landscape of jobs and homes attracted the massive population that made Long 
Island the nation’s suburban exemplar.  Prior to World War II, Long Island’s population was just 
above 600,000.  Twenty years later, the population more than doubled, filling in most of Nassau 
County.  Suffolk’s boom continued into the 1960s as Nassau’s growth slowed, and by 1970, the 
population of Long Island reached more than 2.5 million residents, larger than all but three 
American cities, a three-fold increase in thirty years.55  Where these eligible workers fit into the 
booming economy determined their ability to enjoy Long Island’s consumer bounties.  
Commuters were the wealthiest residents, including professionals, managers, or other high-end 
service employees, and disproportionately contributed to Long Island’s overall earnings.  But the 
majority of Long Island’s workers relied on the structure of a bi-county labor market, a young 
and distinct market with no precedent.  Unlike the wartime economy, where defense firms 
needed unskilled laborers in a supply-restricted market, the premium for educated workers 
rebounded in the 1950s, and skill requirements increased throughout industrial sectors.  The 
college premium rose in the 1950s after dipping during the war, and high school diploma 
requirements likewise returned.56 Rising productivity (primarily via automation) occurred in 
Long Island’s capital-intensive aerospace industry, where new machine investment and skill 
upgrading produced higher returns that were shared with workers.57   Sectors in competition for 
defense workers likewise increased skill requirements and pay to attract new employees.  
Beyond industry, Long Island’s burgeoning service sectors demanded high school and even 
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college degrees, from office and governmental work to accounting, law, and business.  
Essentially, Long Island exemplified what economist Charles Killingworth called the labor 
market ‘twist’ – the decline in demand for low-skilled workers coinciding with long-term 
demand growth for well-educated and skilled employees.58   This was not merely a ‘market’ 
phenomena; government spending was biased against the unskilled in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Federal dollars poured into research and development, and public spending generally funneled 
into education.  R&D spending grew some 20 percent a year, and the growth of teachers trebled 
that of the general labor force.59 
Among Long Island new residents, whites were most prepared to exploit the region’s 
opportunities.  Long Island’s whites were a diverse lot, either immigrants themselves or the 
children and grandchildren of Europeans, and most relocated from the five boroughs.60  Italian-
Americans became the single largest ethnic group in the region, representing a quarter of all 
Long Islanders after World War II and settling across the middle and south of the Island, from 
Elmont on the Nassau/Queens border out to Mastic and Shirley in Suffolk County.  They, along 
with a substantial Polish and Irish population (about eight and seven percent of the Island’s 
population each, respectively), made Roman Catholicism the dominant faith in the region.  Pope 
Pius XII formed a new diocese in 1957 specifically to serve Nassau and Suffolk Counties, which 
immediately became the sixth largest in the nation.61  Over 400,000 Jews also settled on Long 
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Island, both as commuters to New York City and as industrial workers. Vibrant Jewish 
communities emerged in Great Neck and the Five Towns area, but Jews also scattered across 
Nassau and western Suffolk’s suburban housing tracts.62  Over half of these Census-designated 
‘white’ Long Islanders completed high school as of 1960, and that number rose to nearly two-
thirds by 1970.  A significant minority, fifteen percent, held bachelor’s and/or graduate 
degrees.63 
Though black migrants came for the same reasons as whites, they were less able to 
benefit from Long Island’s postwar economy.  In the 1940s, the black migration trailed the white 
exodus to the suburbs and their proportion of the population actually declined.  In the 1950s, they 
outpaced overall population growth, and during the 1960s, their arrival doubled that of whites.  
While a small proportion of Long Island’s overall populace, they reached almost five percent of 
the population by 1970, 119,019 residents in total.64  But of these residents, only twenty-eight 
percent completed high school in 1960;  the new migrants of the 1960s increased the proportion 
to forty-two percent.  As the region’s economy increasingly demanded educational credentials 
and the skills associated with those degrees, the majority of Long Island’s black population 
lacked high school diplomas.65  This was most attributable to the southern origin of a 
disproportionate number of black Long Islanders, who, as part of the tail-end of the Second 
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Great Migration, were three times more likely to migrate from outside the New York area and 
four times as likely to have relocated directly from the South, not including southern migrants 
with brief sojourns in New York City.66  Arriving with educations from Jim-Crow schools placed 
black Long Islanders into the least skilled occupations of the region’s labor market, with few 
credentials or skillsets for Long Island’s well-paying jobs.67 
The educational gulf was expressed in the labor market divide.  As Table 2.2 indicates, 
fifty-six percent of white suburbanites held white-collar jobs, while another sixteen percent, or 
over 100,000 workers, labored in skilled blue-collar jobs in 1960.  In contrast, less than twelve 
percent of Long Island’s employed African Americans were white-collar workers, while nearly a 
third were domestic servants, the largest employment sector for black residents, along with 
another ten percent in the ‘laborer’ category.68  As the education gap closed during the 1960s, so 
did the black-white difference in the labor market.  The new cohort of African Americans in the 
1960s entered into the better-paying jobs on Long Island, benefitting from general trends that 
improved African American labor market outcomes, including access to education, the booming 
economy of the 1960s, and civil rights legislation.69  They found jobs in white-collar and service 
positions, including commuting professionals, along with local black dentists, doctors, lawyers,  
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and a small cohort of engineers.  Craftsmen and operatives, who were over a quarter of Long 
Island’s black workforce, labored in metro-area factories, including Long Island’s defense-
Table 2.2: Occupation and Occupational Distribution of White and Black Employed 
Residents, Nassau and Suffolk Counties, 1960-1970 
 Total 
 1960 1970 
 White Non-white1 White Black1 
Employed Civilians2 656,527 31,831 877,783 43,168 
     
Professional and technical workers 108,429 1,356 173,217 4,034 
Managers, officials, proprietors 87,277 552 110,297 1,567 
Clerical and kindred workers 106,523 1,640 182,682 6,907 
Sales workers 64,695 379 91,969 1,123 
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred 107,277 1,929 124,110 3,571 
Operatives and kindred workers 77,944 4,580 74,421 7,864 
Private household workers 8,665 10,181 4,533 4,874 
Service workers 47,139 4,575 89,859 9,482 
Laborers and farm foremen 20,214 3,039 31,539 3,746 
Not reported 25,887 3,518   
 Distribution (%) 
 1960 1970 
 White  Non-white1 White Black1 
Professional and technical workers 16.5 4.3 19.7 9.3 
Managers, officials, proprietors 13.3 1.7 12.6 3.6 
Clerical and kindred workers 16.2 5.2 20.8 16.0 
Sales workers 9.9 1.2 10.5 2.6 
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred  16.3 6.1 14.1 8.3 
Operatives and kindred workers 11.9 14.4 8.5 18.2 
Private household workers 1.3 32.0 0.5 11.3 
Service workers 7.2 14.4 10.2 22.0 
Laborers and farm foremen 3.1 9.5 3.6 8.7 
Not reported 3.9 11.1   
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Occupation (White Population), 1960. Prepared by Social Explorer, 
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1960TractDS/R11103734 (accessed April 10, 2015); U.S. Census 
Bureau, Occupation (Non-White Population), 1960. Prepared by Social Explorer, 
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1960TractDS/R11103734 (accessed April 10, 2015); 1970 Census of 
Population and Housing, 863, 865. 
Note: There are no labor market distributions by race for Northern states in 1950, as economic statistics by race 
were compiled for ‘southern states only’, with the exception of employment rates. 
1 The calculation for both ‘white’ and ‘black’ changed between the two censuses.  In 1960, African Americans 
were collapsed into the ‘non-white’ category though they were over 94 percent of all non-white inhabitants on 
Long Island. Indian, Japanese, and Chinese-Americans were the remaining five percent, and could skew these 
numbers toward higher skill levels, particularly since the defense industry recruited Asian-American technicians 
and engineers.  In 1970, ‘whites’ were not calculated exclusively, though white and ‘negro’ Long Islanders were 
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oriented aerospace factories, machine shops, or in the transportation industry.70  Clerical 
positions likewise expanded, a reflection of Long Island’s burgeoning service-sector and the rise 
in black educational levels.  Bookkeepers, secretaries, typists, bank tellers, file clerks, and 
telephone operators, among others, were largely female-dominated occupations that typically 
required a high school diploma.  Government employment, generally a secure sector for African 
Americans, blossomed too.  In Suffolk alone, the New York State government employed over 
2,800 black workers, a fifth of the entire state workforce within the county.71  This included three 
massive state mental hospitals, Kings Park, Central Islip, and Pilgrim State, the largest mental 
institution in the world, servicing over 16,000 patients at its peak in the mid-1950s. African 
Americans made up around a third of all hospital personnel, working mostly as attendants, the 
most prevalent occupation in these facilities.72 
Despite improvements, the black/white gap still existed, a reality on Long Island as 
nationwide.73  Education alone did not close the gap, because diplomas did not reward blacks as 
much as whites with equivalent preparation.74  A Hofstra University study revealed that a black 
worker in Nassau County with a high school diploma earned less than a white worker who quit 
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school after the eighth grade, while a college-educated African American made less on average 
than a white worker with no college experience. Discrimination limited the numbers of blacks in 
professional and managerial positions, but this should not discount the incredible progress in the 
postwar period.  More than half of black workers moving to Long Island were indeed securing 
what a Newsday article in 1966 called the “visible measures of success:  a good job, a 
comfortable home, a car.”75  They were no longer the reflection of ‘pre-war’ black Long 
Islanders, the “marginal workers engaged in occupations which were the least secure and lowest 
paid.”76  They made sixty percent more than African Americans in the rest of the country, and 
bought into the postwar middle class, though housing segregation defined them as a ‘black’ 
suburbanite distinct from that of whites, a consequence of housing policy rather than any broad 
cultural differences in their consumption patterns.77  
But the very same structure producing black opportunity for the credentialed limited 
opportunity for those without.  For the unskilled, the job market was bleak; in some ways more 
desperate than what existed before and during World War II.  Few opportunities existed outside 
the traditional ‘black’ sectors.  While industry afforded the greatest opportunity for mass social 
mobility, African Americans occupied the lowest positions and worked in poorly-paying 
industrial sectors.  Despite high black employment rates during World War II, the defense 
industry’s postwar racial progress proved disappointing.  Few African Americans were re-hired 
after post-war demobilization, and the state’s commitment to racial equality receded for almost 
two decades after the war. The few hired were concentrated in unskilled positions, a problem as 
the industry shed its unskilled jobs in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  As the key source of well-
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paying jobs for working class residents in the region, the small black presence and their low 
occupational status within the industry limited black mobility.  Chapter 4 delves into race and the 
defense industry in detail.  Outside defense, black workers encountered the same mobility 
problem.  African Americans found jobs in Long Island’s primary metal, chemical, fabricated 
metal, and printing industries, though they were concentrated in the low-skill positions – janitors, 
shipping clerks, and other laborer positions – or in jobs most threatened by automation.  In 
addition, non-defense manufacturers paid four dollars less per week than the state and city 
average, mostly because they did not compete for the same workers as the defense industry.  
While advantageous to wives or young workers looking to supplement the breadwinner’s 
income, such low pay made it difficult to sustain a family in high-cost Long Island.78  And 
through the 1960s, automation hit these workers hardest. Herman Smothers, a 42-year-old black 
resident of Freeport lost his factory job to a machine in 1964, turning to odd jobs and separating 
from his wife and kids so they could qualify for welfare.  When interviewed while drinking on a 
street corner with friends, he pleaded “I can’t get a job. I want to work, man, and get mine. I 
don’t want no charity.”79  A similar occupational divide existed in Long Island’s service sector.  
‘Services’ entailed a broad swath of jobs, from nurses and police officers to orderlies and 
busboys.  While the nationwide rate of service jobs rose 40 percent between 1957 and 1963, 
‘personal’ services was the bulk of this growth, including low-paid positions in day care, elderly 
care, and cleaning services.80  To reach the region’s median in these fields, two or three of these 
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jobs were necessary.  One black Nassau County resident, a former Floridian, worked two 
hospital jobs to make ends meet, an average of 112 hours per week at $1.65 an hour.81   
Well-paying jobs that did not require credentials or pre-existing skills, i.e. those below 
the skill premium threshold were in high demand, and African Americans were not the only ones 
fighting for these jobs: in 1960, over 20,000 white Long Islanders were still laborers.  The 
competition often played out along racial lines.   Construction was a growth field, though the 
building trades unions, which had a powerful influence over Long Island’s residential and 
commercial construction, hired through personal networks of family, friends, and community 
members, making it difficult for outsiders to find union-protected work.82  Black union 
membership was inconsistent, though minority workers tended to concentrate in less-skilled 
unions.  For example, of 762 painters in Nassau County’s Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, 
and Paperhangers local, only six were black in 1963.  Conversely, the International Hood 
Carriers’ Building & Common Laborers union local, which organized unskilled construction 
laborers, boasted a twenty percent black membership.83  A union card did not guarantee stable 
employment anyway. The mason’s union boasted some of the largest enrollments of African 
Americans, though card carrying black masons rarely secured more than 400 hours of work per 
year, excluding them from various union benefits including health care and paid vacation.  White 
masons meanwhile managed between 1,200 and 1,400 hours.  Black members also found that 
they were passed over when new jobs were available.  White masons fresh off previous work 
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consistently secured jobs as black workers sat idle.84  Civil rights activists addressed these 
problems in the late 1960s, particularly during the buildup of New York’s state university 
system, though progress in Affirmative Action was slow, bleeding into the 1970s. 
 The decentralized layout of the suburban economy compounded the effects of the family, 
friend, and neighborhood networks of ‘job knowledge.’  Despite the proliferation of single-story 
suburban factories, warehouses, and retail establishments across Long Island, economist David 
Gayer found that employers continued to rely on the old urban custom of canvassing for 
unskilled workers at their job sites, which included posting ‘now hiring’ signs outside their 
factories.  While thousands of workers might pass signs or factories in concentrated urban areas, 
only those with automobiles, driving through industrial parks or retail areas, caught a glimpse of 
new employment opportunities in suburbs.  As a result, word-of-mouth, rather than hanging 
signs, spread news of jobs.  As his survey in the late 1960s revealed, most unskilled industrial 
workers found jobs through friends.  So few black employees only perpetuated the low minority 
proportions in Long Island’s factories because finding work beyond one’s network of job 
knowledge required expenditures of time, gas, and/or bus fares, a significant sacrifice for low-
income residents.85   
This left a disproportionate number of black workers in the traditional industries: 
domestic service, farm work, and generalized ‘day labor.’  Domestic service remained the largest 
employment sector for African Americans as late as 1960, when the industry hit peak 
employment of nearly 19,000. This became an increasingly black sector, as fifty-nine percent of 
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all workers were black, and it continued to be a female-dominated occupation.86  Though 
domestics could earn up to thirty dollars per week (over $225 in 2012 dollars), prospective 
domestics outnumbered job opportunities, lured by the ‘mirage’ of high-paying work rather than 
the reality.  Farm labor remained another popular occupation for black Long Islanders, a largely 
‘male’ sector.  The number of farm laborers on Long Island’s east end ranged from an estimated 
5,300 in 1957 to 3,600 in 1966, and eighty-eight percent of the workforce was African 
American.  Migrants made up around three-quarters of all farm laborers, part of the migrant 
labor streams running from Florida to Maine.87  Like their pre-war counterparts, migrant workers 
were tied to crew chiefs, who recruited individual laborers, brought them north, and as 
filmmaker Morton Silverstein put it, “allocated their work, supervised their lives, and paid them 
at the end of the week.”88  Like domestic service agencies, the crew leader offered credit to cover 
transportation and food costs, and since housing was often provided on site in makeshift camps 
at the farm, food, shelter, and other living expenses were removed from wages during the extent 
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of the stay.89 Even settled seasonal workers, called ‘ex-migrants’ despite permanent residence, 
were tied to the crew chief and migrant labor system, relying on these contractors for yearly 
work and having little in common with white Suffolk County residents around them.90  Work 
was physically demanding for both migrants and ‘ex-migrants,’ sometimes reaching fifteen hours 
or more during a harvest season of back-breaking picking, sorting, and lifting.  Pay was low: a 
1964 study of seventy-one east-end migrant households with an average of 3.7 residents 
determined that nearly a third survived on incomes below the official $3,000 poverty line for a 
family of four, while those above that threshold averaged a yearly income of $4,723.91   
Farm workers were in direct competition with new arrivals from the South, putting 
downward pressure on wages and working conditions.  Though the Second Great Migration 
greatly improved economic opportunity for Southern migrants, it reduced wages of northern 
African Americans who had little opportunity to enter other occupations.92  Migration and the 
labor market trend toward skill premiums were not solely to blame for the outcomes; the 
conditions of these jobs was a direct consequence of New Deal-era policy decisions that 
marginalized these lines of work.  These occupations were excluded from labor protections, 
including social security benefits, minimum wage protections, and the right to organize.93  The 
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fight to protect these workers was slow and contentious; while these largely ‘black’ occupations 
were added to Social Security legislation in 1950 and 1954, minimum wage and unemployment 
protections came only in the 1970s and were difficult to enforce.   
 Marginalization only reinforced beliefs that these jobs were ‘menial,’ and the association 
with black skin led to widespread discrimination among black Long Islanders, including at the 
region’s employment offices where black workers sought new opportunities. Unskilled defense 
plant worker Dan Hester put it best when he lamented, “look for a job in Hempstead, and the first 
thing they ask is if you want a job as a porter.”94  For domestics in particular, labor market 
structures and cultural attitudes locked them into domestic service, even when they reached out 
for other work available within the suburban economy.  An AFSCME union investigation of a 
New York State Employment Service (NYSES) office in Great Neck discovered that the office 
kept a separate “active domestic file” with 350 active applicants.  While half had high school 
diplomas and were deemed fit to work outside private households, they were nonetheless placed 
in “day worker” and “yardman” categories.  The office claimed that black clients preferred day 
jobs over higher skilled work, allegedly forgoing unemployment insurance, social security, and 
other provisions for the immediate benefit of casual employment.  These files tracked domestic 
servants’ character traits like “drinker,” “borrows money,” and “submissive” in their job 
applications, not work preferences or skillsets.95  Domestics were treated as a class apart in 
person as well, complete with a separate employment office telephone number, a service worker 
assigned exclusively to them, and limited hours to call (3-5pm) for jobs with only one-day 
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advance notice.  An AFSCME member and employee at the office exposed the discrimination 
behind these policies when he complained to the union, stating that a supervisor commanded he 
“either get those dark clouds jobs, or get them out of here,” and he was repeatedly pressured to 
deal with the “Mississippi car of seven, eight boogies in it…looking for day work jobs.”96   
Working outside the protections of labor laws situated these workers, despite their 
geographic proximity, outside postwar suburbia.  Though the majority of Long Islanders enjoyed 
basic labor protections, federally-backed mortgages, and state support for jobs through defense 
spending, the only form of public security open to these workers was ADC (later AFDC), the 
‘second-tier’ of economic security afforded by the New Deal and subsequent legislation.97  A 
1966 social work survey determined that African Americans were disproportionately receiving 
AFDC, over four times their proportion of the population, and more importantly, black mothers 
receiving welfare were three times as likely to be working as white mothers.  In addition, these 
women were overwhelmingly domestics.98  Welfare was never adequate to support a family, and 
black domestics, along with ex-migrants on Long Island’s east end, cobbled a living together 
from AFDC and other programs, like Nassau County’s Food Surplus program that provided food 
baskets on a monthly basis to registered applicants in the 1960s, to supplement their inconsistent 
and low paychecks.99 
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  Domestics and migrant laborers recognized the degraded status of their work and 
organized to improve their working conditions. Cesar Chavez’s United Farm Worker’s 
Organizing Committee planned protests in 1969, though failed to start an Island-wide strike. The 
National Committee on Household Employees (NCHE) organized a Nassau County branch 
started in 1970, fought for health insurance, clear boundaries for work responsibilities, sick 
leave, and vacation time, but also recognition of their skills and basic respect from their 
employers.100  As one organized domestic, in anonymity argued “People scorn you. ‘She’s a 
domestic, she’s nobody.’ You’re somebody. You really are the person who is somebody. Those 
houses that are sparkling – ask who cleans the house.”101  Within a year, they had organized an 
estimated ten percent of the county’s workforce, planning protests against domestic agencies and 
promises of improved employer/employee relations. In 1972, state law extended the minimum 
wage to household workers, and domestic organizing only escalated as domestic issues reached a 
national platform.102  
Organizing coincided with a decline in these sectors, in both absolute and relative terms 
for African Americans.  By 1970, domestic service employment dropped by half.  The number of 
farm laborers stagnated, and black workers increasingly competed with Puerto Ricans, machines, 
and new housing developments on Long Island’s east end.  Some former domestics and 
agricultural laborers leveraged their skills into postwar service jobs.  Clarence Phillips, the Port 
Washington resident who worked between the domestic and agricultural fields during the 1920s 
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and 1930s, eventually secured a job as a janitor in the Port Washington school district after 
World War II, and later moved into landscape gardening.103  Others moved into the personal 
service industries, but a fifth of black workers still remained domestics or laborers, while another 
forty percent were employed in the other lower-rungs of service and low-wage ‘operative’ jobs.  
For the least skilled, a job remained a daily struggle, one that began on the street corner at 
6:30am, waiting for contractors to drive by, and then bidding for daily wages among the offers, if 
any appeared.  Work in construction and landscaping remained on the margins of the labor 
market generally, not even regulated by the needs of particular employers, as in the case of 
commercial farms or households.104 
 
Poverty and Progress 
Both the gains black Long Islanders made in the postwar labor market and the limitations 
of postwar growth were expressed most clearly in Long Island’s income distribution.  The black 
population boom during the 1960s narrowed the black/white earnings gap in the bi-county 
region, a nationwide development that was particularly pronounced on the Island. African 
Americans outpaced white income growth by eleven percentage points in Suffolk and nearly 
fourteen percentage points in Nassau in real terms during the decade.  The black median reached 
sixty-four percent that of whites in Nassau and seventy-two percent in Suffolk, compared to 
sixty-four percent nationally.105 As Table 2.3 indicates, Long Island’s black middle class became 
dominant during the decade. These gains were part in parcel with the trajectory of the labor 
																																																						
103 Oral history transcript of interview with Clarence Phillips on December 19, 1980 and January 23, 1981, p. 69-72, 
African American Heritage Oral History Collection, PWLHC. 
104 “LI Powder Keg: Awaiting Jobs that May Never Come,” Newsday, August 16, 1966, 4. 
105 For national statistics on the black/white wage convergence, see Reynolds Farley, "Three Steps Forward and Two 
Back? Recent Changes in the Social and Economic Status of Blacks,” Ethnic and Racial Studies. 8, no. 1(1985): 10, 




market itself, because while the gains of the 1940s were due to the tight wartime labor market 
and the 1950s saw the black/white gap stagnate, civil rights legislation and rising black 
educational outcomes combined with favorable market conditions to close the divide in the 
1960s.106  Long Island’s burgeoning black middle class was responsible for the narrowing racial 
gap, as those black families earning near or above the region’s median family income increased 
at a much higher rate than white families at or above the median.   
Behind the emergence of a black middle class and the gains relative to whites were black 
families stuck at the lower end of the income distribution.  While white families generally 
experienced upward mobility over the course of the 1960s as incomes below $10,000 declined 
across the board, only middle class black families matched them.  Those below three-quarters of 
the median family income, half the median increased as well, and families in the lowest category 
(the federal poverty level) grew nearly thirty percent.  Calculating whether these families lived in 
‘poverty’ is complex given the inadequacies the official federal threshold and the subjectivity of 
‘relative’ poverty measurements, though Long Island’s widespread affluence makes relative 
poverty measures useful.107  After all, the region’s high incomes were necessary to even get 
around on Long Island; jobs, shopping amenities, educational facilities, and health centers were 
spread across the suburban highways and single- story suburban ‘parks,’ though buses were 
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privately operated and ran infrequently.  In a 1968 survey, unemployment and car ownership was 
inversely proportional: in low-income neighborhoods where the average number of cars owned 
per household was below 0.75, unemployment reached twenty percent, but where car ownership 
exceeded one per household, unemployment dipped under fifteen percent.108  In addition, 
consumption levels were increasing broadly; a full belly was not a sign that one escaped material 
deprivation.  A ‘decent’ standard of living in the postwar period included modern amenities, 
health care, and education, on Long Island and elsewhere.  Given these factors, the official 
‘national’ poverty measurement did not account for geographic differences in living costs, 
especially problematic when measuring economic distress in Nassau, the nation’s wealthiest 
large county.  If we define economic distress as those families making half each counties’ 
median income, over a third of Long Island’s black families did not meet the minimum income 
requirements to live securely in Long Island’s suburban hamlets, compared to thirteen percent of 
white families.109  
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African Americans were not alone among Long Island’s low-income families:  80,000 
white families fit into this category.  Like low-income black workers, skill and education 
requirements, tight competition for unskilled jobs, and relatively low wages in these sectors 
accounted for their near poverty status.  The difficulties of obtaining an automobile to go to 
work, or keeping the car filled with gas to get to work, particularly among the poor commuters 
who continued to hold jobs in the city, influenced opportunity just the same.  Automation and 
rising educational premiums also pushed unskilled whites into the lower tier of the income ladder 
by 1970, particularly as the defense industry shifted toward highly technical work.  The only 
difference was their skin color, which permitted them wide choice in housing on Long Island, 
spreading ‘white’ poverty broadly, and placed them in distinct networks for job opportunities.110  
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Table 2.3:  Family Income Distribution of Long Island Residents, 1960-1970 (Constant 
1969 dollars) 
 1960 1970 Change (%) 
White    
Less than $3,000 23,362 23,079 -1.2 
$3,000 - $4,999 26,079 22,481 -13.8 
$5,000 - $6,999 57,945 32,387 -44.1 
$7,000 - $9,999 126,730 83,288 -34.3 
$10,000 or more 237,486 438,719 84.7 
    
Black    
Less than $3,000 2,197 2,846 29.5 
$3,000 - $4,999 2,564 2,523 -1.6 
$5,000 - $6,999 2,921 2,987 2.3 
$7,000 - $9,999 2,921 4,886 67.3 
$10,000 or more 2,624 10,416 297.0 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Family Income (White & Non-white Families), 1960. Prepared by Social 
Explorer, http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1960TractDS/R11109521 (accessed August 12, 2014); U.S. 
Census Bureau, Family Income for White Families, 1970. Prepared by Social Explorer, 
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1970/R11109522 (accessed August 12, 2014); U.S. Census Bureau, 
Family Income for Black Families, 1970. Prepared by Social Explorer, 
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1970/R11109522 (accessed August 12, 2014).  
Note: Nassau-Suffolk Median family income for 1960 was $9,935 in 1969 dollars. In 1970, it reached $13,475 
in 1969 dollars. See Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, U.S. Census '70: Volume 6:  Income 




Nonetheless, low incomes stalked African American Long Islanders disproportionately, as it did 
nationwide, and just as importantly, suburban residence was less likely to induce upward 
mobility.  If we measure poverty using the federal poverty threshold, sixteen percent of Long 
Island’s black families lived under the poverty level in 1970.  While favorable when compared to 
the New York metropolitan region’s highest poverty rates in Brooklyn (23.2) and the Bronx 
(22.4), the black rate was only four percentage points below that of the metropolitan region as a 
whole (19.9).  This is compared to the huge divide between Long Island’s overall poverty rate 
(4.1 percent), and that of Brooklyn (13.9), the Bronx (15.5), or the New York metro area (9.2).111  
Long Island’s affluence did not absorb all, a reality for black New Yorkers seeking opportunity 
throughout the metropolitan region’s labor market. 
This poverty in the postwar period is not in of itself revelatory; by the 1960s, the nation’s 
‘poverty amidst plenty’ was the dominant domestic issue that launched a flurry of domestic 
programs rivalling the New Deal.  But its suburban dimension, though small compared to the 
concentrated poor migrating to urban centers or dispersed poverty in the countryside, nonetheless 
illustrated the limits of postwar prosperity regardless of where one lived.  The paradox of poverty 
amidst affluence was not a contradiction of suburb versus city, but of the dynamics of the state-
influenced labor market that produced both jobs for the skilled and few opportunities for the 
unskilled.  The questions were how the state distributed spending to boost employment as much 
as it was how the state subsidized mortgages, how the state enforced fair employment in its 
subsidized industries as much as it enforced fair housing, and how the state approached 
employing the unskilled themselves.  These questions plagued Long Island’s activists, local 
politicians, policymakers and anyone concerned with the black poor living in what President 
																																																						




Dwight Eisenhower believed was the space “universally and exclusively inhabited by the 
workmen:” the postwar suburb.112
																																																						
112 Quoted in Tom Lewis, Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, Transforming American Life (New 
York: Viking, 1997); Eisenhower was referring to Levittown, and he wanted to show Soviet First Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev Levitt’s Pennsylvania project during his 1959 tour of the United States.  The stop was ultimately nixed 





Class versus Class 
 
 
 While decentralized labor markets made mass suburbanization possible, the suburbs were 
a space for homes, in both the popular imagination and the physical layout of the postwar urban 
fringe.  Long Islanders were attracted to the region’s housing developments laid atop potato 
fields, demolished Gold Coast estates, and saltwater marshes.  The Cape Cods, ranches, and 
split-levels dotting the Island, along with the possibility of a garage, basement, large backyard, 
expandable second floors, not to mention neighborhood schools and a plethora of shopping 
choices, all represented what was captured in the postwar “American Dream.”  State policy 
undergirded this explosion in affordable single-family homes and amenities, from federal 
mortgage guarantees and highway development, to pro-development tax policies and the 
expansion of consumer credit.1  As the previous chapter demonstrates, whites dominated the 
purchase of these homes, though African Americans moved to the suburbs as well.  FHA policy, 
municipal zoning and land-use laws, a web of local governmental boundaries, and the realtors, 
developers, and homeowners operating within this public framework determined where they 
could buy houses.  As a generation of scholars have shown, state-sponsored segregation and ‘de 
facto’ racist private actions constrained black housing choices after World War II in both cities 
and suburbs.  But it did not cut African Americans out of the market entirely.   
The labor market divide shaped the process and outcome of postwar African American 
suburbanization, because segregated housing barriers produced distinct but overlapping housing 
																																																						
1 For the state’s role in postwar consumer credit, see Louis Hyman, Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red 





markets for the African American middle class and the black poor.  For the middle class, racist 
housing barriers, tied to schools and local government services, served as the most formidable 
obstacle to racial equality on postwar Long Island.  As historian Andrew Wiese argues, black 
suburbanites settled within the cracks of the segregated housing market, near older black 
working-class settlements or in undeveloped spaces not yet claimed as ‘white’ suburbia. A few 
confronted segregation directly, serving as ‘pioneers’ for others to follow.2  In the process they 
established thriving neighborhoods, using their economic power to become home-owning 
postwar suburbanites.  Here black progress was made within the segregated housing market, and 
in a few cases, against it.  The middle class looked to end remaining inequities through a 
suburban-oriented civil rights movement, influenced by national protests and national 
organizations, though addressing local issues: housing, equal educational opportunity, and fair 
access to government services. 
 The black poor faced the same racial constraints, though low-incomes limited their 
housing choices further in a residential market designed for affluence.  The FHA had minimum 
income thresholds, zoning and building codes imposed costly standards on residential units 
island-wide, their neighborhoods were marked for slum clearance and homeowners strongly 
opposed affordable housing.  But these barriers did not cut the black poor out of the market 
entirely either.  Pre-war communities remained at the fringe of postwar suburbia, and realtors 
found ways to turn postwar single-family homes into affordable housing in modestly priced 
postwar neighborhoods, black middle class hamlets, and tenuously integrated blocks.  In the 
shadows of the single-family subdivision lived those lacking the means to participate in the 
consumer bounty of suburban prosperity.   
																																																						




 While the arrival of the black middle class and their agitation for racial equality had a 
distinct suburban bent, the existence of the black poor, their dire housing conditions, and their 
settlement within middle class neighborhoods produced dynamics familiar to American cities.  
Black homeowners demanded open housing and integrated schools, challenged downzoning 
proposals, and celebrated their upward mobility.  The black poor faced slum clearance and urban 
renewal, and after relocating to middle class neighborhoods, stiff homeowner opposition and 
efforts to push them out.  Housing segregation concentrated the poor into Long Island’s black or 
integrated suburban hamlets, pitting the middle class against the minority poor over schools, 
taxes, illegal tenancies, and welfare, and the black middle class against local government for 
their implicit support of poverty concentrations.  By the late 1960s, tensions reached a boiling 
point, spilling into urban violence.  Though Long Island was on the winning side of what Robert 
Self calls the “overdevelopment of suburbs and the underdevelopment of cities” after World War 
II, the region was not immune to the challenges a growing African American poor posed in a 
segregated residential landscape.3  This was a consequence of suburban segregation, but also the 
structure of the labor market that left disproportionate number of black families with little 
income to support homeownership and financially contribute to local taxes.   
The conflicts that cut across both racial and class lines on Long Island reveals the 
complex history of postwar suburbia, going beyond the city/suburb dichotomy to the dividing 
lines between individual hamlets and within suburban neighborhoods.4  At the heart of these 
conflicts were class tensions, because while African American homeowners challenged the racial 
homogeneity of postwar suburbia, they reified class homogeneity, seeking their place within the 
stratified housing market.  In contrast, the black poor challenged middle class exclusivity and the 
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public foundations built upon it.  Historians ignore these class tensions, especially within African 
American suburbs.  Andrew Wiese’s national study of twentieth century African American 
suburbanization portrays the relationship between working and middle class as harmonious and 
successive, because pre-war black enclaves were spaces for postwar suburban developments 
catering to black buyers.  This was true on Long Island as it was nationwide, though the black 
poor did not disappear, and the relationship between the two was contentious, as pre-war housing 
‘blighted’ new black suburbs and segregation permitted speculators to introduce the black poor 
to middle class neighborhoods.  The tensions between middle class and poor played out in school 
board elections, civic association meetings, and on the streets.5  
 
The Contours of Housing 
 
 Long Island’s postwar housing market was formed through an interconnected web of 
national and local housing policy.  The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans 
Administration (VA) mortgage programs were the most important factors in housing 
development after World War II.  Initiated as a depression-era solution to the high foreclosure 
rate and unemployment in housing construction, the FHA revolutionized homeownership in the 
twentieth century.  The mortgage insurance program lowered the barrier to home-buying by 
reducing down payments and extending the repayment period to thirty-years.  The government 
also shouldered the risk of default, and as a result formed strict, enforceable, and standardized 
criteria for publicly-subsidized mortgages.  Benchmarks included the structure of individual 
homes, minimum lot size, distance from street and other buildings, and width of the house itself.  
																																																						
5Wiese, 116, 159-163.  Wiese does discuss middle class desires for ‘separation’ from the black poor, but not actual 
intra-community tensions; Lizabeth Cohen discusses inequality within suburbia. See Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' 
Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Knopf, 2003), chapter 5; See also 




Insured homes also had to be in residentially desirable areas, measured subjectively in terms of a 
neighborhood’s economic stability and protection from ‘adverse influences.’ Racial prejudice 
along with class biases against multi-family housing and diverse neighborhoods became 
quantifiable calculations for mortgage insurance risk.  Simply put, the FHA favored 
homogeneity, in race, income, and land use.  Homogeneity did not mean white exclusivity, and 
the FHA did insure black mortgages within its ‘homogenous’ framework.  Class barriers 
however, were rigid.6  
 With over a third of Nassau County homes guaranteed by FHA mortgages as of 1960, not 
to mention the VA loans closely associated with FHA standards across the Island, the region’s 
developers were sensitive to government standards.7  Builders planned subdivisions using FHA 
criteria for design, construction, and cost.  The Levitt brothers constructed ‘Levittown’ with 
FHA-sanctioned house-to-lot ratios, Cape-Cod home designs, and curvilinear streets.8  
Developers also included restrictive covenants on their properties, an FHA-approved measure to 
safeguard property values, which often contained a clause against selling or leasing property to 
non-whites.  Racial covenants were ubiquitous on Long Island, covering forty-seven percent of 
large subdivisions in Nassau County as of 1947.9  Though Shelley v. Kraemer declared covenants 
unconstitutional in 1948, the practice was already entrenched on Long Island, part of the spatial 
landscape and the strategies of developers, realtors, and homeowners themselves.  When 
																																																						
6 Jackson, chapter 11; Freund, chapter 4; Adam Gordon, “The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal 
Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and out of Reach for 
Blacks,” The Yale Law Journal 115, No. 1 (Oct., 2005): 186-226. 
7 Calculation based on all housing units constructed since 1939 divided by cumulative number of home mortgages, 
1934-1960.  The total comes to 36 percent, though does not include housing built between 1934 and 1940. If we 
include homes built between 1930 and 1939, the proportion drops to 31%. Regardless, the direct influence of the 
FHA is clear.  See Jackson, 211; U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960, 213. 
8 Kelly, 3n3, 89, 101. 
9 John P. Dean, “Only Caucasian:  A Study of Race Covenants,” The Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics 
23, no. 4 (November 1947): 428-432.  The author defined large housing developments as those with 20 parcels or 




confronted with the injustice of covenants and racial segregation, Levittown developer William 
Levitt famously quipped that “we can solve a housing problem, or we can try to solve a racial 
problem…but we cannot combine the two,” basically stating racial integration threatened to 
undermine homebuilding.10  Since FHA underwriters weighed race among their factors of 
judging mortgage risk, Levitt’s statement followed the logic of state officials.   
 Local government policy was likewise responsive to FHA standards and the developers 
reliant on these mortgage guarantees.  On Long Island, this often meant relaxing building codes.  
Most zoning codes in Nassau and Western Suffolk County were adopted prior to World War II 
for the pre-war middle class and elite Gold Coast residents, with standards well above FHA 
requirements.  In the wake of Long Island’s industrialization, demand for modest homes 
skyrocketed, though minimum lot-sizes and high construction standards priced many out of the 
market.  The housing crisis immediately following the war gave federally-backed developers the 
justification to demand zoning law changes.11  Levitt’s basement-less house design required 
revised codes, and in 1947, the Town of Hempstead repealed the basement code, permitting 
Levitt and others to construct cheaper single-family dwellings. With the proliferation of Levitt-
style developments in the 1950s, zoning authorities pulled back, increasing lot sizes to raise 
property values.  The Town of Oyster Bay erected one acre minimums for future land by the 
1960s to prevent new Levittowns.12  Zoning battles reflected the tension between expanding 
housing opportunity to the wider swath of Long Island’s new residents and protecting 
																																																						
10 Quoted in Jackson, 241. 
11 Newsday, the daily newspaper that grew alongside Long Island’s suburbanization, publicly campaigned hard for 
zoning code reform.  See “Low-Cost Houses, Answer to Shortage, Banned by Old Code,” Newsday, April 29, 1946, 
2 for an example.  
12 Kelly, 58-59; For examples of zoning battles being waged at Town Halls, see “Small Houses or Not? Oyster Bay 
to Decide,” Newsday, May 16, 1950, 18; “Civics Angered by Zoning Threaten to Form Village,” Newsday, January 
23, 1958, 19; “On LI Home Building is Big Business,” Newsday, May 22, 1954, M23; Robert Coldwell Wood, 1400 
Governments; The Political Economy of the New York Metropolitan Region (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 




municipalities from ‘incompatible’ use of property, i.e. any land-use that threatened property 
values and therefore tax revenue.13  On Long Island, FHA-subsidies and the developers 
dependent on the mortgage guarantees opened land to working class New Yorkers, while zoning 
agencies served to check affordable housing growth, though in effect zoning maintained the 
pattern established in the postwar boom since planning measures were largely enforced after the 
heaviest waves of migration in the 1950s and 1960s.14  The barrier was lowered, though only for 
those climbing into the postwar middle class.   
 The FHA guidelines also included requirements for urban amenities and public services 
in order to qualify for mortgage insurance, and this largely coincided with the demands of 
suburbanites themselves.15  Paved roads, garbage removal, police protection, and schools, among 
other public needs, were satisfied within the fragmented governmental system inherited from the 
pre-war period, largely because the existing structure was adapted to the new environment.16  
Long Island’s two counties provided general services like welfare, police (in Nassau and western 
Suffolk after 1960), and justice, while Towns (which in the case of the Town of Hempstead had 
over 834,000 residents, larger than most US cities) or incorporated villages furnished brick and 
mortar services, including road maintenance, sanitation, land-use policy, and sometimes police 
protection.  Beyond this were ‘special districts’ created to provide water, fire, or sewage 
amenities to areas incongruous with town or village borders.  School districts, determined by 
New York State, expanded to meet the needs of the region’s exploding student population, and 
these rarely matched other political boundaries.  In all, two counties, two cities, thirteen towns, 
																																																						
13 Freund, 226-227. 
14 Wood, 100. 
15 Andrew R. Highsmith, “Demolition Means Progress: Race, Class, and the Deconstruction of the American Dream 
in Flint, Michigan” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2009), 18-19, 136-140. 




ninety-two villages, 135 school districts, 126 fire districts, and 477 special districts, 870 different 
governmental units in total, had taxing authority on Long Island by 1970.17  The average Nassau 
County home in an unincorporated area paid taxes to sixteen different districts.18  This system 
has more or less remained, and as of 2010, Nassau and Suffolk were the most balkanized 
suburban counties in the United States.19   
 These factors in sum produced Long Island’s particular housing market.  It was a racially 
and class segmented market, since the FHA and developers considered skin color a calculable 
risk when determining the inhabitants of a neighborhood while zoning authorities carefully 
excluded unwanted socioeconomic groups to secure property values and ‘community character.’  
The FHA’s stance on race changed in the wake of Shelley, though the administration blamed the 
‘market’ for segregation and funded separate federally-protected homes for African Americans 
in the 1950s.  Such housing never met the demand, constituting only two percent of FHA loans 
and three percent of VA loans, but Andrew Wiese calculates that this nonetheless accounted for 
up to 40 percent of the new African American housing during the 1950s.20   The FHA was both a 
boon and detriment to African Americans.21  A number of FHA-approved ‘minority housing’ 
suburban developments were built on Long Island in the 1950s, and after John F. Kennedy ended 
discriminatory federally-insured loans, developers constructed housing tracts for the black 
																																																						
17 “An Island of Superlatives,” Newsday, Apr 29, 1973, 8F. 
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market across Long Island.22  These developments had to be constructed within the layout of 
Long Island’s zoning, school, and public service boundaries, all divided by race.  
The market was also simultaneously more expensive and more affordable than its pre-
war counterpart.  Rapid residential development raised land values, and though housing 
standards were relaxed, they applied to a much broader swath of properties and were more likely 
to be enforced if FHA mortgage guarantees were involved.  Meanwhile, Nassau and Suffolk’s 
fragmented government resulted in a massive public sector that imposed high taxes, particularly 
because property taxes funded sixty percent of county governments and nearly one hundred 
percent of local governmental units.  Despite postwar industrialization and commercial 
development, suburbanites still owned the majority of all property value; residential homeowners 
were the primary funders of local government on Long Island, with the exception of the few 
taxing districts with substantial commercial and/or industrial property.23  On the other hand, 
federal mortgage subsidies greatly lowered the barrier to homeownership, with down payments 
between ten percent and zero for veterans.  Mass production also reduced construction costs.  
Obtaining a job in the metropolitan area’s robust labor market gave borrowers the current income 
threshold and the prospect of future earnings capacity that the FHA required when extending 
mortgage insurance.  At its core, the housing market rested on the foundation of postwar 
prosperity, and the FHA’s success was not possible without it.24  
																																																						
22 Adam Gordon, “The Creation of Homeownership,” 217-218. 
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 This was the web of regulation that Long Islanders navigated.  White migrants’ near-full 
participation in the labor market and FHA-approved skin color gave them wide choice in 
housing.  The black middle class had the income but not the skin color, limiting them to 
segregated options.  But above all, Long Island’s housing market was class exclusive, and the 
poor confronted an inhospitable housing environment as every available parcel was absorbed 
into the FHA approved and highly regulated housing market.  But where there was housing 
needs, there were those willing to meet demand.  The regulatory framework was not 
impenetrable, and the needs of all three populations were met both within the zoned and properly 
coded communities as well as outside them, in the cracks of Long Island’s housing market.  
 
Another “Young Harlem” 
For black suburbanites who benefitted from the postwar labor market, housing 
segregation, both in policy and practice, made it difficult, though not impossible, to purchase 
suburban housing.  The constraints of the late 1940s and early 1950s were the most formidable, 
written into law and violently enforced.  Restrictive racial covenants, legal until 1947 and 
practiced afterwards, explicitly denied blacks housing.  Levittown was the most infamous 
covenant-protected development on Long Island, and when African American military veteran 
and Harlem resident Eugene Burnett toured Levitt models, the agent refused to provide Burnett 
an application, stating “the builders have not at this time decided to sell to Negroes.”  Burnett 
was devastated; “I'll never forget the ride back to East Harlem," he remembered.25   
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White homeowners who imbibed the logic of racial segregation meanwhile proved to be 
the most visible barrier to black homeownership, even resorting to violence as a means to protect 
racial homogeneity of neighborhoods.26  One of the more famous examples occurred in 1953, 
when Clarence Wilson, a non-white beauty products manufacturer from Brooklyn, attempted to 
purchase a home in Deauville Gardens, a white working class suburban development in 
Copiague in western Suffolk County.  The house caught fire twice before his move-in date.  With 
help from the local NAACP, Wilson declared he would rebuild the $16,000 ranch home: “I’m 
going to finish this house and live in it” declared Mr. Wilson, “I am not afraid.  I regard these 
two attempts to burn down my house as enemy attacks…and I’m not running away.  The future 
for me and my family…and for others like us…depends on what I do now.”  Despite assurances 
from the press and public authorities that this was an isolated incident perpetrated by a few 
extremists, the Deauville Gardens community made it clear that residents like Clarence Wilson 
were not welcome in their neighborhood.  When the NAACP met with the Deauville Gardens 
Civic Association to discuss the incident, most of the questions from the audience asked why 
Wilson was causing trouble.27  Wilson hired a detective after receiving dozens of threatening 
letters from the Ku Klux Klan, and the detective’s survey determined that about three-quarters of 
Wilson’s white neighbors did not want the Wilson family in Deauville Gardens.  By January 
1954, Wilson decided to sell the $16,000 home at a loss because he feared for his family.  The 
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transaction was arranged through the Deauville Gardens Civic Association and sold to a white 
buyer. 28 
Outright violence, though a visceral reminder to black homebuyers of the risks of moving 
into suburbia, was the exception.  Instead, black homebuyers more often encountered tacit 
opposition at the real estate office, the middlemen between segregated policy and anti-
discrimination law.29  When engineer Irving Winters went house hunting near his employer in 
Suffolk County, realtors repeatedly told him nothing “suitable” was available.  The one broker 
willing to show him ‘homes’ merely drove to empty lots.  Winters then tried another realtor, but 
was once again rebuffed.  In a fit of anger Irving let out “caustic words” and the realty office 
relented, sending them to a builder in nearby St. James.  The Winters liked the house, though the 
builder led Mr. Winters into the basement, and in tears, confided that selling the home to a black 
couple would destroy his small business dependent on local customers and bank loans.  Though 
angry, Mr. Winters decided not to press the builder, deciding to go it alone and deal with owners 
directly.  The Winters found a home, and with a lawyer in tow, closed on the mortgage.  Despite 
the concerns of realtors, the Winters felt welcomed into the community once they moved in.30  
While realtors, builders, and banks were operating within the hard rules (or in this case legacy) 
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of the FHA’s racial regulations, white homeowners were not tied to such stipulations and could 
respond in a variety of ways.  In this case at least, white neighbors were not the obstacle.     
The dance with realtors was an all-too-common reality for prospective black buyers, and 
moving directly into white neighborhoods required uncommon fortitude.  Consequently, most 
African American housing needs were met within the segregated housing market.  As Andrew 
Wiese argues, pre-war black enclaves, redlined from mortgage approval for white suburbia, 
provided the space for FHA-approved black suburban developments.31  This is how the majority 
of black buyers found homes on Long Island in the 1950s, in the spaces demarcated as ‘safe’ for 
black housing.   North Amityville, in the far southwest of Suffolk County, was an unincorporated 
hamlet with a small community of mixed Native American and slave descendants dating back to 
the eighteenth century.  Migrant laborers also worked North Amityville’s farms in the early 
twentieth century, some of whom settled along what was referred to as ‘tobacco road.’32  This 
small community enabled the Ronek Construction Company to exploit the “pressing housing 
problem of minority groups,” and they built single-family FHA- insured housing competitive in 
price with Levittown but available “to all qualified buyers without regard to race, creed or 
color,” a direct advertisement to those aware of segregated housing policy.33  When the Ronek 
Company unveiled the model units in 1950, over 8,000 potential buyers, almost all black, 
inspected the homes, “necessitating a special police detail to direct the flow of automobiles along 
the route to the development.”34  
The turnout reflected the acute housing demand among African American middle class 
homebuyers, and unsurprisingly, the Ronek Company was not alone in using existing black 
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enclaves to construct FHA-insured single-family developments catering to black homebuyers.  
Just three miles northeast, Taca Home Builders Inc. bought land in an un-suburbanized area in 
Wyandanch, home to working-class German, Irish, and African Americans prior to World War 
II.  They designed ‘Carver Park’ in 1951, and other developers followed, securing FHA funding 
to build developments like Powell Estates, which offered ‘spacious’ cape cods for qualified 
buyers.  As their advertising stated “if you can earn $60 a week, you can afford to buy this 
beautiful home.”35 The housing tracts constructed in North Amityville and Wyandanch, part of 
the larger Town of Babylon, contributed to the town’s skyrocketing black homeownership that 
rose from only nine minority owner-occupied homes in 1950 to 1,885 in 1960.36   
To the west of Babylon, builders and realtors carved out black neighborhoods in the 
housing boom of Nassau County.  In Hempstead, pre-war black enclaves enabled black 
homebuyers to purchase single-family housing along its outskirts, which grew to house over a 
quarter of Nassau County’s middle-class African Americans by 1960.  A similar process 
occurred in Freeport, as pre-war domestic settlement encouraged postwar middle class housing 
construction.37  Just to the north in the unincorporated hamlet of Roosevelt, prewar black housing 
enabled postwar developers and realtors to design black subdivisions, heavily marketed through 
metro-area newspapers.  By 1960, African Americans grew to nearly a fifth of the hamlet’s 
population.38  And north of Roosevelt, a tiny black nineteenth century subdivision served as the 
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foundation for postwar black housing in New Cassel.39  Here modest homes were built to house 
local factory workers in the hamlet’s machinery and instrument plants.40  Unlike the middle class 
in Hempstead or Roosevelt, these prospective homeowners had “less financial means than 
“middle class” may imply… [and] strapped themselves to buy their homes, often necessitating 
full-time employment of wives and mothers in order to meet expenses.”  Nonetheless, they 
qualified for FHA approved homes.41  By 1960, 2,693 African Americans lived in the hamlet 
along with 4,833 whites.42   
While subdivisions in Nassau County operated within the contours of segregation, all 
were built near or within majority white hamlets.  Though tensions existed, the middle-class 
background of these residents tempered white fears.  In Roosevelt, social researchers found that 
whites accepted black residents largely because “their occupational status was higher than most 
other white residents in their block,” and included doctors, teachers, and psychologists.43  The 
hamlet of Lakeview, where black housing subdivisions were built as early as 1950 but whose 
black population expanded rapidly from 1959 to 1961, managed to integrate largely because “the 
blacks moving in were generally considered to be of the “better class” with high income, good 
manners and took care of their property, even an improvement over the residents they replaced” 
an Adelphi University sociological study noted.44  This is not to say that African American 
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incomes alone alleviated white anxieties; black homeowners often had to go above and beyond 
to ‘prove’ their class status and alter the association of black skin with poverty.  As one black 
homeowner admitted, he had to work ‘like hell’ to make improvements on his home “so that way 
the people around here will know we don’t keep chickens in the living room.”45  Nonetheless, 
housing costs and mortgage criteria ensured that these homeowners were from the same class 
makeup as their white counterparts, fitting into the surrounding community in every way save 
the prejudices whites held for their skin color.   
Of course, these weren’t the only places the African American middle class settled; from 
the ‘Nostrand Gardens’ subdivision in Uniondale in Nassau County and the western Suffolk 
hamlets like Huntington Station, Deer Park, and Brentwood, out to Coram in eastern Suffolk, 
black Long Islanders were purchasing homes across Long Island’s budding subdivisions.46  But 
North Amityville, Wyandanch, Hempstead, Roosevelt, New Cassel, Lakeview, and Freeport 
contained over a third of Long Island’s total black population in 1960.  Most importantly, they 
were the centers of postwar black middle class life, nestled within the broad swath of postwar 
suburban housing tracts, just as their residents were tied to the bounties of the postwar labor 
market (See Figure 3.1).  This was distinct from the prewar domestic and agricultural laborer 
neighborhoods, save Hempstead and Freeport, tied to what remained of the pre-war economy. 
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Figure 3.1. Long Island’s largest black suburbs as of 1960.  Data and map generation from Social Explorer. 
These hamlets became thriving black communities, the centers of black middle class 
culture in the two decades after World War II.  North Amityville, the largest postwar black 
hamlet in 1960, featured prominent black businesses, like James Calloway’s ‘Delly’ founded in 
1954, which proved so popular that Calloway expanded the business into a full-fledged IGA 
Foodliner supermarket in 1966.47  With real estate firms, law offices, general stores, barber 
shops, and community clubs, North Amityville residents took great pride in their community.  
IGA employee Sam Edwards proclaimed it a “new era… [for] Negroes in business,” where 
blacks would “overcome and reach immeasurable heights, taking our place in the economic 
mainstream of American life.”48  Barber Joe Daniels declared that North Amityville was a 
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“Harlem young, vibrant and undismayed… a very nice place to live for the average working 
man.”49  While North Amityville was the most celebrated, there were several “Harlems” 
emerging across Long Island.  Lakeview and Roosevelt served as quiet leafy-green sanctuaries.  
Hempstead was a bustling downtown with easy commuting to New York City.  All were 
connected through an expanding black press, primarily the New York Amsterdam News, one of 
the nation’s leading black newspapers.  The paper, sensing the migration to the suburbs, added 
reporters to cover Long Island stories (Chuck Smith’s “Nassau-Suffolk News-Beat”) as well as 
local gossip, “high society,” achievements, and real estate in sections like the “Babylon 
Bailiwick” and “Out our Way.”50  One could pick up the weekly paper and catch up with the 
activities of their neighbors, from summer vacation plans and holiday festivities, to new births, 
promotions, and scholarly achievements.51 
Long Island’s flourishing black communities developed within the contours of state-
sponsored segregation, which initially barred those labeled ‘black’ in the late 1940s, but later 
provided an exclusive ‘black’ housing market in the 1950s.  By the 1960s, the FHA was 
prohibited from segregating mortgages and New York State passed anti-discrimination housing 
laws, further encouraging black suburban development.  Local zoning, real estate practices, and 
neighborhood politics still shaped a segregated market, but middle class African Americans had 
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Postwar Housing and the Poor 
 Though the black middle class could not live wherever they chose, their income allowed 
them to participate in the postwar housing market. In contrast, the entire structure of FHA’s 
mortgage-insurance standards and associated zoning codes wrote the poor out of the housing 
market altogether. Proliferating residential subdivisions, industrial parks, and strip malls placed a 
premium on land, and FHA mortgage-insurance, zoning laws, and developers favored single-
family home construction, which made up eighty-four percent of all units in Nassau and ninety-
four percent of all housing stock in Suffolk.52  Apartments built after 1945 were primarily in the 
‘luxury’ category, attracting the same kinds of residents as single-family homes.  In addition, the 
cost of housing construction uniformly rose as building code enforcement touched every inch of 
Long Island’s landscape west of the two forks.  This was a housing landscape built on the 
affluence of the postwar labor market, with few options for those untouched by postwar 
prosperity.  In this environment, pre-war domestic and migrant laborer enclaves served as safe 
spaces for postwar poor communities, predating land-use laws and written off by federally-
backed developers.    
The black poor continued to concentrate in the largest pre-war hamlets with housing 
stock below postwar market rates.  These districts also remained the most convenient housing to 
the domestic and migrant farm economy, including Inwood, Rockville Centre, and Freeport on 
Long Island’s South Shore, Manhasset and Glen Cove on the North Shore, and Riverhead out 
east.  In general, the black poor further concentrated in these enclaves without attendant 
increases in housing supply, intensifying dilapidated conditions and high prices present since the 
1930s.  The degree of severity depended on the immediate surroundings and low-wage labor 
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demand.  In the North Shore domestic enclaves of Manhasset, Roslyn, and Port Washington, a 
proliferation of upper-middle-class subdivisions replaced the estates, concentrating the black 
poor into the same pre-war districts. In these three neighborhoods, lived over 1,000 people.  
Seventy percent of units did not have central heating, sixty-five percent lacked hot water, and 
over half of households were without indoor toilets or baths. Demand nonetheless made tool 
sheds, garages, and even chicken coops profitable. 53  In the larger and more urbanized city of 
Glen Cove, builders constructed mid-century tenements that slipped under city and state building 
codes, with coal stoves, faulty wiring, and bathrooms shared by an entire floor.  This was the 
newest of what became a four-building slum owned by Morris Idelevitz in 1953, which included 
older buildings and a former incinerator.  Three fires had broken out in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, killing a child.54  
In Nassau’s South Shore domestic enclaves, a similar pattern emerged despite Levitt-
style mass suburbanization.  In the affluent commuter village of Rockville Centre, the Banks 
Avenue area remained the sole affordable residential district, housing over two-hundred black 
and three dozen white families who worked as cooks and house-cleaners along with a large 
contingent of day-laborers.55  In Inwood at the extreme southwest of Nassau County, postwar 
economic development led to a more diverse population in the 1,200-unit domestic 
neighborhood.  Manufacturing, construction, transportation, and utility workers joined the area’s 
																																																						
53 New York State Division of Housing, Survey of Housing Conditions, in Selected Branch Files, 1940-1955, Part 
26, Series B, reel 4, slide 640, Papers of the NAACP. 
54 “Report on Glen Cove Housing Situation,” p. 2, Group II, Box A 313, folder 7, Records of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Library of Congress, Washington DC (hereafter cited as 
NAACP Records, LoC); “Glen Cove Moves to Rehabilitate 2d Idelevitz Slum,” Newsday, December 9, 1955, 7. 
55 “Rockville Centre: Racial ‘Stalemate’,” Newsday, June 20, 1966; “Confused About Urban Renewal? Read This,” 
February 1965, Box 12, folder “Rockville Centre, New York, 1965-1966,” Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, 
Special Collections and University Archives, Stony Brook University Libraries, Stony Brook, New York (hereafter 
cited as Javits Papers); “Causes of Racial Tension in an Urban Renewal Program – An Investigation into the History 
of the Rockville Centre, New York, Project” February, 1966, p. 5, Box 67, folder “Human Rights,” Nickerson 




domestics, and housing conditions did not deteriorate as rapidly: only a quarter of units lacked a 
bathroom, heating facilities, and/or running water.  African Americans were concentrated in the 
most substandard dwellings though, including rooming houses, where entire tenant families 
squeezed into two-room rentals and shared bathrooms with half a dozen other families.56  While 
Hempstead and Freeport became middle class havens during the 1960s, they too remained 
sources of low-income housing in small corners of each neighborhood.57   
Unlike in Nassau, where intensive residential development aggravated dilapidated 
conditions, cheaper land and relaxed building standards in Suffolk enabled developers to exploit 
acute housing demand among the poor.  In western Suffolk, the same forces at work in Nassau 
operated, where former domestic enclaves deteriorated as demand became acute.58 On Long 
Island’s expansive east end, housing options expanded for the black poor.  Migrant farm laborers 
were already housed in barrack-style ‘bullpens,’ or in former chicken coops, tool sheds, and pig 
sties, sharing bathrooms and eating facilities with an entire camp.59  A growing population of 
‘ex-migrants’ and eastward migrating black poor were ripe for new forms of housing 
exploitation, and the lack of building codes in Suffolk’s three eastern towns gave landowners 
freedom to provide housing in any capacity they saw fit.  On the Hollis Warner Duck Farm in 
Riverhead, the Warner family constructed a suburban subdivision for the poor.  An award-
winning Newsday article depicted the three available models: a three bedroom and two-bedroom 
500 square foot model with gas-stove, refrigerator, kerosene gas heater, and hand pump, or an 
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eighty-one square-foot single-room model with refrigerator only.  None had bathrooms; the 
Warners erected a row of outhouses behind the units.  While most inhabitants were local migrant 
or ex-migrant laborers, tenants included those displaced from other areas of Long Island.  A 
resident named Mary and her family were forced to move from their Greenport rental after it was 
sold, making their way to the Warner Farm.  She found work both on local farms and 
periodically commuted to Roslyn, sixty miles away.  Another resident living in a former duck-
brooding house was a long-distance commuter to his landscaping job in the Gold Coast hamlet of 
Brookville, over an hour west.60 Unsurprisingly, Riverhead’s minority poor rented out over 
ninety-nine percent of the Town’s shoddy housing, much of it comparatively new.61 
All low-income housing shared one common problem: high prices.  Rents in Nassau 
County averaged between $130 and $138 for a four-person family in the early 1960s.62  For 
those families with incomes of $5,000 a year, $130 a month represented over a third of their 
wages.  Families below this threshold could be ‘shelter-poor,’ i.e. unable to meet their non-
shelter needs (food, clothing, medical care) due to such high housing costs.63  Though Suffolk’s 
rents were cheaper, the average black family in hamlets like Bay Shore spent nearly a third of 
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their income on rent, while Riverhead residents paid low prices for vermin-infested housing in 
rural isolation.64  The fact that the poor paid high prices for decrepit housing was nothing new; 
what differed was the wide swath of Long Island’s population spending a fifth of their rising 
incomes to build equity.65  Those obtaining secure jobs built assets through property ownership, 
and the lack of affordable housing only exacerbated the precarious job situations of the poor in 
postwar Long Island.    
 
Suburban Civil Rights 
 These two divergent black housing experiences, though a small facet of Long Island’s 
postwar suburbanization, were at the center of the region’s housing politics in the 1950s and 
early 1960s.  For the black middle class, housing and school segregation, along with equal 
political representation, were the final frontiers of racial inequality in suburbia.66  Local 
homeowners and activists took to the courts, realty offices, school boards, town halls, and streets 
to wage their war against racism.  Their fights made front-page news, particularly as they 
coalesced with the civil rights movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Activists, including 
some of the same groups and individuals involved in middle class issues, were also deeply 
concerned with the postwar black poor, whose challenges required public intervention in the 
housing market.  The two struggles, like the divergent housing experiences, followed different 
tracks, appealing to distinct constituencies, organizing disparate communities, and on a 
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fundamental level, fighting different problems.  Nonetheless, the belief that segregation was at 
the core of these problems crossed the lines between the two movements, particularly because 
the NAACP, the most powerful civil rights organization on Long Island, assumed that both 
challenges stemmed from the same root cause:  the inability of African Americans to move 
freely through the housing market.67 
The middle class postwar suburban struggle for equality was rooted in the concerns and 
organizations of black homeowners, who melded their demands as property owners with broader 
civil rights activity. Homeowner activists worked through institutions as diverse as the 
ubiquitous suburban ‘civic association’ to explicitly civil-rights oriented organizations like 
NAACP and CORE.  In fact, the line between the two blurred as activists defined civil rights 
through the lens of the homeowner, while race-conscious civic associations adopted civil rights 
language when pressing for homeowner demands.68  For example, black civic associations, like 
the Progressive Civic Association of New Cassel (PCANC) or the Ronek Park Civic Association 
in North Amityville, operated as any civic association in white neighborhoods.  They fought for 
the interests of their home-owning constituents, including the preservation of ‘residential 
character,’ quality public services, congestion and noise abatement, or environmental protection. 
This meant demanding paved roads, sidewalks, or playgrounds, and fighting down-zoning 
proposals, factory development, or illegal apartments.69 Unlike their white counterparts though, 
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black civic associations approached these problems as a racial minority.  North Amityville’s 
civic associations operated as a racial organization, fighting an attempt to re-zone forty-three 
acres of the hamlet for industry with chants of “we shall overcome.”70  So did PCANC, who 
argued that “it is very hard for us in a minority group to obtain homes” when New Cassel was 
threatened with a new industrial park near their residential community.71   
 Long Island’s NAACP branches likewise interpreted the concerns of their home-owning 
constituency as civil rights problems.  The NAACP had a small presence on Long Island dating 
to the 1930s, but the postwar migration of middle-income African Americans and the national 
board’s encouragement of neighborhood organizations transformed the NAACP’s local presence.  
By 1965 there were fourteen branches representing all of Long Island’s black neighborhoods, 
from Great Neck in the extreme north-east of Nassau County to Riverhead and Greenport on the 
east end of Suffolk.72  Collectively, membership totaled over 2,800 Long Islanders.73  Members 
in solidly middle class neighborhoods used the branches as both community centers and sources 
of homeowner activism.  The Central Long Island branch (stationed in North Amityville), 
representing the entire Town of Babylon, grew to include over 1,300 members in the 1950s 
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under the tutelage of “Mr. NAACP” Dr. Eugene T. Reed, who helped organize banquets, a credit 
union, and the 1954 New York State Conference of Branches of the NAACP.74  The branch 
bulletin reported on zoning changes to black neighborhoods and occasionally lent official 
support to homeowner efforts, from fights against downzoning proposals to promoting large-lot 
housing tracts for affluent African American homebuyers.75  The Central Long Island Branch 
was far from alone in these efforts.  The neighboring Deer Park NAACP branch won an NAACP 
Thalheimer local branch award in 1966 for opposing the “’down-zoning’ of a nearby tract for 
industry.”76  Overall, the NAACP exemplified its middle-class outlook most explicitly in the 
suburbs, where local branches supported black homeowners in their quest to secure equal status 
among white middle class suburbs. 
These local homeowner’s associations and NAACP branches were embedded within the 
broader fight against racial inequality, particularly the national struggle for integration.  High-
profile legal tactics, including two NAACP suits against Levittown for using illegal racial 
covenants, looked to strike down the structural barriers to housing choice.77  After New York 
State passed the Metcalf-Baker Law in 1961 (which barred racial discrimination in housing sales 
or rentals), the Long Island Council for Integrated Housing, an interracial volunteer organization 
founded to lobby for the law’s passage, tested real estate offices and provided financial support 
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to black homebuyers moving to white suburbs.  The Council targeted real estate practices 
because it was the source of “the myths and misconceptions about real estate value, which are 
used to deny equality of housing.”78  Even union locals joined in the crusade for integration, 
assuring members that any fears of black neighbors were unfounded.  The overwhelmingly white 
Engineer’s Association of Arma (EAA), which represented engineers at the defense-oriented 
American Bosch Arma manufacturing plant, educated its members on the reasons why “well-to-
do Negroes” would want “white housing,” including better schools, services, and the fact that “a 
Negro doctor, lawyer, or engineer has as little interest in common with a negro-laborer neighbor 
as would their white counterparts.”79  The EAA’s efforts most directly reflected the class-specific 
vision of open housing for those that could afford it, a key element of the housing integration 
struggle in the postwar period. 
Homeowners also encouraged integration themselves.  In the wake of Lakeview’s rapid 
influx of African American professionals from 1959-1961, thirty-five of the 170 white-owned 
homes went up for sale, stoking fears of ‘white flight.’  Jamaican born World War II veteran and 
airline employee Lincoln Lynch, a new homeowner in the neighborhood, spearheaded a 
movement to ‘stabilize’ the racial ratio of the community.  Lynch wanted to achieve a ten 
percent black population in all of Long Island’s suburbs, based on a rough national percentage of 
African Americans, and together with local white residents formed The Emergency Committee 
for a Stabilized Democratic Community. Lynch and the Committee first asked Morris Milgrim, 
the interracial private housing developer, for advice.  Milgrim suggested the Committee steer 
sales towards whites.  The Committee had difficulty finding white buyers for the neighborhood’s 
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high prices.80   When black real estate brokers continued to show homes to black buyers, the 
Committee launched the “Freedom Dwellers” campaign in 1961, which actively discouraged 
further black home purchases in the hamlet.  Lynch and other committee members barricaded 
roads and deterred minority buyers with signs like “Negroes! This community could become 
another Ghetto,” and “you owe it to your family to buy in another community.”81  Integration in 
this case extended beyond ‘open housing,’ pushing black buyers to become ‘pioneers’ in white 
neighborhoods themselves and reach an even quota across the metropolitan area.  Similar efforts 
emerged in other neighborhoods in the early 1960s.  In Hempstead, the interracial Hempstead 
Neighbors Committee went after supposed ‘blockbusters,’ picketing offending realty offices, 
persuading white sellers to remove their homes from the market, and investigating the origins of 
rumors they believed fomented white fears.82 
 In no other fight were the efforts of the NAACP’s national office, activism of local 
branches, and interests of black homeowners more aligned than school segregation.  Segregation 
was legal in New York State until 1938, and in Freeport, Hempstead, and Glen Cove, separate 
black elementary schools existed, though each fed into larger integrated high schools.  After 
World War II however, all-in-one neighborhood school districts proliferated, where students 
stayed within a district from the kindergarten through the twelfth-grade.  With over a hundred 
districts across Long Island, all funded locally through property taxes, one’s choice in housing 
was strongly tied to schools. As Jack Dougherty argues, school districts and developers were 
aware of the school-housing link.  The former designed special programs to attract residents and 
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carefully zoned its school boundaries for certain populations, while the latter advertised and 
attracted homebuyers to these school districts.  In effect, shopping for a suburban home was also 
‘shopping for schools.’83 
As black homeowners arrived on Long Island, their own search for schools confronted 
the reality of both housing and school segregation.  Fortunately, activists could harness the 
national office’s financial and legal clout.84  The challenge was choosing the best strategy to 
integrate schools where both ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ segregation existed.  In 1949, young 
NAACP lawyer Constance Baker Motley successfully desegregated the Hempstead school 
district, distributing black students on the basis of their residence, not their race.85  While a 
victory against overt segregation, the divided housing market nonetheless led to white and black 
schools, which worsened as more African Americans moved to Hempstead.  Challenging the 
‘neighborhood’ concept of schools as a source of discrimination proved difficult.  In the 
Amityville School district, which encompassed children of Amityville village, North Amityville, 
and East Massapequa, two new elementary school sites were proposed in 1953, one in the 
northeast section of North Amityville, where Ronek Park and other black suburban 
developments were built, and another in the majority-white northwest part of the district in East 
Massapequa. The two schools, while meeting the need for new school buildings, were 
gerrymandered to be racially separate.86  The Central Long Island NAACP sued the district in 
1956, though lost because the courts adopted the housing market argument, stating that the 
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school board did not have to gerrymander lines to achieve a racial balance “because of the 
incidence of location.”87 
Activists had more success in the 1960s, thanks to deeper involvement of local 
homeowners who adopted direct confrontation strategies, as well as new court rulings and 
legislative solutions that overcame housing barriers.  The most sensational battle emerged in the 
Malverne school district, which included children from the white and affluent village of 
Malverne as well as the middle class integrated community of Lakeview (along with a small 
sliver of students from Lynbrook).  Of the district’s three elementary schools, Lakeview’s 
Woodfield Road School was overwhelmingly black – seventy-five percent of students were 
African American, compared to the other eighty-eight percent white schools.  Residents with 
children in the Woodfield School complained that the district failed to distribute financial 
resources equally, left the school overcrowded, and therefore denied their children an equal 
education.  The district’s solution was to build another elementary school next to Woodfield, 
though parents voted against it, and then the board planned a sixth grade wing for its junior high 
school, though the wing would be separated by geography, maintaining the racial order of the 
district.  The NAACP challenged all measures, as did activists within the district.  Black 
psychologist and local resident Dr. Lloyd Delany unsuccessfully ran for school board in spring 
1962, and that same year Lincoln Lynch, the architect of Lakeview’s ‘neighborhood stability’ 
movement, along with other parents picketed school board meetings with signs reading “Equal 
Education for All Children” and “Separate Cannot Be Equal.”  Lynch then staged what was 
considered Long Island’s first sit-in at a school board meeting in August, demanding the district 
																																																						
87 “Bulletin - January 1958,” Branch Newsletters and Printed Material 1956-1965, Part 25, Series C, reel 6, slide 
150, Papers of the NAACP; Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, 182; Untitled paper, Legal Department Case Files, 1956-




rectify ‘de facto’ segregation and distribute students evenly across all schools.88  The already 
politicized housing situation in Lakeview now reached the schools, and a tension emerged 
between militant school integrationists and the desire to keep a balanced interracial population, 
particularly as the non-engaged white community disagreed with the confrontational tactics of 
Lynch and his allies.89  
The protests forced New York State Education Commissioner James E. Allen Jr. to 
intervene.  Allen appointed Dr. Kenneth Clark and other prominent academics to study the 
Malverne school issue.  Ironically, the committee found the school’s education to be on par with 
the other elementary schools and excellent in all regards, despite its racial imbalance.90  
Nonetheless, Commissioner Allen implemented the ‘Princeton Plan’ in 1963 (splitting 
elementary schools by grade rather than neighborhood to achieve integration) because the 
segregated school “interferes with the achievement of equality of educational opportunity.”91  
The school board and a contingent of white parents refused to comply, and a nasty four-year 
battle ensued in the courts, state legislature, and streets.  White parents and the school board 
sought a restraining order to delay the plans and denied funds for new crosswalks and buses.  
The NAACP meanwhile went to court to assure the Princeton Plan’s implementation.  Both sides 
resorted to sit-ins and protests.  Five black parents, including Lincoln Lynch, were arrested after 
refusing to leave a school board meeting in 1963, while nine white women were arrested in 1966 
after climbing onto vans filled with desks in preparation for integration.  The Princeton Plan did 
not begin until 1967.  
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Malverne was the highest profile school segregation case, though one of many across 
Long Island’s districts.  From Manhasset in western Nassau County to Bellport on Suffolk 
County’s south shore, black parents demanded integrated schools, a national goal of the civil 
rights movement refracted through the local politics of schools and housing.  And in Long 
Island’s black middle class hamlets, including Roosevelt, Amityville, Freeport, and Bellport, 
activists successfully desegregated schools in the 1960s after years of litigation, protest, and 
debate over the ideals of integration and its implementation.92 These fights, like the struggle for 
open housing and integrated communities, or the demand for equal treatment from local 
governments, sought parity with white suburbanites. The black middle class was already on “the 
stony road toward advancement” as PCANC member William F. Oliver put it, though Long 
Island’s segregated landscape still produced inequities, even if there was no “aggravated 
injustice” or “sensationalistic situation.”  Oliver laid out what remained in the middle-class fight 
to his fellow PCANC members in New Cassel in 1961, asking: 
 “is there no local current situation when housing opportunities fosters segregation, 
when mothers fear for the quality of the education in neighborhood schools, when 
feelings of “step child” treatment results when area improvements are decided 
upon?”93 
While Oliver listed these concerns to remind civic association members of remaining 
challenges, it spoke as much to the achievements reached by the 1960s.  A vigilant movement 





92 “Negroes Sit In at Four LI Schools; Cops Arrest Five at Malverne,” Newsday, September 4, 1963; “NAACP Tells 
Allen:  Schools in Bellport are Unbalanced,” Newsday, October 15, 1966; “Bellport Schools Choose Racial Balance 
Program,” Newsday, July 24, 1968. 




“Destined for Redevelopment” 
As the black middle class bought homes, formed neighborhoods, and agitated for racial 
equality in suburbia, the black poor faced qualitatively distinct problems: homes unfit for 
habitation, few options outside concentrated low-income neighborhoods, overcrowding, and high 
prices.  Though the activities of black homeowners made occasional headlines, the plight of the 
black poor was of central concern to postwar suburbanites and suburban government, viewed 
through the lens of ‘blight.’  As Amanda Seligman argues, ‘blight’ “connoted a type of physical 
decay with organic qualities,” that overcrowded or dilapidated housing was bad for the people 
living in it and could spread to nearby properties, engulfing whole neighborhoods into a spiral of 
lower property values, poor health, and moral decay.94  There was widespread panic of ‘blight’ in 
the suburbs, as those moving from urban areas wanted to thwart the processes they believed 
responsible for urban decay.  Robert Moses warned Long Islanders that without proper planning, 
“you are going to have suburban slums as sure as God made little apples.”95 Newsday journalists 
noted in 1957 that “nothing seems to arouse quite the controversy among Nassau’s residents as 
the subject of slums.”96 Since the African American poor disproportionately inhabited decrepit 
housing stock on Long Island, and because black skin itself was associated with ‘blight’ 
generally, suburban officials targeted poor black neighborhoods as the ‘cancer’ to a stable and 
slum-free Long Island.  They wanted a “complete break from the past,” remaking outdated 
neighborhoods and integrating them into the vast expanse of industrial suburbia.97   
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Black middle class activists, including the NAACP, their white allies, local civic 
associations, and residents themselves were part of this debate.  All supported efforts to improve 
housing, though they were also concerned about affected residents.  The poor wanted better 
housing and input.  Civic associations wanted to protect property values as low-income housing 
was remade.  Civil rights activists wanted to address racial segregation, even though these 
problems were as much a product of poverty and class inequality as racism in housing.  The 
overlapping interests evolved into conflict as projects to eradicate blight got underway.  Urban 
historians interpret the efforts to clean up ‘blight’ as failures and detrimental to the people 
affected, as ‘negro removal’ both in purpose and outcome.  Andrew Wiese argues that Long 
Island’s suburban renewal was a form of suburban ‘racial cleansing,’ as “white Long Islanders 
sought… not only to exclude African Americans but to displace many who were already 
there.”98  While planners and politicians were surely reforming the ‘racial geography’ of Long 
Island, this reductionist interpretation ignores the complex intentions, goals, and outcomes of 
such efforts from all actors involved.99 Most, including the poor, were supportive of improved 
housing, but the process and the outcomes produced conflict. 
Suburban officials had three primary means to improve housing stock in postwar Long 
Island:  public housing, code enforcement and condemnation, and urban renewal.  Public 
housing, first possible in 1934 thanks to state legislation that permitted local municipalities to 
construct low-income housing, gained momentum during and after World War II.100  The 
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NAACP and League of Women Voters were strong advocates of these projects, but faced stiff 
opposition, driven by the same fears and anxieties of the pre-war period – attracting additional 
poor residents, concentrating poverty within their hamlets, and raising local taxes.  In Freeport, 
the Nassau County branch of the NAACP lent its hand to the long-standing efforts to replace the 
Bennington Park slum with public housing in 1943.  In 1946, Village voters struck down the 
project in fear of rising taxes and attracting new poor to Freeport.101  The League of Women 
Voters in Port Washington and local clergymen had more success, compelling the Town of 
North Hempstead to form a town-wide housing authority in 1946.  The authority planned a low-
rent project along Harbor Road, but local property owners sued the Town for destroying land 
values and building housing that “does not belong on tree-lined suburban Port Washington 
Boulevard.”  But supporters won in State Supreme Court, and the project was completed in 
1951.102  Port Washington’s ‘Harbor Homes’ was one of three New York state-sponsored 
housing complexes that replaced slum housing on Long Island’s North Shore by 1958, including 
the domestic enclaves of Manhasset (Spinney Hill) and Roslyn (Laurel Homes), 236 units in 
all.103  This was in addition to the Village of Hempstead’s eighty-one unit ‘Parkside Gardens’ 
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complex completed in 1951, and Freeport’s Moxey Rigby homes that finally replaced parts of 
the Bennington Park area, opened in 1958.104  
Though public housing replaced ‘blight’ with sleek apartments, it solidified the low-
income status of the area where it was built, necessitated state approval and intervention, 
required local taxpayers to share maintenance costs with the state, was constructed within 
wealthy hamlets with declining unskilled job opportunities, and faced nationwide opposition by 
the late 1950s.105  As a result, public housing was rare on Long Island; by 1965, only 658 family 
units were available in Nassau County, and none existed in Suffolk.106  In contrast, housing code 
enforcement was locally implemented and did not require long-term taxes to house the poor.  It 
was also popular, “taking the profit out of human misery” by attacking ‘slumlords’ considered 
responsible for the deplorable conditions.107  In reality though, few local governments had the 
power to condemn; only one of Long Island’s thirteen large towns developed ‘housing’ codes, 
distinct from zoning and building codes because they could be imposed after construction.108  
Villages and cities, particularly in Nassau County, were more likely to both develop and enforce 
housing codes.109  In 1955, the village mayors of Freeport and Glen Cove met with the New 
York State Rent Commission to plan a joint attack on slum landlords, using the combined 
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powers of the state and local government to withhold rent, inspect, and condemn.  Similar efforts 
were done in the city of Long Beach.110   
Housing activists were torn by code enforcement.  On one hand, they supported better 
housing quality for Long Island’s poor and supported the state’s interest in ending landlord 
exploitation.  On the other, they felt local government disregarded what would happen to tenants 
and ignored housing segregation.  In September 1955, Glen Cove’s city government condemned 
one of the Cecil Avenue slum buildings along Glen Cove Avenue.  Forty-three adults and sixty-
eight children, all black, faced eviction.  NAACP New York State Housing Chairman Laska 
Strachan, along with the Glen Cove NAACP branch and NAACP attorney Jawn Sandifer, 
demanded Glen Cove Mayor Joseph Stanco relocate the families, but Mayor Stanco refused, 
stating it was not his responsibility.  The NAACP then turned to the courts to delay the eviction.  
Since the building was only two years old, it had clearly slipped under the city’s building codes, 
representing a failure of the city to enforce its laws.  But the NAACP went further, blaming the 
housing conditions on the people of Glen Cove for endorsing housing segregation, since “the 
residents of that building would not be in that condemned house if there was a free housing 
market.”  The point fell on deaf ears, though the NAACP secured an extra sixty days for tenants 
and arranged for the Long Island Home Builders Institute, a building industry trade group, to 
purchase and bring the building up to code.  Tenants were then allowed to return.111   
The danger of code enforcement was eviction, eradicating ‘blight’ without a clear 
template for what would happen to the tenants, though activists could intervene to steer 
condemnation toward humane ends.  This was less true of urban renewal projects, where the 
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factions invested in remaking poor neighborhoods greatly overpowered critical voices.112  Born 
from the Housing Act of 1949 and the 1954 amendments, ‘urban renewal’ was the most 
comprehensive answer to the problem of postwar suburban slums.  Federal authorization and 
funding gave local governments the ability to take slum clearance and redevelopment into their 
own hands.  Urban renewal also incorporated private developers, limiting public costs and 
attracting private capital to blighted areas.  Renewal offered more than better housing; it 
promised to turn depressed land into commercially viable property for retail or industrial 
purposes, increasing tax revenues and providing property tax relief.  This is why urban renewal 
attracted such broad support, including planners, labor unions, business and commercial 
interests, housing advocates, and even tenants.113  These factors led to a flurry of proposals in the 
late 1950s across Long Island, what the New York Times described as a “ferment of suburban 
renewal on a scale that was never before possible.”114 As a Newsday article argued in 1957, the 
major difference between Long Island’s poor communities and the rest of the island was that 
places like “Levittown started life with a clean slate…they had no inheritance from the past.”115 
Erasing the outmoded vestiges of the estate and agricultural past and making them conducive to 
a single-family oriented, automobile dependent, industrial park and mall-dominated landscape 
was the goal.  Where the residents fit was only part of the equation.  
This is not to say that residents’ needs were ignored; instead, housing and the needs of 
the poor were subsumed into the broader purpose of these projects, which included jobs, 
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commerce, higher tax receipts, and integration into postwar suburbia broadly.  Glen Cove’s 
renewal proposal in 1959 looked to erase the ailing infrastructure of the estate economy, 
including horse-carriage roads, scattered factories, and rundown domestic enclaves.  If residents 
supported the construction of industrial parks, a “miracle mile” commercial shopping district, 
and new multi-family housing units, “better living and working conditions are ours.”116  In the 
Village of Freeport, slum clearance and a new industrial park was not only as a boon to the local 
job market, but could expand public services without raising costs thanks to more valuable 
property for tax purposes.117  The jobs and services were never directly reserved for local 
residents, but the benefits would trickle down to them nonetheless because the space itself would 
be integrated into the broader postwar economy. It was this logic that undergirded New York 
State Housing Commissioner James W. Gaynor’s convertible public housing/middle-income 
coop project in Glen Cove, designed so that tenants could convert their subsidized low-income 
apartment to a middle-income cooperative as their wages rose.  As he argued, the wealth 
distribution in American society was no longer a pyramid, but a diamond, “with the bottom 
representing the low-income group and the wide center the middle income level.”  Postwar 
suburbia offered mass upward mobility, and poor housing districts were unnecessary as low-
income Americans would benefit from the nation’s egalitarian wealth distribution.118 As Andrew 
Highsmith argues, politicians simply saw ‘blighted’ neighborhoods as obstacles to economic 
growth. 119 These obstacles trapped area residents as well. 
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Fifteen projects were planned across Long Island in 1959, from Inwood in the southwest 
of Nassau County to Patchogue in Suffolk County.120  Four large-scale projects began in 1960, 
affecting an estimated 578 black and 108 white families in the domestic enclaves of Huntington 
Station, Long Beach, Glen Cove, and Rockville Centre.121  They drew support from politicians, 
planners, and private developers, but also from civil rights groups and tenants themselves who 
hoped to benefit from the remodeling of their neighborhoods.122  Their support was contingent 
on three factors, particularly in the case of the NAACP.  First, that adequate relocation and 
affordable housing be made available to affected residents. Second, that housing integration was 
included within the urban renewal project.  And lastly, that tenants and advocacy organizations 
have direct input in the outcomes of the projects themselves.123  
The battle over Rockville Centre’s urban renewal project, which at its outset looked to 
redevelop an area with over 1,100 black residents, illustrates the conflicts that emerged out of the 
process of fixing suburban ‘blight.’ The Village planned to demolish the 36-acre Banks Avenue 
domestic enclave and replace it with competitively-priced suburban single-family homes, 
commercial space, and a large industrial park covering 24 acres.124  The plan received federal 
approval in 1958, and site resident Zeddie Brown contacted the Central Long Island Branch of 
the NAACP “for protection and to get the full benefit of the program.”  Brown hoped to use the 
NAACP’s clout to incorporate affected residents into the renewal process, and in 1959, she was 
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appointed to the urban renewal area’s Citizen’s Advisory Committee, though they only met three 
times.125  In August 1959, the Mid-Village Civic Association analyzed the demographic statistics 
of the village’s renewal application and concluded Rockville Centre government did not provide 
adequate housing for the area’s low-income residents.  The civic association was “fully in accord 
with the Village’s desire” to carry out the renewal project, but wanted the final plan to be “sound 
in conception, fair to the people in the area, and one which will receive full support of all citizens 
of Rockville Centre.”126  
The Central Long Island NAACP also affirmed their support for better housing in a May 
1960 report with qualifications.  The report asked whether displaced residents would receive 
temporary housing, whether owners would get full market value for their property, and whether 
affordable housing would be included in the renewal project.  In addition, the NAACP added 
their own long-standing fight against housing segregation, that without ‘special attention’ to this 
issue, the urban renewal program would eliminate the black population, leaving Rockville Centre 
virtually ‘all-white.’127  Calls for integration contrasted with the immediate need for affordable 
housing, which could not be met in the nearby private housing market. The NAACP surveyed 67 
families, and determined that 54 made too little to own an FHA home.  Only thirteen could and 
wanted to purchase homes in the urban renewal area, while most needed affordable rental 
units.128  Though segregation limited housing choice, so too did the low-incomes of these 
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residents, who were unable to remain in the area given the high cost of housing elsewhere in the 
village and the demolition of cheap units.   
The village balked at the NAACP’s demands, promising only sixteen families affordable 
housing.129  With federal funding involved, NAACP housing director Jack Wood filed 
complaints with the federal Urban Renewal Administration, New York State Division of 
Housing, and State Commission against Discrimination (SCAD) to halt all four of Long Island’s 
renewal projects in November 1961.  In December, the NAACP staged three simultaneous 
demonstrations at the Glen Cove, Long Beach, and Rockville Centre renewal sites, condemning 
the projects as “racial relocation with federal funds” and for forcing black residents to be “driven 
out” to make way for “a shopping center & high-cost housing.”130  The NAACP still supported 
urban renewal generally, and Dr. Eugene Reed claimed the demonstrations “showed the concern 
of Negro residents for fair urban renewal programs.”131 The protests forced the Village Board to 
capitulate, and in January 1962, they agreed to relocate residents within the area “according to 
what they are able to pay.”  Resident Zeddie Brown, now president of the new Rockville Centre 
chapter of the NAACP, re-affirmed the support for the program though lamented the lack of 
commitment to village-wide open occupancy.132   
Now the problem of relocation came to the fore, as the Village proceeded to condemn 
properties and had difficulty finding accommodations for low-income residents and domestic 
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‘roomers.’  The NAACP suggested the Village shoulder the responsibility of housing roomers 
and directly accept monthly rental payments.133  When the Village followed this route, it 
essentially became ‘slumlords,’ placing low-income tenants in temporary housing in and near the 
renewal area, collecting rent on homes equipped with wood-burning stoves, kerosene heaters, 
and kitchen sinks for bathing.  The village refused to improve housing soon to be demolished.134  
By 1963, these conditions pushed the NAACP to fully oppose Rockville Centre’s urban renewal 
project.  In January, NAACP housing secretary Jack Wood condemned the project for promoting 
both segregation and a ‘negro exodus’ at a local NAACP meeting in Rockville Centre, and in 
February, the organization forced the New York State Division of Housing to withhold funding 
until the village met affordable housing needs and furthered integration.135  Rockville Centre 
Mayor W. Harry Lister was confused about the charges of promoting segregation, arguing that 
“this project doesn’t have anything to do with integration or segregation…the thing is not to 
cause it.”  In his mind, the goal was simply to rehabilitate a blighted area.  The NAACP’s 
demands to integrate was an added requirement, difficult to meet given the village’s expensive 
housing market.  Prioritizing the residents could secure housing, but would end up with another 
segregated enclave.136   
By March 1964, the Village promised a new 164-unit mixed middle and low-income 
complex.137  The accusations of segregation and ‘negro removal’ remained unresolved, and as 
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the Village continued to condemn properties and house low-income residents in the remaining 
dilapidated dwellings, conflict between the Village and residents escalated.  In October, Mayor 
Lister listened to criticisms from over 100 opponents at a village board meeting and kicked 
Richard Stimpfl, who denounced the whole project for building a ‘ghetto’ for African Americans 
looking to escape, out of the meeting.138  When residents complained of primitive temporary 
housing accommodations, Urban Renewal director Howard Snell defended these conditions 
because the residents were “used to living that way.”  Their demands for modern amenities were 
uncalled for because these houses “have been rented for many years as cold water flats… [and] 
we have apartments that do not include bathroom facilities in the apartments and this is now 
being demanded.”139 Anecdotal evidence corroborated accusations of racism.  When Mary 
Flower Thomas approached Mr. Snell about new housing for her family, she was told to leave 
Rockville Centre, and when William Osborne asked Mr. Snell whether urban renewal would 
attract new black residents, Snell responded that the village was trying to get them out.140   
By 1965, tenants, with support from the NAACP and CORE, began a series of marches, 
sit-ins, and other demonstrations to force the Village to improve temporary housing conditions, 
immediately begin construction in the renewal project, and fire the renewal authority 
members.141  The Village responded with a timetable for construction beginning in February 
1966, though did not promise action on the housing conditions, and at a meeting in October, 
Zoning Appeals Board chairman Robert Sasseen slapped tenant-activist Alfreda Brown in the 
face after an altercation instigated by a racial epithet Sasseen hurled at Brown.  Demonstrations 
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followed the incident, and when the Village delayed the start of the building project in 1966, the 
Rockville Centre Tenants Association staged a ‘dig-in,’ an unofficial groundbreaking 
ceremony.142 
After seven years, seven revisions, a dozen protests, and countless meetings, Rockville 
Centre’s project began.  The process was particularly ugly in this instance, and clearly racism 
was deeply intertwined in the drawn-out debates over renewal, particularly as the Village 
opposed the demands of residents and the NAACP.  Numerous organizations condemned the 
racism and manipulation of the local residents “to secure the benefits of added wealth to the 
Village through a twist of the federal Law” as the Catholic Commission on Interracial Affairs 
concluded.  A Nassau County investigation reported that the village emphasized “the economic 
and legal aspects of urban renewal… [with an] almost complete disregard of the human problems 
involved.”143  But for urban renewal supporters, in Rockville Centre and elsewhere, the 
‘economic and legal aspects of urban renewal’ were not divorced from the human problems; the 
former would improve prospects for the latter.  This was true of all anti-blight strategies.  Public 
housing, code condemnation, and urban renewal all aimed for ‘integration’ of housing to meet 
postwar standards and incorporate poor neighborhoods into postwar industrial suburbia.  Civil 
rights groups, while supportive of the opportunity for better housing, nonetheless wanted 
‘integration’ in a different sense; open occupancy to break down the concentration of poor black 
Long Islanders into the most decrepit and oldest housing stock in the region.  The former 
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understood blight as the obstacle to civic progress; the latter viewed blight as the consequence of 
racist housing policy.   
While the controversies surrounding these projects drew the most attention, it was the 
slow process of condemnation, renewal, and affordable housing construction that left residents 
uncertain of their current living conditions and future homes.  For all the fanfare, the “glacier-
like progress of urban renewal” and the focus on spatial redevelopment offered little to displaced 
residents except destroyed homes.  Alexander Clifford Johnson, a young cook who had left 
Freeport’s Bennington Park during its decades-long renewal process, concluded that “urban 
renewal is a lot of bull shit…you can’t eat salvation.”144  Affected residents generally agreed 
with his sentiments, because only determined residents waited out these public projects; the rest 
left, producing the outcome of ‘Negro removal’ regardless of the project’s intent.  Rockville 
Centre’s black population dropped by a third from 1960-1965, while the urban renewal office in 
Glen Cove estimated that the city lost twenty percent of its black population living within the 
renewal area’s boundaries.  Overall, former domestic enclaves lost black residents from 1960-
1970 as Nassau County’s black population grew by two-thirds.  Inwood lost a quarter of its black 
population, Rockville Centre’s dropped by a fifth, Manhasset lost seventeen percent, and Glen 
Cove’s black population dropped fourteen percent.145  Since developers demolished more than 
700 substandard dwellings and only 303 units of housing replaced them by 1969, such loses are 
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Class vs. Class 
 The goal of fighting ‘blight’ was to prevent suburban slums on Long Island, but while 
substandard housing was demolished, the poor remained.  As a study on Suffolk’s code 
enforcement and relocation policies concluded, “the problem is being moved, not removed.”147  
The poor continued to reside on Long Island, joined by new low-income African American 
migrants from the South and the five boroughs.  As the older domestic and agricultural laborer 
enclaves were bulldozed and remade, the problem of affordable housing only grew more acute in 
the 1960s, further limiting housing choice in the affluent suburban market.  Low-income housing 
demand nonetheless offered opportunities for profit, and racial segregation, along with the class 
divide among the region’s suburbs, provided the cracks within the residential market to meet 
poor black housing needs.   
Long Island’s most affordable postwar suburbs, including its integrated and thriving 
black hamlets, were the destinations for most of the new black suburbanites in the 1960s, 
including the black poor.  Racial concentration intensified during the decade. Among Nassau 
County’s ninety-four neighborhoods, over eighty-percent of African Americans resided in just 
thirteen communities by 1970, a jump from two-thirds a decade prior.  In Suffolk, only a third of 
African Americans resided in the five largest black neighborhoods in 1960.  A decade later, that 
concentration rose to sixty percent.148  Among these migrants were refugees from urban renewal 
and condemnation projects.  From Rockville Centre alone, a survey of sixty-seven renewal area 
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residents found that fifty-four relocated within Nassau County’s five largest black hamlets:  
Hempstead, Freeport, Roosevelt, Lakeview, and New Cassel.149  In Suffolk’s wide rural expanse, 
the condemnation of dilapidated housing in Riverhead pushed families out to other largely black 
enclaves within the Town of Riverhead, Brookhaven, and Southampton, including suburban 
North Bellport.150   
These postwar communities, constructed within the suburban boom for an FHA-qualified 
middle class constituency, were formerly closed off to low-income residents, save the few pre-
existing affordable units that zoned these neighborhoods safe for black FHA housing.  But 
amidst racial transition, ‘blockbusters’ not only profited from the wedge between the ‘dual’ 
black-and-white housing market, but used segregation to make low-income housing enclaves in 
middle class suburbs.  The actions of real estate ‘blockbusters’ in the postwar period, striking 
fear into white homeowners of black neighbors to induce quick sales which were then flipped to 
prospective black buyers at inflated prices, is well documented.151  As Amanda Seligman argues, 
the controversy surrounding ‘blockbusting’ was as much about the fears associated with rapid 
racial change as it was the actual tactics blockbusters used.  Some realtors condemned as 
‘blockbusters’ were opening opportunities for aspiring black homeowners in a market with 
limited supply, and not necessarily acting in an unscrupulous manner.  Most importantly, 
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blockbusting was impossible without the larger structural context: a racially divided housing 
market where homogeneity was critical to an investment’s security.152  
A similar dynamic occurred to meet low-income housing demand, though rather than 
realtors purchasing homes to flip at inflated costs, it was primarily speculators in search of rental 
income who turned FHA single-family homes into low-income living quarters.  The process 
remains more elusive than racial blockbusting.  In Nassau County and western Suffolk, from 
New Cassel and Roosevelt to North Amityville and Wyandanch, speculators posed as real estate 
brokers, buying up homes from both white and black owners, splitting the rooms between 
multiple families, and collecting rental checks.  Enterprising homeowners joined the speculators, 
putting up walls in their basements, building makeshift dormers, and renting out spare rooms to 
low-income tenants, adding multiple families to their single-family homes or acting as absentee 
landlords.153  While some homeowners profited from rental housing demand, others were 
desperately holding onto properties as local costs rose. As a New Cassel civic leader explained 
the process in her hamlet: 
Here were, in many cases, hard pressed non-whites, running to get away from slums 
and ghettoes…They wanted them to have a place to grow and enjoy living.  They 
came. Taxes skyrocketed and their income was not commensurate.  The children 
grew up and moved on their own and the homeowner takes in roomers at $20, $25 
a week.  Suddenly, the first hint of crabgrass suburbs, absentee landlords and all.154 
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Cash-strapped homeowners put their main asset to work so they could sustain a 
livelihood in suburbia.  In addition, high rents encouraged tenants to sub-lease their 
rentals to boarders, contributing to overcrowding in illegally rented housing.155 
In eastern Suffolk County, a spate of foreclosures attracted investors who bought up 
affordable single family homes for the low-income market. In the tiny hamlet of North Bellport 
along Suffolk’s south shore, developers constructed a half-dozen subdivisions catering to white 
blue-collar employees of a local Republic Aviation plant.  When the plant closed in 1957 during 
defense cutbacks, foreclosures and quick sales attracted speculators, who bought homes below 
original selling price.  By 1964, twelve percent of single-family houses were renter-occupied, 
and sixty-seven percent of those occupants were African American, while only ten percent of 
homeowners were black.156  To the west in Central Islip, a small cheaply-built subdivision of 320 
homes named ‘Carleton Park’ offered some of the most affordable FHA-approved homes in the 
county during the 1950s, twenty-five percent cheaper than Levittown.157  Mostly white in the 
1950s with a small number of black homeowners, blockbusters exploited a small foreclosure 
crisis in the 1960s.  By 1965, seventy homes were vacant, and a local civic association report 
revealed that four holding companies, the FHA, and VA held title to ninety-one houses, almost a 
third of the development.  High school principal James Northrup began buying up the mortgages 
that same year, renovating the homes for people he described as desperate for “anything with a 
roof and four walls.”  With 196 homes in his name, Northrup rented the houses to low-income 
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families, netting over $1,000,000 by 1969.158  Whether in Nassau or Suffolk, these were simply 
new rooming houses, constructed in a Levitt-style Cape Cod or ranch rather than a turn-of-the-
century Victorian or colonial houses.  
Race and class blockbusting ultimately met the housing needs of the black poor and 
middle class in the same suburbs.  As Table 3.1 indicates, Long Island’s postwar black suburbs, 
along with some of its former white hamlets and Freeport, one its largest black domestic 
neighborhoods, all experienced growth in both their black middle class and low-income 
populations. Though only six percent of Long Island’s families lived in Freeport, Roosevelt, 
Hempstead, New Cassel, Lakeview, North Amityville, Wyandanch, Central Islip, and North 
Bellport, the rate of families in poverty residing in these communities was thirteen percent in 
1969.  And nearly sixty percent of all black families lived in these communities, including over 
half of all black families in poverty that same year.159   
For civic associations, NAACP branches, and homeowners, the migration of the poor 
complicated the politics of integration, formerly rooted in the class homogeneity of postwar 
suburbia.  Unlike new black middle class residents who exacerbated segregation but preserved a 
hamlet’s class makeup, the poor posed new economic threats. They jeopardized property values, 
suburbanites’ largest investment.  On a larger scale, the poor signaled to the FHA that the 
neighborhood was now an insurance risk, and in the worst cases, like Central Islip’s Carleton 
Park, the FHA and VA refused to authorize mortgages in the area.  Such an outcome wrote the 
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entire community out of the postwar mortgage market.160  More importantly, within Long 
Island’s balkanized taxing jurisdictions, the quality of public services rested on the property 
taxes of local neighborhoods, costs borne by a small number of homeowners rather than the 
																																																						





Table 3.1: Income Distribution Changes, Black Population, and Poverty rates in Long Island’s 
Black Suburbs, 1960-1970 
Nassau County 
 Freeport Roosevelt Hempstead 
 1960 1970 1960 1970 1960 1970 
Black Population 2,407 7,467 2,241 10,135 7,594 14,111 
Proportion (%) 7 18.5 17.4 67.5 21.9 35.8 
Incomes       
Total Families 8,960 10,296 3,262 3,321 9,127 9,867 
50% or less CMI1 1,336 1,879 511 902 1,396 2,156 
% of total families 15 18 16 27 15 22 
70% or more CMI1 6,212 6,735 2,033 1,914 6,058 5,893 
% of total families 69 65 62 58 66 60 
 New Cassel Lakeview   
 1960 1970 1960 1970   
Black Population 2,693 5,355 2,509 4,495   
Proportion (%) 35.6 61.4 52 82.2   
Incomes       
Total Families 1,865 1,983 1,837 1,235   
50% or less CMI1 276 434 248 332   
% of total families 15 22 14 27   
70% or more CMI1 1,164 1,264 1,187 701   
% of total families 62 64 65 57   
Suffolk County       
 North Amityville Wyandanch2   
 1960 1970 1960 1970   
Black Population 6,350 7,768 2,193 6,371   
Proportion 75.9 65.1 59.2 86.2   
Incomes       
Total Families 1,854 2,724 847 1,619   
50% or less CMI3 354 510 80 316   
% of total families 19 19 9 20   
75% or more CMI3 1,072 1,494 549 865   
% of total families 58 55 65 53   
Source:  Cavaioli, 16-17; Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, U.S. Census ’70: Volume 1: Number of 
Inhabitants (Hauppauge, NY: Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1971), 7-25; U.S. Census Bureau, 
Family Income, 1960. Prepared by Social Explorer, 
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1960TractDS/R11104505 (accessed May 6, 2015); See U.S. Census 
Bureau, Family Income, 1970. Prepared by Social Explorer, 
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1970/R11104508 (accessed May 6, 2015). 
1 CMI stands for ‘County Median Income.’ Income brackets are inexact in Census records, so ‘50% or less CMI’ 
are those Nassau families making below 47% of the CMI in 1960 and 47.8% in 1970.  ‘70% or more CMI’ are 
those families making at least 70.4% of the CMI in 1960 and 68.3% in 1970. 
2 Wyandanch’s accepted borders were incongruous with census tract borders in 1960 and 1970.  I used the 
hamlet’s most populous tract, and the tract with the largest black population.  This is tract BA-25 in 1960 and 
1225 in 1970. 
3 ‘50% or less CMI’ are those Suffolk families making below 44% of CMI in 1960 and 41.4% in 1970. This is an 
underestimate of the growth in families below half the county median for Suffolk County.  ‘70% or more CMI’ 




broad swath of the suburban population.  No institution felt the pain of locally bounded funding 
more acutely than school districts, the most local form of government and costliest element of 
suburban homeownership.  A school district’s property tax rate varied depending on the 
proportion of assorted revenue streams (residential, commercial, industrial, or exempted 
property), versus the costs of educating resident students.  Families with multiple children, 
lower-income students, and students with disabilities used more services than they paid in taxes, 
and the rest of the community shouldered the expense. Illegal rentals added families without 
contributing taxes.  Industrial and commercial property meanwhile provided revenue at no cost 
to school districts, though these land-uses were unevenly distributed across suburbia.  What 
emerged were higher-cost educational systems among lower-income suburbs, and when those 
suburbs did not have lucrative industrial or commercial property within their borders, the burden 
of sustaining the school system rested on residents living within the school district who were less 
able to support the costs of educating their children and neighbors.  With multiple families 
moving into single-family homes, schools became strained, physically and fiscally.161  
Affected homeowners mobilized all the strategies available to fight these changes, most 
of which were familiar from earlier civil rights and anti-blight efforts: stabilizing housing 
integration, enforcing housing or building codes, and demanding local authorities redress the 
problem.  Class dynamics complicated these tactics.  Stabilizing integration was the least 
effective tool, since it was predicated on the belief that the arrival of black residents alone was 
responsible for white flight, and that addressing private actions of realtors and homeowners 
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could thwart the exodus.  This was apparent in Roosevelt, where white and black homeowners 
formed the United Organization of Roosevelt, a collection of homeowner groups fighting to 
maintain a 60/40 black-white ratio and prevent further ‘inverse segregation’ as its leader Morton 
Decker described the process.162  This was a typical response to racial transition, particularly 
from whites, who looked to stabilize communities and halt ‘white flight’ by keeping whites in 
and blacks out, policing the buying and selling behaviors of their neighbors and the actions of 
local real estate agents.163  The problem was that homeowners were selling for reasons beyond 
the color of new residents’ skin.  At a fiery meeting in 1966, 150 white and black Roosevelt 
residents argued for several hours about whether it was simply the arrival of black residents, 
school integration, or “the growth of the blighted area on the south end” that scared white 
homeowners.164  PCANC, New Cassel’s black civic association, and the Westbury branch of the 
NAACP were not as confused about the motivations of white flight: it was the poor driving out 
whites and turning the hamlet into an all-black neighborhood.165   
Homeowners also demanded local government do something to redress the arrival of the 
poor, particularly state placement of welfare recipients in these hamlets.  Though a tiny 
proportion of the population, indigent residents nonetheless faced strong opposition, partly a 
reflection of the national backlash against ADC recipients in the 1960s, but also because they 
were the most visceral reminder of downward neighborhood trajectory.166  Both Nassau and 
Suffolk counties left recipients to the market for housing.  Welfare recipients in search of cheap 
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housing navigated Long Island’s middle-class landscape using friends and relatives tied to 
landlords who accepted state-subsidized rental checks.  With high rental costs, welfare recipients 
were a profitable source of passive income for cunning homeowners and speculators, and the 
housing market fissures along racial and class lines in North Amityville, Wyandanch, Central 
Islip, and North Bellport in Suffolk, along with New Cassel, Freeport, and Roosevelt in Nassau 
County enabled publicly-assisted housing to emerge within middle-class suburbia.167  
 Residents alleged that the counties were colluding with landlords and concentrating the 
welfare population within their hamlets, called ‘welfare dumping,’ and they associated the 
problems of the community directly with the residents receiving public assistance.  In Central 
Islip, homeowners complained that there were “too many welfare people who do as they please,” 
leaving garbage and leading the area “down the sewer.”168  At a meeting about welfare housing 
in Roosevelt, Town of Hempstead Buildings Commissioner Matthew Russo argued that “the 
middle-class taxpayer is being destroyed by the thing he supports – welfare recipients who come 
in and wreck the most precious thing he has, his neighborhood and his home.”  While “these 
unfortunate people must have housing,” declared United Organizations of Roosevelt chairman 
Morton Decker, “it is unfair to put large numbers of welfare recipients into one community.”  In 
New Cassel, PCANC blamed the Nassau County welfare department for ‘white flight’ because 
they permitted “welfare recipients [to] overrun our once-quiet residential neighborhood and have 
it downgraded with lawless acts.”169 The county welfare departments denied any wrongdoing 
because they played no role in placing welfare families in any specific community, and in New 
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Cassel, Nassau Welfare Commissioner Joseph Barbaro countered PCANC’s accusation of 
‘welfare dumping’ with statistics showing that as of 1966, all but 32 of 315 welfare cases in the 
hamlet were already residing in New Cassel when they applied for assistance.170  In addition, 
home relief was only a fraction of the total welfare cases.  In a 1967 survey of welfare recipients 
in Roosevelt, less than a fifth of 576 cases were rental subsidies.  The majority were Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cases, and further proved the ‘indigenous’ nature of 
welfare applications rather than deliberate welfare placements.171  The concentration of welfare 
recipients in these communities was a reflection of both segregation and disproportionate black 
poverty, not the actions of the welfare departments, though the public subsidies flowing through 
these hamlets nonetheless produced a distinct and concentrated housing market, and the welfare 
departments did little to curb this process. 
Civic associations, taxpayer organizations, and civil rights organizations urged county 
and town governments to rectify the concentration of recipients.  Eugene T. Reed, state 
president of the NAACP in 1966, wanted the county departments to house recipients on an 
“open occupancy” basis to avoid racial segregation, though both county welfare department 
chiefs argued that the problem was the dearth of affordable housing itself, which limited 
housing choice for the poor broadly.172  Local homeowner groups pressured town and county 
governments to withhold welfare payments and fine slumlords for illegal multi-family 
dwellings and dilapidated conditions.  County and town governments had different powers to 
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act against welfare concentration, since the county cut the checks while towns and villages were 
in charge of zoning and building codes.  
Towns targeted dwellings.  In New Cassel, the Town of North Hempstead sent 800 
letters to houses asking for voluntary compliance of all codes before sending in inspectors. In 
Roosevelt, Town of Hempstead building inspector Matthew Russo sent out a small army of ten 
inspectors to investigate 118 homes, and wrote 15 summonses to landlords for misdemeanors 
and forty-one violation warnings, all in the hopes of thwarting overcrowding (and welfare 
concentration).  While the United Organizations of Roosevelt and homeowners celebrated the 
inspections, an affected landlord felt that he and his tenants had done nothing wrong, that “the 
only crime of this family is that they’re poor and prolific.”173 Efforts like these occurred 
periodically, but ‘warnings’ and voluntary compliance did little to stem the problem.  In reality, 
zoning and code enforcement was selective and reactive, not universal and preventative.  It 
relied on complaints from neighboring residents, and investigations into abuse were time-
consuming for building authorities with over 225,000 housing units within their jurisdiction, 
like the Town of Hempstead.174  
The county welfare departments used their rental payments to exert influence over the 
quality of housing and the destination of recipients.  They withheld rents in units violating 
housing or health codes, an authority given to them under New York State’s Social Welfare 
Law Section 143-b, but understaffed departments only visited recipients a few times a year, 
unable to manage the quick turnover and high demand for housing.175  Nonetheless, counties 
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increased their attention to recipient concentration in the late 1960s.  In 1967, Nassau County 
established a Steering Committee in Roosevelt to explicitly bar welfare recipients and restrict 
applications to ‘qualified Roosevelt residents only.’  From July 1967 through March 1968, the 
committee, working with the welfare department, managed to locate only one recipient in 
Roosevelt, an administrative error.  Despite the heavy regulation, the committee found that 
Roosevelt residents continued to apply for welfare, and the committee had limited control over 
recipients in Roosevelt, who were as likely to be local residents as ‘outsiders.’176  With limited 
housing options and no county-owned public housing, Nassau and Suffolk resorted to motels to 
avoid the outcry of ‘welfare dumping’ and the explosive politics of welfare placement 
altogether. Initially an emergency measure, motel accommodations became an increasingly 
permanent feature of the two welfare departments, though Nassau’s problems far surpassed that 
of Suffolk County, as Nassau’s motel population climbed to over 300 families in the early 
1970s.  In Nassau County, rent fluctuated between $500 and $1,000 a family per month, over 
twice the median rent in 1970, all for rooms with overflowing cesspools and vermin 
infestations, but without stoves, refrigerators, laundry machines, or accessible transportation.  
Motel owners were the new slumlords in what became small poverty colonies, while tenants 
were basically prisoners, lacking access to opportunity until the department located real 
housing.177   
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Recipients fought the efforts to limit housing choice.  By 1967, twenty-two welfare 
advocacy organizations were assembled on Long Island, united under into two umbrella 
federations: the Nassau Welfare Tenants Coordinating Committee and the People for Adequate 
Welfare (PAW) in Suffolk.178   They were part of the nationwide tenant advocacy and welfare 
rights movement that reached its peak in the mid to late 1960s, and recipients used these 
organizations to demand adequate housing.  In 1967, six welfare recipients staged a sit-in at the 
Nassau County Department of Social Services (formerly the welfare department) for evicting 
them from dilapidated housing and only offering motel accommodations in return.  One of the 
protestors, an African American mother of seven whose husband remained in North Carolina, 
found adequate rental housing, though it was above the department’s threshold. The department 
only offered a motel room in exchange.179  Bertha Grissett, an African American mother of five 
children from South Carolina housed in a Westbury motel for $22 a day, found an eight room 
house in Roosevelt for just $185 a month, but Nassau’s welfare department claimed it was too 
expensive.180  That same year, two welfare families sued the Nassau County Social Services 
Department over the department’s steering efforts in Roosevelt, denying recipients housing in 
order to ‘affect the racial balance’ of Roosevelt, thereby infringing upon the fourteenth 
amendment’s equal protection clause and their right to equal housing choice.181   
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Despite the clamor surrounding welfare recipients, they were but a small fraction of the 
new arrivals, and the fight against them was a limited response to the broader racial and class 
transition.  Overall, a socioeconomically diverse population came to inhabit these hamlets.  In 
North Amityville, in the shadow of Ronek Park and other subdivisions, lived unskilled black 
workers in shacks along the remaining dirt roads, or in newly-built rooming houses and 
subdivided basements.  A recently constructed trailer park along the main corridor on Route 110 
was majority white, an enclave of white poor in an otherwise black middle class area.  While 
the middle class drove cars to their jobs and to out-of-town retail centers, black day laborers 
gathered every morning near the Associated Shopping Center at the corner of Albany Avenue 
and Great Neck Road.  They waited in the bid-and-ask market, as pick-up trucks canvassed for 
workers.  Only a handful negotiated a job each day; the rest returned home, or hung out on the 
corner, in the local tavern, or the billiards hall nearby.182   
Tensions mounted between these two classes, and the NAACP branches were caught in 
between their middle class constituencies and the needs of the African American poor.  In New 
Cassel, while spokesmen for the NAACP and other homeowner groups disavowed the claims 
they were anti-welfare, they nonetheless demanded an end to ‘handouts’ and encouragement of 
work and responsibility.  As one resident exclaimed, “we love our people and we help our own, 
but we have to work – some of us some of us at two jobs.  It’s hard but we maintain our 
incentive and we’re aware of our civic responsibilities to our neighbors and community.”  Grace 
Snead, a single mother receiving ADC resented the claim that the poor were irresponsible to the 
community: “They made us feel as though we were animals and worthless and enjoyed or didn’t 
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care about our hardship, when most of us are doing everything we can to help ourselves.”  
Tensions played out in a fight over a strip of taverns that local day laborers and domestics 
frequented along New Cassel’s Prospect Avenue.  In 1966, PCANC and the Westbury Branch 
of the NAACP attacked these ‘lawless’ hangouts and successfully thwarted an attempt to 
expand the neighborhood grill to accommodate new customers.183   
In Wyandanch, the class battle played out in the local school district.  From 1966 to 
1970, the district’s ADC population climbed from forty to sixty-eight percent of all students. 
Local taxpayers bore the costs of these students, paying the eleventh highest school property tax 
rate in Suffolk County (of seventy six total districts) in a hamlet with a poverty rate of ten 
percent.184  The national office of the NAACP, in cooperation with middle-class residents of 
Wyandanch, tried to dissolve the school district altogether and integrate students into the 
surrounding white districts.  This was in line with the longer history of school integration, 
though now inflected with class and fighting the fragmented ‘fiction’ of school district lines that 
imposed real costs on homeowners.  Lower-income residents and the school superintendent 
James Lewis opposed the measure, arguing that the black majority gave parents control over 
their children’s education.  When the State Board of Education denied the request to dissolve 
the district, middle class residents then organized and won a majority on the Wyandanch’s 
Board of Education in 1969.  They cut taxes, eliminated special needs programs, and instituted 
austerity measures.   This drew the ire of Wyandanch’s lower class, who accused the Board and 
their supporters of being ‘Uncle Toms.’185 
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In a few instances, tensions boiled over into outright violence.  As Thomas Sugrue and 
Andrew Goodman note, the riots of the mid to late 1960s were not limited to segregated inner-
city ghettoes, and in 1967 alone, over a quarter of all racial disturbances occurred in towns with 
fewer than 50,000 people.  While these riots were embedded within the national racial politics of 
the period, each had local contexts and local grievances, even if refracted through the Black 
Power movement or the high-profile riots in nearby cities.186  On Long Island, two disturbances 
took place in 1966 and 1967, all within Suffolk County’s black hamlets among young black men 
over unfair police treatment and little opportunity.  In early July 1966, an angry crowd of 400 
attacked Suffolk County police officers in North Amityville, and during a meeting between local 
residents, the Suffolk County Executive, and the County Police Commissioner on July 29th, 
youths began chanting “black power” while a garbage can was hurled through a store window.  
Bottles, rocks, and Molotov cocktails were thrown at police, and it took more than three hours 
and a helmeted force of 300 policemen to restore order.  Police cordoned off a one square mile 
area of the community, and by the end of the evening, nine were arrested as the shopping center 
where the meeting took place, the same center where day laborers awaited work, was locked 
down.187  The next summer in Wyandanch, a small group of youths set a store, two cars, a local 
VFW, and a school auditorium afire over the course of two nights in August, all while hurling 
stones and bottles at police.188   
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Post-disturbance meetings revealed a variety of grievances of community members.  
They included police-community relations, as a number of North Amityville protestors were 
upset at the police’s regular usage of “nigger.”  Protestors and aggrieved youth also wanted 
greater recreational opportunities in both North Amityville and Wyandanch, including parks and 
movie theaters.  In Wyandanch specifically, there were complaints that local markets were 
overcharging African American buyers.  But central to the protests and disturbances was the 
interrelated demand for better housing, public transportation, and jobs.189  As a protestor who 
seized the microphone during the outdoor meeting in North Amityville in July 1966 exclaimed, 
“a Negro has to be a superman to get an ordinary job.”  The inability to reach jobs, the limited 
access to housing, and the lack of good paying jobs themselves, were the major grievances.  And 
while these acts were perpetrated by young men in both communities, local resident and North 
Amityville anti-poverty activist William Larregui summarized the feelings of residents in black 
hamlets generally when, in the wake of the riots, he declared, “we all came out here for one basic 
reason…we felt we could better our circumstances, but we had not been here long before we 
found out that many of the problems which had plagued us before are with us here.”190  
 
Conclusion 
 The story above is familiar, told and re-told in urban histories.  Segregated housing, 
urban renewal, racial transition, blockbusting, class conflict, welfare opposition, and riots roiled 
America’s urban centers as millions of African Americans entered segregated housing markets in 
cities while urbanization spread beyond municipal borders and the state remade urban cores to 
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counter the ‘overdevelopment’ of suburbs.191  Most histories tell this story in American cities, 
but as the chapter makes clear, similar processes were at work in suburbs.  On Long Island, 
public policy constrained black housing choice, urban renewal remade largely black 
neighborhoods, blacks and whites defended and retreated from racial boundaries block by block, 
middle class and poor clashed over housing needs versus community stability, and frustration 
over limited prospects led to rioting, all in what were considered leafy-green suburbs.  The fact 
that similar dynamics were at work in both cities and suburbs speaks to the metropolitan nature 
of segregation, one which crossed municipal boundaries and divided suburbs as much as urban 
neighborhoods.192  The state was central to segregation, because without state support and 
without federal policy influencing local authorities, realtors, and homeowners, more African 
Americans with the economic means to move to the suburbs could have done so.  Even if the 
FHA standards reflected the mass desires of suburbanites, they could not rely on state power to 
compel segregation.  But the development of black middle class neighborhoods and some 
integration across racial lines illustrates that segregation alone did not thwart racial progress; 
disproportionate black poverty and low-incomes did so.  Segregation enabled blockbusters and 
speculators to exploit black, integrated, and affordable white suburban hamlets for poor housing 
opportunity, but this was not possible without the pressure from a disproportionately black poor 
in a housing market dependent on the labor market prosperity of postwar Long Island.  And it 
was the unequal status of African Americans in the regional labor market that compounded the 
effects of segregation, making Long Island’s black suburbs poorer than its white ones.  
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 The housing politics of the 1950s and 1960s, from black middle class integration and 
white neighborhood ‘stability’ efforts, to housing condemnation and urban renewal largely 
operated within an ideology of ‘affluence,’ uncritical of the structure of Long Island’s prosperity.  
Civil rights and black homeowner activism challenged the public policies that racially 
discriminated against African Americans, though they upheld the class hierarchy of postwar 
suburbia, demanding parity within the FHA-standardized housing market.  Groups interested in 
the plight of the poor treated the problems of acute housing shortages and eviction differently, 
viewing integration as the solution, without considering limited incomes.  Local governments 
meanwhile employed anti-blight strategies to clean up slums, the living arrangements of the 
black poor, housing districts unsuited for industrial and FHA-standardized suburbia.  At their 
best, they improved housing at the cost of instability for former residents who put pressure on 
other affordable (or newly affordable) neighborhoods; at their worst, they forcibly removed 
people for the sake of higher property values.  In sum, the anti-blight strategies failed to account 
for the class segregation in the market. 
By the late 1960s, segregation placed the black poor into black middle class enclaves, 
tentatively integrated hamlets, or white neighborhoods with modest homes, illustrating the 
problems of using housing policy to eradicate slums without addressing the low-incomes that 
made exploitation possible.  As single-family housing was split up for multiple families in 
desperate need of accommodations, the fight for integration increasingly turned to decrying the 
concentration of poverty, and while this was in many ways an extension of the fight to break 
down racial barriers, integration always assumed class homogeneity and could not be used to 
house the poor.  Solving black poverty was more difficult than demanding open housing, and 




Simply put, housing politics had only a limited capacity to improve the plight of the poor.  As a 
1968 social work survey of Long Island’s black enclaves concluded, “the not always fulfilled 
promise of employment” was responsible for the “growing enclaves of poverty [that] have come 
to be a common occurrence in suburbia, sometimes as in the case of a few villages on Long 
Island engulfing whole communities,” and while “not so unsightly as the huge slums of the 
central city, indeed, often all but invisible in the surrounding plenty, these pockets of poverty 
mirror in microcosm the problems of their sister communities in the city’s core.”193   Why they 
were not part of the greater prosperity around them, and how to better integrate them into 
prosperity would have to be fought on fronts beyond housing.   
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Fair and Full Employment 
	
	 On the night of January 1, 1963, the NAACP hosted a dinner in Nassau County marking 
the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation.  Attendees included NAACP labor secretary 
Herbert Hill, Georgia state senator Leroy R. Johnson, state assembly speaker Joseph Carlino, and 
an assortment of local politicians.  Lincoln Lynch, Lakeview’s fiery integration activist and 
chairman of the Long Island Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), was among the half-dozen 
speakers and by far the most memorable, using the occasion to note the failures of the local civil 
rights struggle.  He chastised local government’s “dwarf-like steps” against racism, though he 
saved his harshest criticism for the mostly black audience, stating that the “largest” portion of the 
blame rested “squarely at the door of the Negro himself, especially so of those who claim to have 
achieved middle-class status.”  Black suburbanites “engaged in a mad scramble to attain middle-
class status and to acquire the trappings and false values dictated by the same society which 
holds him contempt.”  They had forgotten that African Americans “cannot attain freedom until 
all Negroes have freedom.”  Lynch wanted the middle class to broaden their struggle and 
“finance lawsuits, badger elected officials for legislation, to picket or sit-in or boycott, if 
necessary” to achieve full equality for all black Long Islanders.1   
 Lynch’s words and stance reflected an alternative to the middle-class dominated fight for 
equality:  militant, confrontational, and focused on the broader inequalities faced by African 
American Long Islanders.  Employment was at the center of this struggle, because as Lynch 
argued, “the gap between Negroes and whites in terms of family income has widened in Nassau 
																																																						




County…[and] the failure of Negroes to secure better jobs in the entire range of employment 
opportunities is part of the source.”2  Alongside the decade-long fight for integrated housing, 
schools, and equal public services emerged a jobs-oriented movement in the 1960s, headed by 
CORE but including a host of new organizations, including a black labor federation, a black 
union, and the national NAACP office.  These groups targeted Long Island’s major employment 
sectors:  retail, banking, and public employment, but no sector offered more opportunity than 
Long Island’s defense-oriented manufacturing companies.   
Cold War firms accounted for one of every six Long Island jobs, nearly all of which were 
well-paying and pivotal to postwar suburbanization.3  While whites enjoyed open access to 
defense work after 1945, the industry’s racial policies changed during the Cold War, and few 
African Americans were able to use the industry as a source of upward mobility.  Though the 
federal government’s fair employment agencies proved necessary to expanding opportunity for 
black Long Islanders during World War II, the successors to Roosevelt’s Fair Employment 
Practices Committee were weak and left activists with few tools to combat discrimination and 
improve black prospects in the industry.  This changed when John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 
Johnson empowered their fair employment committees to monitor minority hiring and revoke 
contracts.  By the 1960s, civil rights groups and African American workers had strong 
institutional support to demand fair employment.   
 But as activists quickly learned, improving minority hiring was not merely a matter of 
fair hiring; the number of jobs, the qualifications within the industry, and the fortunes of Long 
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Island’s firms were under intense pressure in the postwar period.  Defense spending, and 
therefore defense-related jobs, fluctuated as Cold War strategy changed, defense budgets were 
cut, the procurement process was streamlined, and technological progress altered the workforce.  
After the Korean War, military demand shifted from conventional aircraft to missiles and space, 
turning ‘aircraft’ into the ‘aerospace’ industry.  By the early 1960s, calls for a leaner defense 
budget further jeopardized the industry, and Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara 
reorganized the entire defense purchasing process. Companies collapsed in the wake of the 
changes, including Long Island’s Republic Aviation.  Those that survived adjusted to the new 
market by augmenting their labor force, hiring white-collar scientists, engineers, and managers 
over blue-collar production workers. Ultimately, defense was moving in the same direction as 
the private sector – toward higher credential and skill requirements.  By 1970, the defense 
industry no longer served to buttress employment among blue-collar and unskilled workers in the 
northeast.  Spending favored southern and western firms, produced fewer aggregate jobs, and 
concentrated those jobs in skilled sectors.  Public spending no longer produced the same 
employment benefits on Long Island.   
 Activists concerned with black employment had to contend with all of these factors, from 
a labyrinth of federal bureaucracies in charge of racial mediation to a job market shedding blue-
collar jobs in favor of fewer skilled positions.  They altered their goals, adding black mobility 
into skilled and white-collar positions to their demands of minority hiring. But their fight 
nonetheless occurred at a pivotal moment in the industry’s history, as aerospace evolved out of 
its mass-employment role and source for blue-collar jobs on Long Island.  What activists 
demanded – secure employment that paid a middle-class wage – was exactly what white and 




though racial quotas were met from national labor pools and benefitted the already credentialed.  
It did not challenge the trajectory of the industry itself.  Fair employment for the mass of Long 
Island’s black population could not be uncoupled from full employment, and the industry’s 
transformation closed the door on industrial mass opportunity, affecting working class Long 
Islanders both inside and outside the defense industry, and by extension, ending the region’s role 
as a haven for mass upward mobility during and after World War II. 
 
The Shift to Jobs 
 While housing and schools dominated Long Island’s civil rights agenda, jobs moved to 
the center of the agenda in the 1960s, largely thanks to the ascendance of Long Island’s Congress 
of Racial Equality (CORE) chapter, which transitioned from a minor player in Long Island’s 
housing struggles to the leading organization fighting employment discrimination.  CORE 
originated in Chicago as a non-violent and interracial organization in 1942, and the Long Island 
chapter was founded in the 1950s, popular among whites concerned with local housing and the 
southern civil rights movement, though lacking support from black Long Islanders.  Aside from a 
clothing and book drive for the southern movement, a February 1962 report admitted the chapter 
had “not received a discrimination complaint in any area, and to our knowledge the public 
services in this area are not discriminatory.”  CORE tried promoting black employment at a local 
bank, but dropped the effort because they could not find willing black applicants.  Good projects 
were needed, both to motivate existing members and attract black members so the organization 
was truly ‘interracial.’4   
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 By June 1962, Long Island CORE was transformed.  Lincoln Lynch was elected 
chairman and set CORE on a path toward a “more aggressive, dynamic, active program.”  The 
chapter favored African American membership (Lynch moved the headquarters from Levittown 
to Hempstead) and shifted toward employment. 5  This was the direction of CORE’s northern 
chapters in general, who adopted various forms of direct action to force companies into 
accepting minority hiring quotas, first employed in Philadelphia’s consumer boycotts in 1960.  
The goals differed from earlier civil rights demands that firms hire “regardless of race,” as 
CORE pressured companies to enact “compensatory hiring” policies that would allow blacks to 
‘catch up’ in the job market.6  This strategy was direct, giving companies an opportunity to avoid 
confrontation if they were willing to negotiate.  CORE initially submitted a series of numbered 
proposals to a company, including demands to advertise jobs openings to minorities, hire a 
specific number of minorities by a specific date, and inform CORE of any relevant decisions the 
company made in regards to racial hiring and promotions.  Then CORE met with the employer, 
and if demands were satisfied, CORE publicized the company’s promises.  If the company 
refused, CORE advertised the failures and protested the inaction, hoping to affect consumers and 
force the company into concessions.   
The tactic proved effective and raised Long Island CORE’s stature in the region.  Part of 
the success was due to Lynch’s hard-nosed negotiating skills.  When CORE approached Franklin 
National Bank, Long Island’s largest mortgage financier, to hire black workers in “visible” teller 
and office positions, Lynch openly refuted the bank’s excuses for its paltry black employment 
numbers.  When the bank argued that few blacks applied for work, Lynch placed the blame on 
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Franklin National’s poor outreach.  After the bank agreed to do better, Lynch demanded ten jobs 
for black recipients within thirty days and that seventy-five percent of their high-school hires 
should be black.  While the bank nearly cut off negotiations because of CORE’s insistence, 
Lynch was able to secure a four-point program that would ensure fifty jobs for African 
Americans and a long-term commitment to minority recruitment and hiring.7   
When negotiations did not work, Lynch and CORE boycotted and picketed employers.  
When the Merchant’s Association of the Roosevelt Field Mall dismissed CORE’s demands for 
black retail jobs in 1963, Lynch threatened to protest during the holiday season, bringing the 
association back to the negotiating table.  By late November, two hundred jobs were secured for 
minority workers, and a program of minority recruitment was put in place, “a model for other 
shopping centers in Nassau and Suffolk Counties” according to Lynch.8  CORE saved its largest 
demonstrations for the Long Island State Parks Commission.  CORE conceded that “there is no 
deliberate practice of racial discrimination” but that summer help recruitment favored whites. 
CORE wanted the Commission to take positive and deliberate steps to hire black workers, 
including temporary help and permanent employees.  When the Parks Commission dismissed 
CORE, Lynch coordinated a picket, sit-in, and kneel-in at Jones Beach, blocking automobile 
traffic and pedestrians from accessing the beach on July 4th, the busiest day of the year.  
Picketers carried signs saying “Laws aren’t Enough, We Need Jobs” and “Jobs Not Promises.” 
Two protestors were injured by police.  While CORE had to cancel follow-up demonstrations 
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after several threatening phone calls directed at members, the protests forced the State Park 
Commission to negotiate, and they agreed to CORE’s demands for the following summer.9 
By the end of 1963, CORE emerged as the most powerful civil rights group on the Island, 
and Lynch its controversial leader.  Moderate activists and Long Islanders generally disagreed 
with his militancy, and the chapter was embroiled in a fierce election in 1964 to remove him 
from the chair position, though Lynch prevailed.10  But for all the publicity and the significance 
of CORE’s affirmative action plans, the chapter opened a few hundred jobs in the service sector.  
This was only the first shots in a much broader economic war aimed at what Lynch believed to 
be Island-wide discriminatory hiring practices, including the construction industry, migrant 
farmworkers, and the importation of domestics into Long Island, what Lynch called a “black 
slave-running operation.”11  And no target offered more opportunity than Long Island’s defense 
industry, and it was against this industry that Lynch was willing to “take any action necessary to 
bring about full employment of Negroes.”12  While CORE would utilize the tactics that worked 
so well in retail, banking, and public service, the defense industry proved a more difficult sector 
to crack, and the changes riling the industry complicated the activists’ goal of getting blacks 
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Based on the number of jobs, the relatively high wages, the heavy role of the state, and 
low black participation in the defense industry, CORE had chosen the perfect employment sector 
to improve black opportunity on Long Island.  As of 1959, African Americans were only 3.8 
percent of the workforce among Long Island’s five largest defense employers, or 1,974 
employees out of a labor force totaling over 50,000.13  Among Long Island’s largest 
subcontractors, black employment was even lower. Reeves Instrument in Garden City hired 
thirty-three blacks out of a workforce of 1,408, and Potter Instruments Company in Plainview 
employed five African Americans of 267 total employees.14  While one could defend the 
industry’s low black employment numbers by pointing to Long Island’s overall black population 
(and therefore housing segregation), the industry’s labor market included New York City.  In 
1961, two-thirds of Republic Aviation’s black employees commuted from the five boroughs.15  
The industry was also pivotal to the suburbanization of New York City’s working class, so when 
compared to the combined Long Island and New York City black population proportion of 
twelve percent, the industry’s black employment numbers were deficient.  This was not unique to 
Long Island’s defense firms; nationwide, participation among prime defense contractors was 3.6 
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percent, despite the fact that defense firms were located in regions with substantial black 
populations, including the south and western metropolitan areas like Los Angeles.16   
Low black participation during the Cold War contrasted sharply with the gains made 
during World War II, when acute labor demand and government commitment to anti-
discrimination opened jobs to unskilled black workers.  Firms shed their black and white 
workforces in 1945, and while the Cold War revived defense production, military spending never 
produced the same labor demand.  Within this context, a ‘neo-traditional’ white male-dominated 
work culture, divided by gender and ethnicity, set in among the Island’s major firms.  As 
Stephen Patnode argues, Grumman developed an unwritten rule against women on the shop-
floor.  Females were recast as ‘assistants’ and relegated to clerical and other non-production 
positions, a practice made explicit at Grumman but replicated across Long Island’s major 
firms.17  On the production floor, male workers divided the various job areas by ethnicity.  At 
Republic Aviation, Long Island’s largest employer in the 1950s, a management culture existed 
where supervisors “preferred to have members of their own race working under their 
supervision,” and “Italians, Germans and Poles…refused to work with members of other races.”  
Such practices restricted hiring networks to family and friends within ethnic groups, denying 
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opportunity to prospective black employees who had to rely on a tiny network within the 
industry.18  
The federal government did little to alter these practices or mandate black hiring.  After 
the FEPC ended in 1946, President Truman and liberal Congressmen envisioned a permanent 
version of the Committee with expanded authority to enforce fair employment on public 
employers, contractors, and private companies.  A conservative Congress thwarted these efforts, 
and Truman established a successor to the FEPC, the Government Contract Compliance 
Committee during the Korean War.  With jurisdiction limited to defense contracts and no 
enforcement powers, the Committee merely advised and encouraged contractors to voluntarily 
hire more African Americans.  Eisenhower abolished this committee in 1953, establishing the 
similarly named President’s Committee on Government Contracts (GCC) which differed little 
from its predecessor besides collecting contractor data to assess black employment numbers in 
the late 1950s.19  But without the federal mandate to actually provide racial employment 
statistics, the GCC was powerless to even compile numbers.  Contractors simply did not count 
black employees, and compliance officers had to enter factories and count heads to determine the 
number of “very dark skinned persons who may have some Negroid ancestry.”20   
 In comparison to the toothless GCC, New York State’s Commission against 
Discrimination (SCAD), successor to New York’s Committee on Discrimination, proved more 
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effective.  While SCAD enforced existing non-discrimination laws through investigations, 
subpoenas, and court orders, its commissioners chose to use “conciliation and persuasion” rather 
than the penal tools at their disposal.21  If SCAD found any discrimination in a company’s hiring 
or promotion policies, confidential negotiations took place to correct the practice, and SCAD 
conducted post-case reviews after six months.22  The agency sought above all “improvement,” as 
was the case involving a Long Island defense plant in 1953 that allegedly refused to hire blacks.  
SCAD investigated and determined that the firm had no black workers in its 900-person 
workforce.  After negotiations and two follow-up reviews, the firm employed thirty-two African 
Americans, who made up about two percent of the firm’s employees.23 These were like CORE’s 
negotiations, and they did increase black employment, but this case was an exception, as Long 
Island’s defense firms were rarely targeted.  From 1945 to 1960, SCAD received fifteen 
complaints against Republic Aviation: eleven from African Americans, two from Jewish 
workers, and a one from a Protestant employee.  All were dismissed “without probable cause.”24 
Federal concern changed when John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925 on March 
6, 1961, which abolished the GCC and transformed the federal role in anti-discrimination policy 
with yet another agency, the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity 
(PCEEO). The PCEEO went beyond anti-discrimination to a loose kind of ‘affirmative action,’ 
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requiring federal employers, contractors, and unions hire and promote minorities.25  The PCEEO 
demanded compliance reports from firms during the contract process, and also accepted 
“complex group complaint situations.”26  The compliance reports and group grievances shifted 
discrimination investigations from individual cases to statistically based inquiries, a more 
effective tool to challenge discriminatory employment practices.  The PCEEO also encouraged 
business owners to voluntarily adopt non-discriminatory practices and made business-
government cooperation a public matter.  Dubbed “Plans for Progress,” contractors committed to 
hiring, promoting, and training regardless of race, and would actively canvass for jobs in all 
forms of media to increase minority employment.27  Business owners designed their own 
individual plans signed in ceremonies with heavy press coverage.  While the dual role of the 
PCEEO, promoting both compulsory and voluntary means to open jobs to minorities, produced 
conflict, the Commission was nonetheless capable of mounting major investigations into 
potential discrimination cases.  Within the first year of operation, it received more complaints 
than Eisenhower’s GCC in its entire existence.28  
The PCEEO’s aggressive and statistics-driven approach matched Long Island CORE’s 
assertive and numbers-oriented tactics.  Within one year of JFK’s executive order, all of Long 
Island’s major defense contractors had signed a ‘Plans for Progress,’ further tying these firms to 
the PCEEO’s minority hiring efforts.29  Just as World War II activists relied on a committed 
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federal government to pry open the industry, CORE had a willing government agency linked to 
the industry’s only consumer.  And since Long Island’s firms pledged to hire African Americans 
in the abstract, CORE could apply their protest-negotiation strategy to Long Island’s largest 
employers, transforming employment opportunity for the region’s black population.  
 
The End of Full Employment 
 The contention that defense manufacturers could solve black unemployment on Long 
Island rested on firm ground, not only because of the industry’s role in employing black workers 
during World War II or the government’s renewed commitment to fair employment, but because 
defense spending was the closest the federal government came to full employment policy beyond 
aggregate demand management measures after the end of the WPA.  Virtually every government 
activity has an effect on employment, and while defense spending was not an explicit 
employment policy, it was the largest part of the federal budget with direct employment 
outcomes, aside from the military itself.30  During the 1950s, defense procurement consumed 
between fourteen and twenty-three percent of the federal budget, and remained above ten percent 
of total GDP.31  Governmental priorities first shifted toward defense during World War II.  These 
well-paying, unionized jobs, particularly in the aircraft industry, supported new constituencies, 
including defense firms, workers, and politicians, all of which made New Deal-era employment 
programs less attractive.  And although the Roosevelt administration wanted to include the ‘right 
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to work’ as part of the welfare state during the war, defense-related deficit spending did more 
than help people survive a Depression like the WPA and other New Deal jobs programs; it 
spurred recovery and growth, vindicating the Keynesian proscriptions for the economy.32  The 
warfare state accomplished the long-term goals of the New Deal, and the public understood the 
cause and effect of defense spending on unemployment.33 The postwar surge that followed the 
war further limited the need for direct job creation, and the ‘Great Disarmament’ of 1945 and 
1946 did little to phase consumer industries, though the aircraft industry suffered.   
Within two years though, global uncertainty made aircraft’s lull a threat to national 
security, while the ailing industry also jeopardized technological progress and employment.  The 
Truman administration responded by forming the Air Policy Commission in 1947, assembled to 
maintain publicly-funded aircraft production to meet the nation’s military needs, sustain 
America’s economic welfare, and support air innovation.  Key to the Commission’s 
recommendations was that the industry should not be subject to the ‘normal laws of supply and 
demand,’ that even marginal manufacturers should be kept afloat for the sake of national 
security.  While the Commission only suggested two producers associated with the Navy and Air 
Force for each type of aircraft (bombers, fighters, etc.) along with the necessary component 
manufacturers, the government, already the near-exclusive customer of aircraft firms’ goods, was 
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committing itself to supporting an entire industry.34  Growing tensions in Greece, Turkey, and 
the outbreak of the Korean War only cemented the government’s support for aviation. 
This spending supported an industry rivaling automobiles in the United States.  In 1954, 
aircraft led all industries in employment, R&D investment, and sales, a first during peacetime.35  
In the years following, aircraft remained the nation’s second largest manufacturing sector 
through the 1980s.36  Though the government directly employed over 2 million people as of 
1955, its support of the defense-related aircraft industry (along with other defense manufacturing 
generally), was a significant component of the state’s employment toolbox. Of course, defense 
spending was never explicitly an employment policy; such spending was justified as necessary to 
national security, not to keep Americans employed.  Nonetheless, it was considered the “the sine 
qua non for full employment, and as the basis for the prosperity of several states and certain 
sizeable industries."37  Economists in particular understood the employment benefits of defense 
spending, and when unemployment reached eight percent in 1949, Council of Economic 
Advisors chair Leon Keyserling, an avowed Cold Warrior who molded the economics of NSC-
68, fully embraced the economic benefits of defense spending.  He was then vindicated by the 
employment levels during the Korean War.  It became a key component of his full employment 
plans following the war, the “default source of revenue” to finance his full employment drive and 
post-Korea prosperity, as Edmund F. Wehrle argues.38  Truman, the Department of Defense, 
labor organizers and economists meanwhile looked to defense spending to aid depressed areas, 
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enshrined in Defense Manpower Policy no. 4, passed in 1952 to permit contractors in ‘labor-
surplus’ areas to match low bids.  There were critics of this approach, like Budget Bureau 
director James Webb, who feared what military spending meant for domestic priorities like 
education, housing, industrial policy, and agriculture, and the ‘guns versus butter’ debate was 
alive and well in the late 1940s.39   But defense spending, unlike the contentious domestic social 
welfare policies of the ‘Fair Deal,’ had bi-partisan support, largely because national security 
appropriations were first and foremost for defense and had only ancillary employment effects, 
though every Congressmen whose district depended on defense dollars was aware of the local 
impact of such spending. 
Despite the clear employment outcomes of defense procurement and spending, jobs were 
weighed against other priorities, including the size of the military budget, overall military 
necessity, foreign policy strategies, technological change, and institutional rivalries between 
military branches.  Congressmen wanted defense dollars to flow into their districts, while the 
military branches demanded affordable high-performance products from trusted contractors, 
which resulted in concentrated spending in already saturated markets.  The three military 
services meanwhile defended the enormous defense budget as necessary to national security, 
while Truman, Eisenhower, and Congress were wary of deficits and the political implications of 
the federal budget’s military dominance.  Finally, the executive branch had to consider what 
weapons would best meet the nation’s military strategy, which constantly evolved in response to 
Soviet maneuvers, newly perceived global threats, and domestic politics.40  Keeping contractors 
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afloat, and by extension, hundreds of thousands of industrial workers employed, was submerged 
within these broader concerns about how to fight the Cold War, what weapons were necessary, 
and what they should cost.  While we think of the defense industry as powerful agents in the 
‘military-industrial’ complex, in reality contractors were at the whim of these larger bureaucratic 
decisions and global contingencies, not to mention the irregularities involved in war production, 
a crucial factor during Korea and later Vietnam.41  Remaining profitable and keeping plants open 
necessitated that firms be attuned to the ever-changing environment of defense procurement.  
While Long Island’s two largest airframe manufacturers, the Air Force-associated Republic 
Aviation and Navy-dependent Grumman, were one of the fifteen firms laid out in Truman’s 1947 
Air Policy Commission report, their privileged relationship, and the workforce relying on this 
relationship, were challenged by two interrelated factors after the Korean War:  the technological 
shift toward high-tech weaponry and the regional shift of defense contracts toward the South and 
West. 
The Korean War fully revived Long Island’s airframe producers who limped along with 
small contracts during the late 1940s, re-establishing the industry’s dominance in the region.  
Grumman and Republic hired thousands and subcontracted work to hundreds of small firms to 
build jet aircraft.  Republic’s F-84 Thunderjet fighter-bomber, capable of air-to-air refueling and 
atomic weapons deployment, proved to be a devastating asset to the U.S. Air Force, destroying 
dams across North Korea.42  Republic produced over 7,000 F-84s and became the “workhorse of 
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Korea,” the world’s largest private producer of jet aircraft and Long Island’s largest employer in 
1952 with 22,000 workers.43  Grumman’s F9F Panther proved useful to the Navy, and they built 
over 1,000 during the war, as Grumman’s workforce reached 11,000 by 1953.44  Following the 
Korean Armistice and brief disarmament, defense spending consistently rose, though the nature 
of spending changed.  ‘Cold War’ military strategy turned away from the construction of planes 
and tanks toward experimental weaponry as the United States committed itself to the escalating 
arms race with the USSR.  With the Soviet detonation of the A-bomb, the drive for deterrents 
created the first arms-race economic boom:  guided missiles.45  Defense expenditures for guided 
missile development increased from under one percent in 1951 to almost a quarter of the entire 
defense budget by 1959.46  Meanwhile, between 1953 and 1957, the value of conventional 
armaments dropped from $11 to $2 billion.47 Missiles jeopardized established aircraft 
manufacturers, making former airframe production facilities obsolete and exposing firms to 
competition from the electronics industry.  In this regard, California companies like North 
American, Lockheed, and Martin adapted quickly. Lockheed for example transformed itself from 
airframe to missile producer within three years, as missile development jumped from two percent 
in 1957 to over seventy-five percent of the company’s production in 1960.48  Long Island’s two 
airframe producers, Republic and Grumman, joined the guided missiles race as well, though not 
to the extent of their west coast competitors.  Republic opened a dedicated missile plant in 1954, 
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while Grumman expanded to electronic surveillance aircraft and a variety of smaller military 
goods.49  Long Island’s electronics manufacturers procured missile contracts more effectively.  
American Bosch Arma in Roosevelt Field developed the inertial guidance systems for the 
ATLAS and TITAN Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, while Sperry Gyroscope won a number 
of contracts in the late 1950s, constructing guidance systems for the Navy’s Polaris submarines 
and tracking systems for air-to-air missiles.50 
 Missile demand declined in the 1960s, though the ‘space’ boom followed shortly after 
Sputnik’s launch in 1957.   NASA provided a new source of funding in 1959, and companies 
once again jostled for contracts in what was now the ‘aerospace’ industry. On Long Island, the 
fortunes of Republic Aviation and Grumman reversed during the space boom.  Republic 
Aviation had been the largest employer on the Island through the 1950s, and it invested over 
$700,000 and two and a half years of work into space research, including the multi-million dollar 
Paul Moore Research and Development Center in 1958.  Nevertheless, the company lost a key 
contract for the Apollo spaceship.51  In contrast, Grumman was awarded the Apollo Lunar 
Module (LM) contract in 1962.  From here, the company moved to the center of the space race, 
becoming NASA’s second largest contractor and building twelve lunar modules.  By 1964, 
Grumman employed one out of every seven Long Islanders in manufacturing and was the largest 
employer on the Island.52 
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If Long Island’s firms internally managed the technological transitions of the industry, 
they had less power to prevent the defense spending shift toward the South and West, 
particularly California.  New York’s share of defense procurement fell from 13.5 percent in 1952 
to 10.5 percent in 1962, while California’s rose from 11 percent to over 19 percent during the 
same period.  Annual defense purchases in New York dropped over one million dollars from 
1953 to 1956, and though they climbed afterwards, they did not reach the 1954 peak through 
1962.  In comparison, California’s high of 5.7 million in 1954 dropped by 1956, though just one 
year later, the state hit a broke a new record and continued to do so every year through 1962.53  
The shift toward the south and west was not a process of firms leaving one region for the other, 
but of contract cancellations in the Northeast and Midwest coinciding with new contracts in the 
Sunbelt.  Republic Aviation felt the pains of cuts, particularly when the Air Force cancelled the 
F-105E Thunderchief contract, leading to a loss of 7,000 jobs in 1957.54  Republic was not alone; 
Fairchild’s engine division, formerly Ranger Engines during World War II, closed down entirely 
in 1959 in response to the Air Force J-83 engine contract cancellation in favor of General 
Electric’s J-85 engine, laying off 2,600.55  Concerns over regional parity reached Congress when 
New York Senators Jacob Javits and Kenneth Keating, along with every House member from 
New York, introduced Senate Bill 1875, the Armed Services Competitive Procurement Act of 
1959.  The bill would ensure fair distribution of defense contracts among small businesses, areas 
with ‘labor surpluses,’ and most importantly, to different geographic areas in the country, 
especially eligible contractors in defense-starved regions. As the bill argued: 
The security of the nation requires that its economy, and the economy of each 
section of the country, be maintained at a level which can support its programs for 
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defense and sustain the private economic system, and that procurements by 
agencies under this chapter have a meaningful effect upon the Nation's economic 
health.56 
This was a call for jobs couched in the language of national security.  But the bill did not pass, 
and the Department of Defense countered that New York firms weren’t competitive enough.  
Defense Department procurement policy director G.C. Bannerman testified that New York must 
“present new ideas if it expects more contracts.”  As Bannerman argued, “we’re not buying the 
production of a missile but we’re buying the brain power.”57   
 Long Island’s defense firms invested in brain-power to remain competitive, and this led 
to the slow transformation of the industry’s workforce from unskilled and semi-skilled 
production workers to engineers, scientists, and other specialized technical staff.  Nationwide, 
production workers fell to forty percent of the workforce by 1962, while one in nine of the 
nation’s engineers and scientists worked in aerospace that same year.58  Long Island firms 
followed this trajectory.  Republic’s proportion of white collar workers doubled from nine to 
eighteen percent from 1954-1959, while engineer hiring outpaced production worker 
employment by sixty-one percent from 1957-1961.59 This reflected President Mundy Peale’s 
assertion that the company was “part university research lab, part giant machine shop, part space 
medicine center, part undersea exploration lab, part military systems analyst, part weapons 
manufacturer, part satellite and spacecraft builder, and more…much, much more.”60  Grumman’s 
space contracts required physicists, medical researchers, hydro-dynamicists, and all sorts of 
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engineers.  Nearly 7,000 worked on the Apollo contract, a project where production resembled a 
handmade cottage industry.  About one-third of Grumman’s entire workforce focused on the 
company’s space projects in the 1960s, with 2,400 engineers working on the Lunar Module 
project alone.61 
The transition from assembly-line production to technical craft and R&D put unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers at a disadvantage.  While defense jobs did not decline in absolute 
numbers, the skills necessary to remain employable increased and production workers had to 
compete with well-educated and younger engineers entering the field.62  Bob Schmidt, who 
began as a riveter at Grumman in 1941, realized that in the decades after World War II, the 
industry  
got so high tech that you couldn’t slump along as a high school graduate only, a 
tech school graduate, and really hope to get anywhere, because it got to be so that 
you’d have to be practically an engineer like the guys that work on the cars today.  
The airplanes got so complicated.63 
 
These changes led to layoffs, and while workers were accustomed to periods of unemployment 
since the post-World War II and Korean War cutbacks, layoffs in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
coincided with R&D investment and engineer hiring.  Fairchild, a Maryland-based aviation 
manufacturer with a Guided Missile Division on Long Island, cut its production workforce by 
nearly seventy percent from 1957 to 1959 as they increased their technical staff eight percent.64  
Layoffs were no longer a temporary measure following a contract cancellation or short-term 
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disarmament; they were a narrowing of opportunity for production workers due to the divide in 
the labor market between production and white-collar workers and the increased technical 
requirements favoring the latter.   
 For production workers who relied on defense jobs to sustain suburban homeownership, 
unemployment threatened to end their foothold in middle-class society.  In the wake of the mass 
1957 layoff at Republic Aviation, social workers found that while production laborers were 
“essentially middle class in terms of values, status, and goals…many families are far removed in 
terms of income and resources.”65  Workers leveraged their relatively high wages at Republic to 
secure loans and credit for the various accoutrements of the postwar middle class.  One family in 
the social work survey, a married couple with a three-year old son, had monthly payments for 
their freezer, car, fence, furniture, storm windows, refrigerator, new tires, auto insurance, VA 
mortgage, and an FHA loan to finish the attic.  The loss of the husband’s job at Republic after 
four years of employment forced the family onto welfare for over a year.66  While such a case 
was extreme, most families relied on credit to finance their suburban living on Long Island.67  
When laid-off workers re-entered the workforce as cab-drivers, gas station attendants, 
construction workers, or retail employees, jobs that paid ten percent less on average per year 
with fewer hours of work available, their middle-class suburban lifestyle was increasingly 
precarious.68   
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Production workers could hold onto defense jobs if they climbed the company ladder 
through promotions and training.  In an industry that evolved so rapidly and required all sorts of 
new and sometimes arcane skills to solve cutting-edge problems, internally coordinated training 
programs tied to the promotion process were a necessity.  Sperry offered educational 
reimbursement for production workers who took industrial technology courses, along with a 
comprehensive professional engineering program to upgrade engineers for the space age.69  
Unions like the Engineer’s Association of Arma (EAA) provided funds to attend classes at local 
colleges, and even sponsored lectures on new equipment.70  Grumman offered the most 
comprehensive training programs, outlaying 600,000 dollars a year on average to train over 
18,000 employees in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  They offered tuition reimbursement for 
night classes, and provided an incentive for their employees to excel in coursework (you could 
only receive full tuition remission if you managed an ‘A,’ eighty-five percent for a ‘B’ and so 
on).  Grumman even developed a Corporate Training Development Department responsible for 
all employee training across the company’s divisions.71  These training programs, whether union 
or corporate subsidized, were central to promoting workers within a firm since seniority did not 
prepare them for more technical work.   
The changes occurring within aerospace and the path to job security was of particular 
significance to the industry’s black workforce.  The burden of production job loss fell 
disproportionately on African American workers, who occupied the lowest positions in the 
corporate ladder.  In 1961, Republic Aviation had greatly improved their overall proportion of 
black employees, though hired or promoted only ninety-five non-whites to supervisory, 
																																																						
69 O’Rawe Jr., 152. 
70 EAA Scope 1, no. 1 (June 1952), 2, Box 12, EAA Papers.  




professional, technical, or clerical positions (see Table 4.1) and only 127 were skilled craftsmen.  
Meanwhile, 655 were operatives, mostly assemblers and fabrication workers.72  Grumman’s 
distribution was similar.  Of 605 black employees, only fifty-nine held clerical, supervisory or 
professional/technical positions, though forty percent of Grumman’s overall staff were employed 
in operative categories.73  These numbers were even more skewed at electronics firms:  Reeves 
Instrument had three black workers in white-collar or technical positions, while the remaining 
thirty were blue collar, and Fairchild’s Stratos division in Bay Shore had no black workers in any 
of its white-collar/technical positions.74  Overall, in a cross-examination of nine major defense 
manufacturers in 1959, the distribution between white-collar and technical positions versus blue-
collar production was even (they were forty-three percent of the workforce each, service 
occupations making up the difference), while the non-white distribution was skewed: eighty-
eight percent held blue-collar production jobs, while only eleven percent were employed in 
white-collar positions.75 
Two factors accounted for the disparity between the industry’s white and black 
workforce.  In the defense industry, the education gap between blacks and whites played a 
																																																						
72 ‘Non-whites’ included 836 ‘Negroes,’ 34 ‘Orientals,’ and 51 ‘Other.” See Republic Aviation Occupational 
Distribution by Race Report, November 15, 1961, Box 31, folder C-4-1-538, Complaint Files, 1961-1965, 
President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, 1961-1965, RG 220, NARA II. 
73 “Comparative Analysis: Occupational Breakdown by Race- Grumman Engineering Corporation,” October 19, 
1959, Box 3, folder “Comparative Analysis – New York,” Comparative Analysis Summaries of Minority 
Employment, 1958-1961, Records of the President’s Committee on Government Contracts 1953-1961, RG 220, 
NARA II. 
74 See Reeves Instrument January 4, 1960 and Fairchild Stratos October 25, 1960 Occupational Breakdown by Race 
forms, Box 3, folder “Comparative Analysis – New York,” Comparative Analysis Summaries of Minority 
Employment, 1958-1961, Records of the President’s Committee on Government Contracts 1953-1961, RG 220, 
NARA II. 
75 The companies measured were American Instruments Laboratories 1959, American Bosch Arma, 1957, Fairchild 
Stratos, 1959, Fairchild Guided, 1959, Grumman, 1959, Reeves Instrument, 1960, Republic 1959, Weksler 
Instruments, 1960, Potter Instruments 1960.  See their respective Comparative Analysis: Occupational Breakdown 
by Race forms, Box 3, folder “Comparative Analysis – New York,” Comparative Analysis Summaries of Minority 





critical role in aerospace’s particular racial division.  Herbert Northrup’s comprehensive study of 
black participation in aerospace revealed that regardless of any discrimination, the low 
participation of minorities was “above all a function of the skill requirements of the industry.”76  
Nonetheless, with training programs and promotional opportunities available, the issue was not 
simply one of educational deficiencies, and black workers pointed to discrimination as a 
potential source for the industry’s racial disparity.  Republic production employee Norman 
Baskin claimed “negroes in production jobs are often passed over for promotion to white collar 
jobs in preference to white employees.”77  Such discrimination threatened to decimate the 
industry’s paltry black population.  For activists interested in improving the minority 
representation at defense plants, the uneven distribution of black workers added a layer of 
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Table 4.1: Racial Composition of Republic Aviation, by Job Category, 1961 
 All Workers Non-White Percent Non-
White (%) 
Officials and Supervisors 1,816 17 0.94 
Professional and Administrative 2,374 47 1.98 
Sales 23 0 0 
Technicians 505 9 1.78 
Office/Clerical 2,278 22 0.97 
Craftsmen 2,893 127 4.39 
Operatives 5,342 655 12.26 
Service Workers 281 41 14.59 
Laborers 31 3 9.68 
TOTAL 15,543 921 5.93 
Source: Republic Aviation Occupational Distribution by Race Report, November 15, 1961, Box 31, folder C-4-1-
538, Complaint Files, 1961-1965, President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, 1961-1965, RG 
220, NARA II. 





Bias and the end of Republic  
The end of defense as a mass unskilled employer, federal re-commitment to black 
employment, and the racial disparity within the workforce all came together at Republic Aviation 
in the early 1960s, illustrating the challenges activists confronted in Long Island’s largest job 
sector.  Eight months after the PCEEO’s establishment, the national NAACP compelled the 
Committee to end discriminatory practices across the nation’s largest industrial sectors.  NAACP 
Labor Secretary Herbert Hill targeted aerospace in particular for exhibiting “an industry-wide 
pattern of racial discrimination,” and in November 1961, the NAACP launched its largest 
PCEEO complaint against Republic Aviation.  Hill amassed sixty-two promotions complaints 
from black employees at the plant, including mechanics, riveters, assemblers, punch-press 
operators, and electricians.  These ‘lower grade production workers’ were allegedly passed over 
for promotions by whites with lesser qualifications.  Hill accused the company of 
“discriminatory practices against Negroes in employment and upgrading,” stating that “many 
Negroes at Republic would be much further along than they are if color were not involved in 
many promotions.”78    
The sixty-two complaints were filed together, and most grievances were pre-made forms 
workers signed stating blacks were denied promotions solely because the “person was a 
Negro.”79  A few made additional individual complaints, revealing the complex nature of bias 
within the industry.  One was Randolph Ford, hired as a press brake operator in 1951. Ford was 
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trained as an engine mechanic in the Air Force, and hoped to parlay his experience into an engine 
mechanic position at Republic in 1952.  Despite this experience, he watched fellow white Air 
Force mechanics become Republic mechanics while he was deemed unqualified.  In need of 
better pay to support his wife and newborn child, Ford took a job as a stock clerk. He remained a 
clerk for the entirety of the decade.  Though he excelled at the position, and broke few rules at 
the plant (aside from the commonly-broken prohibition against posted flyers inside work 
stations), white clerks were promoted to supervisory positions over him.80  John Diggs likewise 
experienced promotion discrimination that ultimately cost him a job in 1961.  Diggs was a 
structural assembler since 1958, though he contended that the ‘assembler’ classification was 
meaningless since he and other workers did a variety of jobs, including assembling, drilling, and 
installing rivets on plane skins.  In July 1960, Diggs wanted his classification as an assembler 
changed, though the request was denied. A few months later, he and eighteen other workers were 
laid off during a company-wide reduction-in-force, though Diggs was the only employee who 
was not called back.  The company offered jobs to seven laid-off white workers in other 
classifications because they were deemed ‘qualified’ for those positions, thus saving them from 
unemployment.  Diggs filed a grievance, but was not rehired given his ‘poor work performance.’  
He denied this, stating that his ‘slow’ productivity was due to over-work with too few tools, part 
of the multi-tasking that occurred on the shop floor.  Diggs was laid-off, denied a new 
classification, and placed in the re-hire queue, as per union rules.81 
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In both cases, the PCEEO dismissed the discrimination allegations based on a lack of 
documentary evidence, stating that testimony from Republic supervisors and black employees 
was inadequate.  The PCEEO investigations, while unable to find explicit discrimination, 
nonetheless discovered pervasive favoritism, sometimes along racial lines.  Lawyer Simpson, 
IAM union steward, admitted that “by making a job offer to some favorite employee whom they 
did not wish to lay off” the company discriminated “against any other more qualified employee 
subject to lay-off.”82  This favoritism, as was the case with John Diggs and Randolph Ford, 
promoted white workers to ‘safe’ classifications and helped white workers save their jobs during 
layoffs.  Black workers, if unable to climb into these more secure positions, faced job loss.  And 
promotions, or even just reclassification, was pivotal to job security at Republic in the early 
1960s because of major contract losses.  It could mean the difference between having a job and 
collecting unemployment insurance.   
As outlined previously, defense spending had been politically contentious in the 1950s, 
including where dollars went, the problems of ‘wasteful duplication’ from inter-service rivalries, 
and rising costs.  John F. Kennedy entered office following the longest peacetime military 
buildup in US history, and while committed to expanding the defense budget and closing the 
alleged ‘missile gap,’ he was wary of the spiraling costs associated with current procurement 
practices.  Higher taxes could pay for new missiles, but Kennedy also entered office during a 
sluggish recovery from the 1958 recession, and increased taxes threatened to stall the economy.  
So JFK opted to streamline the contract process, because “while it is vital for us to maintain a 
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military force structure that will insure our security and sustain our foreign policy commitments, 
it is also vital to our economic health that we operate this force at the lowest cost possible.”83  
Kennedy chose Ford Motors President Robert Strange McNamara to lead the Defense 
Department.  McNamara enforced the recently passed Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1958, which gave the Secretary of Defense control over weapons acquisitions formerly 
managed by the military branches.  With direct control over all procurement, McNamara brought 
his private sector acumen to the Defense Department, hiring systems analysts, introducing the 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to the Pentagon, and creating an office 
of Systems Analysis, among other changes.84  The goal was to cut costs and improve military 
capability through increased efficiencies. Purchasing weapon systems for the entire military 
could reduce costs without sacrificing security.  Weighing what system to purchase depended on 
its function in the overall military strategy, or as McNamara put it, asking whether each weapon 
system adds “something significant to our national security."85   
The new process shifted procurement from within each military branch to broad 
competition among all contractors.  This, coupled with a ‘try before you buy’ policy, introduced 
new market mechanisms to the contract process, a fundamental transformation in the structure of 
the entire industry.  McNamara could theoretically cut unnecessary spending without sacrificing 
military preparedness, because the health of the industry was no longer the primary concern, but 
rather what spending could best meet the military’s overall strategy.  Essentially, McNamara did 
																																																						
83 John F. Kennedy, "Statement by the President Concerning a Cost Reduction Program in the Defense Department," 
July 8, 1962, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed June 18, 2015, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8761. 
84 Thomas L. McNaugher, New Weapons, Old Politics: America's Military Procurement Muddle (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1989), 53; Ronald J. Fox, David G. Allen, Thomas C. Lassman, Walton S. Moody, and Philip 
L. Shiman, Defense Acquisition Reform 1960-2009 An Elusive Goal (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 
U.S. Army, 2011), 35-36; Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. and Richard I. Smith, “Can the Secretary of Defense Make a 
Difference?” International Security 7, no. 1 (Summer, 1982): 49-51. 




not alter the quantity of defense spending, though these reforms altered its quality.86  Aircraft 
contracts were ripe for re-shuffling, as the Navy, Army, and Air Force each had their own jet 
fighters from distinct contractors.  In 1961, McNamara forced the Navy and Air Force to jointly 
develop a new multipurpose fighter, known as the Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX), 
estimated to potentially save $1 billion.  The announcement threw all aircraft contractors into 
panic, including Republic and Grumman, whose cozy relationship with the Air Force and Navy 
respectively kept each firm running.  Ten companies competed for the largest contract since 
World War II and what would also be the only major aircraft contract of the decade.  Since the 
Navy and Air Force had different interests in the plane, companies either teamed up with a 
competitor associated with a different branch, like the Navy-friendly Chance-Vought with 
Republic or General-Dynamics and Grumman, or went it alone, like Boeing.  On January 24, 
1962, Boeing and General-Dynamics/Grumman were chosen in a final eight week runoff, though 
Grumman was a subcontractor in this instance, and the majority of the plane would be built in 
Fort Worth, Texas.87 
The question was what would happen to the rest of the aircraft manufacturers.  Republic 
Aviation was in the most trouble because 100 percent of its business depended on defense 
contracts. Aside from Grumman, no company had greater than 90 percent dependence on 
defense procurement.88  Having lost space contracts, the TFX contract, and the ‘phase-out’ of the 
F-105D, Republic made its first post-McNamara ‘reductions-in-force’ on February 23, 1962, 
cutting 201 employees from the workforce.  Another 8-9,000 were estimated in the next two 
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years.  This was besides the estimated 8,000 subcontracting jobs on the line.89  In Congress, first 
congressional district representative Otis Pike, hailing from Long Island’s east end, asked Air 
Force Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert “how are you going to keep the airframe industry 
competitive when one by one the companies are going out of business, and where Bell is gone, 
Curtiss-Wright is gone, and Republic is apparently going?" Zuckert replied “What happens to the 
industry after that I can't say.  There certainly is going to be need for some consolidation.”90   
While Pike’s question represented the twenty-year old concern about defense spending’s 
regional employment impact, Zuckert’s response reflected the new approach to defense 
manufacturers and the defense budget itself.  Economists and politicians increasingly turned 
away from the idea that defense spending was good for the economy.  Charles J. Hitch and 
Roland N. McKean’s 1960 book The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age influenced the 
drive for efficiency, but books like Disarmament and the Economy by pacifist economist 
Kenneth E. Boulding directly challenged the pro-spending theory, arguing defense cuts would 
not hurt the economy, and if spending was redirected to ‘more useful’ programs, it would 
produce greater economic and social benefits.  A growing school of economists dug into the data 
to prove this, estimating the real costs of defense spending on a per capita basis for the first time 
and advocating a re-orientation of defense spending toward domestic development in the early 
1960s.  These ideas reached the floor of Congress in 1963 when newly-elected Senator George 
McGovern gave an impassioned speech against the defense budget and for the utility of domestic 
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social spending.91  Supporting the industry and its jobs was no longer the primary concern, 
though economists spoke of how best to transition these factories and workers toward peacetime 
activities.   
While Kennedy remained a Cold Warrior, these ideas were not far removed from the 
plans of his administration, particularly the architect of Kennedy’s domestic economic policy, 
Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Walter Heller.  Heller had been pushing Kennedy to 
support a Keynesian tax cut to boost aggregate demand, and while there would be no large-scale 
spending cuts to match the revenue loss, defense cutbacks would at least partly reduce budget 
growth. On July 10, 1963, Heller organized an informal disarmament committee to investigate 
the economic impact of defense spending cuts on dependent regions and communities.  Johnson 
made the committee permanent in December, adding that the Committee on the Economic 
Impact of Defense and Disarmament would aid governments, private industry, and labor on ways 
to “minimize potential disturbances which may arise from changes in the level and pattern of 
defense outlays.”92  In the two years following, Heller’s Committee (later an agency), published 
reports concluding shifts away from defense would have no major impacts on employment or 
growth, even with complete disarmament.93  These findings coincided with the eventual passage 
of the 1964 tax cuts.  Vigorous economic growth in 1963 and 1964, occurring alongside reduced 
proportional defense spending, marked the first time since World War II that unemployment fell 
during defense reductions, confirming Heller’s economic approach.94  Aggregate demand 
measures replaced targeted industrial policy no longer justifiable for national security. 
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This broad transitional plan was hardly transparent to affected firms and their workers.  
In response to the loss of contracts at Republic and the 13,000 jobs now in jeopardy, Republic 
production workers went on strike in April 1962, stipulating the company no longer use workers 
outside their job title (thereby avoiding promotions), but most importantly, demanding better 
supplemental unemployment benefits and increased severance packages.  After 80 days of no 
production, Kennedy invoked Taft-Hartley to force negotiations because the strike, “if permitted 
to continue, will imperil national safety.”  The union won, but jobs were still on the line.95  
Workers, their families, and Long Islanders in general wrote over 50,000 letters to Washington 
demanding more contracts. Journalists, union officials, and workers justified their call for more 
contracts beyond the terms of national security; for Long Islanders, employment was a 
government responsibility.  Newsday editors established the basic argument:  “even before 
World War II, the government has encouraged Republic and similar defense plants to expand to 
the point where all of them represent a crucially important source of employment… [the federal 
government] has a responsibility to these people that extends beyond emergency help.”96  Justin 
Ostro, President of Republic Aviation’s IAM union Lodge 1987 similarly contended that “many 
of the men who will be laid off in the next month…came out to work in the defense industry for 
the Government and it’s up to the Government to look out for these workers now.”97  Workers 
thought in the same terms, as one laid-off Republic employee demanded the government “use the 
billions of dollars they are wasting trying to reach the moon” to keep workers like him 
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employed.98  Such a statement was on one hand ironic, since federal spending on the space race 
supported aerospace manufacturers like Grumman, but this kind of spending did not benefit 
production workers like conventional defense appropriations.  For workers, union 
representatives, and journalists, not to mention politicians like Otis Pike representing them, 
federal spending was still necessary to maintain employment.  This contention was premised on 
the direct benefits Long Island had received from defense dollars since 1940. 
The local outcry finally found a national platform in the 1964 elections.  By that point, 
Republic was laying off the last round of a total 13,600 workers, three-quarters of their entire 
workforce.  Suffolk County’s unemployment rate hit 7.1 percent, and the county government 
considered separating Suffolk from the metropolitan area to qualify for ‘depressed area’ 
funding.99 On October 25, U.S. Senate candidate Robert F. Kennedy promised defense workers a 
visit from Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz and Robert McNamara in January 1965 to see how 
the area’s declining economy could be rebuilt, particularly because Long Island’s population was 
set to grow by 400,000, and as RFK put it, “where are we going to get the jobs?”100  In the 
meantime, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the outgrowth of Heller’s 
disarmament committee, sponsored a report to prepare these workers for the private economy 
entitled the Transferability of Defense Job Skills to Non-Defense Occupations.  The government 
committed to “research and placement, retraining, and relocation,” relying on the private labor 
market to absorb these manufacturing workers who had depended on federal stimulus dating 
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back to World War II.101  In addition, the Department of Labor and Defense sponsored a 
relocation project through the Manpower Development and Training Act, encouraging former 
Republic employees to work for Douglas Aircraft Company in Long Beach, California.102   
Kennedy’s campaign promise was not fulfilled until October 1965, when Secretary 
McNamara landed in Lake Success to tour Long Island’s defense plants.  By this point, Republic 
had all but collapsed, and Maryland-based Fairchild Hiller Corporation bought what remained of 
the company.  The ‘Republic’ division of Fairchild Hiller received some subcontracting work, 
building the tail section for McDonnell Aircraft’s F-4, but its new workforce was lean and R&D 
oriented, numbering around 3,700.  Approximately a fifth of these workers were engaged in 
production compared to Republic’s eighty percent proportion.103  Politicians, desperate for a way 
to boost industrial employment, expected McNamara to forecast future defense spending.  Union 
officials meanwhile pressed McNamara for a pilot project to convert the local defense economy 
toward consumer production.104  Instead, McNamara used the opportunity to inform Long Island 
the defense boom was over.  Though he discussed the prospect of two contracts for Fairchild-
Republic and Grumman, he reminded workers that new contracts did not mean more 
employment, and that Grumman’s success depended on the company’s ability to keep costs 
down, labor costs and subcontracts in particular.  McNamara generally scolded Long Island’s 
government, business, industry, and education leaders for relying on defense spending because 
“the defense industry is a highly erratic industry and you should not try to build an economy on 
it.”  It was time to shift to non-defense industries, and political leaders should not expect new 
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defense dollars.  When asked whether Long Island’s high wages penalized the area, McNamara 
denied it, though added “if you are there isn’t anything I can do about it.”105   
	
Figure 4.1: The Long Island equivalent of “Ford to City: Drop Dead.” From “McNamara Tells LI: Diversify 
Industry,” Newsday, October. 14, 1965, 1. 
	 Essentially, McNamara was informing these workers that the government was no longer 
committed to employing industrial workers, and what happens to these plants, workers, and the 
region in general was not the state’s responsibility.  Contracts would continue to flow to Long 
Island, though based entirely on how well firms competed in the marketplace.  The trajectory 
toward more technical weaponry would also continue.  McNamara’s demand that defense firms 
and politicians shift toward non-defense activities ignored the structure of the industry, one that 
could not simply transition into private consumer production.  Defense-oriented companies had 
low capitalization, little commercial marketing capabilities, and no experience producing low-
cost items in high volumes.  They were an outgrowth of the warfare state, committed to meeting 
their one customer with high quality products made from over 10,000 parts.106  Assisting defense 
workers’ transition into the private economy misunderstand the challenges of the region, 
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focusing on worker skill deficiencies rather than industrial opportunity.  The Disarmament 
Agency overstated the skill divide between consumer and defense production because most 
production workers were essentially light assembly operators working in gigantic job shops.107   
The problem was the lack of industries hiring production workers, as defense firms cut jobs and 
moved toward high-skill technical contracts.  Relocation meanwhile only poached workers away 
from Long Island (and fewer than two hundred relocated anyway), and Congressman James 
Wydler demanded McNamara move work to Long Island rather than workers to California, all to 
deaf ears.108   
 The post-layoff experiences of Republic workers illustrate the consequences of these 
defense procurement reforms in the early 1960s.  Technical contracts kept the booming 
electronics industry and Grumman’s space work going, and Republic’s laid off engineers and 
professional employees found plenty of opportunity.  Professionals were unemployed for an 
average of three months, and they overwhelmingly returned to manufacturing, either in the same 
job category or in higher positions.109  This represented a minority of Republic’s unemployed; 
only five percent of employees held bachelor’s degrees while slightly less than 80 percent were 
high school graduates.  These production workers were unemployed for an average of five 
months, and over a third exhausted unemployment benefits entirely.  When they returned to 
work, they earned on average less than half what they had been at Republic.  Less than one 
percent of Republic’s workforce made under $450 a month when employed at the plant (around 
$3,200 in 2012), but forty-three percent made less than $450 a month by March 1965, placing 
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them below the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s ‘lower budget’ threshold.110  Unsurprisingly, over 
half of workers were dissatisfied with their new jobs.  Salaries and their new status were the 
leading reasons for discontent.  One Republic worker feared the “possible loss of my home if I 
do not find employment soon.”  Another worker claimed that “the local sweat shops take 
advantage of the situation and offer you a salary which it is impossible to live on… when most of 
them offer two dollars an hour less it is impossible for a family man to survive on such an 
insult.”111  These workers were entering Long Island’s increasingly ‘diversified’ industrial 
economy, one with an influx of low-wage industries like textile and non-electrical machinery, 
making it difficult to live in high-cost Long Island.112 
For the NAACP and black workers demanding increased minority representation and fair 
promotions, the changes taking place within the industry made such struggles difficult.  While 
the PCEEO strengthened the government’s obligation to ensure equal opportunity in the defense 
industry, there were fewer jobs to enforce fair employment.  As the Republic case illustrates, the 
government was no longer using defense spending as a means to boost employment; the defense 
budget was fully wedded to other priorities by 1961.  Simply put, the state’s renewed 
commitment to fair employment meant little when the state’s commitment to full employment 
was ending.  The consequences were felt across the region’s blue-collar workforce, and seriously 
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CORE vs. Grumman 
Despite the collapse of Republic in 1964, defense-oriented manufacturing remained the 
largest employment sector outside low-wage retail jobs through the 1960s, and the problems of 
fair promotions, production versus technical employment, and the role of federal civil rights 
agencies were still relevant.  Grumman, Long Island’s largest employer by the 1960s, remained 
competitive during McNamara’s reforms and was closely tied to NASA’s non-defense contracts.  
Here CORE hoped to improve black prospects, introducing their aggressive tactics to secure 
promotional opportunities and black hiring at the last major industrial firm on Long Island.  
From 1961 to 1965, Grumman’s workforce more than doubled, mostly thanks to NASA space 
contracts. Lincoln Lynch was aware of Grumman’s employment growth, its ‘Plans for Progress’ 
pledge, the PCEEO’s nascent ‘affirmative action’ framework, and the need to place black 
workers across the entire occupational ladder to improve minority representation in the industry.  
The fight to open up jobs at Grumman was, in Lynch’s words, “the opening gun in our battle… 
[to] open up the entire defense industry.”113  For Lynch, African Americans should be included 
within the employment benefits of such spending, especially since the PCEEO could force firms 
to employ black workers.  And since Grumman had paltry minority employment, CORE could 
use Grumman’s non-discrimination pledge and the PCEEO to negotiate an affirmative action 
plan.   
Despite the company’s claims that it was “unique in its achievement in the field of human 
relations,” only 1.1 percent of their workforce were African American as of 1962.  Of 187 black 
workers, 157 were production workers, and there were only two black managers.  In the wake of 
Plans for Progress, Grumman made concerted efforts to employ more African Americans, and 
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the company boasted that their black workforce had grown to 3.6 percent of total employment by 
1965.  They had increased their black employment numbers by 256 percent compared to an 
overall employment increase of 71 percent, and the greatest gains were in skilled blue collar and 
white collar positions.  Black skilled craftsman increased over two-hundred percent, while 
professional/technical employees quintupled, and black clerical workers increased a whopping 
1,320 percent.114  Of course, as a memo attached to Grumman’s own report noted, these 
ridiculous percentages illustrated the company’s low black employment prior to 1962 and 
undermined their assertion that they consistently maintained a fair hiring policy.115   
Lynch and CORE submitted a fifteen-point proposal to Grumman on August 5, 1965, 
laying out the company’s faults, including its low black employment numbers and the various 
ways the company excluded African Americans from higher positions.  These included an 
esoteric promotion policy, a transfer system that ‘loaned’ black workers between departments 
while limiting skill development, and the “virtual exclusion of blacks from the available Rocket 
Training School,” thereby denying them “an opportunity for the development of superior 
technical skills and promotional opportunities.”  To rectify these failings, CORE proposed 
Grumman ‘vigorously’ recruit black workers for jobs, advertise in black media outlets, and target 
heavily black areas on Long Island.  In addition, Grumman must have ‘meaningful 
representation’ in all its departments, from research and development to sales and service, and 
on-the-job training should favor blacks.  To combat future cases of bias, CORE demanded the 
company establish an employee-elected minority grievance panel.  Most importantly, CORE 
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wanted Grumman’s plan to meet these objectives within thirty days, and CORE asked for 
periodic updates on Grumman’s racial progress.116 
Grumman balked at the proposal.  Though the company benefitted from space contracts, 
its long-standing partnership with the Navy, and American involvement in Vietnam, Grumman 
was painfully aware of the national race for dwindling military contracts.  The company had 
transformed over the past decade to remain competitive, and its flagship Lunar Module project 
required a massive recruitment drive for engineers and scientists.117  CORE’s social demands 
jeopardized Grumman’s ability to get the best engineers and scientists, and by extension, 
threatened the contracts that kept Grumman in business.118  Grumman President E. Clinton Towl 
even went as far as claiming that discrimination was impossible at the company, given the high 
standards for talent and quality to make air and spacecraft.119  Grumman personnel manager P.E. 
Viemeister took offense to CORE’s publicity gathering campaign that used Grumman as a 
‘symbol’ to prod the entire defense industry on Long Island to “bend over backwards to 
compensate for past discrimination.”120  The company was particularly opposed to the demand 
that the civil rights group be included in the decisions made within the company, because CORE 
was “unqualified to advise us in meeting the responsibilities inherent in the conduct of a highly 
complex business.”121   
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Grumman took a strong public stance against CORE, though behind the scenes, the 
company feared CORE’s protests.  Management was particularly concerned that such protests 
provided a wedge for unionization.  The company favored government intervention to labor 
strife, hoping that federal fair employment agencies might settle the case without disruption.122  
By the end of August, management agreed to twelve of the fifteen proposals, though three of the 
most contentious proposals stalled compromise:  the employee-elected grievance panel, written 
notification to employees of all new job openings, and detailed implementation plans submitted 
to CORE.123  The company offered to train minority Long Islanders in general ‘employability’ 
skills, like “grooming,” “personal finance,” and “motivation and attitude,” along with basic 
industrial skills.  Grumman also proposed a Long Island Fair Employment Board, a regional 
private FEPC that would settle discrimination grievances in the industry.124  Nonetheless, the 
company outright refused to offer any jobs or much meaningful commitment to training.  
Grumman agreed to join a ‘Job Opportunity Day’ where Long Island’s major industries would 
provide job and training opportunities, though the company clarified that it was only offering 
advice for qualification.125  These plans did not satisfy CORE’s primary grievances, and neither 
side reached any agreement from September through November 1965.  Grumman ceded no 
operational control to CORE nor any input in the company’s personnel decisions.  On November 
1st, Lynch called off further negotiations, citing that he and the organization were “tired of 
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agreements in principle which mean nothing in fact.”126  Grumman management for their part 
concluded that “CORE wont [sic] be convinced of Grumman sincerety [sic].”127  They bluntly 
stated that the company “can fulfill its obligations to all its employees and to the U.S. 
Government…or it can follow the dictates of Long Island CORE.  It cannot do both.”128 
While CORE threatened protest, the pickets never came.  Lynch admitted in April 1966 
that “the exciting times of the demonstrations, while not over, are diminishing.”  Lynch himself 
left Long Island CORE that same month to become associate national director under newly 
elected national director Floyd McKissick.129  CORE’s approach, while useful in the growing 
service sector, proved powerless against the aerospace employer.  CORE used tactics that could 
threaten local businesses’ customer base, but Grumman’s only customer was the federal 
government, and with a vague mandate under the PCEEO, the company could maintain a non-
discriminatory employment policy while improving minority hiring, limiting their racial 
employment policy to informing minorities of jobs and providing them the opportunity to 
promote themselves.   
If Grumman could ignore CORE’s demands, it could not avoid increasing pressure from 
the federal government.  CORE’s own compensatory quota struggles informed a national debate 
on such a policy as early as 1963, and in the flurry of civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1965, 
President Lyndon Johnson abolished the PCEEO and created yet another compliance agency, the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC).  This agency, part of the Department of Labor, 
had direct control over the contract purse, and it required non-discrimination clearance or 
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‘affirmative action’ hiring policies prior to contract awards.  Construction protests in 1966 and 
1967 sharpened the definition of ‘affirmative action.’  The term now meant that companies must 
provide numerical goals for minority hiring, when they would hire them, and what positions they 
would hold.  By 1968, ‘affirmative action’ plans, now clearly defined, were required as part of 
the bidding process itself.130 When mixed with McNamara’s intensified contractor nationwide 
competition, the new quota system could prod firms into improving their racial numbers. 
Indeed, Grumman was sensitive to its own racial deficiencies and the negative publicity 
they might draw in the wake of this legislation.  The company embraced Johnson’s War on 
Poverty, designing a small job training program for the ‘hardcore’ unemployed.  They also 
visibly increased black participation in training courses, averaging between twenty and thirty 
percent of all graduates between October 1967 and August 1968.131  In addition, the company 
targeted North Amityville and Wyandanch residents in February 1968.  Grumman was inundated 
with over two hundred hungry job-seekers who waited up to three hours for interviews.  The 
recruiters were surprised at the amount of skilled labor they found among the ninety-percent 
minority population that applied, though given the layoffs at Republic, a pool of qualified 
unemployed or underemployed workers in search defense jobs was not surprising.  They hired 
thirty-five workers immediately and planned to hire around sixty-percent of those who came in 
for interviews.132  In regards to promotion and grievance procedures, Grumman President Lew 
Evans formed the Open-Door Advisory Council (ODAC), which held bi-weekly meetings to 
handle discrimination charges within the company.  ODAC had both black and white employee 
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representatives and handled discrimination charges on an individual basis to include African 
Americans equally in upgrades and transfers.133   
Grumman’s efforts, while unprecedented in the company’s history, were slow and faced 
potential setbacks from broader industrial changes.  The company increased its minority 
representation to four percent by 1968, though black workers were concentrated in 
unskilled/semi-skilled production jobs compared to an overwhelmingly white technical staff.  As 
NASA contracts declined in 1967 and Grumman’s F-111B contract remained in limbo, the 
company was in flux.  Grumman reached its peak employment in 1967 with over 37,000 
employees, but by the end of that same year, the company’s “general re-evaluation of the 
workforce for the sake of efficiency” led to a reduction-in-force of 800 workers.134  In January 
1968, black Grumman employees Robert Caupain and Bill Paige, along with members of CORE, 
the Suffolk County Human Rights Commission, and local Community Action Programs, met 
with black Grummanites to discuss ways of improving black positions at the company and secure 
better jobs, a concern in the face of possible layoffs.135  From these meetings, Big Brother was 
formed, an organization chaired by Bob Caupain to encourage current black employees to join 
training programs and to inform prospective employees of necessary skills and credentials to get 
jobs at Grumman.  It explicitly avoided the function of a grievance committee, and Grumman 
never officially recognized the organization.136  Nonetheless, over the course of 1968, Big 
Brother became the de facto ‘black’ representative organization for minority Grummanites, and 
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Bob Caupain met several times with management to offer suggestions about employee race 
issues.  The organization negotiated a company promise of 47 supervisory positions for minority 
members as well as a black Corporate Director of Personnel by December 1968.  With around 
500 members, Big Brother formed what was essentially a racial labor union, and when their 
demands were unresolved a year later, Big Brother broke off negotiations with the company and 
turned to Long Island CORE to address their grievances.137   
Unlike CORE’s initial failed attempt, the civil rights group now had a substantial number 
of complaints to justify their protest because Big Brother claimed to represent nearly one-third of 
Grumman’s minority workforce.  More importantly, the OFCC could cancel contracts if the 
company did not meet affirmative action requirements, and since Grumman won the new Navy 
VFX jet fighter contract in January 1969 (out of which emerged the F-14), compliance would be 
a mandatory part of the contract process. 138  Given these factors, CORE, now chaired by 
defense-oriented Sperry Gyroscope employee Lamar Cox, was given a second chance to make 
Long Island’s defense industry a minority employer.  On March 24, 1969, Big Brother and 
CORE held a press conference in Hempstead where CORE alleged that Grumman had made “no 
real move to place blacks into decision-making jobs, or any positions of real power.”  They 
contended that black workers were concentrated in food service and janitorial positions (half of 
these positions were minority-filled), while there were few black foremen or managers (around 
fifty).  Promotions, salaries, and raises also differed between blacks and whites.  Both 
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organizations buttressed their allegations with support from black Grummanites.  CORE sent the 
OFCC executive director a petition signed by six hundred employees, while Big Brother sent 
Grumman over two-hundred written complaints.139 CORE demanded that the government 
investigate these allegations, especially in relation to Grumman’s recent VFX contract, and sent 
out letters to the Labor and Defense Departments for a review of Grumman’s hiring and 
promotional practices.  On April 1, 1969, the OFCC agreed to launch a “routine investigation” 
into the charges of discriminatory labor practices.140   
CORE’s three-pronged approach, including publicity gathering, direct allegations, and 
the federal investigation, put Grumman’s VFX in jeopardy, and local officials like Suffolk Labor 
Commissioner Lou Tempera warned that CORE’s attack posed “a threat to the corporation’s 
position as Long Island’s largest employer” and to Long Island’s economy when over 36,000 
jobs depended on the VFX contract.141  Mud-slinging then ensued between CORE’s Lamar Cox 
and Labor Commissioner Tempera, as Cox denounced Tempera as an “irresponsible bigot…an 
enemy of the black people” for defending the company, while Tempera reiterated the gravity of a 
contract cancellation to Long Island’s economy.142  Grumman chose to wait until the federal 
investigation unfolded, re-iterating their long-standing anti-discriminatory hiring and promotions 
policies.  Grumman’s future ultimately rested in the hands of the OFCC, but since the 
compliance office had yet to cancel any contracts on the grounds of racial discrimination, the 
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company’s contracts were relatively secure.143  On April 14, 1969, the New York Regional 
Office of the Defense Supply Agency launched its investigation at Grumman.  Finding no ‘overt 
bias,’ OFCC officials (through the Defense Supply Agency) concluded there was “room for 
improvement,” namely that Grumman had not implemented an Affirmative Action program.144  
The company responded with an updated Affirmative Action policy focused on equal promotion 
opportunities, and laid the groundwork for an entirely new department devoted specifically to 
racial employment policy, the Opportunity Development Department (ODD).  The ODD took 
over the responsibilities of ODAC and had expanded authority, including running a company-
wide promotion review board, operating recruitment drives for minority workers, seeking out 
qualified minority employees for supervisory positions, and monitoring the company’s overall 
Affirmative Action policy.  Essentially, the ODD was an internal bureaucracy to take care of the 
race problem in-house, as required to ensure contract compliance.145  It addressed the central 
problem of promotions, adding a layer of safeguards and inspection across the company to avoid 
bad press and contract cancellations. 
The OFCC investigation and Grumman’s new commitments did little to satisfy CORE or 
Big Brother.  CORE immediately responded with a new lawsuit, this time targeting not only 
Grumman, but the secretaries of Labor, Defense, and the OFCC because they failed to 
adequately address discrimination at the company as outlined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
CORE filed the unprecedented lawsuit (no one had charged the federal government for failing to 
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enforce contract compliance) to compel the government to “stop being hypocritical by passing 
laws that it has no intention of enforcing,” and the organization hoped the case could affect every 
company with federal contracts.146  To CORE, the lack of minority employees was a 
consequence of widespread discrimination among defense firms, and the in-house solution that 
both Grumman and compliance officers agreed upon would not open the industry, instead only 
adjusting the promotion and hiring process to ensure non-discrimination and fair job advertising.  
The suit, by charging that all involved parties failed to reform the racial employment landscape 
of the industry, was intended to force firms to absorb African Americans from local labor 
markets and to include them in every position within the occupational ladder, a solution for two 
decades of exclusion from the industry. 
While CORE prepared its lawsuit for the courts, Big Brother grappled with a looming 
reduction-in-force.  The agreement reached between Grumman and compliance officers, 
including the new Affirmative Action policy and the Opportunity Development Department, did 
not address layoffs disproportionately affecting production workers.  When a round of layoffs hit 
in 1968, over half of Grumman’s reduction-in-force were blue-collar workers (329) compared to 
just seventeen percent of whom were engineers.  While Grumman won the F-14 contract in 
1969, production would not begin until 1970, and the company announced it would let ten 
percent of its workforce go (around 3,500) over the course of 1969 as the Lunar Module program 
came to an end and its defense obligations declined.  Seniority, necessity, and performance 
factored into layoffs, though Grumman President E. Clinton Towl admitted that the pain would 
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be felt more heavily among manufacturing employees.147  With black workers concentrated in 
production and with little seniority, they faced higher job losses.  By August 1969, Big Brother 
claimed that two-hundred black workers were laid off, or between seventeen and twenty percent 
of the total layoffs, despite the fact that only ten percent of the total workforce was to be let go.  
While company officials challenged the data, stating that 164 of those minority members left the 
company for reasons other than layoffs, Grumman’s black population was nonetheless shrinking 
despite major breakthroughs in the company’s racial employment policy.148 
Grumman’s new Affirmative Action policy and the dedicated ODD could check 
discrimination in hiring and promotions, but could do little aside from a general commitment to 
color-blind layoffs.  Big Brother threatened to shut down the company in reaction, and Chairman 
Bob Caupain promised to fight “even if it means bloodshed.”149  In July 1969, Big Brother and 
CORE laid out seventeen demands to Grumman, including company recognition of Martin 
Luther King’s Birthday, a black vice president, and “extensive training to allow Negroes and 
“exploited” whites to advance.”  If these mandates were not met, Big Brother threatened to 
“disrupt, impede and harass Grumman’s production, morale, and image.”150  When the demands 
were ignored and the company fired twenty-three black workers and hired thirty skilled workers 
at the end of July, Big Brother staged a strike on August 4th.  Sixty protested outside the 
personnel building, holding signs reading “Blacks work for nothing – no respect, no money, no 
advancement,” “how the hell can you get seniority when you are laid off?” and “Sweeper, 
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Janitorial, Cafeteria:  that’s as far as you go Black Boy.”  Caupain wanted seniority waived in 
layoffs until more African Americans held skilled positions, and when prodded about how the 
company would select the white Grumman employees to be laid off in lieu of black workers with 
less seniority, Caupain said “I don’t have time to worry about whites.  I’m worrying about black 
people.”151  Big Brother’s racial promotions-based approach generated only modest support, 
primarily because they challenged only one aspect of a broader layoff affecting black and white 
workers.  Whites still dominated the reduction-in-force, and the problems of discrimination in 
hiring and promotion hurt minority employees at the bottom of the hierarchy, doing little to 
skilled workers and not inducing them to join the protests.  When Big Brother staged a walkout 
and ten mile march from Bethpage to Garden City, it coincided with the nationwide 
construction-site ‘Black Monday’ protests on September 29.152  The walkout only attracted five 
people at the Bethpage plant in the morning, and by the time the march reached its endpoint in 
Garden City ten miles west, around eighty protestors joined the original five, including former 
and current Grumman and Republic Aviation employees.153  The race-based strike, in targeting 
both the problem of layoffs and discrimination, managed to unite few to its cause.  
CORE’s suit failed in the courts.  The case, initially deliberated in US district court in 
1970 and appealed in 1972, found the defendant innocent of any wrongdoing.  Since black 
Grummanites and CORE requested a general government inquiry into hiring practices, the 
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plaintiffs had not exhausted all avenues to address discrimination claims through Executive 
Order 11246 or Title VII.  Therefore, they were not allowed to sue administrative bodies that 
they had not contacted in the first place.154  After over twenty years of weak fair employment 
committees, a labyrinthine network had emerged to formalize negotiations between employers 
and minority workers.  Long Island CORE and Big Brother continued to use publicity gathering 
tactics, including the high-profile lawsuit, but state regulation of fair employment had returned. 
	
Conclusion 
The difference between 1943 and 1969, and therefore the victories of earlier activists 
versus the failures of CORE and Big Brother, was the health and structure of the industry.  
Demands for fair employment corresponded with the end of full employment.  From 1969-1971, 
defense related jobs declined by 23,000 and the workforce contracted by a fifth.155  The racial 
protests were a part of a broader debate over Long Island’s industrial future and what to do about 
declining defense dollars.  On November 25, 1969, Nassau County officials, defense employers, 
and union representatives met to discuss ‘conversion to a peacetime economy,’ a meeting based 
on the premise that the defense industry had employed thousands on Long Island since World 
War II and therefore the federal government had the responsibility to sustain employment 
regardless of current defense priorities.  While this harkened back to the discussions during the 
Republic closures, five years of anti-war protests and disarmament plans shaped an alternative 
strategy to sustaining defense manufacturing firms.  The hope was to sustain high levels of 
spending, though divert defense dollars toward social needs, including environmental solutions 
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to air pollution, waste management, more efficient housing technologies, urban transportation 
innovations, educational technologies, and more.  The Long Island Federation of Labor, the 
region’s AFL-CIO umbrella organization, laid out specific projects for the government to fund, 
including a jet port, mass transit, and a bridge spanning the Long Island Sound, all of which 
would benefit from the skills Grumman and Republic workers possessed.  While some ideas 
were R&D focused, others were infrastructure based, and all could tighten the regional labor 
market.156  Such ideas also had popular support.  At a “Full Employment Day” rally on Labor 
Day in Eisenhower Park in 1970, Democratic congressional candidate Karen Burstein argued 
that “the investment in the future requires our acceptance of the idea that the government must 
play as significant a role in waging peace as it does in waging war.”  Just as CORE wanted 
compensatory hiring, so too did those laid off from defense jobs and the politicians who 
advocated for them.157 
 Contracts for social development never came.  Defense spending slightly rebounded as 
Grumman won the F-14 contract, but still favored skilled workers and a leaner workforce.158  
Meanwhile, CORE’s five year effort to increase black employment at Grumman was victorious, 
though not in the way they intended.  From 1965 to 1971, the minority proportion had increased 
from 3.6 to five percent of the total workforce.  While African Americans had increased in 
proportion, their total numbers had declined from an estimated 1,500 during Grumman’s peak 
employment in 1967 to 1,142 workers by 1971.  In addition, the new hires were concentrated in 
skilled positions.  By 1971, nearly half of all black Grummanites were categorized as 
																																																						
156 “Opening Statement,” November 25, 1969, Box 67, folder “Commerce & Industry [2 of 3],” Nickerson Papers; 
Marvin Berkowitz, The Conversion of Military-Oriented Research and Development to Civilian Uses (New York: 
Praeger, 1970), 397-472; “Long Island Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, Save-a-Job Committee,” p 2-4, Box 68, 
folder “Jobs,” Nickerson Papers. 
157 “Rally: The Works, not the Workers,” Newsday, September 8, 1970, 13. 
158 Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, “Economic Highlights,” Long Island Economic Trends 7, No. 8 




technicians, professionals, managers, or craftsmen, while only forty percent worked in service, 
operative, laborer positions.159  This was partly thanks to Grumman’s vigorous recruitment drive 
that began in September 1969 when the Opportunity Development Department was formerly 
assigned to find minority group employees for supervisory and technical positions.160  But to 
improve their racial distribution of jobs and meet Affirmative Action requirements, Grumman 
looked beyond Long Island.  The company had difficulty recruiting qualified black employees 
from local labor pools, and as David Onkst discovered in oral interviews with former Grumman 
recruiters, the company also faced competition for qualified black workers from defense 
manufacturers in California.  Grumman chose to recruit directly from southern black colleges to 
fill its racial quota, including Morgan State, Howard University, and Bennett College, among 
others.161  Affirmative Action policy did not account for the specific manpower needs of the 
industry or what manpower was available.  Through outside recruitment, Grumman could satisfy 
federal requirements while also procuring skilled workers to assist in the diversification into 
computer data systems and space projects. Once again, CORE’s goal of procuring jobs for black 
Long Islander was undermined, as Affirmative Action helped the already skilled, not the 
unskilled.  Simply put: race was too crude a category for the transformations taking place in the 
industry.162 
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 When Lynch initially targeted the defense industry, he and the rest of CORE believed 
they could improve black opportunity on Long Island through the largest employment sector in 
the region.  Defense spending offered government-subsidized mass employment, and they 
wanted that same government-contractor arrangement which supported the suburban blue-collar 
middle class to include black workers within its mass employment framework.  But their fight 
for racial equality was inextricably linked to defense spending, and by the 1960s, the new 
technological demands of the Cold War and the restructuring of the contract process no longer 
sustained mass unskilled jobs.  While the Vietnam War increased demand for military goods (so 
much that it contributed to runaway inflation beginning in 1968), spending continued to favor 
high-skilled industrial workers or the South and West over Long Island.163  Despite continued 
defense spending, opportunity declined for blue-collar workers, leading to ‘suburban divestment’ 
in Long Island’s blue-collar suburban communities that relied on the consumer spending and tax 
revenue from these high-paying jobs.  The labor market twist included them.  The one 
commitment the government made to civil rights, state-mandated compliance, was a narrow 
policy framework that failed to address the occupational dynamics of publicly-subsidized private 
firms.   
 While workers and politicians hoped to bring public spending in line with the priorities of 
the new decade, their calls fell on deaf ears.  Federal job creation in the region declined, and 
defense no longer sustained a large middle class (at least until the brief defense surge of the 
1980s).  CORE and Big Brother managed to prod Grumman to open jobs to a privileged class of 
black worker, but given the higher rates of unemployment and the barriers to upward mobility 
that black workers faced on Long Island, this victory would not improve the plight of the black 
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working class and poor, who needed access to remunerative employment, a problem they 
increasingly shared with white citizens.  The deeper challenge within Long Island’s racial jobs 
movement was addressing the ‘black’ problem within the larger structural changes occurring in 





The Suburban War on Poverty 
 When Michael Harrington’s The Other America shattered the postwar consensus of 
widespread prosperity, he conceived of the ‘other America’ as an aberration, a ‘hidden’ people 
living in ‘hidden’ places far from the ‘affluent’ society.  For suburbanites removed from 
concentrated poverty in Appalachia or central city slums, “it is easy to assume that ours is, 
indeed, an affluent society.”1   In the aggregate, Long Island was indeed isolated from poverty.  
Politicians in Nassau County claimed that if their county was a city, it would be the nation’s 
wealthiest on a per-capita basis and the sixth largest in population, while Suffolk’s rapid growth 
in the 1950s placed it in close contention with its western neighbor.2  With high rates of 
homeownership, robust job opportunities, and a massive retail market, Long Island was the 
exemplar of postwar prosperity.  But the average Long Islander did not have to travel far to 
discover poverty.  In 1960, nearly 55,000 families survived with annual incomes below $4,000, 
over a tenth of the bi-county population.  As previous chapters have shown, most of these people 
were non-white: while only eight percent of whites lived in poverty, over a third of non-white 
families in Nassau and forty percent of the minorities in Suffolk were poor. 3  The “paradox of 
poverty in the midst of plenty” most resonated on Long Island, where the poor lived in two 
counties with some the highest median incomes in the nation.4   
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The ‘persistence of poverty amidst affluence’ was no paradox if judged by the dominant 
conception of poverty in the 1960s.  During what historian Robert Collins calls the “superheated 
optimism” of the early 1960s, poverty was understood as problem of the poor themselves, unable 
to take part in the prosperity surrounding them due to personal deficiencies or spatial isolation.  
As Joseph A. Kershaw, Assistant Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity argued, “what 
we need in the longer run are ways to increase the productivity of the poor, ways to make them 
valuable in jobs and ways of getting them from where they are to where the jobs are.”5  When 
Lyndon Johnson launched his War on Poverty in 1964, the war’s commercial Keynesian 
architects planned tax cuts alongside the program, believing that injecting capital and consumer 
spending into a stagnating affluent economy would spur growth, and through the War on 
Poverty’s training and rehabilitation programs, the poor could then be absorbed.6  The suburbs, 
the geographic symbol of postwar prosperity, were the perfect laboratories to test the hypothesis.  
When LBJ called for “total victory” in his war against material deprivation, suburban politicians 
on Long Island believed that their unique fortunes could achieve that goal.7  Nassau County 
Executive Eugene Nickerson proclaimed that “Nassau will become the first county in the nation 
to abolish slums” and that the entire War on Poverty rested on whether suburbia could in fact 
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eradicate poverty because “if it cannot be done here, how can we hope that it can be done in the 
cities of America?”8 
Long Island’s county governments had their own reasons to join a war on poverty.  Both 
county budgets became strained under the diverse demands of their surging populations, 
especially as costs became shared between the federal, state, and county governments over the 
course of the postwar period.  Welfare topped the list of unmanageable costs, and both Nassau 
and Suffolk’s executives imagined the War on Poverty could turn ‘tax-eaters’ into ‘tax-payers,’ 
the very same intention LBJ and his advisors had for the program.9  Nassau and Suffolk’s 
executives planned to utilize Long Island’s growing and diverse economy to accomplish this 
goal. County officials not only shared the same intentions as the Johnson administration, but also 
similar assumptions.  County Executives, human rights commissions, county labor departments, 
and a variety of other state actors operating within federal programs or acting independently with 
federal funding, devised imaginative programs to improve the skills of the region’s un- and 
under-employed as well as their mobility within the job market.  These programs included 
replacing migrant farm laborers with local workers, training the poor for suburban jobs, 
developing comprehensive job referral centers, and starting transportation services to link poor 
neighborhoods with industrial parks.   
This confluence of interests and assumptions between local governments and the Federal 
War on Poverty agenda contradicts the dominant historiography of Johnson’s anti-poverty 
platform.  A generation of historians have re-oriented our understanding of Johnson’s project, 
emphasizing how local government, community action programs, and grassroots activists shaped 
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the direction and the outcome of the War on Poverty. While they have overturned the older 
consensus of the program’s failures, Community Action Programs (CAP) remain central to their 
narrative.  Historians argue that CAPs were a funding source for radical and civil rights oriented 
politics, a means to empower the poor and their communities formerly denied political power, 
and central to the tensions between the White House, urban Democratic machines, and poverty 
activists.  But whether CAPs were a source of contention or a wellspring of innovation and 
protest during the 1960s, they did not always figure so heavily in local politics.10  
If we take a broader view of the War on Poverty, one that understands Johnson’s call for 
a ‘war’ on poverty as a movement that included local politicians with mutual interests and a 
perspective that looks beyond the Economic Opportunity Act, a different narrative emerges, one 
where the suburbs were central to the entire project.11  On Long Island, CAPs did not upset local 
political arrangements and local politicians launched their own fronts in the fight against poverty, 
unique programs with the same goal as the national War on Poverty in the space where the war 
was most likely to succeed:  the postwar suburb.  But it was in the suburbs where the narrative of 
postwar suburbia met the reality of the job market, and where the failure of the War on Poverty 
was most apparent.  The defense industry, as outlined in the previous chapter, had evolved 
beyond the mass unskilled employer it had once been, and suburbia’s service economy either 
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required advanced degrees or paid too little to sustain homeownership and the necessities of 
suburban life.  Anti-poverty training programs were unable to breach the divide, and new 
transportation routes merely dropped workers off to non-existent jobs, while referral centers only 
offered low-wage employment.  By the late 1960s, the county officials realized that the problem 
of poverty was not the poor themselves, but of job opportunities and the structure of the labor 
market.  In 1970, Nassau County Executive Eugene Nickerson announced a guaranteed 
employment program, illustrating that the only way to promise jobs was to create them.  Poor 
Long Islanders could not rely on the alleged affluence of postwar private enterprise. 
This chapter looks at the War on Poverty from a different, but no less important 
perspective.  Rather than the cities or rural regions where CAP funding mobilized impoverished 
communities and drew the ire of local government, the chapter looks at how the War on Poverty 
operated in what was the most widely affluent region in the nation.  Rather than considering the 
War on Poverty within the narrow confines of the Economic Opportunity Act, this chapter 
investigates the flurry of local policies and programs that drew inspiration from the Johnson’s 
administration’s broader intent for this domestic ‘war.’  These policies looked to end poverty 
associated with migrant farm labor, transportation, and skill deficiencies of the poor themselves.  
Finally, while there are a variety of perspectives from which to assess the War on Poverty’s 
legacy, this chapter looks at the war’s efforts to incorporate the poor into the economic 
mainstream.  To understand the War on Poverty, we need to understand why it failed in the 







Statesmen of a New Society 
Nassau and Suffolk’s county government’s welfare state, and therefore relationship with 
poverty, evolved in parallel with the federal government.  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
rural interests dominated both Nassau and Suffolk counties.  Both county governments were a 
collective of supervisors from each town, each representing local interests.  Republican Party 
machines monopolized power in both counties, and while machines typically thrived on 
decentralized power that enabled patronage and stable electoral victories, the Nassau County 
GOP managed to centralize their government.  J. Russel Sprague, Hempstead Town Supervisor 
and Nassau County GOP chieftain, recognized that county-wide control of police, health, 
welfare, and property tax assessment could be more efficient, shape the county’s growth, and 
provide new patronage jobs.  In 1936, a new county charter created the County Executive 
position, a powerful central figure that could veto laws of the Town Supervisors and administer 
county services.  By 1938, Sprague handily won the County Executive position, a position he 
held until 1952.12  As the first county in the United States to have such a position, Sprague 
pioneered a new kind of suburban government at the county level, one with municipal functions 
like urban systems rather than a limited rural-oriented state.13  Nassau now had its own budget 
and departments devoted to tax assessments, health, and overall planning.  Welfare, once 
delegated to towns, now operated with four divisions for families, child welfare, medical care, 
and accounting.  All of this accommodated the massive postwar development of Long Island, 
from authorizing residential housing tracts to building Salisbury Park, the county’s suburban 
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version of New York’s Central Park (later renamed after Dwight Eisenhower).  Sprague 
maintained a strong patronage system during this transformation, even incorporating newly 
arriving suburbanites into the GOP, earning Nassau “the most Republican county in the United 
States” moniker in the postwar period.14  
As was true nationwide, the county machine faced increasing pressures during the 1950s.  
A. Holly Patterson, Sprague’s Republican successor in 1952, confronted internal disputes as he 
suppressed department costs and civil service salaries.  The Democratic Party, uncompetitive for 
most of the twentieth century, now mobilized newly registered Democrats in the County (about a 
third of county voters) and promised to cleanse government of the ‘machine.’15  Eugene H. 
Nickerson, a Harvard graduate and Columbia trained lawyer, ran for the County Executive 
position in 1961.  He campaigned in the shadow of John F. Kennedy’s popularity, promising to 
bring the “spirit of the New Frontier” to Nassau County and promised to end the waste and 
mismanagement of the Sprague machine, producing efficiency and lower taxes.16  After his 
electoral victory in 1961, Nickerson ushered in changes similar to the ‘reform’ liberals shaking 
up urban political machines across the country.  He hired experts and professionals to manage 
county services, and re-structured the civil service system to emphasize merit employment and 
advancement. This did more than ‘clean-up’ local politics; Nickerson re-conceptualized the very 
purpose of county government.  Within his first five years in office, Nickerson and the county 
legislature produced what Douglas Rosenthal called the ‘custodial state,’ a local government 
committed to the general welfare, leisure, and safety of all county residents.  This included 
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county departments devoted to the local economy (Commerce and Industry), consumer 
protection (Consumer Affairs), the elderly (Office for the Aging), strike mediation (Department 
of Labor), traffic regulation (Department of Traffic and Engineering), civil rights (Commission 
on Human Relations), and a comprehensive master plan to improve recreational facilities, police 
protection, education, and health care.  Nickerson contended that all could be provided at lower 
cost by ending the patronage that bloated local government.17  Most importantly, Nassau County 
government was now a federal government in miniature, a liberal state committed to welfare, 
civil rights, mediating labor disputes, and planning.   
The expansion of county power was infectious, and Nassau County served as a model for 
the nation.  Suffolk County, whose government dated back to 1683, had also been controlled by 
a Republican Party machine in a decentralized government structure.  In 1958, residents voted in 
favor of a county charter with a strong County Executive and centralized police, health, and 
welfare powers.18  One year later, H. Lee Dennison, a Democrat who never held any political 
position, become the County’s first County Executive.  A former engineer for the County Public 
Works Department, Dennison quit in 1953 after blaming the county’s poor roads on the 
Republican machine.  He ran on an anti-machine platform, and once in office, overhauled the 
civil service and created an office for economic development, a human relations commission, a 
labor and social services department, a new community college, and public works projects.19  As 
a former engineer, Dennison understood Suffolk’s challenges as a ‘planning’ problem, because 
the county faced “unplanned, conglomerate, unrelated, speculative growth” in the 1950s. Only a 
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coordinated effort with education, public relations, business, and industry could make Suffolk’s 
resources “assets, not liabilities,” producing ordered growth that increased job opportunities, 
improved services, and lowered taxes.20 
Both Nickerson and Dennison were expanding the welfare state at the suburban county 
level in the 1960s, a process that coincided with federal state growth and even pre-dated federal 
conservation and environmental reform.21  But county growth in the postwar period was more 
than a parallel development because Nassau and Suffolk were increasingly tied to the federal 
government itself through federal grants, which permitted counties to expand and experiment 
with reforms without raising property taxes or requesting state funds.22  Nickerson actively 
pursued federal assistance, paying for his programs with aid rather than taxes.  He began 
procuring grants in the early 1960s, eventually establishing an Office of Federal and State Aid 
devoted entirely to maximizing federal and state subsidies.  His methods became a model for 
counties nationwide, and by 1967 he was pulling in over $25 million a year from federal sources, 
some fifteen percent of the entire county budget, up from less than four percent ten years prior.  
This funded everything from elderly aid and welfare to smog prevention and nuclear shelters.  
Counties nation-wide adopted these practices, including neighboring Suffolk County.23  Costs 
were also increasingly shared between local, state, and federal government, and public welfare 
illustrated this relationship.  Since the depression, Albany and Washington assisted Nassau and 
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Suffolk counties with their increasing welfare outlays.  By 1957, Nassau’s federal 
reimbursements were between fifty and eighty percent, and Washington covered around two-
thirds of Suffolk’s expenditures.24  Nonetheless, welfare remained the largest expense for both 
counties in the 1950s.   
The increasing burden of welfare was a growing concern for Long Island’s new county 
executives, especially since both Nickerson and Dennison were elected on ‘efficiency’ platforms.  
Reports revealed that the majority of welfare payments went to the aged and disabled, but a 
study of Nassau ADC recipients revealed a disproportionate number of recipients were African 
American women, and nearly two-thirds of these recipients worked.  Both the racial statistic and 
their employment status shaped the Nickerson administration’s efforts to improve efficiency and 
lower welfare costs for county government.25  In 1962, Nickerson appointed John J. MacManus 
to run Nassau’s Public Welfare department.  MacManus announced that his sole intention was to 
“administer [the] department out of business.”  While admitting that abandoned children, the 
elderly, and sick would never disappear, he asserted that at least a quarter of recipients were 
employable, and he actively wanted to transform the purpose of welfare “from the traditional 
custodial attitude toward rehabilitation of welfare cases wherever possible.”26  This attitude, 
when mixed with the increased costs of welfare, the faith in bureaucratic reform, a growing local 
economy, and the shared governance between Long Island’s counties and the federal 
government, made both Nassau and Suffolk eager frontline soldiers when poverty reform 
reached the national agenda.  Once Congress ratified the Economic Opportunity Act on August 
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20, 1964, local government and activist could access the $947 million reserved for education, job 
training, local economic development, legal aid, health initiatives, and local political 
participation.  For Nassau and Suffolk, both rapidly growing county governments with a keen 
interest in fighting poverty, the new Act provided unprecedented Federal resources with relative 
autonomy.27  
Beyond financial resources, institutional capacity, and a desire to alleviate poverty, Long 
Island’s county administrations also shared the basic assumption of affluence that undergirded 
the War on Poverty itself.  County Executive Eugene Nickerson based his poverty agenda on the 
belief that Nassau County had unrivaled prosperity, but while Nassau was the “richest county in 
the world,” accessibility and qualifications were the “root of the poverty problem.”  Unlike 
depressed areas where automation or factory relocation eviscerated job opportunities, Long 
Island was the destination for these factories and automation went hand-in-hand with increased 
wages for those working alongside new technology. High-paying jobs were plentiful but out of 
reach to those who needed them most.  The welfare system provided survival, not skills to enter 
the suburban economy.  The goal was to break down the barriers to jobs, be they transportation, 
child care, skill/motivation deficiencies, or knowledge of job opportunities, eradicating poverty 
through full participation in what postwar suburbia had to offer.  This would not only incorporate 
them into the mainstream, but lower the largest expenditure in the county.  As he stated to 
business owners and the public in 1968, “the cost of poverty is high – for everyone [while] the 
cost of full employment is relatively low.”28  
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In Suffolk, County Executive Dennison was less idealistic.  Given Suffolk’s dual poverty 
problem, on one hand suburban in its west but also rural on its east end, Dennison did not believe 
that “poverty is ever going to be completely or instantly eliminated.”  He did however argue that 
with proper planning “the anti-poverty program will help build a better foundation for a more 
stable and equitable future general economy.”  This meant using planning powers to enforce 
building codes, eliminate substandard housing, and improve education, health, and employment, 
all of which could benefit the poor living in the urbanized west and rural east.  To Dennison, the 
problem of poverty was one of development, and War on Poverty funding could be used not only 
to help the poor directly, but in a broader fashion to develop Suffolk’s rural expanse and 
incorporate the region into the suburbanizing process creeping eastward.  If Suffolk farmers kept 
exploiting migrant laborers, housing conditions would remain poor, and the county would 
continue to subsidize those costs.  Dennison’s conviction was that planning could transform poor 
communities, and the entire farming region, ultimately lowering the burden of welfare.29 
Long Island’s War on Poverty and its architects reflected the national aims of the project, 
or at least those of its leader, Lyndon Johnson.  These leaders constructed a county version of 
LBJ’s “Great Society” with devoted agencies for the aged, consumer affairs, and the 
environment, among others.  They emphasized the costs of material deprivation, not only to 
those who faced it, but to the state that supported their subsistence.  And like the national War on 
Poverty, both Nickerson and Dennison sought to alter the pathways of opportunity around the 
market, not to modify the market itself. This meant improving the transportation links between 
low-income neighborhoods and jobs, initiating job training programs, coordinating the efforts of 
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Community Action Programs to more efficiently provide services, and in Suffolk’s case, stem 
the tide of migrant farm laborers and replacing them with indigenous workers.  These 
unprecedented efforts developed from a conviction that Long Island could eliminate poverty, 
because as Nickerson put it, “if the richest county in the world, with the help of the richest state 
and nation in the world, can’t effectively eliminate its pockets of poverty in this affluent age, 
then the poor are truly justified in their fatalistic desperation.”30  It was on Long Island where 
Johnson’s approach to poverty would be put to the test, through both conventional Federal 
programs and locally-developed experiments with the same intentions.   
 
“Bailing out the Ocean with a Spoon” 
 While Long Island’s county executives embraced Johnson’s overarching goals and threw 
themselves onto the frontline of the War on Poverty, Community Action (CAP), the Economic 
Opportunity Act’s most controversial program, was not a decisive part of Long Island’s poverty 
war.  Nationally, forty-five percent of the Office of Economic Opportunity’s budget (the agency 
in charge of administering the Federal War on Poverty) was devoted to CAPs.  CAPs not only 
delivered social programs but also mobilized the poor so they could alleviate their own 
conditions, and it was these ‘mobilization’ efforts that were nationally controversial, since they 
supported competitive political factions that disrupted existing political structures in the nation’s 
largest cities.31  This bothered LBJ in particular, who never committed to the community action 
idea and came to loathe community ‘mobilization’ as CAPs threatened Democratic mayors 
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across the nation.32  But local CAPs proved neither controversial nor empowering on Long 
Island.  The two county Economic Opportunity Commissions (EOC), in charge of twenty-two 
local CAPs, had difficulty mobilizing Long Island’s poor.  The CAPs themselves were largely 
staffed by social workers and middle class activists, and focused on efficient service provision 
rather than empowerment, further diminishing the role they played in transforming Long Island’s 
poor into a political force.   
CAPs were first organized on Long Island in December 1964. In Nassau, prominent 
volunteer organizations and the social welfare establishment managed the Nassau County 
Economic Opportunity Commission (Nassau EOC).33  In Suffolk, a conglomerate of social 
welfare organizations developed the Economic Opportunity Commission of Suffolk, Inc. (EOC 
Suffolk).   These two county-wide EOC’s served as umbrella organizations for twenty-two 
community action programs across the two counties.  The individual CAPs administered federal 
programs like Headstart, Legal Aid, and Medicaid enrollment, all while encouraging the poor to 
participate in CAP activities so the poor would “have a voice in determining their future.”34  
Providing services was straightforward, but encouraging participation from the poor proved 
problematic. 
 From the outset, both the Nassau and Suffolk EOCs had difficulty determining where to 
establish community action centers.  They defined twenty ‘poverty pockets’ in 1965 (ten in each 
County), though only six CAPs were functioning by 1967.  It took nearly four years to establish 
the twenty-two CAPs, and by then the federal government had curtailed funding and autonomy.  
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Nonetheless, if judged by what services these CAPs offered residents, Long Island’s CAPs were 
mildly successful.  All programs emphasized education and offered courses in a variety of fields.  
Some reflected the therapeutic aspects of the War on Poverty.  The Westbury Community 
Council for Economic and Educational Opportunity (known by its acronym, the WCCEEO) 
offered a course on “sewing and charm” to help young women improve their appearance for job 
interviews.  Just across the hall, the WCCEEO provided small electronics courses.  In the Five 
Towns area, “Project ABC” tackled child and adult illiteracy, while “Project Reach-out” 
procured summer employment for teenagers.  CAPs had the greatest impact in health and child 
care.  Suffolk County’s EOC set up health clinics and food programs within all of their CAPs, 
and Port Washington’s CAP in Nassau County provided medical services to some 700 families.  
Freeport’s CAP managed a highly regarded day-care center for 32 children and had to turn away 
some 150 others.  The daycare center was especially important to female workers.  Coat factory 
employee Dorothy Harris admitted “I don’t know what I’d do without it,” while domestic Mary 
Brown could work a full day and move off welfare.35   
 Long Island CAPs were able to provide adequate service provision largely because they 
were managed by professional social workers and middle class activists.  This drew criticism 
from those looking to “organize the people to force these institutions to respond to their needs” 
as North Amityville CAP Chairman Marion Ball put it.36  Members of local CAPs complained of 
the “middle-class atmosphere,” of welfare professionals more comfortable with rehabilitating the 
poor than political organizing.  Social workers operated the EOCs central functions, though with 
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federally mandated programs comprising nearly three-quarters of the $28.9 million budget for 
Nassau and Suffolk EOC’s from 1965 to 1971, the dominance of professional social workers was 
unsurprising.37  Across the nation service provision overshadowed “maximum feasible 
participation” of the poor in all but the most radicalized CAPs.38  But even when Long Island 
CAPs attempted to organize the poor, they ran into difficulty determining the target 
“community.”  This was a problem with the formulation of “community action” itself, premised 
on an urban conception of a united population living in concentrated poverty.  Even in areas with 
large poor populations, like Hempstead or Glen Cove, organizers faced stiff opposition from the 
middle-class.  Activists for TRI-CAP, formerly known as the WCCEEO, but now covering 
Westbury, New Cassel, and Carle Place, surveyed the three communities to determine the most 
pressing problems, but responses from homeowners illustrated a lack of recognition of any issues 
plaguing the communities.  Neighborhood aides in Suffolk County’s Patchogue CAP noted a 
distinct “middle class fear of rocking the boat and identification with the poor.”  And in 
Roosevelt, CAP Aides assisting residents with welfare faced a hostile black middle class seeking 
to destroy the program outright, because they “do not want the label on their town that reveals 
the fact that there is poverty in Roosevelt.”39   
These CAPs might have produced local class conflict if they united the poor, but 
organizers had just as much difficulty mobilizing low-income residents as they did gaining 
middle-class approval.  Aides working for CAPs in Suffolk noted that residents “don’t want to 
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admit they are poor,” were “satisfied with their surroundings,” or “think it’s a waste of time to 
become active in their community.”  In Hempstead, Newsday reporters found that low-income 
apartment dwellers were not even aware of the CAP center just three blocks from their building.  
In Suffolk, only 667 of the 30,000 eligible residents actually voted in local board elections in 
1970.  An evaluation of Long Island’s programs during that same year determined that few were 
aware of CAP’s existence, and even fewer viewed CAPs as their advocate.  Apathy was partly to 
blame, as was dissonance between the federal conception of ‘community’ and the suburban 
reality of poverty.  Even in the most concentrated poverty areas, residents were spread across 
automobile dependent hamlets and lived amongst those above the poverty threshold. 40     
The overall difficulty of mobilizing the poor on Long Island forced Suffolk EOC 
Executive Director Dean Harrison to quit after only four months in the position in 1968.  Despite 
having prior experience in Newark, he was “wearied by the sprawling nature of poverty in this 
suburban-rural county,” compared to Newark’s dense urban wards.41  Nassau EOC Director 
Adrian Cabral expressed a similar disappointment after seeing how few resources were available 
for the challenges they faced, particularly the lack of a united and informed community.  It was 
like “like bailing out the ocean with a spoon” as Cabral put it.42  Long Island’s CAPs improved 
service access, but did not empower, and this is partly why they rarely received much opposition 
from the political establishment, in contrast to the tensions between urban CAPs and municipal 
government.  Improved service provision also did not incorporate them into Long Island’s 
economy; that goal would be left to county, local, and volunteer groups who designed their own 
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programs to train, transport, and find jobs for Long Island’s poor.  In fact, Long Island’s CAPs 
were more effective after the 1967 Economic Opportunity Act amendments transferred control of 
community action to local government, permitting Nassau and Suffolk counties to include the 
twenty-two CAPs into their own locally designed war on poverty.  In this way, understanding 
Long Island’s war on poverty means going beyond the paltry efforts of the Federal community 
action programs, and instead analyzing how local government charted their own course with the 
expressed purpose of ending poverty in the suburbs, the micro version of Johnson’s goal to 
eradicating poverty in America. 
	
The War on Imported Poverty 
 Long Island’s local war on poverty began with a local issue:  migrant labor in Suffolk’s 
east end.  Whereas the poor were conceived of as a static population in Appalachia or urban 
slums, in Suffolk and across farms on the east coast, the poor chased a low-wage job market 
running from Florida to Maine.  Suffolk farmers used some 3,600 migrants as of 1966, three 
quarters of Suffolk’s entire agricultural workforce.43   Migrants used local resources, like the 
county’s rental assistance program and local public hospitals, but contributed nothing in taxes, 
subsidizing the farmer and crew chief at public expense.44  Furthermore, this poverty became a 
black-eye for the county when Edward R. Murrow’s 1960 CBS special Harvest of Shame 
revealed Suffolk’s east end migrant labor situation.  Congressional hearings in the following year 
exposed the harsh working routines, low pay, and appalling living conditions these laborers 
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faced while staying in Suffolk, and New York State Governor Nelson Rockefeller launched 
investigations into the legality of these camps.  Suffolk County Executive H. Lee Dennison 
responded to this press at the outset of his administration, condemning the “questionable 
employment agencies…specializing in bringing in any kind of labor into the county at a price” 
and established a task force to investigate solutions.45 
Dennison’s task force began a war on migrant poverty, a local effort that coincided with a 
national concern for poor agricultural laborers.  The migrant labor system was a complex 
problem, involving labor exploitation, bad housing conditions, rising government costs, and a 
transient population with even less unity than the suburban poor.  Dennison first chose a strategy 
from his planning background, applying ‘slum’ clearance to rural areas.  In November 1962, 
Dennison and the Suffolk Board of Supervisors bought the 349 acre Hollis Warner Duck Ranch, 
the largest in the world and whose residents testified to Congress about their working and living 
conditions.  The ranch, which sat between the Peconic River and Meeting House Creek in the 
town of Riverhead, would be added to a $4 million state-sponsored wetlands program meant to 
curb pollution, conserve land, and limit ‘undesirable’ development.  The County would assist the 
migrants living in the camp with relocation services, and Dennison entertained the idea of 
moving those who could not find adequate dwelling west to the suburban part of Suffolk 
County.46 
After two years, Suffolk County acquired the ranch, and the wetlands project quickly 
became as controversial as the migrant camp.  Long Island CORE intervened to defend the 
migrants against the County action, establishing a headquarters in the Hollis Warner camp and 
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forming “Operation Tinderbox,” a summer-long protest against the housing conditions, 
relocation plans, and work arrangements migrant laborers endured.  CORE demanded the County 
provide decent jobs and housing, and that they do not resettle migrants in segregated housing 
elsewhere in the county. In June, CORE orchestrated a ‘dump-in’ to protest the lack of garbage 
removal since the County takeover and a seventy-person march and sit-in across Main Street in 
downtown Riverhead.  After two protests, eleven men, including Long Island CORE chairman 
Lincoln Lynch, were arrested.  Dennison swiftly shut CORE’s efforts down, obtaining an 
eviction notice for CORE to leave the County-owned camp, sending bulldozers to the site, and 
after a one-day standoff, leveling CORE’s protest headquarters on July 1, 1964.47   
To Dennison, CORE was disrupting an effort to eradicate slum conditions, a prerequisite 
to alleviating poverty in his mind. He conceded that preventing racial segregation was important, 
as were jobs, but would “not be meaningful until and unless the adverse conditions of a slum 
environment are removed…the first objective must be the elimination of the slums.”48  Like all 
clearance projects, demolishing the duck farm camp scattered the poor to nearby dilapidated 
housing.  Within two months, 150 of the 250 families fled the camp to housing nearby and nearly 
half continued to live in substandard conditions.49  By the end of July 1964, it was becoming 
clear that another approach was necessary.  On July 29, Dennison met directly with the migrants 
of the Warner Duck Farm, promising not only better housing, but greater employment 
opportunities.  He outlined a plan to place a full-time social worker in the area and get local 
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industries to offer employment.  He then assured the migrants that he would apply for anti-
poverty funding from Johnson’s new “war on poverty.”50  Federal funding could provide better 
services, job training, and a political voice for migrant workers, but Dennison intended to use the 
money to remove this unique poverty problem from the county altogether. 
Within a year, Dennison offered what amounted to a war on imported poverty.  He 
claimed both laborers and the County suffered under the current migrant system, since “the cost 
of such importation to the rest of the County – to the overall County general economy – has been 
in some ways disastrous.”  Welfare, police, fire, and health care expenditures, not to mention the 
overall environment, all suffered so farmers could exploit these low-wage laborers.   Removing 
the migrants would solve these problems, and replacing them with local workers would lower the 
county’s unemployment rate.  As he stated, “it may be time to start picking up some of our own 
potatoes, to initiate what might well be called useful and honest local home rule for a change.”51  
With local seasonal workers, the county could invest in ending slums, improve work conditions 
and lower welfare costs, all while preventing future slums from emerging out of new migrant 
streams.  It was a bold plan that had to compete with several alternative approaches.  Two CAPs 
formed to prepare migrants and seasonal workers for non-agricultural employment.  The Suffolk 
County Human Relations Commission meanwhile advocated for labor legislation and union 
recognition to structure work relations in the field.  These three approaches, using local labor, 
preparing migrants for non-agricultural employment, and regulating work conditions, offered 
radically different solutions to imported labor on Suffolk’s east end, each anticipated divergent 
futures for Suffolk’s agricultural economy. 
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Dennison’s local labor plan was a compromise between the farmer’s labor needs and the 
County’s desire to lower costs.  It assumed that manual farm laborers would be necessary in the 
foreseeable future but that the county could replace migrants with local sources of labor.  
However, it was unclear whether an adequate supply existed on Long Island.  The County 
Executive claimed that there was enough year-round labor, and that it was the migrants who 
added significant costs to the welfare system.  His Labor Department could not find local 
farmworkers. Suffolk’s unemployed made at least as much on unemployment insurance or 
welfare as they would harvesting potatoes.  The County could locate only twenty-four welfare 
recipients on the East End who could do the work at peak harvest, along with 657 able 
unemployed welfare recipients county-wide.  These farm jobs existed in a region of affluence, 
and “with the present low wages in existence in the agricultural industry, most local residents are 
looking towards employment in the areas of Suffolk where the wages are higher, the 
employment more stable, and the benefits greater.”52  County officials debated the plan for two 
years until a space heater set an eight room barracks ablaze and asphyxiated three of the fourteen 
people sleeping in a Bridgehampton camp on January 14, 1968.  This high-profile fire coincided 
with a local public television documentary aired in February, Morton Silverstein’s What Harvest 
for the Reaper, a spiritual sequel to Murrow’s 1960 film that followed one crew chief’s migrant 
gang from their homes in Arkansas to their harvest employment in Cutchogue, Long Island.53  
Following the fire, the Suffolk County Board of Supervisors established a Seasonal Farm Labor 
Commission, a nine-member body of government officials, members of the Long Island 
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Agricultural Marketing Association (a representative body of farmers), and church officials on 
January 22, 1968.  Following the film’s debut, Dennison demanded the Commission solve the 
migrant problem because it had become “a matter of national advertising that I don’t really care 
for.”54  The administration re-offered local labor once again, though knowing farmers could not 
afford to pay higher wages lest they “force them out of business,” County Labor Commissioner 
Lou Tempera laid out a ‘wage-subsidy plan’ to maintain the agricultural industry’s national 
competitiveness and make wages attractive to local workers.  The County would assure packers 
received the prevailing two dollar ($13.36 in 2013) area wage and that field workers were paid at 
least $1.75 per hour.  Tempera estimated a $2,695,810 annual operating cost to subsidize the 
wages of 3,890 shed workers and farm hands.55   
The Seasonal Farm Labor Commission criticized the plan and Dennison’s intentions.  
Even Tempera’s calculations for a one-year operation were meant to show the high costs of such 
a program, and he was only willing to implement a test program.  Farmers liked the idea of a 
local and stable workforce, though they knew in an affluent economy they could not attract local 
workers to stoop labor, calling Dennison’s hopes of utilizing Suffolk residents ‘unrealistic.’  But 
farmers did not like the ‘wage-subsidy plan’ because it completely altered the labor structure 
from piece-work to hourly wages, made farmers wards of the state, and was so costly and 
controversial that it could not endure long-term political challenges.56  Farmers also challenged 
Dennison’s contention that these migrants were such a grave cost to the County anyway.  A 1967 
welfare study determined that only nine percent of all of Suffolk’s welfare cases resided in the 
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County for less than two years, while over two-thirds lived in the County for five years or longer.  
For the 431 short-term (i.e. less than six months) migrants who applied for assistance in 1967, 
New York State reimbursed the county for all costs.  The Commission also found that migrants 
were rarely arrested and private charity or the state absorbed most health care costs.57  The 
Commission ended its investigations in May 1968, and the Marketing Association shut down the 
local labor idea, blaming Dennison for perpetuating the migrant system with his threats to 
‘phase-out’ migrants with public money rather than improve housing, an appropriate function of 
government already utilized in urban areas.58   
If Dennison’s plan sought to sustain the system with local labor, CAP programs looked to 
do the exact opposite:  pull migrants away from the farm system and prepare them for Long 
Island’s suburban economy, which would in turn force farmers to mechanize and end the migrant 
labor system altogether.  In no other part of Long Island were CAPs so influential in the local 
debate over poverty.  Three CAPs formed to provide migrants with alternatives to migrant labor, 
the Seasonal Employees in Agriculture (SEA), Community Action Southold Town (CAST) and 
the Organization for Community Action (OCA) in East Hampton.   While all CAPs provided 
conventional War on Poverty services, including psychological counseling, adult education 
programs, literacy, day care, and employment assistance, SEA and CAST designed locally-
oriented initiatives.59  CAST established a short-lived fish-industry training program, designed to 
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at once revive the dying fishing industry in Greenport, Long Island, and to help seasonal workers 
supplement their income beyond the planting and harvest season.  Twenty men at a time were 
trained in marine safety, navigation, wire splicing, and fish preservation.60  The SEA meanwhile 
established a self-help housing program.  With funding from the Federal Farm Housing 
Administration, recipients received a low-interest mortgage to be partly paid off with ‘sweat 
equity.’  This would help former migrants develop applicable skills for the suburban economy 
while they built their own affordable home.  These construction skills were particularly 
important because “farms in Suffolk County are giving way to housing developments and those 
that remain find mechanization the answer to the greater efficiency and production demanded by 
rising real estate values,” both of which would further impoverish migrants.  Within a year of its 
founding, the program had a woodworking plant, cooperative furniture repair shop, credit union, 
grocery store, and day care center.  Self-help housing worker James Smith built everything from 
the kitchen cabinets and furniture to his roof itself for his $17,000 home in Calverton.  He 
planned on opening a construction company with the skills he and his eight co-builders 
developed.61   
Construction skill development was a promising alternative to the migrant system in a 
region just beginning to feel the effects of an expanding building boom, especially luxury home 
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development in the Hamptons.62  Unfortunately, these programs were expensive to implement 
and it was difficult to attract migrants.  The Self-Help Housing program included only twenty 
families in its initial year of funding at a cost of over $51,000, while CAST trained a similar 
number of workers.63  Robert Tormey of the SEA admitted that despite having over 1,600 people 
enrolled in training and job programs, the migrant system made retaining the trainees impossible.  
Tormey discovered that no matter when they scheduled a program, “no one can show up because 
they aren’t finished work yet…they would have more time to learn if they didn’t work. But they 
don’t want welfare. They want to work.”64  Migrants and seasonal workers were too dependent 
on the migrant system, and these programs either offered uncertain ‘skills’ without jobs, or 
stingy projects with too few openings.  For those still part of the inter-state migrant system, 
permanent residency far from home and family was not an attractive endeavor.  Farm laborers 
did not take the alternative jobs east end CAPs could offer.  Out of 115 migrants placed in jobs 
by the SEA in 1966, only ten still held their jobs three years later.  The CAPs waged a war to 
induce mechanization by removing the migrants from the agricultural workforce, but farmers 
would not end the system if a steady supply of laborers remained.65 
Between Dennison’s unpopular war on imported poverty and the meager CAP skill 
development programs, local anti-poverty measures were inadequate.  This was painfully 
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obvious to Reverend Arthur C. Bryant, Pastor of St. Peter’s Lutheran Church in Greenport and 
vice-chairman of the Suffolk County Human Relations Commission.  Bryant was one of the first 
to demand the creation of the Suffolk County Seasonal Labor Commission in late 1967 to 
eliminate the migrant farm labor system.  When Dennison offered the wage subsidy, Bryant 
condemned it as perpetuating the system and providing the crew chief with ways to suppress 
wages, destroying the livable wage the subsidy was intended to provide.  Bryant also contended 
that the CAPs did not promote worker autonomy, and “only occasionally do we find ways to 
help a man escape from the industry.”  As Bryant noted, literacy, while a personal and social 
good, does not guarantee a job.66  Bryant and the Suffolk Human Relations Commission’s war 
on poverty sought to empower migrants.  In practice, this meant including migrant laborers in the 
1937 New York State Labor Relations Act and extending minimum wage laws to farmworkers.  
These legal protections were meaningless without worker activism, and Bryant coordinated with 
the UAW to fund an indigenous union, while using Cesar Chavez’s United Farm Worker’s 
Organizing Committee to organize an Island-wide strike during the 1969 harvest season.  The 
union and the strike never came to fruition, and Bryant lamented that migrant workers were “the 
most passive group of people I have ever met in my life.”67 
Collective action may have been the only means to improve the system, but as Cindy 
Hahamovitch argues, labor supply determined everything in the farmworker system, and new 
immigrants could undermine any unionization efforts, improved housing, innovative health 
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codes, or wage policies.68  Labor organizing or even stabilizing the labor supply would have little 
impact if an interstate population could be imported to depress wages and working conditions.  
The key to altering this system lay west of Suffolk’s east end, in the rapid suburbanization 
process making its way toward the far reaches Long Island’s North and South Forks, which 
affected both the landscape and politics of the agricultural region.  Suffolk’s population almost 
quadrupled from 1950 to 1970, and the construction of the Long Island Expressway, began in 
1955, and would reach the two forks by 1972.  Planners looked forward to urban development 
throughout the East End’s agricultural economy, and Dennison celebrated the end of “those 
goddam duck farms occupying priceless waterfront.”69 Speculators gobbled up farms for housing 
developments, and Suffolk lost 53,346 farmland acres between 1958 and 1972, cutting potato 
production in half.  This perpetuated the migrant system because farmers would only invest in 
machines if they knew they could farm for years to come.  When developers offered $3,000 an 
acre for empty land, $10,000 an acre after a nearby land purchase, and nearly $20,000 an acre 
after houses went up next door, farmers continued using migrants while awaiting more lucrative 
offers.  As Bryant himself claimed, “every farmer knows that the time is not too far off when the 
most valuable crop he can grow will be houses.”70  This meant housing and working conditions 
worsened for a smaller number of migrants as the number of farms dwindled.   
Suffolk County preserved the remaining farms in the 1970s as part of a larger open-space 
planning initiative designed as a bulwark against ‘sprawl,’ a preservation of Suffolk’s ‘rural’ 
past, and a means to re-charge the County’s groundwater aquifers.  These farms continued to use 
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migrant workers, now increasingly imported from Puerto Rico, but jobs disappeared for the 
thousands of seasonal workers who relied on the agricultural economy.  The old migrant system 
that exploited black workers died out, though over time, a new labor stream emerged exploiting 
Hispanic workers.  Nonetheless, Dennison could claim victory against the war on migrant 
poverty as the east end suburbanized.   But the migrants who stayed, i.e. ‘ex-migrants,’ while 
less likely to be agricultural laborers, nonetheless joined the ranks of the ‘suburban’ poor.  The 
CAP drive to train the poor for construction jobs looked to the region’s suburban future, though 
the programs were too small to have a broad impact.71  Winning the war against poverty in 
Suffolk would be fought in its western half, where county government and activists sought to 
incorporate the poor into the affluent mainstream rather than regulate a low-wage labor system.   
 
People – Transportation – Jobs 
 While the shacks that housed migrant workers were the visible markers of poverty in 
Suffolk’s east end, if one were to drive around western Suffolk or Nassau County, affluence 
abounded.  One would pass shimmering office buildings and clean industrial parks along major 
roads. A turn onto the endless lanes, drives, and places named after pleasant flowers, fruits, or 
trees names revealed Long Island’s multitude of single-family homes.  With 471 auto 
registrations for every thousand Long Island residents in 1970, the region was indeed a haven for 
automobiles.  Postwar prosperity and automobile dependence were mutually reinforcing, as new 
housing developments catered to a broad middle class who could afford to use the roads tied to 
such housing.  Beyond this, Long Island’s employment centers were constructed along highways 
and large state roads, and over three-fourths of all workers used cars for their commute.  Less 
																																																						




than three percent of commuters relied on the bus system, divided between twenty-one private 
companies operating infrequent services and offering no intercompany transfers.  The only 
significant mass transit option was the Long Island Railroad, though train service went east and 
west, used by commuters to reach central business districts in Brooklyn and Manhattan, not for 
industrial or office parks in Nassau and Suffolk Counties.  Long Island’s postwar job market was 
essentially tied to the network of mobility predicated on car ownership, a reflection of the high 
wages offered in the region.72   
 Those without a car were part of what Newsday called the “immobile society.”  A 
resident of the Spinney Hill section of Manhasset would have to ride three buses to get to 
Roosevelt Field at a cost of $1.10 and an hour and a half of time.  In a car, the trip clocked in at 
fifteen minutes.  And this was only if one were to ride the bus during rush-hour.  Off-hour jobs 
were largely out of reach.  A Port Washington man had to forgo a night-shift job in Glen Cove 
because there was no way to return home on public transportation.73  Carless workers, largely 
Long Island’s poor, were limited to local jobs within walking distance or car-pool 
accommodations.  Carless Long Islanders were also more likely to be jobless.  A 1968 poverty 
area survey found that car ownership impacted employment prospects.  In poverty 
neighborhoods where there was less than one car per household, unemployment hovered around 
twenty percent.  In contrast, poverty neighborhoods with car ownership rates of at least one car 
per household had lower unemployment rates, dipping below fifteen percent.  In an automobile-
dependent region, a car opened a whole new world of job opportunity, while living without one 
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constrained one’s reliability on the job, the distance you could travel for work, the jobs one could 
take, and even one’s knowledge of jobs available.74 
 This mobility divide between middle class suburbanites and the suburban poor was 
central to the ‘poverty amidst plenty’ paradox echoed repeatedly during the 1960s.  The physical 
divide between ‘ghettoes’ and ‘jobs,’ be it inner city residents and outlying job centers, or 
strenuous commutes from one neighborhood or the next, was understood as the key obstacle to 
upward mobility.  Activists, business owners, and government officials all decried Long Island’s 
auto-dependent transportation network for perpetuating poverty and unemployment.  Following 
Wyandanch’s riots, African American protestors demanded County Executive Dennison build 
new bus routes linking their neighborhood to local industrial parks in the hopes of relieving 
unemployment.75  Industrial firms also claimed that dependable public transit could fill an 
estimated 11,000 unskilled job vacancies across fifty-three industrial parks on Long Island.76  
Washington had its own interest in improving transportation options for the poor.  Federal aid to 
local urban transportation projects began with the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 
initially intended for traffic relief.  Urban rioting in 1965 transformed public transportation 
projects into another front in the war on poverty. The McCone Commission, a response report to 
the Watts riots, cited Labor Department research that inadequate transportation deprived inner-
city residents of decentralized job opportunities.  Charles M. Haar, Assistant Secretary of 
Metropolitan Development in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
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likewise believed mass transit funding could be a “strategic weapon in the anti-poverty 
campaign.” In 1967 HUD granted $2 million to the Tri-State Transportation Commission to test 
“the effect of improved public transportation to employment concentrations which are not 
located in central business districts” on Long Island.77  HUD money provided the much needed 
support to local demands for improved transportation, and HUD could effectively test whether 
bus service would ease poverty best in a broadly affluent region.  This broader front of the war 
on poverty, funded by HUD through a regional transportation commission and administered by 
local government, was a war on immobility. 
 The bus initiative had three phases: a temporary pilot program to a single industrial park, 
a research phase to draw links between labor supply and demand, and lastly additional service 
development based on the findings.  The first three bus routes went from Hempstead, 
Massapequa, and Hicksville, all converging on the Plainview Engineer’s Hill Industrial Park, an 
employment center straddling the Nassau-Suffolk border along the Long Island Expressway.  
The park had 134 businesses employing 9,500 people in 1967, and there were 371 job openings, 
including 197 entry-level positions.  The Massapequa route served an auto-dependent 
community, while the Hicksville route linked a commuter railroad to the industrial park.  
Hempstead tied one of Long Island’s target poverty areas to the park, and program coordinators 
hoped to decrease the village’s high rate of unemployment.  After heavy advertising, the bus 
routes attracted consumers, though not the workers Haar and other local officials envisioned.  
Only forty-two percent of riders used the bus shuttles for work.  Most rode buses to shop 
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(35.4%), travel to recreational services (6.1%), or attend personal appointments (6.1%).  After 
four months, workers began using the buses in greater numbers, though they were not the 
formerly unemployed.  Out of a total 148 work-related riders, only thirteen from Hempstead, 
eight from Massapequa, and nineteen from Hicksville, about a quarter total, found their jobs 
thanks to the new bus route.78   
As the Commission established new routes, workers increased as a proportion of riders. 
In July 1967, two routes connected Bay Shore and Central Islip to three Suffolk County 
Industrial Parks (Perez, Cardinal, and Vanderbilt) as well as the Pilgrim Psychiatric Center.  
Eleven routes were added from 1968 through June 1969, and the bus system became a full-
fledged anti-poverty program, as the Tri-State Transportation Commission allied with the Nassau 
and Suffolk EOCs to connect poverty areas in Glen Cove, Rockville Centre, Long Beach, 
Wyandanch, North Amityville, Inwood, Central Islip, Oyster Bay, and even Jamaica, Queens to 
employment, educational, and health care centers across Long Island.  The Suffolk EOC 
promoted the program with mobile ad campaigns, blaring music and announcements that buses 
“can help you to secure a job or transportation to a job.”  After two years of operation, bus use 
for work purposes rose to seventy-two percent of all riders, and nearly forty-two percent claimed 
they relied on the bus system to get to work, while a third procured their jobs through the bus 
system itself.79  
Higher employee usage obscured the reality that most of these new bus routes were not 
attracting riders.  A route between the Grumman plant, Hicksville industrial parks, and the 
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poverty areas of Glen Cove had on average six riders per work-day. Newsday reported that 
“everybody knows everybody” on the bus, and riders kept one another company, though the 
route “isn’t exactly winning the war on poverty” and was ended after a year in operation.80  This 
was the reality for most poverty routes.  Between 1967 and 1970, the Tri-State Transportation 
Commission, working with the two Long Island EOCs, contracted with eleven different carriers 
to develop twenty-two routes, though thirteen were terminated due to inadequate patronage and 
only seven routes continued after the project ended in 1970.81  The Tri-State Transportation 
Commission Executive Director Douglas Carroll Jr. admitted, “I doubt if [the bus program] is 
making any improvement in the unemployment problem.”  He was right; Long Island’s poor did 
not utilize these routes despite heavy promotion.  Glen Cove NAACP President James Davis 
blamed the low turnout on “basic distrust of government programs and promises,” while affluent 
residents of Rockville Centre protested the bus running through their neighborhood as a “waste 
of money” since “there just aren’t any jobs to transport people to.”82 
Jobs did exist in these industrial parks, and workers did not avoid the programs because 
of any general ‘distrust’, the problem was the value of the jobs at the end of the line.  From the 
outset, anti-poverty activists protested the kinds of jobs offered at Plainview’s Engineer’s Hill.  
Nassau EOC manpower utilization coordinator Richard Ford doubted that low-income workers 
would make the $1.10 roundtrip bus ride to work for $1.50 an hour.  Ford understood that “they 
can get that kind of poverty pay in their own neighborhoods.”  The Tri-State Transportation 
Commission itself concluded that despite claims that transportation ‘handcuffed’ the poor, it was 
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low pay, day-care needs, and other factors that withheld workers from procuring employment.  
They were not simply “ready and able to work if they could solve only their transportation 
problems” as the Commission originally claimed.83  Furthermore, while the program 
conceptualized the problem as one of distance between people and employment “centers,” 
neither the poor nor the jobs were concentrated enough to benefit from mass transit solutions, 
and jobs did not necessarily exist far from these poverty ‘pockets.’  In a 1968 survey of unskilled 
job openings Island-wide, the village of Hempstead, with its large poverty ‘pocket,’ had nearly 
double the amount of openings in comparison to any other hamlet, meaning long-distance was 
not a single deterrent.  Only a quarter of Long Island’s poor lived in the poverty pockets (though 
a much larger percentage of Long Island’s minority poor resided there), and industrial parks 
were dispersed across the Island, making the “traditional, large-vehicle, fixed-route, scheduled 
bus transport unfeasible both in terms of service and economy for many areas.” Linking targeted 
neighborhoods with limited industrial parks produced few job opportunities.  Ultimately, the bus 
program on Long Island came to the same conclusions as those involved in the Watts project, 
that “bus services are not by themselves creating jobs and that there will be no potential for 
movement until there is a demand for the available skills and a willingness to hire.”84   
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The bus program attempted the most direct means of improving employment prospects 
for Long Island’s poor:  literally bridging the gap between poverty neighborhoods and job 
centers.  The problem at the center of higher unemployment and under-employment was not 
access to jobs and mobility, but jobs themselves.  Widespread affluence undergirded the 
suburban transportation system, and jobs at the parks were either low-paying, or too advanced 
for entry-level unskilled workers.  Therefore, low-wage jobs, even if they were more accessible, 
did not reduce the poverty problem.  In fact, linking workers to jobs would take care of itself if 
workers could gain permanent, well-paying jobs to support an automobile, as the Tri-State 
Transportation Commission learned by 1971.  Their report admitted that “if the jobs pay decent 
wages, people will invariably find a way to get to work” and “will purchase an automobile as 
soon as possible, thus eliminating the need to ride the buses.”85 No anti-poverty measure proved 
more idealistic than this bus program, since the initiative, from Washington to the county EOCs, 
assumed Long Island’s affluence and its ability to absorb all if only they had the mobility.  
Poverty could then be eradicated with shuttles that traversed space and opened the ‘ghetto’ to 
middle-class suburbia.  But shaping the commutation links between labor supply and demand 
proved a losing battle, and the war would be fought in the procurement of living-wage jobs, not 
the buses to get there.   
	
Matching Jobs with the Jobless 
 While only the staunchest idealists considered transportation the silver bullet to solving 
poverty, the belief that Long Island’s prosperity could absorb the poor remained central to the 
local war on poverty, and no effort reflected the assumption of affluence more than job training 
																																																						




and placement programs.  As Margaret Weir argues, the architects of the War on Poverty at the 
federal level directed labor market policy toward “changing the characteristics of workers,” i.e. 
improving labor supply so that the poor could take advantage of the growth unleashed from 
macroeconomic tax cuts.86  A litany of programs and agencies at the local level, funded through 
the Economic Opportunity Act and local government revenues, directed by social workers, civil 
rights activists, and government bureaucrats, followed the federal lead.  If the economy was 
prosperous, then the suburbs, the postwar poster-child of prosperity, had plentiful work.  With a 
little skill development, a deeper knowledge of the local job market, and a few hiring pledges 
from local employers, the problem of poverty could be solved on Long Island, making it an 
example for the nation.   
 Manpower policy on Long Island preceded the poverty war.  During the aerospace 
industry’s upheaval in the early 1960s, Nassau County Executive Eugene Nickerson utilized the 
Manpower and Development Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 to help displaced aerospace workers 
with educational and training needs.87  Once the War on Poverty got underway in 1965 and 1966, 
the focus of manpower efforts on Long Island switched from the skilled to the most vulnerable 
on the Island, and black Long Islanders in particular.  A bevy of programs appeared across the 
Island, funded locally and through federal anti-poverty programs.  Job Corps operated out of 
Hempstead, while the two county Economic Opportunity Commissions organized federal 
manpower efforts, from remedial training to job placement.  The U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare implemented the Work Experience Program, a welfare-to-work 
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initiative.88  Local organizations complemented these efforts.  In 1964, the Patchogue NAACP in 
eastern Long Island established Help Educate for Labor Placement (HELP) to counsel and place 
low-income and minority group members into jobs.  CORE followed suit with similar programs 
in Wyandanch, Huntington, and Southold, all in Suffolk County.89 
 Nevertheless, the Human Relations Commissions criticized the programs for neglecting 
the minority poor.  Farrell Jones, chairman of the Nassau County Human Rights Commission, 
complained that the MDTA and the Economic Opportunity Act programs were “not reaching the 
people [they were] designed for because [they were] geared to those who have some basic skill 
and thus can utilize training.”90  The Suffolk Human Relations Commission found that locally-
organized programs were not targeting minorities either.  They were useful as counseling 
centers, but too small to make a serious dent in the employment problem, and the Commission 
felt only a county-wide effort could secure enough funding to provide real job opportunities.91  In 
response, each Commission established their own minority-focused training and referral 
programs.  The Nassau Human Rights Commission established the Job Development Center 
(henceforth Nassau JDC) in 1964.  The Commission dealt in a wide variety of racial issues, from 
fair housing to discrimination complaints and equal employment opportunity in county contracts, 
but it devoted over half of its county-funded budget to the Nassau JDC alone.92  The Nassau JDC 
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began as a referral and consulting service for other federal and local programs, but by 1967, the 
Nassau JDC funded its own job training center to develop work-related skills and directly refer 
the unemployed to jobs. The Nassau JDC secured jobs in Long Island’s growth sectors, including 
public utilities, clerical work, food service, and auto body repair.  In addition, eighty-five percent 
of its clients were African American.93  The Suffolk County Human Relations Commission 
turned to federal funding for its jobs program, the Job Counseling and Development Program 
(hereafter Suffolk JCDP).  The Suffolk JCDP inserted itself into the CAPs across Suffolk in 1966 
in order to reach out to the county’s poor and “improve their aspirations and self-confidence, and 
place them in gainful and satisfying employment.” Like the Nassau program, Sixty-five percent 
of all Suffolk JCDP clients were black.94 
Between federal, county, and local programs, job and training placement had impressive 
results on Long Island.  Historians have rightly criticized the War on Poverty’s poor economic 
foundation, but when funding was used effectively, as Guian McKee illustrates in Philadelphia, 
these programs could procure jobs.95 Unfortunately, an accurate assessment of Long Island’s 
programs is difficult since job placement records are inconsistent.  Regardless, data from Nassau 
JDC records reveal that the commission placed over 7,066 people through 1968.96  The Suffolk 
JDCP measured its ratio of applicants to placements, and forty-three percent of all who came 
through their doors, 3,517 of 8,114 applicants, were placed into jobs or training programs from 
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its inception in August 1966 through 1968.97  The Nassau EOC kept the most substantial records, 
and in 1967, the various CAPs across the county secured around 1,300 jobs and 600 training 
program placements.98  The local programs claimed at least 10,000 jobs by 1968.  But we have 
little data on the kinds of jobs offered or the length of time workers remained employed at them.  
A one month sampling from five Nassau CAPs that did, shows jobs across the occupational 
spectrum (see Table 5.1), and nearly seventy-two percent of these jobs were above “poverty 
level” wages in December 1967.99  An MDTA job training and placement survey from October 
1968 tells a different story, with some success in Long Island’s growth sectors, including nursing 
and manufacturing, but high dropout or unemployment rates in both high-skilled jobs (like 
electronic technicians and stenographers) and low-wage service work (including waiting and 
food service preparation) (Table 5.2).  The high dropout/unemployment rates in most categories 
(nursing and manufacturing excepted) reflect the challenge of breaching the labor market divide  
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Table 5.1:  Nassau EOC Monthly Manpower Placement Record, December 1967 
Employment Sector Job Placement Training Placement 



























Total 102 53 
Source:  Includes calculations from six of the ten Nassau Economic Opportunity Councils, including Roosevelt, 
the Five Towns, Freeport, Hempstead, Rockville Centre, and Long Beach.  See Economic Opportunity 
Commission of Nassau County, Manpower Division, “Monthly Manpower Placement Record, December 1967,” 




in the late 1960s.  Low-wage jobs were of little interest to the un- and under-employed, while 
significant skill training was necessary to land high-wage jobs.  The former required improving 
wages or altering the labor market itself, the latter demanded significant investment in education 
and training.   
Aware of the low-wages offered, program leaders openly protested the futility of their job 
placements despite the numerical victories.  Long Island’s unemployment rate was relatively 
low; Nassau’s rate hovered around 3.3 percent, while Suffolk’s did exhibit some slack at 5.7 
percent in 1967.  The Island did have an underemployment problem however.100  Two-thirds of 
all the people serviced in Nassau’s CAPs found jobs that did not pay enough to raise them out of 
poverty.  The EOC could offer them plenty of work opportunities, but this only provided 
horizontal mobility, not upward vertical mobility.101  Frustrated CAP aide John Gilliard of 
Westbury remarked that “when I say to the people I’ve got a job for them for $1.70 an hour, they 
look at me like I’m crazy.  Some of them figure they can go out on the street and hustle or write 
numbers and make a better living.”  He minimized the transportation problem, stating that “if a 
man can make $100 or more a week, he’ll get to the job if he has to walk.”102  Those who had 
minimum wage work chose to stay rather than risk an unfamiliar job, even if it had promotion 
opportunities.103  As one job seeker noted: 
“Everybody that I hang around with has looked for work at one time or 
another…and when they do get jobs they find jobs washing dishes and sweeping 
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floors and all like that.  And for the salaries they pay you to do that kind of work, 
it’s not worth it anyway.”104 
For those who utilized the programs, disillusionment set in after the initial consultation.  Edwin 
Dove, a Westbury resident and former porter, hoped to take advantage of the War on Poverty to 
climb out of twenty-five years of low-paying and insecure work.  He had worked for the WPA 
during the Depression, joined the Army during World War II, and held odd jobs at food shops or 
in elderly homes after the war.  His family ran into debt, and while his wife managed to pull in 
fifty-two dollars per week from a job as a packer and labeler in a nearby factory, the wages 
barely covered their $120 monthly rent and other bills.  He walked into the Westbury 
Community Council office, part of the Nassau EOC in 1967, looking for better opportunities 
than the former porter job he left.  Despite several leads and interviews, the offers were either 
trainee positions, which he thought was “a good way for someone to get cheap labor,” or poorly-
paid positions, which led to him question whether he should just “give my labor away.”105  
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Table 5.2:  Nassau-Suffolk M.D.T.A. Placement Record, October 25, 1968 by 
Occupational Grouping 




Auto body Repair 323 21 179 30 
Auto Mechanic 343 27 147 41 
Baker 31 39 14 26 
Cashier 11 0 8 27 
Clerk Typist 79 11 45 36 
Counterman 10 20 2 75 
Drafting 93 23 58 19 
Electric Meter Repair 22 45 0 100 
Electronic Technician 23 48 3 75 
Electronics Assembler 44 18 25 31 
Food Service Preparation 30 33 0 100 
Gas Engine Repair 22 41 4 69 
Household Appliance Repair 138 16 87 25 
Job Setter 35 26 17 35 
Keypunch Operator 24 4 8 65 
Licensed Practical Nurse 654 33 378 13 
Litho Duplicating Operator 56 30 26 33 
Machine Operator General 66 20 39 26 
Nurse Aid 434 15 248 33 
Office Machine Service 48 31 14 58 
Oil Burner Installer 141 5 96 28 
Oil Burner Repairman 26 19 11 48 
Plumber 43 33 7 76 
Plumber, Maintenance 33 21 15 42 
Power Sewing 20 20 15 6 
Production Machine Operator 74 23 39 32 
Refrigeration Mechanic 55 27 19 53 
Sales Clerk 13 23 6 40 
Sales Person, General 14 0 7 50 
Service Station Attendant 21 29 6 60 
Service Station Mechanic 36 36 8 65 
Sheet Metal Fabricator 69 29 37 24 
Short Order Cook 50 16 27 36 
Stenographer 104 77 58 44 
TV Service and Repairman 44 32 25 17 
Typist 204 28 78 47 
Waiter/Waitress 35 20 10 64 
Source: Organization for Social and Technical Innovation, Llewelyn-Davies Weeks, Forestier-Walker & Bor, 




The long-term unemployed who avoided these programs alarmed government officials 
committed to reducing welfare rolls.  Year after year during the War on Poverty, county budgets 
hit record highs, primarily because of rising welfare costs.106  A 1968 study determined that a 
woman with three children lived better on welfare unless she earned at least $2.04 per hour on 
Long Island.  Nassau Executive Nickerson condemned the minimum wage jobs offered to 
program recipients since they “can’t get people off welfare or out of poverty…especially if the 
job isn’t the beginning of something more.”  As Nickerson faced mounting political pressures by 
1968, he declared business must do more than “create low-paying, dead-end jobs which again 
appears to be all they are now willing to do.”107  It was a reality even his Republican opponents 
realized.  Hempstead Town Supervisor Francis T. Purcell argued that the $1.60 minimum wage 
did not make ends meet in high-cost Long Island, and private employers along with government 
must “upgrade these wages” to match the publicly-subsidized trained workforce coming out of 
job training programs.108 
 
Higher-paying work existed, and firms complained there was a massive labor shortage 
across the Island.  In 1967, it was estimated that job openings outnumbered the unemployed by 
14,000.  The shortage existed in high-skill jobs though, not unskilled work. A 1969 survey 
determined that less than four percent of day laborer and eighteen percent of domestic positions 
were open for thirty or more days.  On the opposite end, over half of machinist, fifty-five percent 
of electronic assembly, and nearly eighty percent of metal assembly positions remained unfilled 
for more than a month. Electronics, manufacturing, and service dominated the New York State 
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Employment Service’s job vacancy listings, and the New York State Labor Department could 
not fill nearly two-thirds of their job listings because applicants lacked the requisite skills.109  
Howard J. Gresens, personnel manager at Cutler-Hammer’s Airborne Instruments Laboratory in 
Deer Park admitted that “most of the job openings on Long Island are for skilled help, some of 
them for the highly skilled, and most of the unemployed are unskilled.”110  The War on Poverty 
was meant to solve this exact problem, to upgrade skills so that applicants could qualify for these 
better-paying positions, but firms did not trust or need the public training programs.  Defense 
industries had internal skill development programs, and many found the workers graduating from 
these training programs inadequate.  A canvass of eighty-three Nassau County employers 
revealed that over three-quarters had negative experiences with public job development 
programs on Long Island, overwhelmingly because the agencies did not supply workers with 
appropriate skills.  Only fifteen of the Nassau employers made use of public jobs programs.111  
The two explanations for intransigent un- and under-employment, low-wages on one side 
and lack-of-skills on the other, were in direct conflict.  Nassau Human Rights Commission head 
Farrell Jones condemned the out-of-touch employment qualifications as “unrealistic,” an excuse 
to keep wages low and bar low-income minority workers from the affluent workforce.  He cited 
World War II, when Long Island industry “took men and women of every type and every 
mentality – and they turned them into productive workers.  That's the key word – productive.  
These people can produce, but industry has to give something to get something; it must train and 
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offer opportunities.”  The problem as he saw it was that “blacks will no longer accept positions 
from which there is no escape” and that “no matter what the job is, it must pay a wage a man can 
live on.”  The rest of the County administration agreed.  Thomas F. Greene, Commerce & 
Industry chairman, called the cries of businessmen “nonsense…the people are there, and they 
want to work-but they also want to be treated like human beings.”112  Nickerson meanwhile 
appealed to business to improve wages and opportunity in Nassau’s official business newsletter, 
Commerce & Industry News, in October 1968.  In a direct letter, Nickerson declared that “we 
must invoke a new spirit of cooperation between private enterprise and public programs,” and 
that while government must play a key role, so too must business, because 
in far too many instances, industry allots jobs and often fails to fill them. And a 
minimum wage is not sufficient for a family to subsist in the New York 
metropolitan area.  So when we talk about creating jobs, or of assisting the 
disadvantaged, let’s act realistically-and responsibly…those few extra cents an 
hour, and the opportunity for advancement, foster self-respect, improve abilities, 
and make it possible for an employee to absorb the expenses of working. 
He concluded by declaring it was in business’ own self-interest “that welfare rolls be reduced, 
the tax share be spread more evenly, and the economy be strengthened.”113 
Both government and private firms doubled down on efforts to employ the poor after 
1968.  Grumman initiated a National Association of Businessmen (NAB) affiliated training 
program in August 1968, a national program to provide on-the-job training which would develop 
skills relevant to aerospace work.114  Limited to unemployed minorities, teens, older workers, the 
handicapped, and welfare recipients, the NAB program recruited from the existing job programs 
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and welfare services in Nassau and Suffolk counties.  Recruits were then put through a gauntlet 
of training, including psychological counseling, habit and motivation courses, money 
management, and high-school equivalency programs.  After passing these requirements, workers 
gained experience in on-the-job training sessions lasting up to four months.  Federal funding 
subsidized support services from medical and child care to transportation.  By February 1969, 
they had 165 positions ready for OJT recruits.115   
Local government likewise pursued a more comprehensive approach to their job 
programs.  The Nassau JDC and Nassau County government combined all of the county’s 
existing anti-poverty resources in an effort to move the “the disadvantaged upward and away 
from dependence on government agencies for financial support.”116  Dubbed by Nickerson the 
‘Cooperative Center’ in 1968, they were a County-run social service program providing every 
possible means of assistance to tackle the structural unemployment problem, including day-care, 
a car service, mental and physical health aid, skills training, and income support.  Residents 
would no longer navigate the multitude of employment and welfare services across Nassau 
County.  A client met with a counselor who coordinated all the support services necessary as the 
client searched for employment.  The idea was to “to remedy the conditions which prevent men 
and women from enjoying the dignity and material benefits of employment,” and while it 
resembled previous attempts to combat poverty, Nickerson claimed this to be the first of its kind 
in the nation.117  The innovative rhetoric was at least partly a response to Republican attacks on 
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the duplication of services between federal, state, and county programs, but it was unique in that 
it recognized both the material obstacles to skill acquisition and the limits of the existing War on 
Poverty apparatus.118  For Nickerson, the singular purpose was to remove all “barriers to a better 
life,” be they family obligations, poverty, health problems, or emotional issues.119   
The Suffolk JDCP established a similar program, where a coordinator helped an applicant 
with supportive services, from Medicaid, family planning, and Head Start, to training and 
transportation assistance.  The coordinator then referred the applicant to an employer, and after 
acquiring a job, remained in contact with both the applicant and the employer to assure the 
transition remained smooth. Unlike the Nassau program, the Suffolk JCDP focused on living 
wages and actively pursued employers who could either offer $2.00 per hour and/or upward 
mobility within the firm.120  They established their own US Labor Department-funded On-the-
Job Training program in 1967 so their applicants could develop skills and advance into high-
skilled positions.  The median wage began at $1.98 per hour, rising to an average $2.10 (though 
high wage jobs included $4.50) within six months, and within its first year and a half of 
operation, the Suffolk JDCP placed 267 people into the program.121  The JCDP also took 
accurate measurements of the wages offered.  From January to April 1969, 493 placements 
averaged a $2.31 hourly wage, ranging from $1.60 to $3.12, illustrating Suffolk’s commitment to 
a living wage.122   
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Despite these renewed efforts, both the private and public programs did not unravel the 
“paradox of unemployment” alongside “unfilled jobs” as a 1969 business report put it.123  The 
Suffolk JDCP’s search for voluntary hiring commitments from Long Island firms failed as 
companies refused to recruit from public programs.  Companies like Linear Electronics 
Laboratory, developer of communications equipment for the Apollo Missions, remarked that 
“our requirements always lie in a somewhat technical area and you have had very little success in 
matching candidates to our job openings.”124  An electrical manufacturer claimed that the JDCP 
offered no clients “with the experience requirements needed for our medium-size 
organization.”125  Even companies who utilized the program’s prospective employees, like 
Fairchild Republic, could not place these workers into skilled or semi-skilled positions, leaving 
them in low-wage service positions.126 Private efforts to employ the poor, like Grumman’s NAB 
program, likewise ended in disappointment.    Grumman retained one hundred of its 270 trainees 
by February 1970, and program administrators realized that the program did not serve the needs 
of the company, since they were cutting jobs and 
skill needs vary constantly; today we need riveters or clerk-typists, tomorrow spray 
painters or industrial truck operators, and the following day welders or machine 
operators; so you recruit for a specific open job, not for a job that might be open in 
the indefinite future.127 
 
The problems encountered through these efforts revealed that there was no ‘paradox,’ that the 
inability to employ all Long Islanders was intrinsic to the structure of the region’s “affluent” 
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labor market in the late 1960s.  Defense contracts still flowing to Nassau and Suffolk counties 
subsidized technical employment and had multiplier effects on the services they used.  White-
collar employment was expanding, though these jobs had a divide as well, either benefitting 
workers with advanced education or paying too little to provide primary earners with living 
wages.  The growth of white collar and technical employment gave the appearance of affluence 
and influenced the direction of Long Island’s job programs and the entire War on Poverty.  But 
any boot camp that reshaped the unemployed and relied on the private market to hire them 
required more than behavior modification and a few weeks or months of training.  The failure of 
these programs was written into their design, since all were based on the assumption that the 
unemployed could be absorbed into Long Island’s labor market.  In reality, workers were 
precluded from the job market because of the structure of the economy, where manufacturing 
was no longer the mass employer and no clear alternative existed to sustain wages for working-
class suburban living.   
 
Guaranteed Employment 
 After five years, Long Island’s War on Poverty did not produce the kind of results the bi-
county region’s affluence envisaged.  Families living in poverty declined from more than 36,000 
in 1966 to just over 25,000 by 1970, but improved social services accounted for the drop in 
poverty, undermining both administrations’ goal of putting their respective welfare departments 
out of business.128  ‘Tax-eaters’ consumed $63 million of Nassau’s revenue in 1968 as the 
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welfare population grew over 133 percent from 1962-1967, a greater increase than any other 
jurisdiction in the metropolitan area, New York City included.  In 1968, Nassau ran its first 
deficit in history thanks to a thirteen million-dollar hole in the Department of Social Services.  
Suffolk posted a similar 130 percent increase in the welfare population, and by the early 1970s, 
welfare accounted for nearly half of the county budget.   Long Island’s welfare recipient 
population was only a small fraction of New York City’s, and an aging population was partly 
responsible for this increase, as was Suffolk’s population growth.  But a 1969 county analysis of 
Nassau welfare recipients determined that illness, loss of employment or reduction in other 
means of support accounted for three-quarters of cases, and these cases could be resolved with 
stable, well-paying jobs.  The under-employed still required income maintenance to survive, and 
the responsibility fell on the counties to carry that burden.129   
 Nassau and Suffolk’s jobs problem (and the related welfare problem) was a microcosm of 
the broader failures of the federal War on Poverty.  With unemployment among disadvantaged 
groups holding steady, academics and politicians questioned whether the private economy could 
absorb the unemployed.  The Labor Department had been advocating for a public jobs program 
since the outset of the poverty war, and Congressional Democrats attempted two employment 
acts in 1967, including the Guaranteed Employment Act, though Johnson killed both in favor of 
‘voluntary’ employment programs.130  Public service employment nonetheless gained traction in 
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the late 1960s and early 1970s as a means to bridge the gap in what economists Michael Piore 
and Peter Doeringer dubbed the ‘dual labor market,’ the divide between low-wage dead-end jobs 
and well-compensated work that straightforward training could not breach.131  Welfare policy 
likewise went in new directions as guaranteed income schemes became popular among 
conservatives, leftists, and libertarians, each with different stakes in redistributing income to 
provide basic subsistence without a work requirement.132  By the late 1960s, the general 
conversation (among reformers at least) shifted toward a realization that the private labor market 
was not a source for economic security, and that the state would have to do more than train, 
modify behavior, create jobs, or provide support services.  But policy to reflect this realization 
remained mired in debate on the national stage from the late 1960s and into the early 1970s.  
Guaranteed income never came to fruition, and limited job programs, first as part of the 
Emergency Employment Act of 1971, and later as part of the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act of 1973 failed to meet the hopes of public employment advocates. 
Luckily, Long Island policymakers did not have to wait for Congress.  Nixon reorganized 
the Office of Economic Opportunity to “serve as a laboratory for experimental programs” as 
Nixon’s appointed OEO head Donald Rumsfeld put it.  While Rumsfeld deprived radical groups 
of OEO money, he simultaneously provided an opening for innovative projects.133  Nickerson 
had drawn up plans for a large-scale county-wide jobs program in 1968, and a year later he allied 
with the New York University affiliated New Careers Development Center to develop a service-
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oriented public jobs program.134  The program was based on an employment opportunity concept 
known as “New Careers,” first devised by sociologist Frank Riessman and educator Arthur Pearl 
in 1965. ‘New Careers’ claimed that millions of entry-level positions could be created in the 
automation-proof human services field, requiring no prior training while offering long-term 
career advancement if private enterprise and public institutions implemented a Fordist-scheme of 
de-skilling professional positions.  Doctors, teachers, social workers, and other professionals had 
a multitude of daily tasks that could be done more efficiently by aides, inspectors, or general 
assistants – from feeding children at schools to clerical work or recording patient vital statistics.  
These jobs, requiring little to no formal preparation, nonetheless provided on-the-job experience, 
and with built-in credentialing, they could lead to advancements and pay raises, so that the 
teacher’s aide could become a tutor, then a teacher, or a home health aide could become a nurse 
or social worker.  For the state, this eliminated both the costly “secondary educational system” of 
federal training programs and welfare payments.  For workers, this ended the dead-end nature of 
low-wage jobs.  Professionals also benefitted, since they could handle the more complex aspects 
of their job and meet the rapidly expanding needs in health care, education, and social 
services.135   
New Careers was a flexible concept, and found support in Congress from Senator Robert 
F. Kennedy, who secured $70 million for New Careers in the 1966 Economic Opportunity Act 
changes.  It was also similar to the broader push for public service employment at the federal 
level in 1969 and 1970, a concept that sought to expand the quality of local public services while 
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providing jobs to the unemployed.136  Beyond federal legislation, Riessman’s New Careers 
Development Center pushed municipal governments, hospitals, and unions to implement career 
ladders, explicit credentialing, and outreach to the unemployed.137  For Riessman, associated 
with Richard Cloward, Frances Fox Piven, and the anti-poverty movement in New York 
generally, the program had radical implications.  In the post-industrial economy, the service 
worker was the new working class, and ‘New Careers’ would empower this class without 
redistributing power or wealth from one class to another, instead expanding power to both those 
at the top (professionals), and the sub- or para-professional.  As the poor found jobs and power, 
Riessman contended that society would no longer need to maintain a ‘permanent poor,’ and these 
workers could now organize into hybrid union/professional associations linked to the New 
Careers concept.138  Debates emerged among radicals over the consequences of such a program 
as well as its potential to transform the nation.  Other America author Michael Harrington lent 
his strong support in the hopes that this would lead to a new union movement, but others like 
Frances Fox Piven believed the existing political system would not pass such a program, and she 
continued to push to overload the existing welfare system.139   
 Nassau County executive Eugene Nickerson was more interested in the practicality of 
New Careers rather than its radical potential.  Such a program could win the war on poverty by 
breaching the Long Island’s labor market divide and shifting the poor from welfare to 
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participants in the region’s economy. If federally funded, Nickerson could also expand public 
service provision without tax increases.  In June 1969, Nickerson established the county Office 
of Manpower Development, headed by labor economist and former textile union organizer 
Elwood Taub, who in cooperation with the New Careers Development Corporation filed for an 
OEO grant to design what was considered “the nation’s first guaranteed employment 
program.”140  The program proposal was an evolution of the County’s Cooperative Centers.  
Welfare applicants were treated as job seekers first, and would have the option of receiving 
immediate supportive services (day care, income assistance, Medicaid, etc.) while the office 
coordinated a job with advancement opportunities.  The manpower office had to find cooperative 
private employers who would design career ladders, but if they could not find a job within the 
private sector, the government served as the “employer of last resort.”   The job guarantee was 
the major innovation, so that “any individual who is willing to work ought to be able to work.”  
In a suburban county with high cost human services, public tasks could be subdivided, training 
could be built in, and jobs could be created.141   
The Nickerson administration contended that the job guarantee would solve many of 
Nassau’s poverty problems, above all the soaring welfare costs strangling local government.  
Aside from a three percent sales tax, property taxes were the only form of county revenue and 
had reached “confiscatory” limits, according to the administration.  The program would reduce 
the welfare rolls by a fifth and turn the rehabilitated into ‘taxpayers’ with career prospects and 
higher incomes in the future.  It would allow the County to meet service demands, particularly 
for the growing elderly population without burdening taxpayers.  Nickerson also understood the 
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political value of replacing the welfare system with guaranteed jobs, reassuring taxpayers their 
“hard-earned dollars are not perpetuating someone’s laziness,” and instead going toward a 
valued public service.  Furthermore, public service employment fit squarely within Nickerson’s 
‘custodial’ state, both as an efficient means to provide services as well as guarantee the welfare 
of county residents.  The Nickerson administration’s support for guaranteed employment also 
reflected a broader realization:  that the suburban economy, understood as the affluent model of 
the postwar 1960s, did not have unbridled opportunity for everyone, if only they had the skills, 
motivation, or proper knowledge of the labor market.  Suburbia, like the nation itself, had its 
share of low-wage jobs that mired people in poverty and placed them on the welfare rolls.  A war 
on poverty, whether suburban or otherwise, required interventions in both the supply and 
demand side of the labor market.  The guaranteed employment proposal recognized that “there 
are persons who are unemployed or underemployed who cannot be placed in the private 
economy,” that Long Island’s labor market had a deep divide, and that despite relative full 
employment, there were those who “do not show up in the very low insured unemployment 
statistic published and revised monthly,” and instead in other data, from welfare loads to poverty 
surveys.142  Direct job creation was necessary to reach full employment and raise the minimum 
wage private employers offered. 
The guaranteed employment proposal found a receptive audience in Nassau County.  At a 
public hearing on October 14, 1969, anti-poverty activists and residents expressed overwhelming 
support for the idea in a five-hour session.  Emma Morning, Nassau Welfare-Tenants 
Coordinating Committee chairperson, endorsed the program because “it’s about time that people 
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realize that everybody on welfare isn’t there because they are lazy and shiftless.”  Newsday 
journalist Martin L. Gross praised the plan as a step toward removing citizens from the 
“generation-to-generation dole,” and likened it to New Deal work relief programs.143  Nickerson 
intended the program for all county residents, publicly employing the recently laid off and 
returning Vietnam veterans if private employment could not be found, keeping them out of the 
unemployment offices and off the welfare rolls.  Nickerson believed that the program was so 
popular that he could use it as a political weapon against his Republican opponents, who had to 
publicly support the program, and if they didn’t, could be linked to Nixon’s “failed anti-inflation 
measures.”144   
For all the promise the proposal held, securing funding proved problematic.  After an 
initial $37,000 OEO research grant, Nickerson finally submitted a full plan in late 1969, though 
Manpower director Elwood Taub warned that it would be “an expensive program” and that while 
it would ultimately pay for itself, “society must first make the investment.”145  It turned out 
society, or at least the bureaucratic representation of society known as the OEO, was unwilling to 
invest.  The OEO demanded a narrower demonstration project, and Nassau responded with a 
pared down proposal covering only 450 volunteers.  In April 1970, the OEO rejected the 
demonstration project, claiming it could not generate data for “expanded implementation,” 
because from a national perspective, Nassau County’s poverty problems were less severe than 
most areas, and “a program that is successful in reducing poverty in Nassau would not be 
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necessarily successful elsewhere.”146  The OEO, while open to experimentation, wanted larger-
scale results that could be emulated nation-wide.  Nassau’s ‘affluence’ disqualified the county as 
a laboratory for experimentation.  Later that spring, the County received a much smaller 
$400,000 grant to restructure their civil service system and employ 120 unemployed or 
underemployed residents into para-professional and blue-collar career ladders.147 
 
Conclusion 
 The loss of OEO funding spelled the end of the local war on poverty, at least in the way it 
was conceived in the 1960s.  As the federal purse-strings tightened, the experimentation ceased.  
County Executive Eugene Nickerson, who at the War on Poverty’s outset claimed Nassau 
County as the litmus test for the national project itself, limped through his final year in office in 
1970, failing to mount his third run for state governor, facing allegations that his party received 
campaign contributions from architects and engineers in exchange for contracts, and continuing 
to run up the county debt.148  The Democrats then lost the county executive seat in November, 
the only major county position they held, and Nickerson’s successor, Republican Ralph Caso, re-
shuffled county government.  He appointed a university dean to the Social Service Department, 
and wanted something done about the illegitimate children born to women on welfare.149  In 
Suffolk, Dennison turned on the Suffolk County Human Relations Commission, firing its 
chairman George Pettengill in 1969 for favoring “low income ghetto groups” and therefore 
																																																						
146 “Application to Office of Economic Opportunity for Funding for a Demonstration Guaranteed Employment 
Program,” Box 68, folder “Jobs,” Nickerson Papers; “U.S. Shifts, Rejects Nassau Job Plan,” Newsday, April 17, 
1970. 
147 “County Jobs for Poor Seen in Nassau,” Newsday, June 30, 1970; For an analysis of the civil service reform, see 
June Leonard, Changing Values in the Civil Service Commission. 
148 “Signs point to no Return if Nickerson Fails Again,” Newsday, February 19, 1970, 5; “Nickerson, English, and 
others Subpoenaed in Contract Probe,” Newsday, October 27, 1970, 2. 
149 “It’s Caso for Nassau Executive,” Newsday, November 4, 1970, 6; “Caso Names Hofstra Dean Welfare Head,” 




failing to improve total human relations in Suffolk County, a goal which required working with 
both minorities and the “great “silent majority.” The termination became mired in court, and not 
until June 1970 did the two sides settle on Pettengill’s resignation.150  With the SCHRC 
sidelined, Dennison finished out his third term emphasizing his usual brick-and-mortar solutions 
to poverty, namely better housing and a welfare department overhaul.  In June 1971, he stepped 
down, paving the way for a Republican capture of the County Executive office in 1972.151   
After six years and over fifty million dollars, what did Long Island’s poverty war 
accomplish?  Former Nassau EOC director Donald Middleton lamented that his commission only 
“sponsored the kinds of programs which could…merely create a new form of welfare 
colonialism….that is, through simple services, these programs could turn served people into kept 
people.”152  His diagnosis mirrored that of the war on poverty in general.  If judged by the 
poverty programs’ ability to mitigate deprivation, the war was won, cutting poverty in half across 
the nation and keeping Long Islanders fed, cared for, and with a modicum of material goods, 
regardless of income.  In terms of political mobilization, Long Island’s CAPs did not produce a 
new politically active poor, and the local war on poverty operated mostly through bureaucratic 
offices rather than in the streets and poor neighborhoods of Nassau and Suffolk counties.  But if 
judged by the war’s broader purpose, that of increasing the earning capacities of the poor and 
including them into the prosperous mainstream, then it was a failure, and that failure was most 
apparent on Long Island.153  The War on Poverty was predicated on the idea that the United 
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States had mastered the tools to promote capitalist economic growth, and the suburbs like Long 
Island were the geographic manifestation of that mastery.  But Long Island’s affluence and its 
economic growth, especially by the late 1960s, did not absorb all of its inhabitants.  
Manufacturing, which had once been a mass employer, no longer played that role.  New 
economic sectors, mainly in white-collar service, had a deep divide between well-compensated 
skilled jobs and low-wage unskilled work.  Nonetheless, a structure designed with affluence in 
mind had been laid down.  Roads had been designed for automobile use and job centers 
depended on them.  Schools were sustained with property taxes and zoning encouraged 
homeownership.  Poverty was not concentrated but spread across a mixed urban and rural 
landscape.  Poverty activists focused on these barriers as the target of their programs.  Buses 
carried the poor to job centers to break down the spatial barrier, migrant workers were to be 
replaced with local residents, and skills were taught to prepare the under- and un-employed for 
the prosperous economy.  But all these efforts to employ the poor and provide adequate income 
attempted to alter the labor supply, and the only efforts to alter demand were voluntary 
commitments to hire. 
Skills, residency, and transportation, while problematic, were not the barrier.  The 
structure of the labor market that failed to provide adequate incomes stood at the center of the 
region’s problems.  By the end of the poverty war, Nassau County Eugene Nickerson had 
concluded that Long Island’s prosperity would not absorb the poor in of itself, and that jobs had 
to be created to permit the poor to become participants in Long Island’s affluent society through 
a right to work.  While perhaps radical compared to the heavy reliance on the ‘free market’ for 
jobs under the War on Poverty, Long Island had long relied on public employment for its robust 




employees and white collar workers, Nickerson merely sought a new source of state funding to 
buttress employment in the region as military Keynesianism had been doing since the 1930s.  
But, when the Office of Economic Opportunity closed that door, the bi-county region’s war on 
poverty was seriously compromised.  By 1971, Newsday claimed that Long Island’s poverty war 
was in a ‘phased withdrawal,’  and former Nassau EOC director Adrian Cabral stated that 
regardless of the war’s failures on the economic front, the anti-poverty efforts “succeeded in 
making many Long Islanders aware that poverty was there, and guilty that it was there, and 
uncomfortable with it.”154  Awareness did little for the poor. 
																																																						







If the suburbs were the symbol of postwar American affluence, the implications of 
suburban prosperity dramatically changed in the late 1960s.  After two decades of celebrating the 
suburbs as the embodiment of prosperity, the urban riots turned policy against the suburbs.  The 
1968 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Report) condemned America’s 
“two societies, one black, and one white – separate and unequal…one, largely Negro and poor, 
located in the central cities; the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs 
and in outlying areas.”1  The suburbs were part of the problem, beneficiaries of segregation and 
zoning policy to the detriment of cities.  Restrictive suburban land practices not only denied 
African Americans and the poor free housing choice, but restricted access to jobs leaving for the 
suburbs and tax revenue concentrating in suburban hamlets, depriving the urban poor of 
necessary public funds.  While the Report was not the first civil rights commission to condemn 
the ‘white noose’ for urban black problems, it publicized over a decade of activism and policy 
research that linked the city/suburb divide to the ‘urban crisis.’2  In this telling, suburban 
prosperity was “deeply implicated in the ghetto” because the suburbs concentrated jobs and 
public revenue within its borders.3  The problem of poverty and joblessness were spatially 
conceived, concentrated in some places and not others. 
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The Kerner Report gave long-standing struggles to end housing segregation a new moral 
imperative, because urban/suburban integration would solve joblessness, inferior schools, and 
poverty.  It also encouraged federal administrations and state legislatures to expand housing 
agency powers so they could construct suburban public housing, because widely dispersed low-
income housing projects would alleviate urban problems. In all, the Kerner Report and related 
research galvanized civil rights groups, federal bureaucracies, state housing agencies, and local 
governments to address integration in the wider metropolitan context.  The NAACP looked to 
break down zoning laws and literally disperse the urban poor into the suburbs and link them to 
suburban jobs.  The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), state agencies like 
Nelson Rockefeller’s Urban Development Corporation (UDC), and even county and local 
initiatives likewise hoped to enhance employment opportunity with targeted housing 
integration.4  Even modest proposals to improve housing opportunity for the suburban poor 
adopted the belief that the suburbs were generally affluent and owed their ‘fair share’ of public 
services to the poor.  All proposed high-density housing projects to redress injustices in housing, 
land-use policy, and by extension, employment and public service inequalities. 
This view approached the nation’s problems with a binary city versus suburb, poor versus 
affluent, and decline versus growth framework, and it obscured the reality that the ‘urban crisis’ 
was part of a much larger shared economic transformation affecting the entire metropolitan area.  
Long Island’s long-term labor market divide already undermined the belief that spatial mobility 
translated into upward mobility, and the gap between well-paying and low-wage employment 
only widened after 1968.  Blue-collar jobs left New York City, but suburban Long Island did not 
gain them in proportion.   From 1969 to 1974, manufacturing jobs left all but the five least 
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populated and most remote suburban counties in New York’s seventeen county metropolitan 
area.5  In contrast, white-collar employment expanded in both city and suburbs during the 1970s, 
though these gains did not offset the blue-collar losses, and metropolitan area employment fell 
seven percent from 1969 to 1976 as the New York area’s population dropped by nearly half a 
million.6  The post-industrial turn in New York, Long Island, and the metropolitan area as a 
whole benefitted those who could transition to white-collar work, while those who relied on 
industry for their livelihoods suffered.  The ‘suburb’ was not a promised land for jobs. 
Long Island’s suburban hamlets were not necessarily overflowing with tax revenue to 
share either, and the dualism obscured the diversity of suburbs too.  If suburbs were to offer their 
‘fair share,’ the question was who was ‘responsible’ to redistribute their resources.  While some 
suburbanites opposed low-income housing projects on racist or class grounds, the hamlets 
targeted for new housing included working class, low-income, and black or integrated 
neighborhoods.  Placing the minority poor into black or integrated suburbs would only 
exacerbate segregation, and working class or low-income suburbs were hardest hit by job loss.  
In Long Island’s balkanized tax system, the fiscal costs of public services were limited to local 
populations.  Any alteration to a community’s tax base, from declining job opportunities to 
proposed public housing had serious consequences on yearly tax bills, neighborhood stability, 
and school quality.  And since property taxes were based on assets owned rather than ability to 
pay, it became increasingly regressive as incomes stagnated and unemployment rose.  In sum, 
Long Island’s suburbs were deeply divided along race and class lines and property taxes only 
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exacerbated the divide.  ‘Fair share’ was a question between suburbs as much as it was between 
city and suburb. 
 The following chapter describes the dissonance between the binary city/suburb 
formulation employed to solve urban problems and the complex reality of suburban inequality on 
Long Island. Historians have documented the brief moment in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
when housing integration reached the national stage but was fiercely (and successfully) resisted 
by suburban homeowners and their political allies.  At the center of most accounts is white 
racism and the political coalitions built around segregated property and neighborhoods.7  But by 
focusing on homeowner resistance, particularly ‘white’ homeowners, historians simply 
reproduce the arguments of the Kerner Report, that city and suburb was the great dividing line 
between the haves and the have-nots in postwar America.   By ignoring the massive changes 
occurring in the suburban labor market, both activists at the time and historians since ignore the 
emerging inequality among suburbanites and the links between the urban and suburban poor.  
 
Post-Industrial Long Island 
On October 23, 1972, The White House Office of Management and Budget christened 
Long Island a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), marking its official 
transformation from a bedroom of Gotham to a city comparable with Los Angeles, Chicago, 
																																																						
7 The literature on integrated housing and why it failed is voluminous.  For an influential contemporary discussion, 
see Michael Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Detailed historical 
accounts along this line of thought include Matthew Lassiter’s Silent Majority, who argues that suburbanites 
successfully defeated the integrationist liberal agenda by adopting a ‘color-blind’ ideology that claimed their 
suburban residence was a marker of market-based meritocratic success, and that integrationist policies threatened 
‘freedom of choice.’ See Lassiter, Silent Majority; Lily Geismer makes a similar argument for postwar liberals, who 
supported key liberal stances on the environment, war, and civil rights nationally, but believed in the same market-
based individualism with regards to suburban housing and successfully defeated housing proposals on those 
grounds.  See Geismer, “Don’t Blame Us.”  For studies of how Richard Nixon solidified support among 
suburbanites by prohibiting federal agencies from pressuring suburbs to accept integration, see Lamb, Housing 




Detroit, and its neighbor, New York.  As the first metropolitan area without an urban core, the 
region exemplified the 1970 census revelation that more Americans lived in suburbs than in 
cities or rural areas combined.8  Long Island was at the center of a debate over what Louis 
Masotti and Jeffrey Hadden called the “urbanization of the suburbs,” that suburbs were not only 
a distinct place to live, but home to factories and offices as well, making the ‘sub’ prefix 
meaningless.9  While recognizing the culmination of a century long process that accelerated over 
the last three decades, Masotti and Hadden claimed that a rapid transition had taken place, 
turning the suburbs into a source of economic growth independent from the urban core the 
suburbs once relied on, what historians Jon Teaford called ‘Post-Suburbia;’ Joel Garreau titled 
the ‘Edge City,’ and what Robert Fishman christened the ‘technoburb.’10   
At best this was a belated recognition of suburbia’s growth and newly relevant political 
influence, which complicated the urban/rural divide that historically drove politics in the 
twentieth century.  But discussion of suburban independence obfuscated the massive economic 
transformations affecting city and suburb alike in the 1960s and 1970s, part of the broader 
national transition from industry to services.  New York City, while historically the global 
financial capital, became the national hub for corporate headquarters in the postwar period, 
largely because corporations could utilize New York’s concentration of banking institutions, 
professional services, and the region’s highly skilled labor force.  Between 1947 and 1980, 
																																																						
8 Jackson, 283-284. 
9 Peter O. Muller, Contemporary Suburban America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), x, 5-6. 
10 Jon Teaford, Post-Suburbia; Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier (New York: Doubleday, 1991); 
Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, 1987); This debate 
over whether suburbs were dependent on central cities was pronounced in the early 1990s.  For a review of the 
literature, see Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, “The Importance of the Central City to the Regional and National Economy: A 
Review of the Arguments and Empirical Evidence,” Cityscape: A Journal of Policy, Development, and Research 1, 
no. 2 (August 1995): 125-150; For an excellent critique of the suburbs as a new city, see Sharpe and Wallock, “Bold 





developers added 145 million square feet to Manhattan’s office space supply.  Managerial and 
professional occupations increased as a proportion of total employment in Manhattan, part of 
some nine million jobs south of 60th Street that employed half of New York City’s workers and 
300,000 suburban commuters as of 1980.11  New York’s suburbs, Long Island included, were 
drawn into the orbit of this growing white-collar economy.  While few large corporations located 
to Nassau and Suffolk Counties, satellite offices for insurance and credit card companies, as well 
as law, advertising, accounting, and real estate firms sparked an office building boom across the 
Island.12  White collar employment had been growing since World War II, but accelerated 
rapidly in the 1970s.  In 1960, there were only thirty office buildings Island-wide, occupying 
800,000 square feet.  During the 1960s, developers constructed five million square feet of new 
office space.  Builders added another nearly eight million from 1970-1973 alone.  By 1980, some 
twenty million square feet existed throughout Long Island, forming new concentrations of 
service sector employment that dotted central Long Island from Lake Success to Hauppauge.13  
Office development ushered in a new age of job growth.  In Nassau County for example, 
finance, insurance, real estate, and more generalized ‘services’ accounted for about eighty 
percent of all job growth from 1970-1975 (see Figure 6.1).  Service-sector jobs did not mean 
Long Island developed an “independent labor market identity, separate and distinct from that of 
the remainder of the New York Metropolitan region” because the wealth generated in Manhattan 
																																																						
11 Danielson et al., New York, 45-7.  
12 Two prominent corporate firms, Lufthansa and American Airlines, made high profile moves to Long Island.  
More common however were satellite branches for insurance firms such as Metropolitan Life and Government 
Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), and credit card companies like MasterCard and Uni-Card.  See Francis 
Wood, “LI Is White-Collar Vineyard,” Newsday¸ April 1, 1970, 96; “LI Overstocked with Office Space,” Newsday, 
April 1, 1973, 11; Nassau County Planning Commission, Roosevelt Field Area Development Guide (Carle Place 
NY: Nassau County Planning Commission, 1977), 14. 
13 Long Island Regional Planning Board, and Arthur H. Kunz, Commercial Development Analyses: 1982 
(Hauppauge NY: Long Island Regional Planning Board, 1982), 41-2; Suffolk County Planning Commission, Suffolk 




drove this expansion.14  While there were fewer commuters in 1970 than 1960, those commuters 
contributed a disproportionate share of local spending, supporting a broad array of service 
workers, ranging from teachers and civil servants to health care aides and fast-food attendants.  
The median income of commuters was twice that of local employees, and a fifth of all locally-
employed residents toiled in low-level clerical work.15			 	
Just as Long Island’s white-collar growth mirrored the structural changes occurring in 
New York City, Nassau and Suffolk also shared in the tristate (New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut) metropolitan area’s manufacturing losses.  The defense industry, already discussed 
in chapter 3, faced the combined threat of recessionary shocks and long-term structural change, 
																																																						
14 Pearl M. Kamer, “Inflation and Economic Activity: The Nassau-Suffolk SMSA,” Long Island Economic Trends 
Quarterly Technical Supplement (June 1974): 6.  
15 In 1960, 31.8 percent commuted to NYC. Ten years later, that number dropped to 24.6 percent.  Kamer, “Inflation 
and Economic Activity,” 7; Professionals made up the second largest contingent of workers on Long Island.  See 
Kamer et al., A Profile of the Nassau-Suffolk Labor Force, 18-20; Nassau commuters accounted for forty-three 
percent of the aggregate earnings for the county.  The median income for Nassau-Suffolk commuters was around 
$12,000, compared to $6,200 median income for local employees.  See Pearl M. Kamer, “An Economic Profile of 
Commuter Relationships: The Nassau-Suffolk SMSA,” Long Island Economic Trends Quarterly Technical 
Supplement – Third Quarter 1974 (September 1974): 2-4; See also “Island is Found Still Dependent on City,” New 



































Figure 6.1. Share of Nassau County Employment Growth, 
1970-1975.  Source: Nassau County Planning Commission, 
Nassau County, New York Data Book (Mineola NY: Nassau 










shedding some 11,450 jobs in just two years from 1969-1970. 16		As Table 6.2 indicates, the 
entire New York metropolitan area lost industrial jobs in the early 1970s, an abrupt change from 
general growth during the 1960s.  Manhattan and Brooklyn’s losses were acute, but these jobs 
left for the South and West, not the suburbs, which despite small gains along the outer ring, 
collectively lost over 29,000 jobs.  Academics and journalists focused on the economic decline in 
central cities versus the new economic role of suburbs, largely because the central cities in the 
metropolitan region – New York, Newark, Jersey City, or Yonkers – visibly displayed the scars 
of manufacturing job loss.  But manufacturing was “no longer a flourishing industry even in the 
suburban portions of some of the nation’s metropolitan areas” as Nassau-Suffolk Suffolk 
Regional Planning Board economist Pearl Kamer concluded in 1977.17  By 1976, over ten 
million square feet of industrial space was vacant on Long Island, sixty-two percent due to either 
contractions or plant closings, and the remainder because of out-migration to other states or 
foreign countries.18  Industrial job loss was a regional shift rather than local migration within the 
metropolitan area.19 
Long Island’s vacant industrial space was less visible because of the nature of suburban 
industry, where highly flexible and decentralized industrial parks seamlessly made the transition 
from industry to services.  No employment center better exemplified this physical	transformation 
than Roosevelt Field in Nassau County.  The former airfield and home to the Island’s largest 
mall was a major industrial hub from World War II through the 1960s.  Over three-quarters of its 
land was zoned for industry, home to defense contractors Reeves Instrument and American  
																																																						
16 “Long Island Recession: A Fact Sheet,” Box 65, folder “Commerce and Industry,” Nickerson Papers. 
17 Kamer, Nassau-Suffolk’s Changing Manufacturing Base, 1. 
18 Ibid, 2. 




Bosch Arma.  By the 1970s, industry accounted for less than half of Roosevelt Field’s land use 
and only forty-seven of the 542 establishments in the area.  Vacant factories became furniture 
stores and office complexes sprouted from industrially zoned land.  Finance, insurance, and 
service firms employed five thousand workers in the area.  Another quarter of Roosevelt Field’s 
twenty thousand jobs were in retail, the new source of “job opportunities for unskilled and semi-
skilled people” as a local land use study noted.  Manufacturing still remained, though 
increasingly in low-wage and footloose textiles and plastics.  Roosevelt Field, a planned 
industrial center that once housed makers of missile guidance systems and spacecraft computer 
Table 6.1. Net Change in Manufacturing Employment, 1964-1974, New York/New Jersey 
Metropolitan Area. 
   1964-69 1969-74   
  Core     
  Manhattan 6,427 -119,558   
  Kings -5,147 -55,786   
  Bronx 1,832 -13,995   
  Queens 11,571 -22,079   
  Hudson 3,009 -24,091   
  Essex 974 -22,575   
  Inner Ring     
  Richmond -1,388 -1,789   
  Nassau 17,198 -19,685   
  Westchester 8,651 -7,880   
  Bergen 19,220 6,524   
  Passaic 7,435 -14,052   
  Union 15,546 -15,190   
  Outer Ring     
  Middlesex 12,232 3,703   
  Somerset 4,339 5,952   
  Morris 11,426 3,771   
  Rockland 1,682 -195   
  Suffolk 9,843 7,747   
  Putnam 133 -120   
  Net Change 124,983 -289,298   
Source:  Pearl M. Kamer, Nassau-Suffolk's 




components was now a regional center for furniture, clothing stores, and life insurance branch 
offices.20  
Roosevelt Field’s transformation from industrial to service hub highlighted the cosmetic 
differences between city and suburbs, but while idle smokestacks and weed-infested warehouses 
did not scar Long Island’s landscape, the effects of the transition were no less traumatic for Long 
Island’s industrial workers.  Suburban manufacturing employees already faced financial hardship 
in the 1960s.  Increasing property, income, and social security taxes along with inflation ate up 
all but 94 cents of increased purchasing power in Nassau and Suffolk Counties from 1965 to 
1968.21  Long Island’s average weekly manufacturing wage was $125 in 1967, just nine dollars 
over the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ lowest budgetary threshold above poverty for a New 
York family of four.22  Cutbacks in the aerospace industry pushed Long Island’s rising 
unemployment rates ahead of the national average in the late 1960s, and when national recession 
hit in the early 1970s, manufacturing employees along with construction, retail, and low-level 
service workers made up the bulk of the region’s unemployed.  The jobless rate climbed to five 
percent in Nassau and nine percent in Suffolk in 1971, and after a slight drop, returned to over 
seven percent in Nassau and nine percent in Suffolk in 1975.23   
Long Island’s working class, who Newsday journalist Bill Moyers called the “not-so-poor 
who earn too much to go on welfare and too little to live securely,” took lower paying jobs, 
second jobs, or sent another family member to work, forgoing movies and vacations to adjust to 
																																																						
20 Nassau County Planning Commission, Roosevelt Field Area Development Guide, vi-17, 99. 
21 Nicholas Kisburg, Suburban Affluence: For Whom? (New York, NY: International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Joint Council No. 16, 1969), 69-4.1. 
22 Ibid, 69-4C. 
23 “Labor Demand and Supply Fact Sheet: Nassau,” February 1971, Part V, Box 1526, folder 3, NAACP Records, 
LoC; “Labor Demand and Supply Fact Sheet: Suffolk,” February 1971, Part V, Box 1526, folder 3, NAACP 
Records, LoC; Pearl M. Kamer, “Income Levels and Purchasing Power:  The Nassau-Suffolk SMSA,” Long Island 




their lower standards of living.  The Newsday editorial staff viewed Long Island’s workers 
through the ‘silent majority’ lens, interviewing the ‘white working class’ and their feelings 
toward minorities, student activists, and elite liberals, though these workers had much in 
common with Long Island’s black working class, who likewise fit Newsday’s description of the 
‘not-so-poor.’24  Black workers were half as likely to hold white-collar jobs, nine percent more 
likely to work in the blue-collar sector, and were unemployed at rates exceeding their proportion 
of the population.25  The increasing hardship of both black and white blue-collar workers 
illustrated a growing inequality emerging during the decade in America’s cities and its suburbs, 
an inequality based on the loss of productive jobs for millions of Americans.  The focus on 
suburbia’s new dominance obscured what suburbs and cities shared, even if the transition in 
cities dwarfed that of suburbs.  Those suburbanites who possessed higher education and skills, 
like their urban counterparts, thrived in the post-industrial economy.  Those who could not easily 
transition into white-collar work faced an uncertain future, regardless of their urban or suburban 
residency.26   
 
																																																						
24 “The Plight of the Not-So-Poor,” Newsday, May 24, 1969, 1W; “Survival in the Working Class:  They Gripe but 
they Manage,” Newsday, May 24, 1969, 6W; “Life with Cappelli on $101 a Week,” Newsday, May 24, 1969, 11W; 
“How they Get Away from it All,” Newsday, May 24, 1969, 13W. 
25 “LI Rides a White-Collar Trend,” Newsday, July 21, 1972, 3; While blacks were around 4.6 percent of Long 
Island’s 1970 population, their unemployment rate ranged from 5.7 to 6.5 percent in spring 1971.  See “Labor 
Demand and Supply Fact Sheet: Nassau,” March 1971, Part V, Box 1526, folder 3, NAACP Records, LoC; “Labor 
Demand and Supply Fact Sheet: Suffolk,” March 1971, Part V, Box 1526, folder 3, NAACP Records, LoC; “Labor 
Demand and Supply Fact Sheet: Nassau,” April 1971, Part V, Box 1526, folder 3, NAACP Records, LoC; “Labor 
Demand and Supply Fact Sheet: Suffolk,” April 1971, Part V, Box 1526, folder 3, NAACP Records, LoC; For long-
term black unemployment see “Black Jobs:  Not so Bad but still Bad,” Newsday, March 27, 1975, 39. 
26 This growing labor market segmentation amidst overall growth was occurring in other North-eastern regions, New 
England in particular.   After World War II and accelerating into the 1970s, the region lost its semi-skilled blue-
collar textile and shoe industries, though held onto transportation equipment while gaining high-tech and white-
collar work.  See Bennett Harrison, “Regional Restructuring and “Good Business Climates:” The Economic 
Transformation of New England since World War II,” in Sunbelt/Snowbelt: Urban Development and Regional 




The Lily-White Suburb 
While manufacturing jobs left city and suburbs, the nation’s urban problems were 
viewed, thanks to the Kerner Report, as a uniquely ‘urban crisis,’ the consequence of a divided 
and racist society.  The Commission set the terms of the debate in its sixteenth chapter, 
presenting statistics that proved segregation of low-income African Americans had accelerated, 
while jobs and the middle class had moved outward to the suburbs, a process that excluded 
minorities.  The Commission offered two possible solutions: ‘enriching’ the ghetto through 
public expenditure, or ‘integrating’ ghetto residents into suburbs, and in its conclusion advocated 
that both were necessary.27  ‘The Enrichment Choice’ or what policymakers and activists called 
the ‘place-based’ approach to urban problems, was an extension of slum clearance, urban 
renewal, and anti-poverty policy, though sensitive to local community needs.  ‘Place-based’ 
advocates conceived of the inner city as an underdeveloped region, similar to that of former 
colonies in the Third World. These advocates, which included Black Power radicals, aspiring 
black capitalists, and the AFL-CIO, supported public or private investment to stimulate the local 
economy, train the poor for new jobs, and improve the local quality of life from within the ghetto 
itself.  This call for a domestic urban ‘Marshall Plan’ eventually became the Model Cities 
program in 1966, a massive endeavor to revitalize cities headed by the newly minted Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and its head, Robert C. Weaver.28  The Kerner 
Commission and those promoting enrichment after 1968 called for an expansion of Model Cities 
and similar initiatives to encourage inner-city institution building. 
																																																						
27 US National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 389-408. 
28 Pritchett, “Which Urban Crisis?” 266; Hylan Lewis, “Pursuing fieldwork in African American communities,” in 
Against the Odds: Scholars Who Challenged Racism in the Twentieth Century, eds. Benjamin P. Bowser, and Louis 





The Kerner Commission also urged the ‘Integration Choice,’ which aimed to integrate 
the poor into the suburbs and ‘disperse the ghetto’ (known as the ‘people-based’ approach to the 
urban crisis).  It was the product of the same economic and racial statistics as the ‘place-based’ 
approach to inner-city development, but was based on different assumptions about the cause of 
urban decay and supported by distinct interest groups from those proposing inner-city 
‘enrichment.’  The ‘people-based’ approach implicated the suburbs in the plight of the inner city, 
arguing that the urban crisis was a product of the broader metropolitan redistribution of resources 
away from the city and toward the suburbs.  Exclusionary policies, including zoning and real 
estate practices, deprived the minority poor of vital tax revenue and job opportunities available in 
the suburbs, not to mention housing choice.  It was a zero-sum game, and the suburbs won as 
cities and their residents lost out.  These conclusions were drawn from researchers studying the 
link between race, the spatial layout of metropolitan areas, and employment, and few academics 
were as influential as Harvard economist John F. Kain, who produced studies that linked housing 
segregation and black unemployment.  Kain’s theory, a contribution to urban policy literature 
known as the ‘spatial mismatch hypothesis,’ were cited in the McCone Commission Report, a 
response to the 1965 LA riots, and the Kerner report.29  Kain was a vociferous critic of ‘place-
based’ policies, arguing such policies ‘gilded the ghetto,’ hardening the problems associated with 
inner-city poverty and encouraging further migration of poor blacks to northern ghettoes. He 
wanted to break down housing segregation to open the expanding suburban job market to inner 
city African Americans, i.e. ‘dispersing the ghetto.30  For Kain and the people-based approach 
																																																						
29 Edward L. Glaeser, Eric A. Hanushek, and John M. Quigley, “Opportunities, Race, and Urban Location: The 
Influence of John Kain,” NBER Working Paper No. 10312 (February 2004): 7; Kain, “Housing Segregation, Negro 
Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization,”175-197; For Kain’s ideas in the Kerner Commission Report, see 
US National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 392; See also Kain, “the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis:  
Three Decades Later,” 373-374. 




generally, the city was not to achieve parity with the suburbs; the suburbs had to be opened up to 
make their plenty available to urban dwellers.   
The link between jobs and housing segregation was appealing because it tied the most 
profound problems of the urban north together:  housing segregation, minority unemployment, 
and the fiscal challenges of cities.  The ‘spatial mismatch hypothesis’ provided activists and 
academics a powerful argument for the plight of the minority poor and a renewed impetus to end 
housing segregation.  Civil rights groups, particularly the NAACP, who had previously 
challenged racist housing policy at the federal and local levels, applied these conclusions to their 
existing struggles against segregation.  The logic also fit well with the emerging consensus of the 
‘urbanization of the suburbs’ and the alleged suburban dominance in the economy, politics, and 
social life of the nation.  Popular academic books, including Richard Babcock and Fred 
Bosselman’s Exclusionary Zoning, Michael Danielson’s The Politics of Exclusion, and Anthony 
Downs’ Opening up the Suburbs attacked zoning for constructing the divide between declining 
minority dominated cities and white suburbs.31  Policy organizations like the Regional Plan 
Association (RPA) and the National Committee against Discrimination (NCDH) incorporated 
Kain’s ideas into their own efforts to integrate housing and ease the urban crisis.  The NCDH 
conducted research into the “relationship between access to housing and job opportunities” and 
warned that housing segregation forced black workers into an employment situation “previously 
experienced by no other group in the history of this nation:  denial of the opportunity to live in 
areas reasonably proximate to available jobs.”32  The Regional Plan Association published their 
																																																						
31 Two earlier examples include: Jeanne R. Lowe, Cities in a Race for Time (New York: Random House, 1967); 
Mitchell Gordon, Sick Cities (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965); For more information, See Bruegmann, 47; For a 
discussion on the long history of anti-suburban academic literature, see Sharpe and Wallock, “Bold New City or 
Built-Up 'Burb? Redefining Contemporary Suburbia.” 
32 National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, The Impact of Housing Patterns on Job Opportunities; 




own findings in 1969, illustrating the “widening “geographic gap” between the location of 
unskilled jobs and the location of housing for people who hold (or could hold) these jobs.”33   
The NCDH, RPA, and other reports formulated their conclusions from three basic 
statistical categories:  the racial demographics of cities and suburbs, the disparity between high 
black and low white unemployment, and finally, the long-term movement of jobs (namely 
manufacturing) to the suburbs.  The existence of suburban housing segregation was widely 
accepted by the late 1960s, but the suburbs were only recently recognized as the new dynamic 
job growth centers compared to jobless inner-cities.34  Expanding commutation links between 
city and suburb would help around the margins; building affordable housing, which required re-
zoning single-family suburban districts for high-density housing complexes, was necessary to 
give the inner-city minority poor the ability to relocate to the suburbs and take suburban jobs.  
Anthony Downs, economist and member of Johnson’s National Commission on Urban Problems 
in 1967 (and contributor to the Kerner Commission), best exemplified this view in his 1973 
book, Opening the Suburbs.  Job growth was understood spatially, and the suburbs were 
currently producing the most employment opportunities and were expected to for the future as 
well.  Fostering ‘ghetto industries’ would never provide enough jobs for all those in need, and 
suburban employment centers were too dispersed for new commuting links to be beneficial.  As 
a result, “the only way to establish the required linkages is to provide suburban housing 
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opportunities near new job openings.”35  Publicly-funded or privately-financed high-density 
housing would be affordable, and would shorten the distance between people and jobs.  For these 
policymakers, researchers, and activists, labor market barriers were rooted in the housing market.   
By making housing available in the suburbs, the poor could escape ‘poor places’ for the ‘right 
places.’   
This framework developed into a ‘dispersal consensus,’ a common belief that dispersing 
the poor into the suburbs could improve their job prospects, educational outcomes, and quality of 
life.  This consensus was convincing enough to inform the strategies of housing agencies from 
local governments to Washington.36 In 1969, Housing and Urban Development Secretary George 
Romney launched a nationwide attack on housing segregation, fearing that the nation itself could 
not survive with “a run-down, festering black core, surrounded by a well-to-do, indifferent white 
ring.”  Romney’s HUD designed the Open Communities Program to “provide an opportunity for 
individuals to live within a reasonable distance of their job and daily activities by increasing 
housing options for low-income and minority families” in the suburbs.  “To solve problems of 
the ‘real city’” Romney contended, “only metropolitan-wide solutions will do.”37  In New York 
State, Governor Nelson Rockefeller empowered his new Urban Development Corporation in 
1969 with the legal ability to override local zoning ordinances state-wide.  The UDC, under the 
command of planner Edward Logue, had unprecedented powers to construct low and middle-
income units in the suburbs, and Logue set out to build suburban housing for the poor because he 
																																																						
35 Downs, Opening the Suburbs, 28; For a complete understanding of Downs’ perspective, see chapter 4 of this 
book.  
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believed that New York’s urban problems could only be solved “within the wider metropolitan 
context.” 38  Agencies did not limit dispersal advocacy to the city/suburb divide; even dispersal 
within suburbs was understood as critical to breaking down barriers to employment and 
education.  On Long Island, the Civil Rights Coordinating Council of Suffolk County formed the 
Suffolk County Development Corporation (SCDC) in 1969 to build public or publicly-assisted 
housing across the county.  The goal was to free “black and other minorities from the 
deteriorating ghetto housing in which they had been locked by a combination of discrimination, 
poverty and powerlessness.” The Corporation associated inadequate housing in the suburbs with 
“unemployment, inferior education, inadequate transportation for access to jobs and the 
debilitating effects of successive generations of welfare dependency.”39   
Public agencies embraced the ‘dispersal consensus,’ but civil rights groups were the first 
to act on this theory, largely because it added urgency to long-standing fights against housing 
segregation, and no organization had been as committed over the long-term to ending housing 
segregation as the NAACP.  Since its inception, the organization addressed residential racial 
segregation, invalidating racial residential ordinances in Buchanan v. Warley in 1917 and 
restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948. It was during local housing campaigns and 
the Shelley case that the NAACP first incorporated economic data and sociological research into 
lawsuits, a tactic they adapted to other suits, most prominently Brown v. Board of Education.40  
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Despite these victories, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and hundreds of state and local laws 
banning discrimination in housing, segregation remained.  Selective enforcement was partly to 
blame, but so too was the other key component of spatial segregation:  zoning.  A land-use 
power widely used across America’s suburbs since the 1920s, zoning barred unwanted land-use 
and ‘undesirable’ development in order to balance the need for revenue-generating property with 
the protection of property values.  While not explicitly racial, suburban zoning was overtly class-
exclusive, favoring single-family large-lot homes and banning high-density housing.  This, when 
combined with a racially segmented mortgage market, produced racially segregated and class-
exclusive suburbs, as David M.P. Freund argues.41  But the color-blind intent of zoning, 
obscured in the language of professional planners, made it difficult to challenge on racially 
discriminatory grounds.  The ‘spatial mismatch’ of jobs and housing offered a new framework to 
challenge zoning policy, since denying housing opportunity to low-income people in effect 
nullified equal employment opportunity, and by extension, the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.   
For the NAACP, the claims of the ‘dispersal consensus’ linked all of the major inequities 
facing non-whites, from unequal housing opportunity to unemployment and concentrated inner-
city poverty.  In 1969, the NAACP challenged zoning on these grounds.  A trove of economic 
data was required to prove such a complex claim, and the NAACP coordinated with the 
Suburban Action Institute (SAI), a Westchester based planning think-tank founded by planner 
Paul Davidoff.  Considered a father of ‘advocacy’ planning, a subfield devoted to addressing 
racial and class inequality, Davidoff wanted SAI to be the research and litigation foundation for 
																																																						




the ‘clientless.’42  SAI represented the millions of poor and non-white urban residents, and they 
promised to secure ‘locational choice’ for all, a privilege reserved for industry and white 
Americans in the postwar period.  Spatial mobility, and therefore increased employment 
opportunity, required breaking down those “exclusionary practices of the suburbs themselves 
that help create the poverty and ugliness of the slums,” and forcing suburbanites to assume their 
social responsibility “by opening up their land, job markets, and tax resources to [the poor and 
working class].”43  The NAACP received SAI’s expertise in this relationship, while SAI gained a 
prestigious activist organization with unparalleled legal clout, what one planner called 
“organized pressure from the people who are being done in.”44  All they needed was a case, and 
in 1969, SAI and the NAACP found their first opportunity in the nearly all-white town of Oyster 
Bay, Long Island. 
 Fair Housing Development Fund Corp. v. Burke, the case challenging zoning in Oyster 
Bay, had its origins in a local housing fight.  The Glen Cove NAACP branch wanted to secure 
adequate housing for a small black population in the Town of Oyster Bay in the mid-1960s.  
Glen Cove branch President James Davis established a non-profit housing corporation in 1969, 
the Fair Housing Development Fund Corporation, and applied for federal housing loans to build 
moderate and low-income apartments.45  High-density housing required a zoning variance from 
the Town of Oyster Bay’s zoning authority, the most local government unit in charge of land-
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use.  The authority excluded almost everything except single-family large-lot housing, and 
variances provided zoning boards flexibility and gave local residents discretion over what to 
permit or deny. 46  The Town did not approve the variance, which attracted the attention of the 
NAACP national office.  From the NAACP’s perspective, the Town of Oyster Bay was a perfect 
example of the spatial mismatch hypothesis and how housing barriers denied employment 
opportunity.  Oyster Bay was located on Long Island, the national suburban exemplar just twelve 
miles from the New York City border.  The Town enforced strict zoning laws that favored higher 
standards for building construction and minimum lot acreage in the two decades after 1950. The 
majority of vacant land was already zoned for two-acre plots, and in the 1950s, smallest 
residential zoning category, similar to Levittown’s plots, was erased altogether.  Apartments 
were likewise removed from zoning categories, and variances were required for any multi-unit 
developments.47  Increasing minimum lot size rose property values and tax revenues, as did 
attracting industrial property.  Already home to Grumman, Oyster Bay vigorously lured firms to 
its borders in the 1950s and 1960s.  Between 1963 and 1969, over half of all Nassau County job 
growth occurred within the Town’s borders, largely in industrial fields including electronic 
components, machinery, aircraft parts, and plastics.48  In addition, office building construction 
attracted insurance companies, brokerage houses, and various business firms to the area, 
boosting white-collar employment.49  Lastly, Oyster Bay did nothing to racially integrate 
housing, typical of most suburban jurisdictions.  In 1970, the Town’s 333,000 residents were 
99.2 percent white, and among the thirty-six villages and hamlets over which the Town of Oyster 
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Bay had zoning powers, half of the 2,700 African American residents lived in three segregated 
areas:  East Massapequa, Oyster Bay village, and Locust Valley.50  The Town’s white 
dominance, in combination with its economic boom, made it a good illustration of the poor 
city/affluent suburb formulation.   Oyster Bay was a white fortress, using zoning to block non-
whites from both housing and job opportunity. 
   As the zoning variance languished at Town Hall in December 1969, NAACP national 
housing director William Morris ordered the Town to downzone a fifth of its vacant residential 
land for multi-family dwellings and affordable single-family homes, or face legal action.51  The 
goal was to open Oyster Bay to New York’s poor, and according to SAI estimates, the re-zoning 
proposal would add about 18,000 people to the Town’s population (an increase of five percent) 
and would raise property taxes by 2.3 percent.52  The Town and its residents refused to comply.  
Newly elected Oyster Bay Town Supervisor John Burke promised to defend ‘home rule’ against 
the NAACP, claiming that “Oyster Bay doesn’t have any fences around it.”53  Residents 
interpreted the demand within the context of the racial and class inequality inscribed into 
property and neighborhoods.  At NAACP/SAI sponsored meetings across Oyster Bay, residents 
expressed concern that taxes would rise while public service quality would diminish. In addition, 
residents associated the decay occurring in city centers with race, and public housing in Oyster 
Bay would introduce those problems to the suburbs.54  As one resident proclaimed, “nobody 
																																																						
50 “Population,” Legal Department Case Files, 1960-1972, Supplement to Part 23, Series B, Section 2, reel 8, slides 
87, 101, Papers of the NAACP. 
51 “History of the Case,” Part V, Box 1526, folder 3, NAACP Records, LoC. 
52 “NAACP Official Defends Figures in O. Bay Study,” Newsday, December 27, 1969, 8. 
53 “Planners Back NAACP in O. Bay,” Newsday, January 28, 1970, 4. 
54 David M.P. Freund discusses how the relationship between racist housing policy and zoning influenced the white 
racial ideology about property in the twentieth century.  He argues that whites came to understand property and 
neighborhoods in terms of their racial makeup, associating inner city decay with the presence of African Americans 
and suburban stability with whites rather than the structural forces under-developing cities and over-developing 




wants a Negro project to spring up on the land they’ve cherished.  We moved to this area 
because of the way it is.”55  Just as the NAACP understood the problem as one of housing, Burke 
and the majority of residents resisted the plan in terms of housing, that it threatened their own 
neighborhoods and the sanctity of local zoning powers.   
A few residents and politicians went beyond the housing framework and questioned the 
NAACP’s broader claim that dispersing the poor would transform employment opportunity.  The 
outgoing Town Supervisor Michael Petito argued that the NAACP was “making a serious 
mistake playing with 50,000 human beings, moving them from a ghetto in New York to another 
ghetto in Oyster Bay.”56  While an exaggeration of numbers, Petito doubted whether a spatial 
move would improve their quality of life. The Town of Oyster Bay Conservative Party likewise 
condemned the NAACP’s proposal as a project of activists, who “have apparently despaired of 
eliminating city slums, and who now propose to transplant them to Oyster Bay…without 
providing anything of value for the slum dwellers themselves.”57  Local resident and city 
planning student Jerry Katz elaborated on these criticisms.  For the residents to benefit from the 
move, jobs would be necessary, but Katz doubted the local job market could employ thousands 
of new low-skilled residents.  Without employment, poor residents would be worse off in 
suburbia, far from public transportation and social services.  As Katz argued, the project 
increased costs to local and future residents without much benefit to the relocated.58  
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 After over a year of deliberation, the NAACP took legal action, submitting their suit on 
March 24, 1971 to the U.S. District Court.59  It was an ambitious class-action lawsuit, accusing 
the Town of Oyster Bay Town Supervisor (John W. Burke), the Town Board, and the Town 
Housing Authority of supporting a land-use policy that discriminated in three ways.  First, 
zoning policy segregated existing non-white residents.  Second, zoning excluded non-whites and 
other disadvantaged low-income citizens from living in Oyster Bay.  And finally, those same 
zoning laws excluded non-white and low-income workers from jobs they could otherwise attain.  
Therefore, zoning effectively nullified equal housing and employment laws, and since the courts 
permitted local zoning powers only if land-use policy promoted the ‘general welfare,’ Oyster 
Bay’s zoning codes were unconstitutional.60  The NAACP went further, demanding affirmative 
action to end segregation, that the Town set aside land for new dwelling units that “meet the 
needs of the Plaintiffs and the members of the classes they represent,” disadvantaged minority 
residents from outside Oyster Bay.61 The NAACP assembled a diverse group of plaintiffs to 
represent New York’s disadvantaged non-white population. Six plaintiffs were black Town 
residents occupying ‘substandard’ dwellings, including a temporary county-subsidized motel 
room, a shack on a golf course, and a variety of dilapidated apartments.  Another plaintiff 
worked for Grumman but could not find suitable housing within the Town.  Finally, the suit also 
included an unemployed Bronx man who did not take a job in the Town of Oyster Bay because 
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he was denied housing.62  Since the NAACP sought a broad Court decree rather than redressing 
narrow plaintiff grievances, they had to amass census data, housing statistics, employment 
figures, and expert testimony to convince the court that land-use policy, while not explicitly 
biased, was in effect discriminatory because it had disparate impacts on housing choice and job 
opportunity.63   
The NAACP faced formidable obstacles to their claims.  The defense refuted the first 
claim that poor housing conditions and limited housing choice for Oyster Bay’s non-white 
residents was contrary to zoning’s ‘general welfare’ purpose by arguing that income, rather than 
race, accounted for such outcomes.64  This line of defense, that economic segregation was the 
outcome of pure market forces and lawful efforts to stabilize communities, had been woven into 
the logic of ‘property rights’ and land-use policy since the early twentieth century.  By the 1970s, 
homeowners, Supreme Court justices, and President Richard Nixon himself followed this logic.  
One year prior, the Supreme Court upheld color-blind bans on low-income housing in James v. 
Valtierra (1971), and by 1975, the Supreme Court fully defended the constitutionality of 
economic exclusion.  This required a narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment’s equal 
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protection clause, but was nonetheless emerging as a defensive strategy against open-housing 
cases.65 
The same logic could be applied to out-of-town black residents.  The NAACP alleged 
that the Town’s zoning prohibited black employees of Grumman Aerospace Corporation (located 
in Bethpage) from living in its hamlets.  To prove this, the NAACP illustrated that only thirty-
one of a total 1,100 black employees lived within Oyster Bay’s borders in 1971.  Nearly a fifth 
commuted from New York City, compared to just four percent of white workers.  This was not a 
factor of occupational differences between white and black workers either.  Operatives, who 
were paid the same rate regardless of race (seniority, however, affected wages), were five times 
more likely to be city residents if they were African American.  Black workers, even in the same 
positions, did not share communities with their white co-workers.66  Housing segregation, as 
both general population statistics and Grumman employee residence proved, was clear.  Whether 
Town zoning played a role in this segregation was less apparent, and whether workers or 
employers suffered as a result was unclear.  The NAACP contended that the racial residential 
divide existed because of exclusionary zoning.  Edward Underwood, the plaintiff’s 
representative Grumman employee, resided in Westbury, a village two miles west of Oyster 
Bay’s town border.  He desired to live within the Town of Oyster Bay, but did not waste time 
looking because he knew of friends who “claimed that [prices] were so high that they couldn’t 
buy one over there.”67  The defense questioned whether Underwood faced undue hardship 
because he could not live within the Town.  From Westbury, he made an eight-mile trek to and 
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from work each day, which took on average twenty-five minutes.  His commute, while 
originating outside the Town’s borders, was substantially less than trips from nearly half of 
Oyster Bay’s neighborhoods.68 As Underwood’s case revealed, the Town’s borders were porous, 
and out-of-town workers were not necessarily burdened because they lived outside Oyster Bay. 
This was the reality for African American Grummanites living in North Amityville, Wyandanch, 
and New Cassel, all less than ten miles from the Grumman plant in Bethpage, and for over half 
of Grumman’s white workforce in Suffolk County.  The defense meanwhile challenged the claim 
that zoning played a pivotal role in the Town’s housing segregation, and Edward Underwood 
admitted that “because I’m black and if I go to the bank, they’re not going to loan me the money 
to buy a house.”69  Aside from loan discrimination, depositions revealed a myriad of widespread 
private discriminatory practices, from racial steering to outright realtor refusal to sell to non-
whites.70  This did not implicate zoning directly, which was color-blind but legally class-
exclusive.   
The NAACP had the most difficulty proving that exclusionary zoning increased black 
unemployment.  They amassed hundreds of pages of data from the 1950s and 1960s, 
substantiating the fact that industry had shifted from cities to suburbs, and that between 1963 and 
1969, the Town of Oyster Bay enjoyed factory growth.  They then projected this data forward to 
prove that job opportunities (especially in blue-collar sectors) would increase in the Town, using 
Regional Plan Association estimates for metropolitan job growth to 1985 and their own appraisal 
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of future plant growth based on vacant industrial land in Oyster Bay.71  As the NAACP claimed 
in January 1972, 
Regional trends indicate that in the coming decades, increasing numbers of blue-
collar workers will be migrating to the New York Metropolitan region to work and 
live.  Many will look to the suburbs for jobs and housing, as the city’s ability to 
provide blue-collar employment continues to decrease.  Trends indicate that the 
Nassau-Suffolk County area will contain…about 20 percent of the Region’s total 
employment growth and more than 50 percent of the manufacturing growth 
between 1959 and 1985….the Town of Oyster Bay in particular contains the bulk 
of the bi-county area’s major employment centers, a relationship which is expected 
to continue in the future.72 
The plaintiffs warned that this growth was dependent on “future changes in the Town’s Building 
Zone Ordinance” to accommodate the workforce for these plants.  Without affordable housing, 
black job-seekers would not find work, leading to higher levels of unemployment and labor 
shortages.  According to the NAACP, zoning undermined the Town’s economic future, because 
industrial growth required a ‘diversified’ workforce.73  This was contrary to the ‘general welfare’ 
purpose of zoning for the broader metropolitan population, Town employers and the Town’s 
economy. 
 These claims were based on past data from the 1960s projected forward, not considering 
present conditions.  The NAACP did recognize the short-term cutbacks in the defense industry, 
though were confident that over the long-term, blue-collar employment would continue to 
grow.74  The defense was unconvinced.  The NAACP provided no concrete data that blue-collar 
demand existed within Oyster Bay, and according to the Town attorneys, the NAACP “merely 
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state the conclusion that there are job opportunities in Oyster Bay.”75 Employment data 
contradicted the NAACP’s claims (see Table 6.1), as did a 1971 HUD report, which found “no 
reason to believe that employment will expand…salaries are on the decline and unemployment is 
on the increase.”76  The defense repeatedly asked for numbers proving there were jobs for the 
urban unemployed, and in the depositions, they questioned each plaintiff about whether the local 
economy was actually expanding.77  Grummanite Edward Underwood agreed that his employer 
shed jobs in the early 1970s, and that industry in general had been contracting in the area.78  
When Fair Housing Development Corporation chairman and Glen Cove NAACP member 
William Joseph Johnson was asked where they amassed their job data, he admitted it was from a 
1965 Nassau County Planning Commission report.  Defense Attorney Albert Bader then inquired 
about employment growth after 1969, to which Johnson replied, “we are in unusual times right 
now.  We are in a recession.  And I think that has affected the whole structure, the whole 
picture.”79 
 The NAACP and the Suburban Action Institute believed spatial mobility, i.e. opening up 
the suburbs for the urban poor, would translate into jobs and upward mobility.  The plaintiffs 
based their case on the alleged city/suburb divide, where suburbs were an affluent space with 
plentiful jobs, and city was a poor space with declining employment.  Housing segregation 
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denied the urban poor access to suburban plenty.  But the ‘two societies’ trope assumed the 
economy was prosperous, that job opportunities were widely available and what mattered was 
the location of economic growth.  This was the basic premise behind the dispersal consensus 
generally, as outlined in the Kerner Report and promoted by policy-makers, academics, and 
activist groups.  All operated within a liberal framework that wanted to use the state to enhance 
economic opportunity for individuals within the private ‘free market’ of jobs.  Like the dominant 
strain of the War on Poverty, the problem for the poor and unemployed was supply – in this case 
housing supply in the right places, limited by racism.80   
Meanwhile, the Town and Long Island generally were shedding blue-collar work, both 
due to a short-term recession and the broader transformation occurring in the region.  Suburban 
plenty was available to those with the skillset and credentials to participate.  In response to the 
dispersal consensus and this case, Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board Chief Economist 
Pearl Kamer contended neither “Nassau or even Suffolk can provide substantial numbers of blue 
collar jobs for central city residents whose blue-collar jobs have moved elsewhere.”81  Without 
jobs, the urban poor would compete with the suburban poor for low-wage work in a high-cost 
area.  MIT Economist Bennett Harrison warned in 1974 that “there may be jobs in the [suburban] 
ring, but they are not necessarily jobs that will raise the ghetto dweller’s standard of living.”82  
The two tiers of the labor market, which long-existed on Long Island, were diverging further as 
high-paying unskilled industrial work contracted and white-collar jobs flourished.  
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Suburbanizing the urban poor would not improve the skills of the current generation nor break 
down the discriminatory barriers to higher-paying employment.83   
On the brink of losing the case, the plaintiffs changed their argument in March 1973, 
demanding Affirmative Action based on the ‘fair share’ concept. They argued that the Town of 
Oyster Bay should house some 34,000 new residents, composed of people whose racial 
demographics were the same as those of New York City.84  This was necessary because 
The Town of Oyster Bay has a duty to provide housing for some of the black 
economically disadvantaged persons who currently live in the ghettoes of New 
York.  Considering the fact that the New York City Housing Authority operates 
approximately 154,000 units of public housing, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
Oyster Bay build 10,000 units by 1985 as its fair share of public housing needs of 
the New York Metropolitan Region.85 
The NAACP was now in effect demanding a spatial redistribution of poverty across the 
metropolitan landscape, for suburbs to share in the burden of urban poverty and unemployment.  
Suburban opportunity would not lift the poor out of poverty, but the suburbs had a responsibility 
to house them.  The weakened case limped on for another two years before the NAACP 
withdrew the suit in October 1975.  A recently settled case in Rochester, New York destroyed 
their class action strategy when the court limited petitioners to those who were 
“personally…injured.”86 And since the Town of Oyster Bay was in the process of building low-
income housing, both parties admitted land-use controls were ‘color-blind,’ and the Town Board 
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never outright rejected the zoning variance, the plaintiffs had little chance of winning.87  But the 
case also failed on the logic of linking fair housing and employment opportunity, assuming 
suburban affluence without considering the particular economic processes occurring in specific 
places.  When the logic no longer held up, the NAACP turned to a redistributive strategy, that 
suburbanites should have their ‘fair share’ of the metropolitan area’s poor.   
 
 “More than the Average Homeowner Can Sustain”88 
The NAACP case illustrated the flaws of the dispersal thesis, and while the NAACP 
ultimately failed to resettle New York’s poor into the Town of Oyster Bay, they were but one 
organization attempting to solve urban problems through space.  HUD, under the leadership of 
George Romney, New York’s Urban Development Corporation, led by planner Edward Logue, 
and county agencies initiated their own high-density housing integration plans on Long Island.  
They were not as ambitious as the NAACP’s dispersal plans, instead draped in the discourse of 
‘fair share,’ that the suburbs held of surplus of tax revenue that could be redistributed to the poor.  
The benefits for the poor were improved housing and better access to suburban services, but jobs 
were not paramount.  Instead, ‘fair share’ focused on the costs, namely the costs suburbs could 
afford to bear.  It also implied responsibility, that suburbanites owed the poor access to their 
resources.   
Advocates of these housing projects, including HUD, the UDC, and local agencies, faced 
virulent resistance.  Suburban opposition partly stemmed from the racial and class views formed 
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through segregationist policy and ideas coalescing around crime, urban protest, and public 
housing in the 1960s.  For many white suburbanites, decades of exclusionary housing policy had 
obscured the structures of segregation, and whites believed that suburban homogeneity was a 
consequence of market forces.  Intrusion into the natural workings of the housing market was a 
threat to property rights and freedom of choice, and asking that they ‘take responsibility’ for their 
achievement in the marketplace was a threat to basic freedom.  This was the basis for resisting 
integration since the 1940s.89  These long-held ideas mixed with more recent developments, 
including ‘culture of poverty’ theory, the rise in crime, urban protest, and public housing.  As 
African Americans increasingly inhabited public housing projects in the nation’s cities, public 
housing itself became associated with black Americans.90  The riots, originating as protest 
against police brutality, were interpreted as the actions of criminals and civil rights protest was 
successfully linked to the steadily rising crime rates, as Vesla Weaver argues.91  Finally, ‘culture 
of poverty’ academic theory, which drew links between the poor’s behaviors, attitudes, and 
values and their poverty, gained academic and public legitimacy.92  These racialized ideas about 
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the source of urban poverty were a conservative counter-narrative to the Kerner Report’s 
conclusions.  Rather than segregation causing urban deprivation, it was the behavior of the poor 
and government appeasement through generous welfare, lax arrests, and a search for ‘root 
causes’ that enabled such conditions.  Responsibility, in the minds of any suburbanite who 
subscribed to these ideas, began with the poor themselves and with a government that should 
enforce ‘law and order’ rather than abetting the violence.  Relocating the poor into the suburbs 
would only disperse these problems into their neighborhoods, and segregating the poor was the 
only recourse suburbanites had to keep suburbs ‘free’ of the perceived threat of the poor.  This 
form of resistance was politically potent and had powerful allies, including President Richard 
Nixon, who played a key role in diluting housing integration efforts at the national level in the 
early 1970s.93    
Though powerful, this conservative counter-narrative was expected; these ideas, and the 
policies that fostered such ideas, were exactly what dispersal advocates were challenging.  But 
this was not the only criticism of suburban housing projects.  Contrary to the assumptions of the 
dispersal consensus, suburbs were diverse, and suburbanites from working class and low-income 
hamlets challenged the rationale behind ‘fair share’ itself, namely the idea that the suburban 
labor and housing markets benefitted all suburbanites equally and consistently, and that the 
‘suburbs’ were a space of generalized affluence, unlike the city.  For one, ‘white’ did not 
accurately describe Long Island’s suburbs, and black residents felt especially wronged when 
their neighborhoods were targeted for public housing because they already shared space with 
poor people and adding more non-whites would exacerbate segregation.  Just as importantly, the 
consequences of low-income housing projects were not borne by the ‘suburbs’ as a whole; the 
																																																						




affected local community would disproportionately accept the costs of such housing.  As 
described previously, Long Island’s suburban hamlets were highly fragmented, placing the costs 
of key public services on local neighbors.  For working class suburbs, the problem of property 
taxes and the quality of public services became more acute in the 1970s in the face of stagnating 
incomes, inflation, and rising unemployment.  This was a ‘suburban crisis,’ fiscal challenges that 
hit particular hamlets in a divided suburban landscape, unlike the deeper ‘urban crisis’ shared 
broadly by cities with unified taxing districts. 
As stated in chapter 3, property taxes were one of the most contentious issues in suburban 
politics, linked to residents’ pocketbooks, quality of local services, and the stability of a 
community itself.   On Long Island, the property tax was not levied evenly across suburbia.  A 
homeowner’s tax bill was ideally based on the market ‘value’ of the property, though houses 
were rarely assessed at market prices.  In Suffolk, each of the ten towns had different assessment 
practices and did not reassess properties on a yearly basis. Islip calculated assessments on five-
year old market values, while the Town of Babylon assessed levies according to 1954 
construction costs.  Nassau County likewise assessed based on 1938 construction costs minus 
depreciation.  In Nassau and the Suffolk’s Town of Babylon, property taxes were determined by 
the quality of construction, not the market value of one’s home.  Even if two cape cods in 
completely separate hamlets had vastly different market values, their assessed value would be 
the same if construction standards were similar.  This became a problem as the value of homes 
and the incomes of residents between suburbs diverged over time, particularly in the 1970s.  By 
1984, residents of majority-black Roosevelt, the most over-assessed hamlet in Nassau County 




percent of their property’s value in taxes, while New Hyde Park, the most under-assessed, paid 
only 1.5 percent.94  
Since Long Island’s government structure was divided into tiny taxing districts, a small 
group of homeowners had to fund public infrastructure, which further added a burden on 
property-poor and lower-income districts that had to raise tax rates to maintain schools and other 
public services.  Basically, uneven assessments forced lower-income homeowners to pay higher 
taxes compared to their home’s market value, while balkanized tax districts placed the costs of 
public services on these homeowners alone (save state funding), all while incomes stagnated, 
unemployment rose, public expenses grew, and poverty concentrated in these communities.  
These combined factors unleashed the property tax’s regressivity.  As Table 6.2 indicates, the tax 
rate for each one thousand dollars of assessed valuation in 1971 was highest in neighborhoods 
with family incomes below the County median.  By 1984, tax inequities were skewed further.  
Newsday conducted an award-winning study illustrating how Long Island’s assessment practices 
disproportionately affected lower-income homeowners.  Property owners in the affluent suburbs 
of Manhasset and Garden City paid between 0.9 and 1.2 percent of their homes’ value in 
property taxes, while residents of the two lowest valued communities, Roosevelt and 
Wyandanch, paid over four percent of their homes’ value in taxes each year.  In some instances, 
residents in poorer neighborhoods actually paid more in taxes than affluent homeowners.  In 
Nassau, a $41,000 home in Roosevelt owed $2,144 in taxes in 1984, while a $175,000 home in 
																																																						




Manhasset owed only $2,091.  In Suffolk, a two-story Wyandanch home worth one-third of a 
West Babylon ranch received tax bills only two dollars apart.95   
Discussions of over-assessment and property wealth may seem abstract, but homeowners 
felt such inequities directly. As the Newsday report contended, “over-assessment affects the way 
a family lives – the way people eat and dress and furnish their homes…whether they can plant 
grass, or paint the kitchen or pay the phone bill.”96  Individual stories illustrate this point.  
Elizabeth Milton had purchased a $36,500 home in Wyandanch across from a vacant lot, which 
came with a $2,233.64 yearly tax bill, about $960 more than she should be paying based on the 
value of her home.  This tax burden contributed to her $616 combined monthly mortgage and tax 
payments, a bill she failed to pay when she fell ill and missed workdays at her $5.45-an-hour 
packer job at a local plumbing supply company.  To catch up, Milton had to end Friday pizza 
nights with her daughters and avoid purchasing needed clothing.  Such sacrifices were small 
compared to that of the Holman family of Amityville.  Glenda and William Holman fell behind 
on their monthly mortgage and tax payments, a combined $724 (including a $223 monthly tax 
bill, double the county’s median tax burden).  To catch up, William worked double maintenance 
shifts at a hospital while his wife asked relatives for money and braided hair for extra income.  
Nonetheless, the mortgage company had begun the foreclosure process, and Glenda admitted 
“we’re just buying time.”97  Such outcomes affected not only individual	families, but entire 
communities.  Foreclosed and boarded-up homes depressed property values, encouraging a cycle 
of further inequality between thriving and declining suburbs.  
																																																						
95 Lawrence C. Levy and Robert Fresco, “Property Taxes: The Unbalanced Burden,” Newsday May 12, 1985, 4-5, 
30, 34; Irene Virag, “Penalties for Those Who Struggle: Making the Struggle Harder,” Newsday, May 13, 1985, 4, 
21-22; Paul Vitello, “Overassessment Hits New Homes Hardest,” Newsday, May 14, 1985, 5, 26-28. 





This was the context to public housing opposition in working class and low-income 
suburban neighborhoods in the 1970s.  Since the costs of such projects would be borne at the 
most local level in a regressive tax structure, public housing had material consequences for those 
living within its taxing districts. Nevertheless, policymakers continued to embrace the notion of 
suburban affluence and sited their integration projects in these struggling suburbs.  These 
neighborhoods fit their conception of suburbs that should take their ‘fair share’ of the 
metropolitan region’s poor.  Just as ‘inner city’ and ‘urban’ became euphemisms for ‘black’ and 
‘poor’, ‘fair share’ advocates viewed ‘suburb’ as a surrogate for middle class and white.  This 
obfuscation meant that the integrationist solution, low-income housing schemes, were not social 
justice projects but an unfair burden weary governments placed on a small segment of the 
Table 6.2:  Total Tax Burden of Selected Nassau County Communities, 1970-1971 
 Median Income (1969) Total Tax Burden, 1970-1971 
(per $1,000 of assessed valuation) 
Lawrence 27,413 159.12 
East Williston 22,671 174.99 
Garden City 21,221 154.12 
Manhasset 19,864 130.69 
Jericho 19,311 149.43 
Great Neck 18,167 178.20 
Merrick 17,518 167.10 
Plainview 16,198 181.56 
Nassau County Median 14,632  
Uniondale  13,356 149.70 
Levittown  13,083 181.64 
East Massapequa  12,728 151.04 
Farmingdale  12,585 195.07 
New Cassel  12,013 196.16 
Hempstead 11,504 179.72 
Roosevelt 11,122 183.50 
Inwood 9,444 152.30 
Source: Income Data from Nassau County Data Book, 1974, 152-154; Tax data from New York State 
Department of Audit And Control, Division Of Municipal Affairs, Bureau Of Municipal Research And 
Statistics, Overall Real Property Tax Rates: Local Government In New York State: Fiscal Years Ended In 1971 
(Albany: Bureau Of Research And Statistics), 22, 63-64.  




suburban population in an attempt to alleviate poverty through relocation.  The fights that 
ensued, including the three examples below that originated from the county, state, and federal 
levels, illustrate the spatial battles over the poor that spatial solutions to poverty created.  
 HUD’s Open Communities program, intended to incentivize suburbs to build affordable 
housing for the minority poor with grants and urban renewal funds when it was initially 
conceived in 1969, targeted the Town of Oyster Bay on Long Island because it fit the ‘spatial 
mismatch hypothesis,’ the same reason the NAACP chose Oyster Bay.  Long Island, along with 
twenty-five other SMSAs with similar conditions, had employment facilities under construction, 
a projected labor shortage, and a lack of nearby housing for new workers.  Though Nixon 
curtailed the ambitious Open Communities program in 1970, the ideals of Open Communities 
remained, and HUD continued to favor suburban applicants to further housing integration and 
employment opportunity.98  The Town of Oyster Bay applied for HUD funding in the early 
1970s to house its small but growing poverty population, most likely to counter the claims of the 
NAACP.  In 1973, the Town unveiled a 172-unit public housing project (30 units were for low-
income families) to be built in the small hamlet of East Massapequa, tucked into the very 
southeast of the town.  The location met all of HUD’s suburban objectives as initially outlined in 
Open Communities.  East Massapequa was majority white (sixteen percent of its residents were 
black), had open space, lacked environmental hazards, and was situated in a Town with 
“employment positions available to all types of applicants.”99  From the broad formulation of 
suburban affluence, East Massapequa fit.	
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	 But environmental data, the suburban location of the project, general census numbers and 
Town-wide labor market statistics belied the more complex socioeconomic dynamics of East 
Massapequa.  The hamlet was the most diverse in the entire Town, and children attended the 
half-black Amityville school district in neighboring Suffolk County.  Nearly a fifth of the 
district’s students were enrolled in Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), while thirteen percent of 
school district families survived on incomes below $5,000, around the 1970 Federal poverty line 
for a family of five.  Lastly, the claim of employment opportunities did not ring true at the local 
level.  The Sunrise Mall, currently cutting retail jobs, was the only local employment center, and 
project residents would otherwise have to travel over a mile for the nearest public bus or expend 
between ten and fifteen percent of their yearly income to drive to any nearby large employment 
hub.100   
East Massapequa residents and Amityville school officials opposed the project from its 
outset in 1974.  Some residents expressed fear of crime and their rhetoric was steeped in 
assumed behaviors of the poor.  One resident warned that “someone is going to get mugged,” if 
the project were built, engulfing the entire community in criminal activity.  The West Amityville 
Civic Association took out a full page ad in the Massapequa Post, sarcastically remarking that 
“free trouble” came complimentary with low-income housing.  Another resident countered the 
Town’s claim that eighty-eight children would enter the school district since “sterilization is not 
a requirement,” invoking the belief of the poor’s promiscuity.101  But residents also had concrete 
reasons beyond their fears of the poor.  As the official opposition report noted, the project 
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contradicted HUD’s goals of integrating suburbs and increasing opportunity, and would instead 
exacerbate segregation and isolation.  By re-housing a proportion of Oyster Bay’s low-income 
population (estimated to be sixty-five percent black) in this project, HUD would be lowering the 
racial balance of other hamlets while tipping the black school population over fifty percent, 
requiring an already burdened school district to now educate Oyster Bay’s low-income 
population.  The potential for neighborhood change already motivated blockbusters to scare 
homeowners into moving, tipping the racial balance further.  As both the school district and 
residents made clear, the project contradicted the ideals of the Civil Rights Acts rather than 
upholding them.  The project would also isolate the poor from public amenities and job sites, 
accomplishing little aside from offering improved and stable housing.102   
If the project did little to integrate or improve opportunity, it nonetheless imposed costs 
upon existing residents that would not be shared Town-wide.  East Massapequa (parts of which 
were also called ‘West Amityville’ prior to 1974), had the lowest median income in the entire 
Town of Oyster Bay, but residents paid a yearly school tax around the median for school districts 
in the area.103  HUD estimated that the project would add fifty children to the district at an 
additional cost of $75,000, a conservative estimate given their low-income status.  The Town 
promised $10,000 from rents paid by residents, and project opponents calculated HUD would 
only cover $8,700.  The rest would be covered by existing residents, all while the Town removed 
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taxable property that could provide $165,000 a year if privately developed.104  In light of the 
fiscal costs imposed on the hamlet and school district, the projected increase in segregation, and 
the isolation from jobs, residents basically wanted to know why East Massapequa was targeted.   
If the Town and HUD were both committed to providing affordable housing to increase 
integration and opportunity, as a Town-sponsored planning report claimed, why not place the 
project in the “restrictive and exclusionary zoning of the north shore of the Town of Oyster 
Bay”?  Why not nearer to the larger employment centers in the center of Oyster Bay, in 
Plainview, Hicksville, Bethpage, or Farmingdale, where public transportation could provide 
mobility and schools were overwhelmingly segregated?105  Placing public housing in the suburbs 
was no panacea to limited opportunity and segregation, as the housing debate in East 
Massapequa made clear, but it would nonetheless add a fiscal burden to local residents.   
A similar conflict occurred when Nassau County tried to build a public housing project in 
Uniondale to house the county’s homeless population. The County had long avoided public 
housing, but as the costs of welfare motels and private rentals strained the budget, and as 
recipients caused friction within affected neighborhoods, Nassau County opted for public 
housing.  In 1968, the County unveiled a massive hotel, sports arena, and office/retail complex 
for the former Mitchel Field air force base in Uniondale, once part of Long Island’s cradle of 
aviation.  The proposal included an eight building, 1,200-unit low and middle income housing 
project.  Norman Blankman, real estate developer from Sands Point on Long Island’s north 
shore, was the chief advocate of the housing proposal.  He argued that such housing was 
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necessary to stem both the motel crisis and subsidized rentals “starting to decay whole 
neighborhoods into eventual slums.”106  Blankman believed that the same process that created 
inner city ghettoes was at work in the suburbs, namely that racism and the dynamics of the 
housing market were producing concentrated poverty.  In a 1972 meeting with the Nassau 
County Board of Supervisors, he presented each board member a copy of the foundational study 
of ‘ghetto formation,’ Gilbert Osofsky’s Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto.  If housing was left to 
the market, concentrated slums of poor people in decrepit conditions would ensue.  Only planned 
housing that met needs on a county-wide basis could reverse this ghetto-formation.107   
This ‘County-wide’ solution actually concentrated the welfare population into Uniondale, 
a lower-middle class hamlet with a nine percent black population.  Blankman argued that the 
housing would prevent a ghetto; a black Uniondale resident responded that “slums are made; 
they don’t just occur, and the politicians are trying to make another Roosevelt in Uniondale.”108  
To Uniondale residents, the County was forcing them to sacrifice their neighborhood so that 
other hamlets would not become slums.  Residents opposed the project for similar reasons as 
East Massapequans, including race and class-based assumptions about property values, the 
perceived behavioral deficiencies of welfare recipients, but also the fiscal concerns of the 
Uniondale school district.  Residents voted down the school budget three years in a row in the 
late 1960s, and the school system operated with temporary classrooms to accommodate 
increasing enrollment.  The project would add over one hundred children to the district, and 
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residents were unconvinced that Mitchel Field’s commercial space would increase tax revenues 
by fifty percent as project advocates claimed.109   
Deliberations over the housing proposal continued into 1970, and the fight reached a 
fevered pitched when welfare activists staged a “move in,” inhabiting vacant military housing on 
former air force base property.  Sixteen families with twenty-seven children, all former residents 
of a welfare motel, squatted in the homes, growing vegetables, cooking, and organizing into a 
small-scale protest movement intent on securing adequate housing.110  The County did not 
remove the squatters, but Uniondale homeowners and the school district blocked the twenty-
seven students from enrolling during the 1970-1971 school year. Uniondale was heavily 
condemned for their actions, and a state judge ordered the school district to enroll the students 
shortly after the start of the school year.111  Newsday columnist Martin Buskin called 
Uniondale’s decision “one of the more sickening examples of the rotting civic conscience of 
suburbia… [a] selfish, narrow demonstration of local control.”112  Residents did not feel this was 
merely an issue of ‘local control,’ but a response to the costs the County was imposing upon 
them, so that other hamlets, especially wealthier communities, did not have to bear any of the 
costs associated with low-income residents.  They framed their fight in spatial terms, rallying 
around State Assemblyman and Uniondale resident Joseph Margiotta, who demanded that the 
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welfare families be placed “on the North Shore,” the former Gold Coast and still home to Long 
Island’s more affluent residents.  Hempstead Town Supervisor Francis Purcell put it in blunter 
terms:  “why doesn’t Blankman go over to Sands Point, where he lives, and the density is about 
1.1 persons per acre, and do this in his backyard?”113  The sentiment that the County was only 
creating a ‘welfare ghetto’ to the detriment of the poor and the Uniondale community was 
echoed repeatedly by residents, who believed scattering the poor across Long Island was a fairer 
solution to both Uniondale and the recipients.114  
 The uproar (and political connections of Uniondale politician Joe Margiotta) pushed 
incoming Republican County Executive Ralph Caso to remove any housing plans from Mitchel 
Field’s future in 1970.115  Blankman, along with the Suburban Action Institute and Long Island 
NAACP sued the County for denying racial minorities and low-income residents affordable 
housing in 1972.  Blankman demanded that “countywide interests…take precedence over those 
of communities.”116  District Court Judge Mark Constantino disagreed and sided with Uniondale 
residents.  He admitted racial sentiments were a factor in the opposition, but so too was the “the 
loss of revenue [public housing] causes and the increased burdens it places on the community's 
resources.”117  Constantino judged this burden unfair “considering the availability of land 
throughout Nassau County that could be used to construct multifamily housing.”118  In addition, 
Judge Constantino recognized that low-income housing in Uniondale would exacerbate 
segregation and not alleviate it.  Mitchel Field was zoned within integrated Uniondale school 
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district, and bordered the Village of Hempstead, the largest black village in Nassau County.119  
As both Uniondale residents and Judge Constantino made clear, ‘integration’ was more complex 
than a suburban location and county funds.  Balkanized and sensitive tax structures made such 
housing projects costly for school districts, and if the goal was to redistribute resources to the 
poor, Uniondale residents wondered why they were the ones sacrificing their tax bases when 
Long Island’s affluent, some of the wealthiest homeowners in the nation, were not sharing their 
school and local service resources.   
The question of who should give their ‘fair share’ was especially acute in Long Island’s 
most impoverished suburbs like Wyandanch.  The community already faced illegal tenancies, the 
highest concentration of welfare recipients in the county, deteriorating housing stock, and a 
majority of its student population were dependent on ADC. 120  Nonetheless, local taxpayers bore 
the costs of such change, paying the eleventh highest school property tax rate in Suffolk County 
(of seventy six total districts) in a hamlet with a poverty rate of ten percent.121  While black and 
white homeowners organized into civic associations and were active on the school board, these 
were ineffective tools, as chapter three illustrates. In contrast, low-income residents had new 
avenues to shape Wyandanch in their interests.  In 1970, over 100 residents and local clergy 
established the Wyandanch Task Force in 1970, who wanted to ease the hamlet’s housing and 
jobs crisis by “increasing industry, constructing low and moderate income housing, and 
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strengthening Negro owned businesses in Wyandanch.”122  The Task Force, “firmly committed 
to the concept of a separate black controlled community,” tied itself to the New York State 
Urban Development Corporation (UDC).123  Formed in 1968 and empowered with the legal 
ability to override local zoning ordinances across the state, the UDC, under the command of 
planner Edward Logue, had unprecedented powers to construct low and middle-income housing 
in the suburbs.  Logue believed the UDC capable of taking a ‘metropolitan’ approach to urban 
problems, executing “broad-gauged programs to deal with the urban crisis.”124  The UDC was to 
take a ‘fair share’ approach, where no single community or school district bore a 
disproportionate burden.  Wyandanch’s suburban location and grassroots support fit within these 
guidelines.125   
The UDC proposed a 182-unit garden apartment complex for a vacant lot near 
Wyandanch’s main thoroughfare, and while Reverend David Rooks, a central figure in the 
campaign for the project, celebrated the effort as Wyandanch’s poor “trying to pull ourselves up 
by our own bootstraps,” project opponents gathered 4,931 signatures against the apartments.126  
Reverend Rooks blamed “outside whites” who “come into Wyandanch to stymie the efforts 
Blacks were making,” but in reality black homeowners were central to the opposition.127  With 
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no guarantees from the Town or County that the existing dilapidated housing would be 
refurbished, homeowners feared the project would only attract more low-income residents, and 
as African American civic association member Bernice Bostic put it, “we’ve already have 
enough [welfare] recipients already.”128  Like residents in Uniondale and East Massapequa, 
homeowners in Wyandanch and the surrounding communities wondered why Wyandanch was 
targeted.  Black homeowner Ella Williams exclaimed that “we are being asked to support 
something when we are not able to.  We are not elite. We have to work hard for what we have 
now.”129  White homeowner Ann San Pedro of neighboring Deer Park likewise didn’t understand 
“why they took Wyandanch in the first place. It’s a poor, low-income community.”130 Resident 
opposition linked them to a broader state-wide protest centered in Westchester County against 
the UDC zoning override powers, also concerned over property taxes, community stability, and 
the overreaching power of state government.131   
In response to the protests on Long Island and Westchester County, the New York State 
Legislature stripped the UDC of its zoning override powers in 1973, and the Town of Babylon, 
the most local land-use governing body, rejected the Wyandanch project by a 3-2 vote in August 
of that same year.132  Reverend Rooks interpreted the decision along racial lines, citing ‘racial 
attitudes’ for its defeat, and UDC President Edward J. Logue remarked, “I know of no other 
instance where there has been such clearly demonstrated support for a development in a 
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community…it is sad that the will of that community was disregarded.”133  A reporter for the 
New York Amsterdam News decried the “death a miniature civil rights movement in 
Wyandanch,” further proof that white suburbanites “do not intend to allow Blacks, and other 
minorities to break out of the ghetto walls which the whites have built around them and spill over 
into neatly manicured lawns and tree-lined avenues which such whites have designated as 
belonging to them alone.”134  This binary black versus white narrative did not exist.  Black 
resident Bernice Bostic celebrated the Board’s decision, proclaiming “finally the taxpayers of 
Wyandanch have been heard.”135  Black homeowners like Bostic were either ignored or written 
off as white accomplices.  In another smaller battle over a HUD-sponsored project in New 
Cassel, black opponents of the project were accused of “thinking like whites” and being 
“Oreos…Black on the outside but white inside,” all to stop “black people from getting their share 
of housing.”136  But as Fred Meeks, one of those opponents remarked, it was unfair to be 
“expected that [we] accept what can be considered as the accommodating, or compromise type 
of measures with the pretense that these are in [our] best interest.”137 
That African Americans should enable other African Americans of lower income to 
reside in their communities to the detriment of school quality and taxes was a demand linked to 
the logic of white suburban affluence, that ‘fair share’ should be imposed on the ‘suburbs’ 
without taking into account the complex reality of racial segregation in the suburbs or the fiscal 
costs of such projects on communities whose collective incomes varied.  In Wyandanch and 
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Uniondale, homeowners were able to resist these housing demands, but East Massapequa’s 
project was eventually built, largely because as one local resident argued, “the town fathers do 
not fear the power of the East Massapequa vote” versus the electoral power of wealthier hamlets 
in Oyster Bay.138 Thus, the logic of “fair share” led to an unanticipated result: racially mixed and 
working class suburbs demanding that wealthy suburbs accept their own ‘fair share.’  HUD, the 
UDC, and County housing efforts tried to solve a real housing need by demanding suburbia 
redistribute their resources to the poor.  But with only a superficial understanding of the 
communities they targeted, advocates only offered added costs and little benefit to the 
communities affected.  Essentially, they were asking suburbanites to share their public resources 
without offering proposals to grow the local economy or increase the incomes of the new 
inhabitants so they could contribute to the hamlet’s tax base.  And since all of this was imposed 
upon suburbs within a balkanized tax structure and upon suburbanites already paying high taxes 
for services in a period of rising unemployment and inflation, residents opposed these attacks on 
their communities, incomes, property values, and public resources, namely schools.  Opponents 
deployed “fair share” logic, arguing that other affluent suburban hamlets could easily share their 
resources.  This was as much an outcome of the framing of ‘fair share’ itself as it was the 
‘backlash’ against housing policy, framed in binary and spatial terms.  Of course, though 
Wyandanch and Uniondale homeowners defeated the projects, the challenge of lowering taxes 
and poverty remained.  Just as housing advocates looked for new ways to promote spatial equity, 
project opponents would still “have to take upon themselves the unwelcome burden of coming 
up with something better.”139   
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In 1975, the UDC went bankrupt, and its mission re-oriented towards economic 
development projects. That same year, the NAACP dropped its suit against the Town of Oyster 
Bay and prioritized a ‘fair share’ lawsuit in New Jersey.140  Two years later, HUD’s focus on 
suburban integration was sidelined in favor of urban revitalization.141  Interpreted on its own 
terms, dispersing the poor and integrating the suburbs was a noble effort to break down an 
injustice inscribed into the very fabric of America’s urban and suburban neighborhoods.  And 
suburban determination to thwart integration, along with the politicians who chose to secure the 
suburban vote, defeated these efforts in the 1970s.  But the dispersal approach was flawed 
because it gave primacy to race and operated within the dualisms of suburb and city, white and 
black, affluent and poor.  None of these fit the realities of suburban Long Island.  The dispersal 
advocates assumed the suburbs offered jobs that could lift the poor out of unemployment and 
poverty.  They ignored job loss occurring in the suburbs, and more importantly the metropolitan 
shift from industry to services.  Though Long Island successfully transitioned to a service 
economy, the change benefitted skilled workers.  Unskilled workers, and by the 1970s, industrial 
laborers more broadly, faced a labor market of low wage jobs or joblessness.  Even the modest 
integration projects that sought to alleviate local suburban housing problems ignored the fiscal 
crisis tied to this rising inequality between suburbanites and between suburbs, as the property 
tax-based structure was overwhelmed by stagnating incomes, rising poverty, and growing service 
demands in fragmented local jurisdictions.  As Manuel Pastor argues, “suburbs were never 
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constructed to deal with such overwhelming poverty and economic challenges – they were meant 
to be symbols of success, not markers of distress.”142  The dualist approach ignored the labor 
market and thus undermined the moral demand that suburbs take their ‘fair share’ of poverty. 
Like the War on Poverty, the Kerner Commission’s diagnosis of America’s social ills, a 
reflection of academic research and the impetus for activism, was predicated on an assumption of 
suburban affluence.  The urban/suburban dualism framed the nation’s problems in spatial terms.  
It was about where jobs and prosperity went, not what undergirded postwar growth.  And racist 
housing practices were the obstacle to overcome, not joblessness and low-wages.  The challenges 
that Long Island’s working class population faced were disregarded in this formulation.  But 
cities and suburbs shared in regional economic trends, if unequally, and all experienced the 
national transformation from industrial to post-industrial services with its concomitant growth of 
inequality.  Both the urban and suburban poor needed remunerative employment, regardless of 
their metropolitan residence.   
																																																						







Though christened an ‘affluent’ suburb, Long Island’s economy resembled the rest of the 
nation in the 1970s, a decade plagued with three recessions where the average American ended 
up poorer than they began.1  Productivity outpaced wages by two-thirds, real wages declined for 
the poorest third of families, and the proportion of Long Islanders living near poverty grew by a 
fifth despite falling national and elderly poverty rates during the decade.2  Though Nassau was 
the fastest growing county in the 1950s, and Suffolk the fastest in the 1960s, from 1970-1980, 
Long Island recorded the smallest population increase in census history (one percent), and for the 
first time, Nassau County’s population actually dropped (eight percent).3  It was the end of an 
era.  A local union official admitted in 1978, “I was a lot like other people who felt because of 
our growth through the ‘50s that Long Island would always prosper and grow, but our economic 
expansion has come to a halt. Considering our present unemployment figures and high costs, I 
have very little optimism for the immediate future of Long Island.”4   
The bleak figures illustrate the unravelling of the ‘Great Compression’ that Long Island 
embodied in the two decades after World War II.  Before the war, Long Island was dependent on 
the service needs of New York City’s middle class and industrial elite.  The region offered 
mainly low-wage and precarious employment to its working class population, who were housed 
in sub-standard dwellings.  The war introduced military contracts that transformed the region’s 
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small aviation manufacturers into massive employers and turned Long Island into a haven for the 
working class.  Military spending continued during the Cold War, and along with federal housing 
subsidies, made mass suburbanization possible.  Defense contracts not only provided jobs, but 
raised wages in competing sectors, not to mention the multiplier effects that reverberated through 
the private economy.  Federal defense outlays nevertheless served military ends, not unskilled 
workers.  Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, contracts favored skilled technicians and 
engineers, and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s budget changes in the 1960s further 
limited the employment benefits of defense spending on Long Island.  As a result, highly trained 
and educated residents enjoyed robust job opportunities while the unskilled faced declining 
prospects.  By the 1970s, Long Island’s working class relied on low-wage jobs in services or 
footloose factories.  The consequences were felt among families and the communities where they 
lived. 
Predictably, African Americans’ fortunes on Long Island were tied to the same 
developments.  Southern migrants of the Great Migration struggled in the precarious labor 
market of the Roaring Twenties and Depression.  Wartime contracts, which included fair 
employment provisions, and tight employment conditions benefitted black workers, who briefly 
entered the industrial working class.  But in the fifteen years following the war, minority hiring 
commitments and federal enforcement were weak, and the Long Island’s aircraft manufacturers 
did not hire black workers in large numbers.  Few unskilled black Long Islanders could use the 
region’s defense manufacturers for upward mobility.  Left to the region’s private economy, 
African Americans were the first to be exposed to the labor market twist occurring on Long 
Island and nation-wide.  While activists dismantled the racial barriers in defense by the 1960s, 




degrees and impressive resumes used defense or the region’s budding service sector to climb into 
the middle class, and they narrowed Long Island’s racial income disparity.5  But an equally large 
cohort of African Americans had insufficient educational credentials and less skilled 
backgrounds, and they were disproportionately on the losing side of the employment divide.  In 
the postwar period, race declined in significance, while skills became more important.  This was 
a consequence of policy, including federal policy affecting manufacturing.  And out of this, the 
median black/white wage gap closed while intra-race inequality increased between the black 
haves and the black have-nots. 
If the significance of race declined in the labor market, it still mattered in housing.  
Discriminatory policy and prejudicial practice produced racially disparate suburbs, with fewer 
choices for black than white homebuyers.  This did not mean racially unequal suburbs were 
inevitable however, particularly in the short-term. When a rising black middle class inhabited 
black suburbia, neighborhoods thrived in spite of segregation.  Limited supply inflated housing 
prices and the discriminatory mortgage market pushed black homebuyers to accept inferior 
loans, but progress was possible.  As poor enclaves were demolished and low-income housing 
opportunity narrowed, segregation provided a wedge to house the poor in middle class hamlets, 
making ‘black’ suburbia distinct from ‘white’ beyond the skin color of residents, including 
socioeconomic makeup, school quality, and community tensions.  And as intra-race inequality 
rose in the 1970s, segregation’s negative consequences intensified. While Long Island 
experienced little overall population growth, its black population expanded by a third.  New 
middle-class migrants closed the racial income gap further, while segregation forced them into 
the same communities established three decades prior.  With them arrived a new cohort of the 
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poor, and they concentrated in the same neighborhoods, in Roosevelt, New Cassel, Freeport and 
Hempstead in Nassau County, or Central Islip, Mastic-Shirley, and Bay Shore in Suffolk.6  And 
both middle-class and poor moved next to downwardly mobile black families in the 1970s, 
“those losing their jobs and those not being able to find ones.” These were the neighbors who 
“replaced the once stable homeowners” as North Amityville resident Lenny Canton recalled.7   
These conditions, in the context of Long Island’s fragmented local jurisdictions, 
produced a ‘suburban crisis’ in Long Island’s largest black suburbs by the 1980s.  Though black 
hamlets never lost their ‘middle-class’ buffer, ‘role model’ neighbors couldn’t prevent fiscally-
starved school districts or desperate individuals from entering the underground economy.8  Local 
property taxes no longer adequately funded school districts, limiting educational quality across 
black suburbia.  While Roosevelt’s district was desegregated in 1964, housing segregation and 
the county’s second highest poverty rate turned Roosevelt’s schools 99.7 percent minority with 
the highest proportion of costs devoted to non-operational and special education needs by the 
1990s.  Only four of 130 graduates obtained a New York State Regent’s diploma in 1990.  The 
state put the district under close supervision, and in 2002, the legislature passed a law permitting 
state takeover of the district, the first and so far only instance where Albany took direct control 
over a local school.9  Drugs and crime likewise stalked these hamlets.  The heroin trade reached 
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Long Island in the early 1970s, and by the 1980s local police and homeowners were fighting 
open-air drug markets.10  Roosevelt had Nassau Road, Wyandanch’s dealers peddled their wares 
on the corner of Straight Path and Booker Avenue, New Cassel’s market operated along Prospect 
Avenue, and a strip mall at the corner of Albany Avenue and Great Neck Road in North 
Amityville was regionally known as “the corner.”  These enclaves, abutting single-family homes 
and neighborhood shopping centers, became the distribution centers for the drug needs of two 
million suburbanites.11  
By the 1980s, these communities experienced the cumulative effects of housing 
segregation’s long-term costs: decreased property values, inferior schools, and concentrated 
poverty.  The hardship originated in the simple reality that despite suburban residence, the black 
poor and working class did not find greater job prospects or opportunity for upward mobility.  
The suburbs were not the land of opportunity scholars, activists, and the public purported them to 
be.  The dominant view of metropolitan problems and that of the black poor, the urban/suburban 
divide and the assumption of affluence, could not solve the problems of black suburbanites.  
Anti-poverty warriors and housing integrationists of the 1960s and early 1970s both believed 
suburbia’s prosperity would absorb the poor and viewed housing segregation as the great 
obstacle to racial equality.  As this dissertation contends, the benefits of the suburban job market 
and housing integration were dubious without confronting the labor market that crossed 
municipal boundaries or the federal abandonment of full employment policy.  Housing 
integration would surely expand spatial mobility to those already able to live in suburbia; solving 
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black poverty and unemployment, whose effect reverberated through communities, was a 
question of jobs. 
Historians continue to present the postwar suburb as an exclusive affluent ‘space’ and the 
urban/suburban divide, the metropolitan and spatial redistribution of jobs, people, and tax 
dollars, as the critical factor in urban decay and broader inequality after World War II.12 
Segregation was the major barrier, a ‘New American Dilemma,’ distinct from explicit Jim Crow 
laws because segregation was supported by “structures…imbedded in the built environment” 
according to Matthew Lassiter.13  And therefore the failure to integrate housing and open the 
suburbs to the poor during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the pivotal years when integration 
reached the national agenda, was a ‘lost goal’ to combat inequality in the twentieth century.  
Charles Lamb contends that “no point in American history was as vital” as the years following 
the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.14  The failure of integration, from the White House 
down to local activists, closed the door on racial equality for the century, with dire consequences.  
This interpretation falls into the same narrow understanding of metropolitan problems as activists 
of the time, which obscures the North Amityvilles, Wyandanches, Roosevelts, and New Cassels, 
whose challenges had more in common with urban neighborhoods than their suburban location 
might suggest.  There is limited analytical utility to viewing postwar problems in terms of 
housing segregation, which favors the economy’s spatial transformations over its broader 
temporal and structural changes, and uses racial disparities as the “the default frame for 
characterizing inequality.”15  This is especially true for the black suburban poor, because even if 
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suburbia was thriving or weathering recessions, they did not necessarily benefit despite their 
physical proximity.   
This points to a different ‘lost goal’ from the 1960s and early 1970s, apparent in Long 
Island’s history when defense workers demanded peacetime spending, when War on Poverty 
activists called for jobs with living wages, when civil rights organizations urged fair hiring, or 
when a county executive proposed a right to a job.  All of this was inflected through Long 
Island’s particular job landscape, with over a hundred-thousand state-subsidized positions in 
aerospace.  But they were nonetheless microcosms of national debates, including those over 
deindustrialization, automation, the widening chasm between highly paid service jobs versus 
low-wage fleeting jobs, racial disparities in employment, and anti-poverty policy.  Most 
importantly, these were suburbanites who viewed these as suburban issues.  Urban historians 
would benefit from incorporating these suburban concerns and the suburban economy into their 
studies, integrating the suburbs into the broader transition from the ‘Age of Compression’ to the 
‘Age of Inequality’ in a unified way the urban/suburban framework cannot.16  
Now that most of the nation’s poor live in the suburbs as of the 2010 census, this history 
is more relevant than ever.17  Contemporary policy proscriptions, including renewed calls for 
urban-suburban regional governments, dispersed public housing, reformed welfare policies that 
consider specifically ‘suburban’ problems, and inner-city development programs to implement in 
suburbs, while laudable, are still premised in spatial terms.18  As David Imbroscio argues, with 
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fewer ‘good’ suburbs available, the benefits of greater spatial mobility are less clear than they 
were fifty years ago.19  State support for jobs, including public jobs, is an alternative that does 
not require moving people to the current ‘right place’ in an ever-changing economy.  It creates a 
stronger job market, as it did decades ago on Long Island. The suburb’s postwar history 
illustrates that broad upward mobility was built on mass job opportunity, including publicly-
subsidized employment.  Of course, this was war spending, a controversial budget necessitated 
by the unique circumstances of the Cold War.  Nevertheless, defense spending was also infused 
by the nation’s commitment to full employment. It is not so much a question of finding a 
substitute for defense jobs as rediscovering this responsibility, one that infused the nation’s ‘Age 
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